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VAbstract
There are few more crucial episodes in economic history than the industrialisation 
of some regions of Europe during the first half of the nineteenth century. This thesis 
attempts to make a contribution to the history of early industrialisation by rigorously 
analysing the transition process through which a proto-industrial region hopes to move from 
a condition of slow industry growth rates to one of self-sustained industry growth. I hope 
to accomplish this task by drawing liberally on the stock of existing economic theory and 
then proceeding to weave them into an explanation of industry growth in Catalonia from 
1830 to 1861.
First, the familiar neo-classical equation for decomposing growth rates is used to 
estimate the contribution of factor accumulation and productivity improvement to modem 
industry growth rates. This leads to results that are significantly different from those 
advanced by the literature on Catalan industrialisation. The discussion underlines the 
importance of disembodied innovation, rather than the previous accumulation of capital, the 
transference of foreign technologies or the elastic supply of labour.
Second, I offer evidence that this increase in total factor productivity was the 
consequence of the development of new business institutions. In particular, the transition 
from the decentralised forms of production to more efficient factories. The thesis also 
supports the hypothesis that factor endowments and the level of human capital associated 
with scale economies explains the localization of factories in Catalonia.
Finally, two points of broad relevance should be noted. One is that the conventional 
wisdom that factor accumulation is crucial in early industrialisation needs to be reconsidered. 
The other point is that it seems necessary to recognize that factor endowments, local 
knowledge and market forces, specially those connected with the development of new 
institutions and new products, were far more important than standard texts of European 
economic history tended to allow.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Overview
1.1. Some Words on the Purpose and Limits of this Dissertation.
This dissertation is not a general survey of the early industrialisation of Catalonia 
between the establishment of the Bonaplata factory in 1832 and the 'Cotton Famine' in the 
1860s. It is not intended as such and should not be read as an introduction to the subject. 
There are several excellent textbooks covering the period and a dominant paradigm among 
Catalan historians.1 It is obvious that disagreements among scholars persist and new 
revisionist positions recently appeared. Therefore, I believe that the writing of a new textbook 
should be postponed until these revisionist theories affect the actual paradigm.
My purpose in this work is to answer one question which is central to European 
economic history using Catalonia as example. How did industry grow in the early 
industrialising regions? I do not provide an overall picture of all aspects of the economy 
during early industrialisation in Catalonia. The dissertation puts more emphasis on the 
mutations in industry than on the transformations in agriculture, services or demography. 
Similarly, the rhetoric of the text is on the side of economics not on the side of sociology or 
politics. Neither political events, nor social changes, nor cultural transformations are explicitly 
discussed because the purpose of this investigation is not to produce a piece o f Histoire Total. 
Certainly, there are many other interesting research topics on the economic history of early 
industrialisation in Catalonia: the development of agriculture, the rise of the commercial
1 See, for example, Maluquer (1998).
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economy, the integration of Catalonia into the world economy, the role of banks, the rise o f  
the industrial bourgeoisie, the demographic transition, and so on. However, in my view, w h a t  
is most striking about this region is that in the Southern Europe periphery it was the first a n d  
the most important industrial region during a great part of the nineteenth century.2 But w h y ?  
An obvious explanation is difficult to find because Catalonia did not enjoy deposits of c o a l  
or other minerals, a central position in the maritime routes or a large and rich home m arket.
Answering questions concerning causation in economic history is always controversial. 
It is not possible to prove anything beyond reasonable doubt. One can begin by form ulating 
a series o f hypotheses which can be based on some economic theory or historical intuitions. 
These hypotheses can then be tested using mathematical (econometric) methods. In order t o  
do so, we must accept some a priori assumptions which can yield a testable hypothesis. I t i s  
obvious that some assumptions are themselves absurd and can lead directly to an answer. N o te  
that it is even harder to discriminate between plausible and non-plausible assumptions w h e n  
one refers to economic history. Moreover, rigorous statistical tests are difficult to perform o n  
historical data. In some cases the data is not consistent, in other cases the data that we n e e d  
does not exist or it was collected in such way that it can not be employed for our purposes. 
None the less, deficient as this methodology is, it is the best available.
The dissertation covers the period from 1830 to 1861, with the main focus on th e  
1840s and 1850s. Perhaps, for those familiar with Catalan economic history, the justification 
of this chronology would be superfluous. But the author thinks that it would be convenient 
to say something. The period was chosen because an acceleration in Catalan industrial o u tp u t 
took place in the 1830s. This acceleration was accompanied by some important changes in  
industrial organisation that were consolidated in the two subsequent decades. However, th e re  
was not a simple ‘spurt’ or ’take-off, but a long period of gradual preparation, that w a s  
translated into sustained growth in manufacturing output throughout the 1840s. Note that th is  
acceleration was strongly influenced by the changes in the cotton industry since that industry 
had the lion’s share of Catalan manufacturing output.
2 Pollard (1981).
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This chronology for early industrialisation has received general support by leading 
Catalan historians, such as Jaume Vicens Vives, Miquel Izard, Jordi Nadal, Jordi Maluquer 
de Motes and Albert Carreras. Who describe the 'revolutionary' character of the period from 
1830 to 1861.3 In that scheme, the period that began in the 1830s was an abrupt transition to 
modem industry. With a substantial increase in industrial output being achieved over a fairly 
short period of time, roughly thirty years.
Alternative chronologies are not unwarranted. PietTe Vilar emphasises that industrial 
change originated in the eighteenth century, when new 'modes of production' appeared, and 
not during the mechanisation period. He, together with others, asserts that the accumulation 
of capital, which from this point of view is the key for defining the historical relation between 
manufacture and industry, took place during the eighteenth century. Vilar points out that the 
period from 1830 to 1860 was more a 'recovery' than a 'revolution'. He argues that the 
movement towards mechanisation, which had begun in the early years of the nineteenth 
century, was interrupted by the political disturbances of the revolutionary and Napoleonic 
periods.4 5
The more recent view is that, despite the spectacular changes of the period 1830-1860, 
Catalan industrialisation began before 1830. Alex Sánchez and James K.J. Thomson are the 
two leading proponents of this view.3 They acknowledge that the performance after 1830 was 
important, but also stress that the modem industry has its roots in the developments of the 
second half o f the eighteenth century and the first thirty years of the nineteenth century. The 
origin of modem industry was the development of calico printing in Barcelona between the 
1730s and the 1760s. In a following period, situated at the end of the eighteenth century, the 
Catalan cotton industry expanded the production to cotton yam and cloth. According to Alex 
Sánchez, this process of expansion culminated with the mechanisation, without steam-engines,
3 Vicens Vives and Llonens (1984), Izard (1969), Naial (1975), Maluquer (1985X1998), and 
Cañeras (1990a).
4 Vilar (1962).
5 Sánchez (1989) and Thomson (1992).
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of cotton spinning from 1815 to 1839.6
Two points should be made before continuing. First, the extent of change in the second  
third of the nineteenth century must be kept within the perspective of the im pressive 
metamorphosis of the twentieth century. Questions analysed in isolation invariably assume an  
exaggerated importance. Which is why it is necessary to set them in context and consider 
their general interrelationships. Second, the second third of the nineteenth century in C atalonia 
is of considerable interest per se. Indeed, it repays close study. It is the period of transition 
from the relative stability of the traditional economy to a new industrialising economy. T h e  
period when the essential characteristics and direction of transformations were worked ou t. 
The second third of the nineteenth century in Catalonia can be identified as the period of early  
industrialisation in Catalonia.
The choice of Catalonia as a focal point is justified by the fact that, during this period, 
the development of modem Spain’s industry was largely confined to this region. As is w ell 
known, during the nineteenth century, Catalonia grew to dominate the Spanish production o f  
textiles. Eclipsing the older textile centres of Galicia and western Castilia. Moreover, the 
spatial concentration of the textile industry within the Catalan borders took only thirty years, 
from approximately 1830 to 1860. Catalonia not only kept its place as the first textile region 
in Spain but grew to dominate the entire Spanish industrial sector during the nineteenth 
century. In 1856, it was the dominant Spanish region in textiles, paper and miscellaneous 
industries. In 1900, it was dominant in textiles, glass, leather, chemistry, metallurgy, paper, 
and wood. It was second in wine and alimentary and third in wheat, flour and olive oil 
refining.7 It should be emphasised that in Spain there were no other regions at the Catalan 
level until the last decades of the nineteenth century. Various 'old' industries survived in other 
regions of Spain but none showed the modernisation features that characterised Catalan 
development. For this reason Spain's industrialisation during the nineteenth century is best 
examined region by region rather than from a national point of view. Furthermore, the
6 Sanchez (1989).
7 Nad al (1985).
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national view fails to pick up on the regional dynamism that was unique to the period and 
revolutionary in its impact. In this sense, William N. Parker and Sydney Pollard have 
emphasised that industrialisation has a regional scope.* 9 In considering the basic unit of 
analysis it is important, too, to consider the importance of European dynamics. One cannot 
comprehend the functioning of different regions without addressing the role of each one 
within Europe.
1.2. Catalonia in the European debate
Many readers probably agree with me that the two major influential and long lasting 
scholar visions of early industrialisation in the Western World are due to Walt W. Rostow and 
Alexander Gerschenkron.9 However, recently it seems that a new paradigm is emerging based 
on a revisionist view of the amplitude and significance of the process o f industrialisation in 
Great Britain. And the spread o f industrialisation through Europe and the United States. This 
new paradigm is less unified and his based on the works of Rondo Cameron, Pat O'Brien, and 
Nicholas F.R. Crafts.10
Rostow developed his original formulation in the mid 1950s and must be interpreted 
within this historical context. The sub-title of his path-breaking work -A non-Communist 
Manifesto- can only be understood in the context of the 'Cold War'. Basically, Rostow 
sketched a description of the process of industrialisation assuming that his 'ideal* British 
model was necessarily followed by many countries in their industrialisation processes, 
ignoring the period when their industrialisation began and their geographical position. His 
vision was, one could argue for ideological reasons, optimistic about the diffusion of 
industrialisation.
1 Pollard (1981) and Parker (1984).
9 Rostow (1956)0960) and Gerschenkron (1962).
10 Cameron (1985), O'Brien (1986) and Crafts (1984)(1985a).
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Rostow envisaged five periods, stages in his terminology, in the process of grow th.11 
In this sense, his formulation was not very original since it did not differ from the ideas o f  
the German historical school and from the Marx-Engels formulation of the process o f  
historical development. In the words of William Parker "the stages have oddly m em orable 
names".12 They were called (in chronological order): traditional society, preconditions of ta k e ­
off, take-off, drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption. Each stage had a fe w  
general characteristics, and was necessary for the process of growth.
The stage called ’take-off is undoubtably the most controversial and debated b y  
economic historians. In the spirit of Rostow's thesis, the 'take-off was a (short) phase o f  
growth caused by a vast increase in industrial investment, a large movement o f labour tow ards 
industry, and a substantial increase in productivity. Along with a rise in real income p e r  
capita. He also asserted that the growth rate of gross domestic product might be above fo u r  
percent per year. It is certainly obvious why, rapidly, this term became synonymous with th e  
other famous/infamous term 'Industrial Revolution*. Therefore, in the 1960s, hordes o f  
quantitative historians began empirical tests, hunting for the ’take-off in their respective 
nations.13 Unfortunately for Rostow the historical evidence have provided very little support 
for his hypothesis. In other words, there was practically no evidence of a sudden and massive 
discontinuity in national economic performance for any European industrialised nations. E ven 
in the British case, the evidence for a sudden 'take-off was less than convincing.14
The thesis of Alexander Gerschenkron is also very influential and, in some respects, 
has stood up quite well (of course, better than Rostow’s hypothesis) to criticisms and  
empirical tests.15 Gerschenkron claims that the spurt of industrialisation was related to capital. 
Modem industry, for him, originated in the transformation of commercial-agricultural capital
11 Rostow (1960).
12 Parker (1984).
13 A review of the research on Rostow’s hypothesis is available in Kindlebeiger and Di Telia 
(eds)(1982).
14 Crafts (1981)(1985a).
15 See a review of Gerschenkron’s thesis in Sylla and Toniolo (eds)(1991).
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into industrial capital or, in other words, the conversion of working capital into physical 
(fixed) capital. Gerschenkron’s view is that the state of relative backwardness, and absence 
of prerequisites, had fundamental implications for the course and nature of the development 
process itself but did not necessarily prevent economic growth. Relative backwardness is very 
important because the requirements of capital increase with the passing of time. The main 
reason is that the 'standard of technology’ became more complicated and, consequently, more 
expensive during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. At this point, he argues for the 
substitution of prerequisites as the main ’engine of growth' in the backward countries. Because 
when a country does not have enough factors of production it can replace them with 
institutions such as Banks or the State’s intervention in industrial investment. This seems to 
be the most powerful part of Gerschenkron’s thesis because it describes economic growth as 
a goal with alternative routes.
Concretely, Gerschenkron envisaged a staggered sequence of national industrial 
revolutions in Europe. He distinguished three types of countries depending on the chronology 
of their industrialisation: (1) The first comers where the capital flows directly into industry 
(e.g., Britain), (2) the relatively backward countries where the capital flows from banks to 
industry (e.g., Germany), (3) the most backward countries where the State played a direct role 
in the spurt of industrialisation (e.g., Russia). To reiterate, according to this line of reasoning, 
the main cause for this change of 'engine of growth' was that capital equipments increased 
with the delay in industrialisation. Gerschenkron argues that in conditions of relative 
backwardness the role of banks is crucial. When there was a high degree of economic 
backwardness banking was too limited and feeble to play a role in meeting the capital 
requirements of the industrial firms.
On a less optimistic note, Gerschenkron's thesis has important problems. The main 
problem is that he considers nations as the basic unit of analysis. Industrialisation was a 
period of great disparity in regional rates of change and economic fortunes. Expanding 
industrialising regions were matched by regions with declining industry, and chronic 
underutilisation of capital.16 Another major problem is his definition of 'standard technology'.
16 Pollard (1981), Parker (1984), Hudson (1989).
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Gerschenkron relates each historical period to one 'standard technology’ that has particu la r 
capital requirements. Moreover, he adds that this technology is the most modem during th e  
period. According to Gerschenkron, the development of backward countries is always re la ted  
to the adoption of the latest technology, which also implies increasing capital requirem ents. 
Technology has changed during the past century, becoming more and more complicated, and* 
sometimes, more expensive. However, it is really very difficult to consider for each p e rio d  
one 'standard technology’. Several examples can be given, in England during the first p h ase s  
of the Industrial Revolution, the most advanced technologies were in the cotton and iro n  
industries. However, the capital requirements of these industries were very different. 
Moreover, in the same England several 'old' technologies survived, which were perfectly  
efficient, with lower fixed capital requirements.17 The same could be argued for Germany, th e  
classical backward country according to Gerschenkron. In Germany during the spurt o f  
industrialisation different industries with very different capital requirements survived a n d  
flourished.18 Consequently, what was standard technology in every period? What was th e  
associated capital requirement? It is very easy to argue that every industry has a standard  
technology, but it is very difficult to argue this for every country and historical period.
The works of Rostow and Gerschenkron and the idea of universalities is n o w  
discredited. Nowadays, very few economics historians agree with the argument that European 
industrialisation merely consisted of the reiteration and diffusion of the British model in o th e r  
countries. O r that every country followed a path according to its relative backwardness. In th e  
words of Nicholas Crafts 'nineteenth century European economic development is increasingly 
coming to be regarded as hard to describe in terms of generally recognizable patterns’.19
Today, the recent works of Rondo Cameron, Pat O'Brien and Nicholas F. Crafts appear 
to be, in many senses, more influential. In 1985, Rondo Cameron rejected the whole idea o f  
an 'industrial revolution', the existence of an universal model of industrialisation based on
17 See, for example, Mokyr (1994) and VonTunzelmann (1994).
18 Feldenkirchen (1991).
19 Crafts (1984), p. 438.
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coal, cotton and iron that was imitated by the rest of the industrialisers. Cameron sees the 
emergence of industrialisation in many parts of Europe as the result o f two factors: the 
existence of coal deposits and the availability of human capital.20 On the other hand, Crafts 
found the Rostovian models not particularly illuminating but found that some parts of the 
Gerschenkron story are redeemable. He pointed out that the story of the followers would be 
better explained if one considers that: (1) coal was a decisive factor; (2) it is possible to 
achieve high income levels on the basis of exploiting a different comparative advantage; (3) 
economic policies appears to have little influence on the development of latecomers; (4) these 
countries appear to be unable to establish a comparative advantage in manufacturing goods.21
More recently, the debate has moved towards the concepts of 'globalisation' and 
'convergence'. Economic historians have rapidly introduced into the debate many of the new 
instruments of Growth Theory and some new issues have displaced the preoccupation with 
industry. In the new accounts, human capital, migration, and trade have substituted 
technological transference as the main factors in European history.22 Although, it is hard to 
explain the first half of the nineteenth century in the context of these new arguments. 
Basically, because the high cost of transport, especially in the periphery, made the impact of 
these 'globalisation' forces much less evident. Moreover, there are some pre-conditions for 
convergence which have not been studied.
The historiography of Spanish economic development is obsessed with the concepts 
backwardness and failure. Note that, in the last decades, the Spanish economy, Spanish 
society, and the debate on economic history in Spain have all converged towards the centre. 
Although a gap still divides Spain for the most advanced countries. Only thirty years ago, the 
debate in Spain was shaped by the political debate on the failure of the bourgeois revolution 
in Spain. Then, the pioneering work of Nicolás Sánchez-Albomoz represented the first break 
in the orthodox Marxist interpretation of the economic development of Spain and the first
20 Cameron (1985).
21 Crafts (1984).
22 See Williamson (1996), O'Rourke and Williamson (1997), Williamson and Hatton (1998).
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attempt to introduce Spain into the debates on economic history. Sánchez-Albomoz sees the 
Spanish economy of the nineteenth century as a dual economy with many similarities with 
today's underdeveloped countries.23 Later research has discredited this view although one 
cannot denied its innovative character when it was published.
A few years later two economic historians introduced Spain into the core of the 
European debate. Jordi Nadal in his classic book El fracaso de la revolución industrial en 
España introduced the work of W. Hoffmann, W.W. Rostow and D. Landes.24 25Gabriel Tortella 
spread the thesis of A. Gerschenkron, and the tests of R. Cameron on the arguments of the 
Austrian-Russian economist.23 According to Nadal, the case of Spain was the experience o f  
an unsuccessful attempt to consolidate a process of industrialisation based on the adoption o f  
the British model. He found evidence of the take-off and argues that Spain failed to  
consolidate its industry during the nineteenth century. This failure was a consequence of the 
weakness of the home demand for manufacturing goods. Therefore, it was a weak agriculture 
sector that impeded the industrialisation of Spain. Foreign trade, government policy and the 
land reforms had also a negative impact on Spanish industrialisation record.26 On the other 
hand, Gabriel Tortella has stated that the lack of entrepreneurship and the limited role of the 
Spanish State enabled the banks to play a leading role in industrialisation.27 However, the 
consolidation of the modem sectors, the railways, the banking system and industry was not 
absolutely successful during the nineteenth century.
In the 1990s Nadal and Tortella have refined their arguments. More recent versions 
of Nadal's work give pride of place to the traditional industries instead to the 'leader' 
industries, cotton and iron. But he has not modified his original formulation: Spanish 
backwardness has its roots in the poor agriculture. On the other hand, Tortella spoke of a
23 Sánchez-Albomoz (1968b).
24 Nadal (1974), Rostow (1956)(1960), Hoffmann (1955), Landes (1969).
25 Tortella (1972a)( 1972b), Gerschenkron (1962), Cameron (1967), Cameron, ed. (1972).
26 Nadal (1974).
27 Tortella (I972a)(1972b), p. 129
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'Latin pattern of economic modernisation', by which he mean that countries in the 
Mediterranean basin have some common characteristics. He argues that in the nineteenth 
century Latin economies were in a vicious circle where physical and institutional factors 
retarded economic growth and development.28
Recently, three cliometric historians have changed the view on Spanish 
industrialisation. Albert Carreras quantitatively extended the works of Jordi Nadal. He was 
the first to develop an index of industrial production for Spain and to compare the Spanish 
pattern with other European patterns of industrialisation. His pathbreaking research resulted 
in two major conclusions: Spanish industry began to grow in the nineteenth century, and was 
characterised by slow growth rates.29 Pedro Fraile severely criticises the 'demand' and 
'exogenous* argument. In two influential works, he demonstrated that supply (industry) 
explanations for the Spanish backwardness cannot be rejected a priori. With his argument that 
Spanish industry failed to compete in foreign markets and that industrialists had rent-seeking 
attitudes, he directly confronted Nadal's interpretation of recent Spanish economic history.30 
Finally, Leandro Prados introduced Spain to the debates on convergence. He demonstrated 
that neither the European norm, nor the Third World norm, nor the Italian norm have been 
followed by Spain in the process of convergence. In other words, Spain was different.31
What can an analysis of Catalan early industrialisation contribute to the European 
economic history and to the Spanish debate? In terms of the European debate, this thesis 
serves to situate the experience of Mediterranean industrialisation in a broader context. Until 
now, quantitative studies of early industrialisation outside the core countries were very scarce. 
Consequently, there is little quantitative knowledge of the process industrialisation in the 
Southern Europe industrialising regions. In terms of the Spanish debate, it is clear that this 
thesis returns to one of the main topics: Why and how did Catalonia become the major
28 Toitella (1994a).
29 Carreras (1990b)(l 997).
30 Fraile (1985X1991).
31 Molinas and Prados (1989). Prados (1988)(1997).
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industrial region in Spain? Answering this question can also help us understand the forces that 
hampered the process of industrialisation in other Spanish regions. Note also that this thesis 
concentrates on a supply-based explanation for the process of industrialisation.
1.3. Plan of the Thesis and Overview
This dissertation can be inserted within the mainstream of cliometric history. It should 
be noted, however, that the point of view is more heterodox than orthodox since not only th e  
neo-classical perspective but also some of new economic theories are employed in th e  
historical analysis. Specifically, in the second part of the dissertation, readers will find th a t 
some events are interpreted in the light of new growth theory, evolutionary economics, an d  
new institutional economics. In any case, this dissertation makes use of, implicitly a n d  
explicitly, quantification and economic theory. But the objective is not to test econom ic 
models without making any reference to economic history. Quite the contrary, econom ic 
models are used as instruments in the narrative.
The strategy followed in this dissertation is simple. In the first part, a list of possible 
explanations of Catalan industrialisation are given, based on neo-classical economic theory . 
Once that list is complete, an attempt will be made to examine each of these hypotheses 
critically. What is important is that the final list does not have to be reduced to one s in g le  
cause. The methodology employed serves to discriminate and to establish priorities. In o th e r  
words, which factor was more important and decisive, but this does not mean that any fa c to r  
was unimportant by itself. Once that analysis is complete, the second part of the dissertation 
is devoted to profoundly analysing that main factor.
Part one of the thesis is concerned with the explanation Catalan manufacturing grow th  
from 1830 to 1861. This part shows that the key factor for manufacturing growth was th e  
rapid improvement in total factor productivity. Chapter two investigates if an acceleration in  
manufacturing growth rates took place in the period from 1830 to 1861. It also explores h o w  
important the contribution of the development of Catalan manufacturing was to overall 
(Catalan and Spanish) growth rates. Chapter three analyses the contribution of cap ita l
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accumulation to industry growth. Chapter four seeks to explain the changes affecting the 
labour market in manufacturing and the contribution of labourforce to the growth of industry 
output. This part is concluded by chapter five which discusses the neo-classical production 
function. The objective of chapter five is to determine the importance of productivity 
improvement and the accumulation of factors of production for the growth of Catalan 
manufacturing.
Part two is mainly concerned with the cotton industry although references are made 
to other sectors, especially in chapter seven. This part provides a detailed evaluation of the 
causes of the productivity performance of that industry. Unquestionably the most important 
Catalan industry and, in several ways, the leading industry in Catalan industrialisation. It 
should also be highlighted that to be convincing, any explanation of productivity performance 
must be able to stand up to scrutiny at a finer level of disaggregation. Chapter six analyses 
the contribution of human capital to output growth in the cotton industry. In order to do so, 
the chapter investigates how large the accumulation was of human capital prior to the 
emergence of the factory system, and what the role of human capital was during this process. 
Therefore, the goal of the chapter is to investigate the level and growth rate effects of human 
capital. Chapter seven seeks to explain the influence of the emergence of the factory system 
on the record of productivity and the causes behind the enlargement of firm size in Catalonia. 
Chapter eight analyses the main improvements in the organization of firms in the cotton 
industry after the emergence of the factory system; the development and diffusion of vertically 
integrated enterprises. Finally, chapter nine puts the Catalan cotton industry into the 
international context by comparing the Catalan industry with the largest cotton industries in 
the world. Which at that time were located in Lancashire and New England. In the first part 
of the chapter I address the relations between quality-mix, factor endowments and the 
technical choices of the cotton industry. The second part is devoted to analysing the 
competitiveness of the Catalan cotton industry in international markets.
Rigorous tests require numbers and theoretically sound and consistent reasoning. Much 
of this thesis is devoted to discussions of economic theory and quantitative analysis. Because 
of the obvious limitations of cliometric history, however, semi-quantitative and qualitative
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evidence is indispensable to this study. Therefore, qualitative and quantitative evidence have 
been seen as complements, not as substitutes.
This study makes no claim to being an exhaustive survey of all sources of Catalan 
economic history in the second third of the nineteenth century. Four sources play a central 
role in this study: the Sayró census (Sayró (1842) and Madoz (1846)), the Junta de Fábricas 
census (Junta de Fábricas (1850)), the industrial guide of 1861 (Gimenez Guited (1862)), and 
the tariff commission inquiry (Comisión especial arancelaria (1867)). Other nineteenth-century 
reports and investigations complement these four monumental sets of industrial data. Writings 
of contemporaries on Catalonia provide unusually good coverage of the main issues of 
industrial history. Furthermore, when it was necessary, firm accounts and non Catalan sources 
have been used. It should be noted that vast amounts of material still await historians and will 
allow them to confirm or reject the conclusions put forward in this study. In any case, I have 
tried to restrict the use of manuscript sources to those directly relevant to the questions posed.
Part I. Explaining Output Growth

Chapter 2
The Growth of Industry Output
This chapter is devoted to computing and analysing the growth rates of Catalan 
industries during the early phase of industrialisation. Therefore, it has three main objectives. 
First, to provide a stylised description of the industrial path of the period 1830-1861. Second, 
it reviews the evolution of the Catalan industry in the Spanish context and, thus, can serve 
to describe the relative importance of the Catalan industrial experience. Finally, this chapter 
will provide some of the essential instruments used to measure productivity in chapter 5. The 
results show that Catalonia experienced a true process of industrialisation during the period 
1830 to 1861, but that its contribution in rapid increase in Spanish GDP was relatively small.
2.1. Introduction
The measurement of the industry growth rates has a major role in the debate on the 
nature and characteristics of the beginnings of industrialisation since the subject of industrial 
growth rates has caused a great deal of controversy. Pioneering work on industrial output 
indices was based on the well-known non-superlative indices, such as Laspeyres or Paasche. 
These indices tended to concede large shares to the new sectors, cotton and iron, within 
industrial output. In broad terms, all these exercises tend to stress the existence of an 
explosive beginning where overall industry growth rates were fast.32 By contrast, more recent 
work using superlative indices such as Fisher or Divisia has challenged that explosive view, 
and put emphasis on gradualism and slowness.33 Critics of the explosive beginnings have
32 See, for example, Rostow (1960).
33 For example, Crafts and Harley (1992).
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pointed out that only new industries experienced fast growth rates whereas the rest o f  
industries remained in premodem backwardness.34 Their analyses were based on a revisionist 
assessment of the size of the modem industries, with the implication that estimates o f  
aggregate industrial growth should be lowered appreciably for the period of ea r ly  
industrialisation.
A similar debate also took place in the Spanish literature. Albert Carreras has poin ted  
out that during the early period, 1830-1861, industrial growth rates were above 4 percent a n d  
that the share of the textile and metal industries, the modem industries, in Spanish industrial 
value-added was about 45 percent.35 Moreover, he argued that early industrialisation w a s  
characterised by an abrupt change in industrial output. By contrast, Leandro Prados, a c r itic  
of the explosive beginnings, has pointed out that the share of modem industries of value- 
added was lower than Carreras suggested (about 27 percent).36 By reducing the share o f  
modem industries and considering more industries, he developed a new index with s lo w  
growth rates (about 2 percent per year).37
Albert Carreras has also computed an industrial index for Catalonia with fast grow th 
rates (above 6 percent per year).38 However, the recent revision of that index by Jo rd i 
Maluquer has not changed the general view on Catalan industrialisation.39 This economic 
historian reduced the share of cotton of value-added and considered more industries, but th e  
resulting growth rates remained impressive for this early industrialisation period (about 6  
percent per year).40
34 See the recent revision of the debate at Temin (1997).
35 Carreras (1990b).
36 Prados (1988), pp. 163. recently, Prados has revised part of his earlier estimates see, for 
example, Prados (1997). Unfortunately, for the purposes of this chapter, his series begin too late (by 
1850).
37 Prados (1988), pp. 166.
38 Carreras (1990b).
39 Maluquer (1994b).
40 Maluquer (1994b), Table 6, pp. 61.
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Unfortunately, the stimulating revisions of Carreras' indices have not dealt with two 
important methodological (index) problems.*1 Firstly, Prados and Maluquer did not compute 
changes in the quality of output. In contrast, they assumed the quality remained constant 
throughout the period, since their quantity indices are the result of multiplying the gross 
weight of the main raw materials by a fixed coefficient.41 2 It should be noted that this kind of 
procedure is likely to understate growth rates of modem sectors, where quality change was 
very important. Secondly, Maluquer and Prados weighted their indices with the last year 
weights assuming, implicitly, that the relative prices and the composition of the output 
remained constant. It is well known that this assumption overstates the rate of growth since 
it gives larger weights to the faster growth sectors.43 Therefore, in order to measure correctly 
the industry growth rates, a different kind of index number is necessary.
For that reason, the main objective of this chapter is to recalculate industry growth 
rates in Catalonia from 1830 to 1861, employing a different kind of index number. Using a 
superlative index number, specifically a Tòrqvist index, one is able to solve the two 
shorthcomings mentioned above.
It should be noted that there are important limits to the degree to which growth 
estimates for many Catalan industries can be developed, since data is not available for the 
whole manufacturing sector. Thus, only the following sectors can be studied, cotton spinning, 
cotton weaving, cotton finishing, linen, metal, mixed fabrics, paper, silk and wool. We use 
two benchmark years: 1840 and 1861. However, it should be noted that, empirically, the 
industrial growth rate is determined by three different findings: the rate o f growth of the 
modem industries, their share in the industrial output, and the rate o f growth of pre-modem 
industries. I f  the rate of growth and share of modem industries is large enough, overall growth 
rates are necessarily higher. Consequently, by estimating the share and growth rates of modem
41 See the criticisms to Prados's methodology in Bustelo (1993).
42 In both studies Prados and Maluquer recognized the existence of these biases and the possible 
influence in the resulting growth rates (Prados (1988), pp. 148 and Maluquer (1994b), pp. 51-53).
43 It should be noted that Prados only employed Laspeynes indices for 1830-1860, since in the rest 
of periods he employs the exact Divisia indices. The reason is that there is not enough data to 
construct the two benchmark estimates necessary for Divisia weights (Prados (1988), pp. 145-147).
18 The Early Phase o f Catalan Industrialisation (1830-1861 )
industries we can calculate a range of plausible growth rates.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the construction of a n ew  
annual index for the Catalan cotton industry for 1830 to 1861. It should be noted that grow th 
findings in cotton industry are very important since it was the main Catalan industry during  
the period and, therefore, its growth rates heavily influence the results. The next section 
describes the elaboration of new production measures for the other Catalan manufacturing 
industries for the period 1840 to 1861. In section 2 .4 ,1 present a brief analysis of the resu lts 
and the contribution of Catalan industry to Spanish growth rates. The bulk o f the chapter then  
takes up the technical and empirical issues related to the construction of the new measures 
for Catalan manufacturing.
Because all statistics are imperfect and, obviously, they are more imperfect the o ld e r 
they are, the author wants to make clear that the results displayed in the next chapters contain 
substantial error margins and they must be interpreted as ’best guesses' rather than facts. 
Nevertheless, the presence of these substantial error margins should not invalidate th e  
quantitative methodology since the error margins necessary to change the direction o f th e  
results are large. Moreover, when there were alternative numbers the most conservative o f th e  
possible calculations and/or the most reliable data source was chosen.
2.2. A New Yearly Index of Cotton Industry Production (1830-1861)
Traditionally, the cotton industry has been regarded as the central industry in m any  
regional processes of industrialisation in Europe.44 Catalonia is not an exception to th is  
general rule since, from 1830 to 1861, the most important industry in Catalonia was the cotton 
industry.45 In the Spanish panorama of the middle of the Nineteenth Century, cotton w as 
unusual because it was the most dynamic industry and the only industry that depended o n  
imports of foreign raw materials, (here, in value order, raw cotton, coal and chemical
44 See the evidence presented in Pollard (1981),or Landes (1969).
45 Nadal (1974), chapter 7.
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products).46 Despite the cotton industry being widespread in several Spanish regions, it should 
be noted that Catalonia possessed a large portion of that industry during the whole period.47
Before going further it is necessary to define what industries formed the Catalan cotton 
industry, since there is some confusion on this point. In several contemporary censuses, and 
in many recent studies, cotton industries not only comprised cotton spinning, weaving and 
finishing but also mixed fabrics weaving. The first three industries employed exclusively 
cotton fibre, or process cotton, as textile inputs, while the last blended cotton fibres with other 
textile fibres such as wool, linen and silk. This section is only devoted to analysing the 
evolution of the cotton sectors that employed only raw cotton or its by-products as textile 
inputs; in other words, cotton spinning, weaving and finishing but not mixed fabrics weaving. 
The choice of an 'enlarged* cotton industry is capable of producing different results due to the 
different evolution of 'pure* cotton and the other textile industries.48 For example, during the 
'cotton famine* in the 1860s, mixed fabrics production partly substituted pure cotton cloth 
production, and therefore their market share grew whereas cotton cloth's decreased.49
The objective of this section is to develop new measures of the growth of the Catalan 
cotton industry from 1830 to 1861.50 51My analysis begins with a review of the measures of the 
cotton industry developed by other economic historians and their flaws. In the light of these 
observations, I develop Torqvist indices (also called Divisia or Translog) of sectoral (gross) 
output, physical intermediate inputs, and value-added for the cotton industry and its sub­
components (spinning, weaving and finishing).31
46 At the beginning of the period. Motril, in Andalusia, produced raw cotton but during the 1840s 
its crops were reduced drastically and practically disappeared in the following years.
47 For example, in 1861, Catalonia produced about 75 percent of cotton spinning output, about 70 
percent of weaving output, and about 77 percent of calico printing output (Gimenez Guited (1862), 
pp. 209).
48 See sections 3 and 4 in this chapter.
49 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867), pp. 113-153.
50 The measures developed in this dissertation are all based on the economic theory of production, 
rather than traditional national accounting methods.
51 More exactly, throughout this dissertation I employ a concept closely allied to gross output: 
'sectoral output*. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics definition sectoral output is 'the name
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This is not the first time that attempts have been made to compute the value of th e  
production of the Catalan cotton textile industry. Albert Carreras, Carles Sudri&, Leandro 
Prados de la Escosura and Jordi Maluquer de Motes have proposed different figures fo r  
Catalan cotton industry production in the nineteenth Century.52 All the previous studies h av e  
employed the same methodology to compute the consumption of cotton cloth, whereas several 
alternative methods have been employed to calculate quantity indices (i.e., to combine in to  
a single measure the different components of the cotton industry).
To compute consumption of cotton cloth, all these economic historians h ave  
transformed the raw material figures by means of fixed coefficients into output figures. In  
particular, they have hypothesised that the quantity of raw cotton imported minus 10 percent 
of wastage was equal to the quantity of cotton cloth produced.53 This method is likely to  
produce a downward estimate of the output indices, since it does not consider one of the m ain  
characteristics of modem growth and the growth of the Catalan cotton industry during th is  
period: the increase in the quality of output.54
Consequently, the major source of the differences among the different authors is th e  
methodology used to weight quantity figures (i.e., the kind of quantity index). Broadly, tw o  
great families of indices can be distinguished: the non-superlative indices, which w ere  
employed by Carreras and Maluquer, and superlative, which were used by Prados. r
It should be noted that the superlative indices have several important advantages o v e r 
the non-superlative indices. The most common used and best-known non-superlative indices 
are the Laspeyres, Paasche and Geometric. Empirically, Paasche indices tend to reduce th e
given to gross output less intra-industiy transactions'. In other words, sectoral output for an industry 
represents deliveries to purchasers outside the industry (see, Dean at alt. (1996), pp. 192).
52 Carreras (1990b), Sudria (1983), Prados (1983)(1988) and Maluquer (1994b).
53 However, it should be noted that Maluquer (1994) has employed two different wastage 
measures: until 1870 he assumed 10 percent wastage, whereas after this year he progressively reduced 
the wastage because new machinery was introduced. Machinery which was capable of reducing raw 
cotton losses.
54 The same Prados discusses these biases (Prados (1988), pp. 148).
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rates of growth whereas Laspeyres indices tend to increase the rates. Moreover, the Laspeyres 
and Paasche indices are similar to the Leontief production function, which is a first-order 
approximation of an arbitrary Neoclassical production function. In other words, they assume 
a constant elasticity of substitution among the factors of production. If the choice is a non- 
superlative index, the analysis of the interrelations among the factors of production is biased, 
because a correct measure of growth must consider that sometimes the innovation implies 
changes in the elasticities of substitution, and the output measure necessarily assumes that 
there were no changes in the quality of production. For this reason, modem growth 
accounting, and growth measurement, has abandoned these indices and introduced superlative 
indices.35 These indices are a second-order approximation to an arbitrary Neoclassical 
economy because they assume multiple elasticities of substitution among the factors of 
production. The best-known superlative indices are the Fisher ideal and the Divisia (also 
called Tômqvist). The first assumes a quadratic production function and the second a Translog 
production function. Both production functions assume, obviously, multiple elasticities of 
substitution among the factors of production and quality changes during the period 
considered.5 6
Several steps must be carried out to solve the flaws present in the previous studies. 
Firstly, according to the most recent practices, the exact measure of quantities is not their 
unweighted sum but a bilateral quantity index that is a weighted average of quantity 
relatives.57 Then, one of the primary objectives for output and value-added measures is to start 
with as much detail or disaggregation of the measured outputs as possible. It is also 
convenient that subaggregates are homogeneous.58 The intent is to develop output indices that 
correctly reflect the differing trends in the output of the various products produced within the 
industry. Secondly, to combine quantities and prices in a single measure Torqvist indices must
55 See a review of recent practices at Hill (1993).
56 On index theory see: Diewert (1976)(1987), Dieweit and Nakamura (1993) and Hill (1993).
57 To make this distinction clear some authors named this weighted index Volume index' (Hill 
(1993), pp. 381).
58 Subaggregates are homogeneous when the price dispersion of their components is not 
statistically significant.
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be employed due to their conceptual advantages. Finally, according to the Torqvist in d e x  
methodology, the weights of the industry must be computed as the average value in t h e  
period.
Briefly, this work differs from the previous works for six main reasons: (1) the so lv ing  
of the index number problem by using Torqvist indices; (2) the disaggregation of output in to  
several components; (3) the method used to estimate the value-added; (4) the technique o f  
computing the yearly amount of raw cotton which was employed by the industry (i.e., t h e  
estimate of the quantity of cotton cloth produced each year); (5) the estimating o f the w astage 
as result of the spinning and weaving process; (6) the relative prices of the different types o f  
outputs and inputs.
To measure output, physical inputs and value-added I use Tomqvist quantity indices, 
which are the changing-weight indices that have been used most frequently in the literature 
on productivity measurement.59 These indices make use of logarithms for comparing a variable 
at two points of time. When used to compare outputs for two time periods, they employ a n  
average of value-share weights for the two periods being considered. The index number i s  
computed after first determining the logarithmic change as follows:
59 See Dean et alt. (1996), pp. 184.
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(2.1)
Where xi designates outputs, where n outputs (l..i..n) are being considered, the two time 
periods are t and t-1, and the value share weights 0 ^  are computed as:
eXj = + e^ r-i)],
(r=1 ,»*,• *«).
Where the ©¿s denote the share of each output in total payments to its aggregate 
outputs. The exponential of this logarithmic change yields an index number.
The starting point for the construction of Tbmqvist indices of sectoral (gross) output 
is the measurement of the total product in current prices (i.e., the measurement of total 
payments).60 Empirically, the total product in current prices is equal to the sum of the values 
of all components of output or, equivalently, to the result of multiplying quantities by the unit 
prices of each component. Here, the system chosen to calculate the total output has been to 
compute yearly quantities of output and multiply these by their current prices (unit values). 
Because it is not methodologically convenient to employ a unique value for cotton spinning, 
weaving and finishing, employing five unit values and output categories for each of these sub­
sectors, I compute their values. Therefore, the total product of subsector x in the year i is 
equal to:
(2-2) W a ; .
The sum of the prices (unit values) x quantities (yearly consumption) of the n different 
types of output. Consequently, to construct these estimates of total product it is necessary to 
establish quantities of inputs and to infer quantities of outputs. For spinning, the yearly 
production of the five qualities o f yam has been inferred from the consumption of raw
60 The methodology is based on Christensen, Cummings, and Joigenson (1980) and Jorgenson 
(1990).
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cotton.61 For weaving, the production o f the five qualities of grey cloth have been inferred 
from the estimated consumption of the five different qualities of yam. Finally, for finishing, 
the quantity o f the five qualities of finished cloth have been derived from the estimated 
consumption o f the five qualities of grey cloth.
The previous calculations used two different systems to estimate the yearly 
consumption of raw cotton by the Catalan industry. Albert Carreras and Leandro Prados used 
the importation figures directly, whereas Carles Sudrià and Jordi Maluquer created new 
figures because they transformed the original figures by means of a three-year average centred 
on the middle year.62 The latter argued that this mathematical transformation is necessary 
because the yearly fluctuations of the importations figures are excessive. Moreover, Jordi 
Maluquer added to the import figures the Spanish raw cotton which was produced in M otril 
and imported through the Port of Barcelona, which was the main entrance for the raw  
materials used by the Catalan cotton industry. The Carreras-Prados solution implies that a ll 
the imported raw cotton was transformed into final products during the year in which they 
arrived in Catalonia. Therefore, there were no stocks of raw cotton in the hands of th e  
wholesalers or semi-finished products in the hands o f the cotton industry. Obviously, this does 
not seem plausible. On the other hand, the Sudrià-Maluquer solution implies that the quantity 
of raw cotton consumed by the industry in one year must necessarily depend on the quantity 
of raw cotton that would be imported during the following year. This also does not seem  
plausible. Therefore, the solution adopted in this paper is quite different from these tw o 
proposals.
The departure point for the computation of the quantities of raw cotton is to add to the  
original importation figures Motril's raw cotton sold in the Port of Barcelona.63 Although this 
national raw cotton was only important before 1840, because after this date its production w as
61 It should be noted that this procedure is possible due to the fact that each quality of yam can 
only be produced by a particular combination of different types of raw cotton. For example, to  
produce the finest grades of yam only Egyptian raw cotton was employed.
62 Carreras (1990b), Sudriá (1983), Prados (1983)(1988) and Maluquer (1994b).
63 Comisión del Gobierno (1841).
Chapter 2: The Growth o f Industry Output 25
drastically reduced.64 *Where there are no figures for the Motril raw cotton trade it is 
hypothesised that the Motril raw cotton figures maintained a straight-line relation with the 
trade of American raw cotton. Second, from 1850 to 1861, figures on the raw cotton imports 
of the Almanaque del Diario de Barcelona63 replace Nadal’s figures, but these new figures do 
not differ strongly from Jordi Nadal's.66 Third, mobile averages that differ strongly from 
Sudrià-Maluquer's have been computed in order to transform the original import figures to 
production figures. Thus:
(2.3) Quantity (Year,) » 0.8 * Imports (Year,) + 0.2 * Imports (Year,.,).
The choice of this mobile average has been based on different historical evidence: the 
quantity of raw cotton and intermediate products that different cotton firms declared as having 
in their factories,67 literary evidence on the stocks of raw cotton, and the recommendations 
of different historical technical books on the problems of storing raw cotton for long periods.6* 
Thus, different averages have been computed for nine unusual years (i.e. about 30 percent of 
years), although these maintain the raw cotton stock for no more than two years.69
All the previous studies assume that wastage of the raw cotton during the spinning and 
weaving process was equal to ten percent of its weight, in this study wastage is not constant 
because we assume it varies with the quality of raw cotton. Huberman, in his study on the 
Lancashire cotton industry, has divided raw cotton into five qualities (G l, G2, GF, FI and 
F2), from the coarsest to the finest, matching to each quality a different wastage during the 
spinning process. Beginning with a wastage of nine percent for quality G l, wastage grew 
successively by one percent for each quality because the best qualities that were employed
64 Nadal (1974) and Maluquer (1994b).
69 Diario de Barcelona (1866).
66 Nadal (1974).
67 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
68 Calvet (1857), Arau (1855), Feirer Vidal (1875), and Ronquillo (1851-1857).
69 In particular 1844 (0.6Year, + 0.2Yeart_,); 1845 (0.8Year, + 0.4Year,.,); 1850 (0.7Year, + 
03Year,.,); 1851 (0.8Year, + 03YeartI); 1856 (0.6Yeart + 03Yeart.,); 1857 (0.8Year, + OAYear,.,); 
1858 (Year, + 0.2Year,.,); 1859 (0.9Year,); 1860 (0.8Year, + O.lYear,.,).
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cotton.61 For weaving, the production of the five qualities of grey cloth have been in fe r re d  
from the estimated consumption of the five different qualities of yam. Finally, for F inishing, 
the quantity of the five qualities of finished cloth have been derived from the e s tim ated  
consumption of the five qualities of grey cloth.
The previous calculations used two different systems to estimate the y e a r ly  
consumption of raw cotton by the Catalan industry. Albert Carreras and Leandro Prados u s e d  
the importation figures directly, whereas Carles Sudrià and Jordi Maluquer created n e w  
figures because they transformed the original figures by means of a three-year average cen tred  
on the middle year.62 The latter argued that this mathematical transformation is necessary 
because the yearly fluctuations of the importations figures are excessive. Moreover, J o rd i  
Maluquer added to the import figures the Spanish raw cotton which was produced in M o tril 
and imported through the Port of Barcelona, which was the main entrance for the r a w  
materials used by the Catalan cotton industry. The Carreras-Prados solution implies that a l l  
the imported raw cotton was transformed into final products during the year in which th e y  
arrived in Catalonia. Therefore, there were no stocks of raw cotton in the hands of th e  
wholesalers or semi-finished products in the hands of the cotton industry. Obviously, this d o e s  
not seem plausible. On the other hand, the Sudrià-Maluquer solution implies that the quantity 
of raw cotton consumed by the industry in one year must necessarily depend on the quantity 
of raw cotton that would be imported during the following year. This also does not seem  
plausible. Therefore, the solution adopted in this paper is quite different from these tw o  
proposals.
The departure point for the computation of the quantities of raw cotton is to add to th e  
original importation figures Motril's raw cotton sold in the Port of Barcelona.63 Although th is  
national raw cotton was only important before 1840, because after this date its production w as
61 It should be noted that this procedure is possible due to the fact that each quality of yam can 
only be produced by a particular combination of different types of raw cotton. For example, to  
produce the finest grades of yam only Egyptian raw cotton was employed.
62 Cañeras (1990b), Sudriá (1983), Prados (1983)(1988) and Maluquer (1994b).
63 Comisión del Gobierno (1841).
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drastically reduced.64 Where there are no figures for the Motril raw cotton trade it is 
hypothesised that the Motril raw cotton figures maintained a straight-line relation with the 
trade of American raw cotton. Second, from 1850 to 1861, figures on the raw cotton imports 
of the Almanaque del Diario de Barcelona65 replace Nadal's figures, but these new figures do 
not differ strongly from Jordi Nadal's.66 Third, mobile averages that differ strongly from 
Sudrià-Maluquer's have been computed in order to transform the original import figures to 
production figures. Thus:
(2.3) Quantity (Year,) = 0.8 * Imports (Year,) + 0.2 * Imports (YearM).
The choice of this mobile average has been based on different historical evidence: the 
quantity of raw cotton and intermediate products that different cotton firms declared as having 
in their factories,67 literary evidence on the stocks of raw cotton, and the recommendations 
of different historical technical books on the problems of storing raw cotton for long periods.68 
Thus, different averages have been computed for nine unusual years (i.e. about 30 percent of 
years), although these maintain the raw cotton stock for no more than two years.69
All the previous studies assume that wastage of the raw cotton during the spinning and 
weaving process was equal to ten percent of its weight, in this study wastage is not constant 
because we assume it varies with the quality of raw cotton. Huberman, in his study on the 
Lancashire cotton industry, has divided raw cotton into five qualities (G l, G2, GF, FI and 
F2), from the coarsest to the finest, matching to each quality a different wastage during the 
spinning process. Beginning with a wastage of nine percent for quality G l, wastage grew 
successively by one percent for each quality because the best qualities that were employed
64 Nadal (1974) and Maluquer (1994b).
65 Diario de Barcelona (1866).
66 Nadal (1974).
67 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
68 Calvet (1857), Arau (1855), Ferrer Vidal (1875), and Ronquillo (1851-1857).
69 In particular 1844 (0.6Year, + 0.2Year,.,); 1845 (0.8Year, + 0.4Year,.,); 1850 (0.7Year, + 
03Year,.,); 1851 (0.8Year, + 03Yeartl); 1856 (0.6Year, + 0.2YearH); 1857 (0.8Year, + 0.4Year,.,); 
1858 (Year, + 02Year,.t); 1859 (0.9Year,); 1860 (0.8Year, + O.lYear,,).
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to produce the finest yam suffered most friction during the spinning process. Huberman 
derived the five figures by observing the places of production of the raw cotton, since quality 
depended on the place where the raw cotton was produced.70
In this study the quality figures have been drawn from the Diario de Barcelona, in 
which was listed the producing places of the raw cotton bales and their weights, from 1851 
to 1861.71 However, this source only specified the producing countries and not the different 
locations within each country. Concerning the United States, this incompleteness in the  
sources is important because Huberman has computed the quality of British yam by referring 
to three different producing locations in the United States (Sea Island, Upland and Alabama).72 
For this reason, the raw data for 1850,73 which distinguished the producing locations of raw  
cotton for different regions within the United States, has been extrapolated to the following 
years. Moreover, the Huberman equations have been modified to adapt to the Catalan 
procedures, which are described in different technical handbooks.74 The results are in the 
equations below:75
(2.4) Cl = 0.30 (US) + (India and China) + (Levant)
C2 = 0.50 (US)
CF = 0.19 (US) + 0.50 (Brazil) + (Motril and Puerto Rico)
FI = 0.50 (Brazil)
F2 = 0.01 (US) + (Egypt)
For the period before 1850 the wastage had to be calculated in a different way. 
Different estimates on the counts (quality) of the yam produced by the Catalan industry were
70 Huberman (199Ia)(1996).
71 Diario de Barcelona (1866).
72 Huberman (1991a)(1996).
73 Ronquillo (1851-1857).
74 Cal vet (1857) and Arau (1855).
75 The quality Cl corresponds to yam below 20 count; the C2 from 21 to 30 count; the CF from 
31 to 40 count; the FI from 41 to 60 count; and the F2 from 61 count (all measures are Catalan 
measures).
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available for 1840, 1846 and 1849.76 Thus, if one treats as equivalent the counts of yam and 
the five qualities specified in equation (2.4), it is possible to derive the same figures for those 
years. A straight-line evolution between the proportion of the qualities has been assumed to 
hold throughout the years. However, for the period before 1840 there was no data on the 
quality of yam, so it has been assumed that the production of coarse yam depended on the 
proportion of functioning hand spindles. This idea is based on technical handbooks and 
historical data stating that Catalan hand spinners could not produce the finest yams.77 
Therefore, quality figures from 1831 to 1840 have been constructed by deflating the 
proportion of coarse yam to the proportion of production produced by the hand spindles.78
The former calculations did not consider the process of doubling. This process 
consisted of doubling the yam in order the increase its resistance but maintain the count. Note 
that doubling did not increase the quantity of yam. Moreover, the doubling process was 
mainly carried out with fine yam since doubled yam was mainly employed in the production 
of fine cloth and mixed fabrics. Consequently, the relative importance of doubling increased 
with the increase in the quality of Catalan yam. For example, in 1841, the doubling process 
only affected 4 per cent of Catalan yam, while by 1850 this proportion had increased to 14 
percent.79
Moving to cotton weaving, the output has been derived from the difference between 
the total production of yam and the quantity of yam employed in mixed fabrics.80 The 
calculation of wastage in weaving is much simpler than in spinning, because the proportion
76 Madoz (1846) and Figuerola (1968).
77 Calvet (1857), Arau (1855) and Figuerola (1968).
78 See the next chapter for a description of the sources for functioning hand spindles.
79 Madoz (1846) for 1841 and Ronquillo (1851-1857) for 1850.
80 The information about mixed-fabrics production and the origin of yam derives from Comisión 
del Gobierno (1841) and Comisión Especial Arancelaria (1867). In Catalonia, high quality mixed- 
fabrics were woven with English fine cotton yam, while Catalan yam was used in the production of 
low-middle quality mixed fabrics. Information due to Madoz (1846) and Figuerola (1968) has been 
employed to establish yearly figures for the imported English yam. Finally, the total demand of 
national yam by the production of mixed fabrics has been established by assuming that the proportion 
of high quality mixed fabrics, which were produced with English yam, and low-middle quality fabrics, 
which were produced with Catalan yam, was the same as the figures for 1841 and 1861.
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of wastage was the same for all qualities and types of machines. The wastage while w eav in g  
was equal to 5 per cent of the yam employed.81 Moreover, the quality of the cotton c lo th  
relied exclusively on the quality of yam because coarse yam could be employed only t o  
produce coarse cloth and, on the contrary, fine yam could be only employed to produce f in e  
cloth.82 In other words, the improvements in the quality of cotton cloth were due to th e  
improvements in the quality of yam produced by the spinning industry. Consequently, e a c h  
of the five qualities of grey cloth (GC1, GC2, GCF, GF1, GF2) was produced with th e  
equivalent of the five qualities of yam (Cl, C2, CF, F I, F2).
In cotton finishing the total quantity of output was equal to the quantity of output in  
weaving, since in finishing the wastage was negligible. However, estimating the d iffe ren t 
categories (qualities) of finishing production generates new problems since quality of fin ished  
cloth is partly independent of grey cloth quality. Specifically, the main problem is generated 
by the fact that not only the finest cloth was printed, but that some coarse cloth was a lso  
printed. The solution chosen is to consider five categories of finished cloth: two types o f  
bleached cloth (Bl, B2) and three different types of printed cloth (CA I, CA2, CA3). S in c e  
the cost of bleaching was the same in B l and B2, these two kinds of cloth only differed b y  
the grey cloth employed (coarser in B l than in B2). In printed cloth, the quality CAl w a s  
produced with coarse cloth since it was employed in upholstery and curtains.83 The qu a lity  
CA2 corresponds to the calicoes produced with medium grey cloth and a reduced range o f  
colours. The most expensive calicoes (CA3) were produced with the finest quality of g re y  
cloth and printed with several fine colours, and they were employed to produce good qua lity  
materials.84 Finally, note that the quality of the final production also grew since the proportion
81 Comisión Especial Arancelaria (1867).
82 Comisión Especial Arancelaria (1867).
83 Some confusion can be caused by the fact that the quality CAl by metre was more expensive 
than the finer qualities CA2 and CA3, but when the price is calculated by kg. quality CAl w as 
cheapest.
84 Obviously, these three qualities of printed cloth are a necessary simplification of the large range 
of products produced by the Catalan mills. A complete description of all qualities of Catalan cloth is  
furnished by Ronquillo (1851-1857) and Orellana (1860).
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of cloth printed g rew .85
Considering all the issues mentioned above and the data of the historical sources I 
estimated the next equation to convert grey cloth output into finishing output:86
(2.5) B1 = 0.75 (GC1)
B2 = 0.50 (GC2)
CA1 = 0.25 (GC1) + 0.50 (GC2)
CA2 = (GCF)
CA3 = (GF1) + (GF2).
The last step in the computation of the total value is to establish the prices for each 
quality of yam and cotton cloth. However, yearly price data for all qualities of yam, grey 
cloth and finished cloth is not readily available. In particular, there are yearly price figures 
for the Spanish 30 count of yam, middle quality grey cloth and cheap calicoes. It should be 
noted that these figures seem very accurate according to the different sources contrasted.87 The 
main problem with these figures is that they refer to the typical products from the 1850s 
onwards, but before the 1850s typical Catalan cotton products were coarse. Moreover, it 
should be taken into account that prices of the different qualities did not evolve in the same 
way. Therefore, to employ one of these series as a unique deflator could provoke severe 
distortions in the results.88 The correct way to solve this data constraint is to construct some 
kind of superlative price index using a set of prices for all qualities of cotton products 
available. A Fisher price index was computed for five types of yam using the 30 count figures
85 For these proportions see Sayró (1842), Madoz (1846), Ronquillo (1851-1857) Giménez Guited 
(1862), and Comisión Especial Arancelaria (1867).
86 This fomiula is mainly based on the data of Sayró (1842) and Comisión especial arancelaria 
(1867).
87 The equivalence with the measures of other countries is: the Spanish 30 count is equal to the 
English 31-32 count and the French 26 count. In other words,the equivalence is 1 Spanish = 1.042 
English = 0.883 French. The data is from Ferrer Vidal (1875), pp. 70-71.
88 For the different evolution of the technical innovation in fine and coarse textiles see Von 
Tunzelmann (1978) and Hubeimann (1991a)(1996).
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as a yearly deflactor and two complete price weights, one by 1840 and one by 1861.89 T he 
main advantage of the Fisher price deflator is that the prices reflect technological 
innovations.90 The method used to estimate the prices of grey cloth is similar to the method 
used with yam. Two complete price weights for different kinds of cloth and the annual series 
of grey cloth prices have been employed to construct five different price indices.91
The method used to estimate the prices of finished cloth is slightly different to the  
method used with grey cloth. As with yam and grey cloth, yearly figures on the prices o f  
cheap calicoes have been used to compute the prices of the three qualities of printed cloth 
(CAI, CA2 and CA3), with two weights.92 However, it is not convenient to employ the prices 
of printed cloth for estimating the prices of bleached cloth. Since the difference between the  
two prices is larger, as sometimes calicoes sold for two or three times price of bleached cloth. 
Moreover, the technological innovation in bleaching had different chronology to that in  
finishing and, hence, the evolution of their prices would diverge. Consequently, the prices o f  
the two qualities of bleached cloth (B1 and B2) have been computed by adding the price o f  
the bleaching process to the prices of grey cloth (GC1 and GC2). As described in several 
sources.93 In the next page, table 2.1 presents the prices of the main inputs and outputs in  
weight units (Qm).
Once total payments for every year and kind of output has been computed it is sim ple 
to compute the final index. The quantities have been estimated previously and the shares o f  
these quantities are the average of the relative values in the n years considered. T h e
89 The weights for 1840 come from Madoz (1846) and Sayró (1842) whereas the weights for 1861 
come from Comisión Especial Arancelaria (1867).
90 Moreover, it is practically equivalent to the Torqvist price index. See Diewert (1987) and Hill 
(1993).
91 The weights of 1840 are drawn from M^loz (1846) and Sayró (1842) whereas the weights for 
1861 are drawn from Comisión Especial Arancelaria (1867).
92 The weights for 1840 come from Madoz (1846) and Sayró (1842) whereas the weights for 1861 
come from Comisión Especial Arancelaria (1867).
93 It should be noted that bleaching was sometimes sub-contracted by weaving fnms to specialised 
bleaching films. Then, after the process of bleaching, weaving films sold the bleached cloth directly 
to cloth wholesalers.
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exponential of the resulting logarithmic change yields an index number. These indices of 
sectoral (gross) output for cotton spinning, weaving and finishing are presented in table 2.2.
Table 2.1 Prices of the Main Input and Outputs: Cotton Industry 1830-1861
Raw Cotton Yam Grey Cloth Calicoe
US Middling 30 count for printing cheap colours
PtaVQm PtaVQm PtaVQm PtaVQm
1830 188.00 656.25 1537.74 2529.03
1831 192.00 625.00 1309.68 3129.68
1832 182.00 593.75 1309.68 2287.42
1833 199.00 593.75 1309.68 2287.42
1834 239.00 593.75 120335 2167.74
1835 273.00 562.50 1115.48 2167.74
1836 257.00 562.50 1083.87 2045.81
1837 227.00 531.25 1022.90 2045.81
1838 184.00 531.25 992.42 1926.13
1839 212.00 531.25 948.39 1926.13
1840 175.00 531.25 977.74 1926.13
1841 155.00 500.00 951.77 1806.45
1842 134.00 437.50 784,68 1506.13
1843 133.00 406.25 706.77 1806.45
1844 166.00 406.25 690.97 1521.94
1845 121.00 406.25 690.97 1506.13
1846 136.00 375.00 690.97 1323.23
1847 168.00 343.75 570.16 126432
1848 125.00 329.38 540.81 1235.16
1849 146.00 312.50 585.97 1203.55
1850 188.00 375.00 660.48 1144.84
1851 188.00 375.00 585.97 1144.84
1852 156.00 343.75 570.16 1115.48
1853 163.00 32938 601.77 1083.87
1854 158.00 375.00 616.45 1144.84
1855 165.00 343.75 585.97 105432
1856 164.00 343.75 555.48 105432
1857 188.00 343.75 540.81 1022.90
1858 200.00 343.75 555.48 100238
1859 189.00 343.75 555.48 961.94
1860 178.00 350.00 50335 912.26
1861 197.00 386.25 555.48 1004.84
N otes and so u rces: O riginal raw cotton prices are drawn from  Izard (1969). Sim ilar p rices are availab le in D iaño 
de Barcelona (1866)(1870). Original yam  prices in Libras Catalanas converted  to  Qm by  m ultiplying by 250. Grey 
cloth and Calicoes: O riginal prices in Canas Catalanas converted to Q m  by multiplying by 903.2258. W eights are 
drawn from Com isión especial A rancelaria (1867) and Ferrer V idal (1875). T he prices o f yam , grey c lo th  and calicoes 
are drawn from the figures o f D iario de B arcelona (1866).
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Table 2.2 Sectoral Output Indices: Cotton Industry, 1830-1861
Spinning Weaving Finishing
1830 100.00 - 100.00 100.00
1831 102.20 103.75 103.49
1832 101.21 103.95 103.69
1833 98.98 102.68 102.43
1834 96.69 102.07 101.83
1835 88.75 94.65 94.85
1836 101.05 10838 108.00
1837 117.73 127.84 126.31
1838 141.62 15532 152.63
1839 121.31 137.61 136.02
1840 201.74 235.65 229.16
1841 232.61 277.96 267.35
1842 156.67 189.95 184.23
1843 86.85 106.47 105.99
1844 172.26 214.41 204.82
1845 306.12 39230 37134
1846 343.52 452.27 425.34
1847 218.26 293.35 281.27
1848 300.77 402.71 385.77
1849 358.73 478.59 458.55
1850 433.56 620.69 653.25
1851 532.47 751.19 777.54
1852 499.74 695.38 696.74
1853 480.16 668.25 663.50
1854 470.54 657.27 665.26
1855 536.18 750.27 771.35
1856 60130 837.23 840.97
1857 685.91 953.13 947.75
1858 67836 941.97 927.35
1859 605.73 836.22 802.52
1860 592.34 81838 787.41
1861 622.60 857.14 825.20
Notes and sources: see text.
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In the next pages I will develop Tòrqvist indices of physical intermediate inputs for 
cotton spinning, weaving and finishing. Then, I employ these indices and sectoral output 
indices to compute value-added indices.
To measure intermediate inputs I employ the same method than it was used to measure 
output. Therefore, one of the primary objectives is to start with as much disaggregation of the 
measured inputs as possible. Then, I divide intermediate inputs into homogeneous categories 
which must then be weighted by their share in the total value of intermediate inputs. For that 
reason, I consider up to six categories of inputs in cotton spinning, weaving and finishing. In 
spinning the six categories of inputs are: five types of raw cotton and rest of materials (mainly 
coal); in weaving, the five types of yam and rest of materials (mainly, again, coal); and in 
finishing, the five types of grey cloth, coal, and chemical materials for bleaching or printing.
In spinning, the quantity of raw cotton is drawn from the figures described above, 
while the price figures for each type of raw cotton are drawn from Izard.94 In the years 
without prices for one kind of cotton its price has been estimated as a proportion of the price 
of the two kinds of raw cotton most widely consumed (U.S. and Brazil). Moreover, the price 
of the raw cotton from Motril and Puerto Rico is assumed to be equal to the price of the raw 
cotton that is most similar in terms of quality, i.e. Brazilian raw cotton. The rest of the 
intermediate inputs in spinning have also been estimated. For example, coal, vegetal coal, 
food for horses, gas for lights, starch, oil for machinery, and so on. In 1840 the proportional 
cost of these intermediate inputs was lower than in 1861.* 93 An index according to the 
procedure described in the equation 2.1 was estimated.
In weaving, the main input was, obviously, the yam, for which the complete figures 
have already been used for the spinning calculations. Next, the amount of Catalan yam 
employed to produce mixed fabrics instead of pure cotton cloth was computed and the figure 
obtained has been subtracted from the total yam figures. Finally, as in spinning, the costs and
94 Izaid (1969).
93 For 1840, Comisión del Gobierno (1841) and for 1861 Comisión Especial Arancelaria (1867).
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weights of the intermediate inputs were calculated and, again as in spinning, it is seen that 
these costs increased during the period. This is because the new machinery required increasing 
quantities of coal and other intermediate inputs.96 As before an index according to the 
procedure described in the equation 2.1 was estimated.
Moving to finishing, the main input was grey cloth, for which the complete figures 
were already given for weaving. Then, the consumption of energy, chemical and colouring 
products during the process of finishing cloth was computed. It should be underlined that to  
produce each kind of finished cloth different quantities and types of inputs were employed. 
Thus, the evolution in the consumption of different inputs is related to the changes in the 
composition of finished cloth production. For example, to produce finest calicoes with several 
colours, printers had to employ more energy and colour than to produce coarse calicoes. An 
index according to the procedure described in equation 2.1 was estimated. Table 2.3 shows 
all the indices for physical intermediate inputs.
96 For 1840 SaynS (1842) and for 1861 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
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Table 2.3 Intermediate Inputs Indices: Cotton Industry, 1830-1861
Spinning Weaving Finishing
1830 100.00 100.00 100.00
1831 102.12 103.27 103.72
1832 99.79 102.64 103.98
1833 97.24 100.80 102.79
1834 94.68 99.84 10222
1835 85.32 91.96 94.98
1836 101.72 104.52 108.97
1837 117.16 121.40 128.45
1838 141.24 145.44 156.47
1839 110.82 126.62 139.06
1840 207.94 208.88 23834
1841 214.16 241.82 279.92
1842 128.37 166.95 191.40
1843 69.84 95.41 107.62
1844 177.00 190.41 21539
1845 375.87 341.13 393.07
1846 202.52 381.27 454.87
1847 198.37 244.86 297.39
1848 285.36 332.72 40825
1849 329.44 393.85 485.21
1850 416.59 467.51 644.68
1851 394.76 556.94 778.73
1852 415.48 527.80 716.77
1853 390.32 511.90 687.77
1854 384.22 50221 679.14
1855 447.76 567.05 777.46
1856 651.14 637.49 862.99
1857 395.31 725.80 980.21
1858 499.47 723.04 966.92
1859 559.75 657.68 853.33
1860 54559 646.23 835.76
1861 565.84 676.77 874.95
Notes and sources: see text
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Once the sectoral output and intermediate sectoral inputs indices were constructed, it 
was possible to develop value-added indices for each sector. Value-added is defined as the 
sum of the value of capital input and the value of labour input or, equivalently, sectoral 
(gross) output minus (sectoral) physical (intermediate) inputs. Specifically, the rate of growth 
of sectoral value-added is equal to the rate of growth of sectoral output minus the rate o f  
growth of sectoral intermediate inputs multiplied by their share in total payments. Thus:
(2.6) btVA^lnVA'^  = [6^000,-lari,_,)] - [0,.(lnyir lnyiM)]
where VA designates value-added, x sectoral (gross) outputs and y sectoral intermediate 
inputs, where n outputs and inputs (l..i..n) are being considered. Two time periods are t and 
t-1, and the value share weights 0 Ki are computed as:
eXi = i P & J T ) * e*<r-i)],
(i=l,..i,..n).
Where the 0 ,/s  denote the share of each output (total payments) in its sectoral output. 
Similarly, the ©yi's denote the share of each input (total payments) in sectoral output. Table 
2.4. shows the indices of value-added.
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Table 2.4 Value-added Indices: Cotton Industry. 1830-1861
Spinning Weaving Finishing
1830 100.00 100.00 100.00
1831 101.16 101.95 100.99
1832 101.33 102.50 101.02
1833 100.43 102.25 100.61
1834 99.63 102.19 100.41
1835 98.06 99.48 98.38
1836 98.43 105.65 102.00
1837 104.02 113.60 106.63
1838 111.64 123.77 112.60
1839 109.67 119.44 108.76
1840 128.06 150.01 126.71
1841 145.46 162.33 131.97
1842 122.64 138.07 119.05
1843 87.71 109.42 98.99
1844 105.13 141.70 124.65
1845 116.57 178.26 152.20
1846 174.45 191.91 157.52
1847 111.99 163.04 139.29
1848 123.61 183.90 155.85
1849 135.24 197.26 165.31
1850 138.82 231.61 192.94
1851 176.70 251.33 201.39
1852 160.89 240.81 190.91
1853 160.66 235.71 187.21
1854 158.91 234.53 189.42
1855 165.77 248.11 199.50
1856 142.76 257.02 202.03
1857 223.75 268.44 208.16
1858 194.14 265.97 205.70
1859 159.99 251.45 195.64
1860 159.46 249.21 195.02
1861 163.30 252.21 19731
Notes and sources: sec text.
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Finally, I construct new indices of sectoral (gross) output and value-added for th e  
Catalan cotton industry. Sectoral output is computed according to the Tòrqvist quantity  
equation:
(2.7) InX'-lnX,^
where X designates sectoral cotton industry output, x individual outputs, and where n outputs 
(l..i..n) are being considered. Two time periods are t and t-1, and the value share weights 
are computed as:
\  - i w j n  + q j t - vh,
The ©x/s denote the share of each output (total payments) in its aggregate sectoral
output.
According to the definition of sectoral output, the nominal value of sectoral output in  
the cotton industry is equal to the value of finished cloth production plus the part of spinning 
production ’exported' to the mixed-fabrics industry. Similarly, the value o f  grey cloth and y a m  
employed in the production of ’pure' cotton cloth are not considered, since they are deliveries 
to purchasers inside the industry. Empirically, the aggregate index is computed as a weighted 
sum of spinning and finishing sectoral indices, where the weights of spinning and finishing 
are computed using the value of deliveries to buyers outside the cotton industry.
The aggregate value-added not only requires the assumption of separability of value- 
added from intermediate inputs, but also that all sectoral value-added functions must b e  
identical to the aggregate production function. In other words, the value-added function an d  
the capital and labour input functions must be replicas of the aggregate functions.97
In this case, the current value of aggregate value-added (VA) of the cotton industry 
is the sum o f the values o f the value-added in all sub-sectors (spinning, weaving an d  
finishing). In other words, the value of sectoral cotton industry output minus intermediate
97 Gullickson (1995).
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physical inputs bought outside the sector. Thus, it is computed as follows:
(2 8) lnVAr lnVA,.^ -  e .iln o i.- ln a i,.,)
- e^dnp/j-lnpi,.,) - e^Onyij-lnyf,.,) -  e^QnSi.-lnSi,.,).
Where X designates sectoral output of cotton industry and a  is raw cotton inputs, (5 
is energy in cotton spinning, y is energy in cotton weaving and 8 is energy in cotton finishing 
and other secondary inputs purchased outside the cotton industry. The two time periods are 
t and t-1, and the value share weights 0 M and 0 ^  are computed as in equation 2.6. The 
exponential of this logarithmic change yields an index number.
These sectoral output and value-added indices are presented in table 2.5. Moreover, 
other index (which is called a pure quantity index) has been computed. This index is close 
to the indices developed by other authors. This index is the exponential of the difference of 
successive logarithms of the actual imports of raw cotton into Catalonia (Motril or foreign), 
minus a constant wastage of 10 percent. Therefore, it assumes that quality and relative prices 
remained constant throughout the period.
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Table 2.5 Aggregate Indices: Cotton Industry,, 1830-1861
Pure Sectoral Sectoral
Quantity Output Value-added
1830 100.00 100.00 100.00
1831 102.03 103.40 102.82
1832 99.36 103.53 103.23
1833 96.69 102.21 102.40
1834 94.02 101.50 102.24
1835 84.43 94.46 97.84
1836 101.10 107-56 105.64
1837 116.03 125.76 117.87
1838 139.63 151.93 134.72
1839 107.62 135.10 12657
1840 204.99 227.46 180.02
1841 206.50 265.21 206.04
1842 120.57 18257 157.90
1843 65.31 104.88 103.10
1844 172.99 202.85 15950
1845 376.86 367.74 233.14
1846 168.59 420.78 290.65
1847 181.50 278.01 199.16
1848 262.81 381.34 245.78
1849 301.87 453.32 279.00
1850 379.35 644.10 360.02
1851 359.78 766.96 425.19
1852 388.77 687.89 38059
1853 364.66 655.19 368.67
1854 356.81 656.60 369.84
1855 417.33 761.03 407.91
1856 628.73 830.23 401.08
1857 346.34 935.91 499.93 y
1858 455.97 915.99 466.32
1859 530.43 793.32 398.01
1860 516.56 778.32 393.84
1861 488.53 815.74 404.94
Notes and sources: See text.
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2.3. Catalan Manufacturing Output (1840-1861)
The goal of this section is to generate new measures of the growth of Catalan 
manufacturing from 1840 to 1861. In this chapter I develop measures of real sectoral (gross) 
output, physical intermediate inputs and value-added for nine Catalan industries. I also 
construct an aggregate measure for manufacturing.
Output data on current values for two benchmark years (1840 and 1861) is available 
for nine industries. In the paper, metal, and mixed fabrics industries output values are taken 
from the sources.98 The values of cotton industry (spinning, weaving and finishing) output are 
those computed in the previous section. Finally, the values of the wool, linen and silk 
industries have been estimated from several sources.99
For the wool industry in 1840 the quantity and current value of production was 
computed using raw wool figures. The quantity of raw wool employed by the wool industry 
is equal to the quantity of raw wool imported into Catalonia (300,000 arrobas) minus the 
quantity of raw wool employed by mixed fabrics (21,570 arrobas).100 Since, at that time, six 
arrobas of raw wool were necessary to produce one wool fabric,101 which had on average 40 
varas castellanas, and the average price was 10 Rv per vara,102 the current value of the 
production was 18,562,000 Rv (i.e., 4,640,500 Pta).103 For silk and linen, the methodology
98 For the metal and mixed fabrics industries, for 1840 Sayr6 (1842) and Madoz (1846). For the 
paper industiy, for 1840 Delgado (1991), pp. 214 and Gutierrez (1837). For all industries, the 1861 
data comes from Gimenez Guited (1862).
"  It should be noted that the wool and silk industries comprised spinning, weaving and dyeing 
whereas linen only dyeing and weaving.
100 The quantity of raw wool is from Benaiil (1991), pp.l 19 (this figure is based on a survey of 
the Junta de Comercio) and the mixed fabrics data comes from SaynS (1842).
101 Benaiil (1991), pp. 119.
102 Figuerola (1968), pp. 225.
103 A test of the quality of the result can be obtained by computing the implicit density (kgJm.) 
of the average fabric and comparing this result with the data that appeared in the contemporary 
technical handbooks. Density can be calculated by multiply raw wool by 0.4 (eliminating the wastage 
in the process of cleaning), then by 0.95 (eliminating the wastage in the process of spinning), and then 
dividing by the number of fabrics multiplied by 33.4 (the measure in metres of 40 varas). The implicit
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differs slightly from that employed for wool. As for wool, the quantity of fibre (silk in hanks 
and linen yam respectively) consumed by the silk and linen industries is equal to the quantity 
imported into Catalonia, minus the quantities consumed by mixed fabrics production and lost 
in wastage.104 Since the prices of cloth are only available in varas, it has been necessary to 
compute the quantity of varas produced.105 The quantity of varas is computed in two steps: 
(1) the weight of cloth is obtained, deleting the wastage through weaving from the quantity 
of yam, (2) the resulting figure is multiplied by the average density of the cloth.106 Then, the 
value of output is the quantity of varas multiplied by its average price. Finally, for 1861, the 
value o f output in silk, linen and wool is taking directly from the source, but before using the 
figure one must first subtract the quantities sold to the mixed fabrics industry.107
A further problem is that Gimenez Guited's guide included a lot mixed fabrics 
production within the production of the silk, wool and linen industries. Furthermore, many 
weavers, especially those that wove with jacquard looms, changed textile fibre (even two or 
three times during the year) according to the changes in fashion and season. For example, in 
the summer they produced winter textiles with wool, or blended wool with cotton or silk.
density was 0.7858 kg7m. whereas the technical handbooks show that the densities of wool fabrics 
produced in Catalonia were in the range of 0.55 to 0.95 kg7m. (see Ronquillo 1851-1857, pp. 373- 
385). The wastage of raw wool is based on the coefficient of Prados (1983), pp. 469.
104 The imports of silk amounted 67,000 kg. 7,000 kg. were used in the production of mixed 
fabrics. The data on imports comes from Figuerola (1968), pp. 226 and consumption by mixed fabrics 
from Sayro (1842). In the case of linen, the imports of linen yam amounted to 142,540 kg. and 41,675 
kg. were consumed by mixed fabrics. The first data comes from Madoz (1846), pp. 555 and the 
second from Sayr6 (1842).
105 In particular, the average price of silk cloth per vara was 25 Rv, whereas the price of linen 
cloth was 6 Rv (the first number from Figuerola (1968), pp. 224-225 and the second from Madoz 
(1846), pp. 555). The wastage of silk and linen is based on the coefficients of Prados (1983), pp. 470- 
471.
106 The average densities were 0.14205 kg7vara for silk and 0.1492 kg7vara for linen (these 
densities are an average of the data of Ronquillo (1851-57), pp.385-389 and 394-409).
107 Gimenez Guited (1862), pp. 210-212. Note that the value that appeared in the source was the 
sum of the values of yam and cloth. Therefore, to convert these values into sectoral output it was 
necessary to remove yam from the total value. This is possible since the source gives the quantities 
of yam and cloth produced.
Chapter 2: The Growth o f Industry Output 43
While in the winter they produced summer textiles with linen, silk or/and cotton.108 In other 
words, it does not seem justifiable to separate the different non-cotton textile sectors and, 
therefore, I put these industries together in a single measure. The next table presents these 
current values and shows the extraordinary differences in the composition of the sector 
between the two years. These results justify the option taken in this chapter.
Table 2.6 Value of Sectoral Output: Other Textiles, 1840-1861 
(Current prices, thousand Pta)
1840 1861
Value Share Value Share
Mixed Fabrics Textiles 35,445 81.19 18,580 20.18
Wool Textiles 4,641 10.63 45,881 49.85
Silk Textiles 2,640 6.05 17,420 18.93
Linen Textiles 931 2.13 10,159 11.04
Total 43,657 100.00 92,040 100.00
N otes and  so u rces : see text. N um bers subject to  rounding errors.
The values of intermediate inputs were also estimated.109 Sources only provided the 
value of all inputs in the metal, mixed fabrics, linen and paper industries for 1840.'10 
Therefore, all the values for 1861 and the rest of the values for 1840 have been estimated 
from the available cost functions and/or the quantities consumed of the main inputs. 
Specifically, the quantities of raw fibre consumed were used to estimate values of inputs for 
wool and silk in 1840.111 In the metal, linen, mixed fabrics, silk, and wool industries, detailed 
cost functions are available and they have been used to compute the values of inputs for 
1861.112 Table 2.7. reports the evidence on the values of industrial output and inputs at current
108 This flexible production is described in Comisión Especial Arancelaria (1867) and in Ceidá
(1968).
109 See the previous section for the estimation of inteimediate inputs in the cotton industry.
1.0 The sources are: Metal: Madoz (1846) and Figuerola (1968); Mixed fabrics: Sayró (1842); 
Paper. Gutiérrez (1837).
1.1 It should be noted that in 1840 in both industries all machinery was hand-powered and that the 
other costs of production, except transport that is included in the price of raw materials, were 
relatively small.
112 The sources of these cost functions are Ronquillo (1851-1857), Comisión especial arancelaria
(1867), and Escribano (1986).
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prices.
Table 2.7 Sectoral Output and Intermediate Inputs: Modem Industries, 1840-61
(current prices, thousand Pta)
Sectoral Output 1840 1861
Cotton Spinning 31,592 67,422
Cotton Weaving 46,419 93,758
Cotton Finishing 76,597 143396
Cotton Industry 80,484 147319
Metal Industry 2,402 8,703
Other textiles 43,656 92,040
Paper Industry 5,250 6366
Intermediate inputs 1840 1861
Cotton Spinning 17356 48,094
Cotton Weaving 28,005 68360
Cotton Finishing 53309 106,480
Cotton Industry 22,192 62393
Metal Industry 1,941 4,666
Other textiles 29,794 60,031
Paper Industry 2,007 2,844
Notes a n d  so u rces: See text. Cotton industry sectoral output is here the agreggation o f  finishing sectoral output value 
and the co tton  yam  sold to mixed fabrics industry.
Given the measures of outputs and intermediate inputs in current prices, the next task 
is to separate this data into price and quantity components, the real sectoral output. The 
traditional method is to separate components using deflators. Here, the deflators are Divisia 
(Torqvist) price indices113, which have been computed according to the next equation:
1,3 However, when the information is sparse the deflators of the main product of the industry have 
been used. It should be noted that these deflators are equivalent to Divisia deflators if the product 
considered is the average product of the industry. See Hill (1993).
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(2.9) InP-lnP,^ = £ ( [e ,i(hyi,-ta/7f,_,)]
where pi designates prices, and n prices (l..i..n) are being considered. The two time periods 
are t and t-1, and the value share weights 0^ are computed as:
%  = i/2 [e„{7) * y r - i) ] ,
(i = l 7 l ) .
The ©pi's denote the share of each output (price x quantity) in total payments. The 
exponential of this logarithmic change generates an index number.
Torqvist price indices have two important advantages: (1) they avoid the problems 
related to the fact that some Catalan industries changed substantially the quality of products 
during this period and/or in the composition of the physical inputs;"4 (2) the measures 
computed by deflating current values with these indices are equivalent to the measures 
computed with Torqvist quantity indices. Hence, they are adequate for productivity 
calculations. However, the Torqvist, like other superlative indices, has some practical and 
conceptual disadvantages: (1) prices and quantities for both periods und?r consideration are 
required, whereas non-superlative indices require both price vectors but only base period 
quantities; (2) the indices are not additively consistent."5
Here, Torqvist deflators were constructed for outputs and inputs for each industry, 
except the paper industry’s inputs, where the deflator is the index of wholesale prices 
computed by SardSt."6 In the cotton industry, the prices are the same as section 2.1. Therefore, 
the inputs price indices are composed of up to six categories. In the metal industry the prices 
of inputs correspond to the prices of iron ingot and coal. Output prices are for metal plate and *15
,w It should be noted that in this kind of situation alternative Laspeyres, Paasche or unit-value 
deflators tend to bias the results. For example, the cotton spinning industry modified the composition 
of its output towards more quality yam, thus increasing the proportion of input costs that were due 
to energy use. Therefore a unit-value deflator tends to artificially increase the price of outputs and 
decrease the price of inputs.
115 Hill (199.3), pp- 384.
1,6 Sardi (1948).
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steam engines. For the input deflator the weights are: 90 percent iron ingot, 10 percent for 
coal. For the output deflator metal plate and steam engines have equal weighting.117 In the 
paper industry the price of output corresponds to the price of common paper, while the price 
of inputs is computed with the Sardà wholesale index.118
The most formidable problems arise in the construction of price indices for the 
remaining textiles, especially for outputs. Specifically, in outputs the main problem was to 
convert many different measures into an equivalent unit of weight. Then after this one must 
construct coherent output categories. To convert the unit that appeared in the 1840 sources, 
varas castellanas (a length unit equivalent to 0.835 metres), to the weight unit of 1861 (kg.), 
I must obtain the density of each kind of cloth and then multiply by the 1840 data. It should 
be noted that another problem is caused by the fact that different types of cloth had different 
widths, and hence densities per vara not only change due to weight but also due to width. 
Ronquillo collected data on all kinds of cloth produced in Catalonia and their standard weight 
and densities.119 Moreover, cautiously, I do not employ prices of the kinds of cloth that have 
altered their composition or quality (for example, during the period some kinds of mixed 
fabrics reduced the quantity of cotton yam increasing, in turn, the quantity o f  the other textiles 
fibres). The table below presents the prices in current values of inputs and outputs for that 
industry.
117 In particular, the prices are: coal 5.5945 Pta/Qm (1840) and 5.875 Pta/Qm (1861), iron ingot 
21.13 Pta/Qm (1840) and 23.64 Pta/Qm (1861), for iron plates 88.76 Pta/Qm (1840) and 80.5 Pta/Qm 
(1861), steam engines of low pressure (below 25 h.p.) are 1500 Pta/h.p. (1840) and 1240 Pta/h.p. in 
1861. The prices for 1840 come from Sayró (1842), except the price of steam engines which comes 
from Figuerola (1968) whereas the prices for 1861 came from Comisión Especial Arancelaria (1867).
118 The prices are 175 Pta/kg. in 1840 and 137,36 Pta/kg. in 1861. The sources are Gutiérrez 
(1837) for 1840 and Gimenez Guited (1862) for 1861.
1,9 Ronquillo (1851-1857), pp. 344-414. In the case of several weights and densities I decided to 
take an average of the available data.
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Table 2.8 Prices of Inputs and Outputs: Other Textiles 1840-1861
Inputs
1840 1861
Growth rate 
(percent 
per year)
Low-quality washed Raw Wool (Spanish) 1.79 2.24 1.07
High-quality washed Raw Wool (Spanish) 6.51 7.66 0.77
Imported wool yam (French, count no. 80) 9.77 13.20 1.43
Linen white yam (Imported) 3.75 5,48 1.81
Silk yam in hanks (Spanish) 48.86 45.48 -034
Cotton yam (Catalan, count no. 59) 11.80 858 -152
Imported cotton yam (English, count no. 80) 20.63 16.13 -1.17
Imported Coal (British) 5.43 5.87 037
Outputs
Damasco de lana (pure wool cloth) 19.43 16.45 -0.79
Raso de seda (fine silk cloth) 95-55 8356 -0.64
Cutíes (pure linen cloth) 14.24 10.82 -131
Dril (linen and cotton cloth) 13.24 14.85 055
Telas para vestidos (cheap wool and cotton cloth) 23.19 19.37 -0.86
Pañolería de Invierno (fine wool and cotton cloth) 36.80 3053 -0.89
Damasco de mezcla (fine wool and cotton cloth) 25,62 19,23 -1.34
Notes and so u rce s : A ll prices are in Pia /kg. except coal that is in Pta/Q m , and are prices in Barcelona's m arket 
Prices included taxes (tariffs and indirect taxes) and transport costs from producing sites to Barcelona. T he prices of 
1840 from Sayrd (1842) except linen white y am  from Madoz (1846) and the prices of 1861 from  C om isión especial 
arancelaria (1867). T he price o f high-quality raw  wool is an average o f  the price o f  Extremeña superior and
Aragonesa superior.
Table 2.9. reports price indices for sectoral output and intermediate inputs, 1840 is 
taken as base year. These price indices has been constructed using equation 2.8. Perhaps the 
most striking pattern that emerges from a comparisi on between the output and input price 
indices is that the prices of outputs declined significantly relative to those of inputs. In all 
industries the price of outputs grew less than the price of inputs. From these results and the 
fact that real wages rose during the period, it can be inferred by duality that total factor 
productivity must have rosen.120
120See chapter 5.
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Table 2.9 Price Indices of Sectoral Output and Intermediate Inputs: 
Modem Industries, 1840-61 (1840=100)
Sectoral Output 1840 1861
Cotton Spinning 100 69.82
Cotton Weaving 100 56.81
Cotton Finishing 100 53.58
Cotton Industty 100 54.21
Metal Industry 100 86.59
Other textiles 100 85.77
Paper Industry 100 78.49
Intermediate inputs 1840 1861
Cotton Spinning 100 112.49
Cotton Weaving 100 72.46
Cotton Finishing 100 63.73
Cotton Industry 100 105.80
Metal Industry 100 111.37
Other textiles 100 107.91
Paper Industry 100 116.98
N otes and so u rce s : See text
The next table presents estimates of growth rates of sectoral output, intermediate
inputs, its share in total payments, and value-added. According to the methodology proposed 
by Jorgenson, value-added growth rates are equal to the growth rate of output minus the
growth rate of intermediate inputs, weighted by their share in sectoral output payments.121
Table 2.10 Growth Rates (yearly percent) of Sectoral Output and Value-added:
Modem Industries, 1840-1861
Sectoral Intermediate Share Value
Output Inputs Intermediate Added
Cotton Spinning 5.32 4.29 0.63 2.61
Cotton Weaving 6.04 5.80 0.67 2.17
Cotton Finishing 5.95 5.44 0.72 2.04
Cotton Industry 5.80 4.65 0.35 4.18
Metal Industry 6.82 3.66 0.67 4.35
Other textiles 4.28 2.97 0.67 2.30
Paper Industry 2.07 0.91 0.41 1.69
Notes a n d  s o u rc e s : S ee  text for m ethodology an d  sources.
121 Jorgenson (1990).
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To aggregate single measures into sectoral gross output and value-added figures, I 
employ the methodology developed by Jorgenson.122 Two kinds of aggregation have been 
developed. The first is a weighted average of the individual industries' sectoral output, 
intermediate inputs and value-added, with weights given by the current values. The second 
has been developed under the assumption of separability of value-added and the existence of 
an aggregate function for the whole industry. Therefore, current values of sectoral output, 
intermediate inputs and the corresponding (Torqvist) price indices were computed. The results 
are presented in the table below:
Table 2.11 Growth rates of Aggregate Sectoral Output, Intermediate 
Inputs and Value-added: Modem Industries, 1840-61 (percent per year)
Sectoral Intermediate value
Output inputs added
Weighted sum 5.29 3.68 3.81
Aggregate model 5.13 3.72 3.44
N otes and  so u rces: see text.
It should be noted that the difference between the first model and the second model 
is, according to Jorgenson, the result o f market failures and, consequently, to the misallocation 
of resources. Traditionally, economic historians have preferred the first version.123
2.4. The Role of the Catalan industry in the Growth of the Economy
In the two previous sections I developed new measures of output and value-added for 
several Catalan industries. The next table aids the comparison of previous estimates with the 
new figures:
122 Jorgenson (1990).
123 See, for example, Crafts (1985a), pp. 27-28 or Prados (1988), pp. 163.
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Table 2.12 Alternative Industrial Indices: Catalonia, Spain and Andalusia, 1830-1861)
Catalonia
Growth rate per year
- Maluquer (1830-1861) 5.91 percent
(1840-1861) 5.28 percent
- Carreras (1844-1861)
- New Estimates 
(1) Sectoral Output
6.20 percent
Modem Industries (1840-1861) 5.13-5.29 percent
Cotton Industry (1830-1861) 
(2)Value-added
6.77 percent
Modem Industries (1840-1861) 3.37-3.81 percent
Cotton Industiy (1830-1861) 
Spain
4.51 percent
- Bairoch (1830-1860) 131 percent
- Carreras (1830-1860) 4.60 percent
- Prados (1830-1860) 
Andalusia
232-2.64 percent
- Parejo 235 percent
N otes a n d  so u rce s : Catalonia: M aluquer (1994b), pp. 70, Carreras (1990b), pp.56; N ew estim ates: previous ta b le s  
2-4, and  2.11. Spain: Bairoch (1982), pp. 292, Carreras (1990b), Prados (1988), pp. 166; and A ndalusia: P a re jo  
(1995), pp . 40.
It is immediately apparent from table 2.12 that the difference between the new and the 
previous industrial output estimates for Catalonia is relatively small. With the early Carreras's 
index about one point, with the more recent Maluquer's index the difference is negligible. In  
spite o f these small differences in growth rates, in each study the contribution of their sub­
components is different. Thus, in Carreras's index the cotton industry explained about 77 
percent o f Catalan growth in 1860. For 1844 to 1859 Carreras used imports of raw cotton as 
an index for Catalan production.124 In Maluquer's the proportions vary from a minimum of 
about 40 percent to a maximum of about 49 percent.125 This study puts the proportion at 
around 67 percent. It is clear that some discussion of the causes is required. I suspect that the 
differences between the other two indices and the new figures are mainly caused by the
124 Carreras (1990b), pp. 60.
125 Maluquer (1994b), pp. 59.
Chapter 2: The Growth o f Industry Output 51
different choice of index numbers.126
The growth rates of the new quantity indices of the cotton industry, which were 
computed with the Tôrqvist formula, are higher than those estimated by Maluquer and 
Carreras. The reason is simple since the Tôrqvist indices consider quality shifts in the 
composition of sectoral output. This is shown table 2.5, where the 'pure quantity index1 has 
a yearly growth rate of 5.12 percent (1830 to 1861). This contrasts with the new sectoral 
output index, which has a yearly growth rate of 6.77 percent. Since this study’s estimate of 
the rate o f growth of the cotton industry is higher than the estimates of Maluquer and Carreras 
we should infer that the other industries had lower growth rates. However, these lower growth 
rates cannot be attributable to my treatment of index numbers. Since there were large output 
quality increases in the metal, linen, silk, and mixed fabric industries. I can only suspect that 
the difference is related to the treatment of the mixed fabrics industry as Carreras and 
Maluquer assume that all cotton yam is used for the production of pure cotton cloth.
Nevertheless, the growth rates of value-added are lower than the growth rates of 
output. I want, though, to stress that industry value-added grew much more slowly than was 
once thought. Even though value-added growth was more modest than was previously 
believed, it did create a genuine process of industrialisation, that is reflected in a shift in 
industrial growth rates. Interestingly, this result confirms the opinions of several Catalan 
historians such as Graell, Vicens Vives, Izard, Nadal, Maluquer de Motes or Carreras, who 
all stressed the importance of this period.127 It is important to appreciate that the industries 
present in the index grew at respectable rates, except the paper industry, which was the only 
sector with growth rates below the average Spanish industry growth rates. This result is also 
consistent with the comments of many nineteenth century observers. Who not only 
emphasised the extraordinary development of Catalan cotton mills, but also the importance
126 It should be noted, however, that it is impossible to compare my weights with the weights of 
the other authors since they do not provide enough infomnation on this aspect.
127 Graell (1910), Vicens Vives and Llorens (1961), Nadal (1974X1985), Izard (1969), Maluquer 
(1976)(1985)(1994a)( 1998), and Carreras (1990a)(1990b).
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of the metal, paper, linen, silk, mixed fabrics and wool factories and workshops.128
The comparison of the evolution of the Catalan index with the Spanish indices and the 
recent industrial index for Andalusia is very revealing. The sectoral output indices are 
comparable with the indices of Maluquer, Carreras, Bairoch and Parejo, whereas the value- 
added indices are comparable with Prados' one. Any indicator shows that Catalan industrial 
growth rates were almost 30 percent higher than Spanish rates.
On a less optimistic note, however, one can argue that the sample used for the new 
index is biased in favour of the modem and capital intensive industries, and is biased against 
the traditional sectors. Note that a characteristic of the Catalan secondary sector was its 
capacity to produce many different industrial goods. For example, in 1861, Gimenez Guited 
collected data on 13 major industries located in Catalonia (cotton, olive oil refining, flour, 
wool, silk, soap manufacturing, spirits & liquors distilling, linen, metal manufacturing, paper, 
mixed fabrics, curtains and cork).129 The industries in the index had about 85 percent o f  
workers and 92 percent of the capital.130 Furthermore, other minor industries such as bakery, 
beer brewing, card-making, chemical products, gloves, jewellery, pottery, shoemaking, 
woodwork & furniture, glass, hosiery, boatyards, quarries, publishing, clothing, pin-making, 
wax, wine, hat manufacturing, canning, and coaches were also located in Catalonia.131 
Therefore, it seems necessary to compute the coverage of the sample in order to determine 
the bias introduced by measuring only the modem sectors and paper.
I do this with two alternative measures: one based on the active population figures and 
another on value-added. Ideally I would like to examine the Catalan population census and 
the Gimenez Guited data on labour to establish the part of the industrial working population
128 See Gutiérrez (1837), Sayró (1842), Madoz (1846), Ronquillo (1851-1857) and Gimenez Guited 
(1862).
129 Gimenez Guited (1862), pp. 207-214
130 Gimenez Guited (1862) appendices to the provinces of Barcelona, Gerona, Lérida and 
Tarragona.
131 See the references to these industries in Madoz (1846) and Ceidá (1968).
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covered by this sample. Two major problems with the male workforce figures make it 
impossible to directly compare the data of Gimenez Guited and the population censuses: (1) 
the figures for males in the Spanish censuses included an important part of industrial workers 
in a heterogenous category jom aleros (labourers), that also comprised agrarian and services 
workers, (2) Gimenez Guited did not give information on the number of industrial 
entrepreneurs but on the number of industrial establishments, which could have more than one 
entrepreneur. Furthermore, I cannot use the number of female workers in the whole sample 
for the modem industries, since it is likely that the percentage of women in the modem 
industries was higher.132 Consequently, the coverage of my sample must be estimated with an 
indirect method, employing the detailed census of Cerdd on the Barcelona workers of 1856. 
According to the data of Cerdd, the industries described by Gimenez Guited employed about 
58.8 percent of the manufacturing workforce (excluding construction workers).133 A simple 
comparison among Cerda's censuses, Gimenez Guited's data of females in industry, and the 
population census of 1860 prove that the structure o f Barcelona industrial workforce 
represents the whole of Catalonia.134 I can therefore extrapolate the relative figures for 
Barcelona. Briefly, my sample covers about 50 percent of the labour force in the Catalan 
industry (i.e., 85 percent x 58.8 percent).
Moving to value-added figures, the first step is to compare the value-added figures for 
Catalonia and Spain. According to Nadal, in 1856 Catalonia paid 25.04 of Spanish 
manufacturing tax.135 Considering that the Basque Provinces and Navarre did not pay direct
132 See the discussion of this issue in chapter 4.
133According to Cerdi (1968) pp. 587-616, the salaried workforce in Barcelona and its 
surroundings was around 55875, of which 39078 worked in industry: 22990 (41.14 percent) of workers 
were in the major industries (those industries where Gimenez Guited collected data), 12886 workers 
were in minor industries, and 3202 workers were in construction. I use the average of the minimum 
and maximum workers by each occupation.
134 For example, Gimenez Guited (1862) reported a figure of about 30,000 women in industry 
whereas the census (Nicolau (1990)) shows about 40,000, which is the same proportion that Ceidd 
reported in Barcelona (75 percent of female workers in Gimenez Guited's industries and 25 percent 
in the rest).
135 Taxes for manufacturing and mining were paid separately and it is likely that mining taxes 
were higher than manufacturing ones. For example, in 1856, manufacturing taxes amounted about 2.4 
million Pta whereas mining taxes amounted about 1.2 million Pta (Nadal (1992a), pp.156). If the taxes 
were set according to value-added then one could infer that mining produced about one third of
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taxes and that they must represent about 10.25 percent o f the Spanish manufacturing,136 
Catalonia might possess about 22.5 percent of Spanish manufacturing. Prados, correcting 
Mulhall's previous figures, estimated the current value of the value-added of the Spanish 
manufacturing production as 975 million of Pta in I860.137 Therefore, the total value-added 
of Catalan manufacturing was about 219.4 million Pta, whereas the value-added of the sample 
is 124.7 million Pta (i.e., about the 56.8 percent of the value-added of Catalan manufacturing). 
The similarity between this and the previous estimate of the share of working population 
supports the view that these two figures and the total figures are reasonable estimates.
The next step consists of computing a range o f possible estimates of Catalan industry 
growth rates for the industries where there was no data. Empirically, the overall growth rate 
is equal to the growth rate of the modem industries multiplied by their share in value-added 
(which was about 56.8 percent) plus the growth rate of the non-represented industries 
(traditional sectors) multiplied by their share in value-added (which was 100 - 56.8 = 43.2). 
It seems plausible that the growth rates of the traditional sectors were positive but did not 
exceed the growth rates of the modem sectors. Therefore, their growth rates were between 0 
and 5.29 percent per year. Then, resulting overall industry growth rates might be (in the case 
of zero growth in traditional sectors) between 3 percent and 5.29 percent per year (in the case 
of the same rates in modem and traditional industries). Therefore, I can argue that early 
industrialisation significantly increased overall industry growth rates, even if traditional sectors
Spanish industrial value-added. However, Mulhall (Prados (1982), p 110) assigned to mining a value 
125 million of Pta, around 11.4 percent of total Spanish industry value-added. Furthermore, Prados 
in his index gives mining share of industrial value-added of only 5.1 percent, whereas Carreras gives 
it share of 14.6 percent (Prados (1988) and Caneras (1990b), pp. 91). To sum up, to establish the 
share of mining in industrial value-added, taxes must not be used.
136 In 1861 the Basque and Navarre Provinces had the following shares in several industries: 15  
percent in flour, 5.1 percent in olive oil refining, 20.5 percent in cotton spinning, 16.9 in cotton 
weaving, 21.4 percent in calico printing, 2.0 percent in wool spinning, 7.8 percent in wool weaving, 
12.5 percent in silk spinning, 13.3 percent in paper, 13.8 percent in leather, 13.9 in linen, 12.5 percent 
in soap and 103 percent in spirits. (Source: Gimenez Guited (1862), pp. 207-214). From this data we 
can infer several industry shares: 15  percent in food, 14 percent-in textiles, 20 percent in metal, 12 
percent in chemicals, 14 percent in leather and 13 percent in paper. Then, with the value-added shares 
of Prados (1988), pp. 163 it can be established their share in Spanish manufacturing was 1035 
percent.
137 Prados (1982), pp. 110.
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remained stagnant.
Using this range of estimates of Catalan industry, I can also estimate the contribution 
of Catalan industry to the growth of Catalan GDP and Spanish GDP. Specifically, the 
contribution of Catalan industry is the result of multiplying each estimate by the share of 
Catalan industry and then dividing the result by the overall growth rates. Since I employ 
value-added weights that corresponded to the last year the results are equivalent to a 
Laspeyres index and, hence, overstate the Catalan contribution to Spanish growth rates. 
Moreover, the results may be biased because it is likely that this revision of Catalan industry 
output altered Spanish figures by a significant amount. Therefore, in order to correctly 
establish the contribution of Catalan industry to Catalan and Spanish growth rates, I must 
review industrial output and GDP estimates for Spain.
The share of the value-added of Catalan industry in Catalan and Spanish GDP can be 
estimated by means of Mulhall's figures.138 Carreras and Yânez give the share of Catalonia 
in Spanish GDP as 13.4 percent in 1862.139 Then, since the current value Spanish GDP was 
of 5,594 million Pta in 1860, and assuming the same proportion for 1862 and 1860, the 
Catalan GDP was 749.6 million Pta.140 14In other words, the share of value-added of Catalan 
industry was equal to 29.3 percent of Catalan GDP and 3.9 percent of the Spanish GDP.*41
The data on Catalan GDP are very imperfect and so any estimates are controlled 
conjectures. Thus, I decide to estimate two alternative figures for Catalan GDP. The first 
(GDP A) is based on the assumption that the share of Catalonia in Spanish GDP in 1832 was
138 Prados (1982), pp. 110.
139 Carreras and Yaiiez (1992), pp. 156.
140 It should be noted that the discrepancy between this estimate and that provided by Carreras and 
Yahez is because they computed Spanish GDP as 7,071 million Pta and Catalan GDP as 948 million 
Pta (Carreras and Yanez (1992), pp. 156). However, I preferred not to modify Prados' figures since 
he separates Spanish GDP into its different components.
141 Similarly, since the value-added of Spanish industry (i.e., manufacturing plus mining) was 
1,100 million Pta in 1860 (Prados (1982), pp.l 10), the share of Catalonia was about 19.9 percent.
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the same as in 1802 (8.3 percent).142 The second (GDP B) has been computed under the 
assumption that the portion of Catalonia in the Spanish GDP in 1832 was the geometric 
average of the quotas of 1802 and 1860 (the share in 1860 was 13.3 percent).143 The rate of 
growth resulting with GDP A (2.57 percent per year) is the upper bound, and the rate of 
growth of GDP B is the lower bound (1.62 percent per year). The choice of GDP has strong 
implications for the interpretation of the period considered here and the previous phase (from 
1802 to 1830). Specifically, with GDP A Catalonia grew during the period 1800-1830 at the 
same rate as Spain (a mere 0.31 percent per year) whereas with GDP B it grew at four times 
the Spanish rate (1.23 percent per year). By contrast, during the following period (1830-60), 
with GDP A Catalan growth was double the Spanish growth rate, whereas with GDP B grew 
at only a quarter faster than the rest of Spain. Demographic figures revealed that from 1800 
to 1830 the Catalan experience was very similar to the rest of Spain, whereas in the 1830- 
1860 the growth rates of the Catalan population were double the Spanish average.144 1456
According to Pérez Moreda, Catalonia suffered during this period 'a precocious and striking 
decline in mortality as well as immigration from other regions.'143 Admittedly, the estimates 
of the Catalan experience derived from GDP B is unlikely, but it would be desirable to 
expand our knowledge of the first third of the nineteenth century to discriminate definitively 
between both figures.
Finally, I must revise previous estimates of Spanish industrial production, considering 
the new growth rates.144 It is of interest to note that the industries considered in my sample 
were the Catalan industries with larger shares in Spanish industry. My estimate based on the 
Gimenez Guited data suggests that Catalonia had 69.1 percent of the textile industry, 17.4
142 Sources: Spanish GDP, Prados (1982), pp. 110 and Catalan shares Carreras and Yáñez (1992), 
pp. 157.
143 The same sources as in previous footnote.
144 In particular, the average annual demographic growth rates per thousand habitants in the period 
1797-1833 was 4.3 in Spain and 5.4 in Catalonia, whereas in the next period (1834-1857) 9.6 in Spain 
and 19.4 in Catalonia (Pérez Moreda (1987), Table 23, pp. 18).
145 Pérez Moreda (1987), pp. 19.
1461 cannot recalculate Carreras' index since in his book (Carreras, (1990b) the industrial index 
is not disaggregated by sub-sectors.
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percent of the metal industry and 30.8 percent of the paper industry.147 By contrast, the share 
of the rest of the Catalan industries in Spanish value-added was reduced, except in cork 
manufacturing (a very small industry).14* Consequently, I can conjecture that their growth rates 
did not affect total growth rates. Furthermore, since Prados does not consider the paper 
industry in his estimates, I only need to change the growth rates of the metal and textile 
industries.
I also introduce a further refinement to Prados’ index by reweighting the textile 
industries. Similar to the debate on the British Industrial Revolution, the debate on the early 
phase of Spanish industrialisation was centred on the appropriate weights that must be given 
to the different industries. Two main issues have been raised by Carreras and Prados, the 
quotas of the two main sectors, food and drink and textiles, and the share of the cotton 
industry within textiles.149 Indeed, the results are very sensitive to the weighting for cotton. 
The great advantage of this sector is the availability of good historical data (I believe that the 
second and third sections of this chapter support this assertion). Furthermore, Gimenez Guited 
calculated precisely the output of all the textile industries (cotton, wool, linen, silk and mixed 
fabrics), except the clothing industry, for all Spain, including the Basque and Navarre 
provinces. Therefore, employing this data and the production functions available, it is simple 
to compute the current value-added of the textile industries. These current values can then be 
weighted with the total current values given by Mulhall.150
147 Based on industrial tax (1856), Nadal reports similar figures: 663 percent in textiles, 21 percent 
in metal and 31.8 percent in paper (Nadal (1992a), pp. 153).
148 According to Nadal (1992a), pp. 153, 10.1 percent in food and drink, 15.7 percent in 
construction goods, 13.3 percent in leather, 17.4 percent in chemicals, 243 percent in wood and 
furniture, and the exceptional 42.8 percent in miscellaneous industries (mainly cork manufacturing).
149 Carreras employed a backward extrapolation of the ratio between the value-added at factor 
costs and the value of total product in 1958. Which was the first year in which highly reliable Spanish 
National Accounts data was available. Carreras also used a unique price vector for the whole cotton 
industry to determine the value-added share to total industrial production. In contrast, Prados used the 
shares of each industry in the industrial tax records (Contribución industrial y de comercio) for 1856 
and 1900, under the assumption that these corresponded well to the value-added. See the criticism of 
the methodologies in: Prados (1988) chapter 4 and Carreras (1990b), addenda to chapter 3.
150 Note that the shares computed with this method are not directly comparable with the shares 
computed by other authors since their indices were based on a sample of industrial activity rather than 
data for the whole sector.
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Table 2.13 Share of the Textile Industries: Spanish Industry Value-added, 1860 
Share (percent) in total value-added Share (percent) in textile industries
Carreras Prados New Carreras Prados New
Cotton 27.0 8.0 11.6 78.7 34.8 56.9
Wool 2.7 12.4 4.5 7.9 53.9 22.1
Linen 4.0 1.9 2.5 11.7 8.3 12.2
Silk 0.6 0.7 1.1 1.7 3.0 5.4
Mixed fabrics 0.7 3.4
Total 34.3- 23.0 20.4 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes a n d  so u rce s : Carreras and Prados figures cam e from Carreras (1990b), pp. 91. The new  estim ates are derived 
from G im enez G uited  data ((1862),pp. 209-212) and are com puted according to  the method o f  the section  2.3. T he 
share in the total values added is the result o f  to  divide the value-added o f  each  industry by  M ulhall estim ate on 
industrial value-added (Prados (1982), pp . 110).
Prima facie , the new estimates are relatively closer to Prados' than Carreras' figures. 
In this study the share of output of the textile industries is smaller than the share assigned by 
Prados and Carreras. However, it should be noted that the total share of the textile industry 
in the new estimates is probably the lower bound of the sector, since clothing has been not 
considered. Due to this, I do not modify the quota of the textile industry (23 percent) given 
by Prados.131 132But the composition of this new estimate for textiles differs greatly from those 
of Carreras and Prados. Thus, from this new point of view, Carreras overestimated cotton and 
underestimated wool whereas Prados does exactly the opposite. ;
With the new estimates of the textile and metal industries and the new (internal) share 
of textiles, I decide to estimate two alternative industry indices. Both of which are 
modifications of the original Prados industrial index.152 In the first (Spain Industry A) index 
of industrial output, I assume that the textile and metal industries in Spain had the same 
growth rates as equivalent Catalan industries. In the second one (Spain Industry B) I consider 
that the non-Catalan industries maintained the growth rates computed by Prados. As in 
Catalan GDP, Industry A can be considered the upper bound whereas industry B the lower
151 Unfortunately, the coverage of Gimenez Guited for the other major industrial sectors is patchy. 
Thus, food is underrepresented since only flour, oil refining and spirits were considered, whereas 
mining is not.
132 Prados (1988), pp. 143-168.
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bound. These alternative annual rates of growth lie, again, between the estimates of Carreras 
and Prados.
Table 2.14 Contribution to Overall Growth Rates: Catalan Industry, 1830-1860
Share Catalan
Overall industry in Contribution
Growth Rate value-added growth rates
(percent) (percent) (percent)
(a) (b) (c)
Catalonia (1) GDP A 2.57 29.3 34.3 - 60.4
(2) GDP B 1.62 29.3 54.2 - 95.4
Spain (2) Industry A 3.32 19.9 18.0 - 31.7
(3) Industry B 2.99 19.9 20.0 - 35.2
(4) GDP A 1.29 3.9 9.1 - 16.1
(5) GDP B 1.21 3.9 9.7 - 17.0
(6) GDP C 0.88 3.9 13.3 - 23.4
Notes an d  sou rces: The growth rates have been computed under the assum ption that the growth rates o f Catalan
industry during the period 1830-60 were identical to those in the period 1840-61. C atalan GDP A  and B: see tex t 
Spain Industry A and B. see text. G D P A: Prados index of Spanish G D P  (Prados (1988), pp. 38-47) com puted with 
the Industry A. G D P B: the same than G D P B but calculated with Industry B. Spain G D P  C: M ulhall’s estimates of 
current Spanish G D P  (Prados (1982), pp. 110) deflated with S ard i w holesale prices index. The contribution in the 
column c is the result o f  to multiply the range o f  Catalan industry grow th rates (see text) by the share o f  the column 
b and to divide by the growth rate o f  the colum n a.
The range of estimates based on different assumptions suggest similar conclusions. The 
contribution of the Catalan industry to Catalan GDP was larger. In Catalan GDP A, industry 
is the main factor in Catalan growth whereas in GDP B practically the unique factor. Another 
relevant result concerns the contribution of modem industries to Catalan growth, the 
contribution is between 34 and 54 percent.133 The image of early industrialisation as one in 
which modem industries produced strong changes at regional level is fully proved.
By contrast, the contribution o f Catalan industry to Spanish figures was less important. 153
153 It must be remembered that the lower contribution of industry to overall growth rates 
corresponds to the case when the rate of growth of the traditional industries is equal to zero. 
Consequently, it can be interpreted as the direct contribution of the modem industries to overall 
growth rates.
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Particularly, the contribution of Catalan to Spanish industry varies from about 18 percent to 
about 35 percent. It is noteworthy that the widespread industrialisation at Spanish level 
required that more than one region experienced industrialising processes. Similarly, the role 
of the leading sectors is relatively small (about one fifth). From this last result, it can also be 
inferred that broad industrialisation demanded that traditional industries experienced large 
growth rates. Indeed, the contribution of Catalan industry to Spanish GDP is also small from 
about 9 percent to about 23 percent.
2.5. Conclusions
The main arguments can be re-stated as follows. First, I would stress that the results 
of the first section indicate the importance of quality in industrial growth during this period. 
Consequently, this paper provides a serious quantitative challenge to previous estimates o f 
industrial output that did not take into account this issue. Second, I have made further 
revisions of the earlier estimates by means of the Tôrqvist indices in the course of the second 
section; these are generally fairly small in overall growth rates but tend to change the internal 
contribution of each sector. Third, I accept that the measurement of growth yields only a 
range of best guest estimates and that the coverage of the new index is not complete. 
However, it is important not to exaggerate the degree of scepticism. Fourth, I point out that 
Catalonia experienced the beginnings o f industrialisation during this period. Finally, I 
demonstrate that despite the impressive growth rates in several modem industries, early 
industrialisation in Spain remains a regional phenomenon. On the whole, during this early 
period of industrialisation, rapid growth rates in Spanish GDP were only possible when 
traditional sectors experienced similar growth rates to those found in the modem industries.154
154 See chapter 7.
Chapter 3
Capital as a Factor of Production
In this chapter I investigate the role of capital accumulation in Catalan manufacturing 
growth during early industrialisation. Traditional interpretations of the early Catalan 
industrialisation have underlined (1) the importance of the previous accumulation of 
commercial capital for the spurt of industry, (2) the existence of some sort of capital-supply 
constraint in the development of Catalan manufacturing. In sharp contrast, this chapter 
highlights that the main role in the process of industrialisation was not played by capital 
accumulation and that the record of Catalan investment in manufacturing correlates quite well 
with the experiences of other industrialising countries. Therefore, it is unlikely that the capital- 
supply constraint was larger in Catalonia than in other industrialising European regions.
3.1. Introduction
Economic historians have long been interested in determining the role of capital 
accumulation in industrialisation: whether the shift to a high rate of investment was a 
characteristic of the early part of industrialisation, and whether machinery investment is the 
strategic factor in economic growth. It is generally accepted that capital was important for 
growth, but there is disagreement on the part o f economic growth that can be directly 
attributed to capital accumulation.
One extreme position in the debate is represented by the authors who postulate the
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strong association between investment in fixed assets and growth.155 According to this school 
of thought, capital accumulation must precede rapid growth rates. For example, W.W. Rostow 
postulates that an investment boom for a number of years will cause a spurt in the short-run 
growth rate, and shift it to a new, higher growth path.156 A corollary for economic policy is 
that a pro-investment policy leads to higher capital formation and to a higher level of income.
A variant of this argument is provided by academics who conjecture that the rate o f 
investment affects the rate of technical change in a positive manner.157 Thus, machinery 
investment and productivity growth are strongly associated, since technical progress is due 
primarily to improvements in the design of new capital. Therefore, changes in the capital to 
labour ratio may lead to a long-term increase in the rate of growth of productivity. The 
corollary for economic policy is that favouring the acquisition of machinery (e.g., subsidising 
imports of the most modem machinery ) induces higher growth rates.
Finally, the other extreme of the debate is occupied by the authors who suggest that 
growth induces subsequent capital formation more than capital formation induces subsequent 
growth.158 Similarly, shifts in productivity, and hence technological innovation, precede high 
investment rates. The economic policy consequences o f this posture are also strong. Simply 
raising saving and investment rates will not increase growth levels. Economic policies must 
encourage changes in institutions, the economic climate, education, direct investment, the 
population structure and make efficient the use of available resources.
Recently there seems to have an upswing in interest in the subject of capital in 
Catalonia, primarily because of its profound implications for the understanding of early 
industrialisation. However, relatively little has been written on the relation between investment 
and economic growth. The (implicit) assumption of almost all Catalan literature on capital is
155 The two classic references are Rostow (1960) and Lewis (1955).
156 Rostow (1956X1960).
157 For example, Rosenberg (1963), Landes (1969), Landau (1989), De Long (1991) and De Long 
and Summers (1991).
158 See, for example, Blomström et al (1996).
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that investment in fixed assets (especially in machinery) must cause economic growth. In 
other words, it is the rate of investment which decides growth rates and, hence, an increase 
in the amount o f capital invested in industry will positively affect the rate of output growth. 
Consequently, the tendency in the literature has been to look for external factors that 
determined the supply of capital rather than those internal factors which determined the 
demand for capital.
A large group of writers have tended to highlight the constraints on the supply of 
capital to industry. The truth is, that since the beginning of the twentieth century many 
authors have worried about the weak links between banking and industry. Furthermore, these 
authors have alleged that Catalan banks failed to properly finance industrial enterprises. The 
seminal work in this area is Guillem Graell.159 He pointed out that Catalan banks were less 
active than other Spanish banks because of the reduced size of the home market for financial 
instruments. More recently, Gabriel Tortella160 come back the issue following the ideas of 
Cameron.161 He found that banks were important for the construction of the railway network 
in Spain, but not for Catalan industry. Furthermore, he pointed out that the large demand for 
funds from the Spanish government and railways crowded out industry investment. Tortella's 
book spawned a series of works which, using banking data examined the relationship 
between banks and industry in Catalonia. Similar conclusions were reached in all these 
studies: the relations between banks and industry were scarce since the banking system was 
mainly devoted to financing the development of the railway network and other public 
works.162
Some studies based on data drawn from industrial firms arrived at similar conclusions 
to those articles based on banking sources; that is, the lack of direct involvement of banks in 
industrial business. The pioneering work in this area is Jordi Nadal and Enric Ribas,163 who
139 Graell, ed. (1908).
160 Tortella (1972aX1972b).
161 Cameron (1967) and Cameron, ed. (1972)(1992). See a critical review of the methodology and 
arguments of Cameron at Checkland (1968).
162 Castaneda et alt (1991) and Pascual (1990).
163 Nadal and Ribas (1992).
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found that cotton entrepreneurs relied mainly on their own reserves (either personal wealth 
or, more commonly, plough-back profits) and the wealth of family and relations for long-term 
finance. However, recent studies cast doubts on this view since it was found that industrialists 
required outside funds on some occasions (e.g., during the downward periods of the business- 
cycles or when they wished to increase the size of their firms) and that, in practice, long-term 
loans could easily arise out of the continual renewal of short-term accommodation.lw
The evidence for a lack of involvement in industrial finance by the banks could be 
taken as evidence for either the absence of an active demand for funds from industry, or a  
supply constraint. In other words, the evidence of a lack of involvement cannot distinguish 
between demand and supply. Furthermore, it must be said that no direct evidence on the 
refusal of banks to finance new industrial projects has been produced. Moreover, even if there 
was a fringe of dissatisfied borrowers, one cannot presuppose market failure in bank lending. 
To sum up, the evidence collected does not serve to discriminate between autonomous 
demand and supply factors.
A variant of the supply-side constraint argument is provided by two studies which 
blame monetary restrictions. Carles Sudria holds that the restrictive monetary policy conducted 
by the Banco de Barcelona, the main note-issuer in Catalonia, reduced the supply o f money.164 65 
He offers evidence that this bank maintained a large amount o f money in cash and reduced 
note-issuing during the downward periods of the business cycle. Similarly, Carles Sudrià and 
his associates have pointed out that the loss of the American colonies at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, combined with the large exports o f gold and silver to pay for imports, 
provoked a money-supply restriction in the Catalan economy.'66 Although, recently, Xavier 
Cuadras and Joan R. Rosés have shown that macroeconomic evidence does not correspond 
to a situation of currency shortage. Since there was rapid economic growth, an important 
commercial deficit which was offset with exports of metals, and price stability.167 Then, they
164 Rosés (1993).
165 Sudrià (1994b).
166 Sudrià et al. (1992).
167 Cuadras and Rosés (1998).
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argue that the explanation of this puzzle lies on the use of bills of exchange and other 
privately issued documents as means of payment, probably due to the shortage of other 
alternative exchange media.
Evidence on the nature of the demand for capital is much scarcer. The major results 
on this issue have been accomplished by the recent work on the formation of companies. 
According to the collected data, the constitution of companies in Barcelona showed that 
capital invested in the service sector was twice the amount of capital invested in industry.168 
In other words, the absolute levels of industrial investment appear to have been quite modest 
when compared to the other sectors of the economy. Although, it should be noted that this 
kind of indicator is not exempt from probleips. First, it is biased in favour of investment in 
industry, since most of the new factories were constituted in the form of companies whereas 
agricultural and small shops were not registered. For example, 0.22 percent of the total of 
capital invested in companies in Barcelona corresponds to agriculture. Which at that time 
covered about two thirds of the active population. Second, the number of registers is strongly 
affected by the changes in the commercial legislation or custom. Third, since companies were 
registered when they constituted, reformed, or closed, increases in capital after the constitution 
are difficult to discover. Fourth, companies were sometimes registered with fictitious capital 
figures and, hence, resulting capital figures are unbelievable. Finally, the resulting figures are 
not adequate for developing macroeconomic estimations since it is impossible to distinguish 
between the sources of the investment (machinery, buildings, inventories and circulating). 
Consequently, depreciation rates cannot be obtained or computed.
To sum up, unfortunately, the empirical work on capital has not used standard 
macroeconomic measures of capital input and, hence, it can only offer an incomplete view 
of the role played by investment during industrialisation. Moreover, the results obtained are 
rather inconclusive. Banks were relatively less important for Catalan industry than in other 
backward countries, like Germany or Italy, but it is not clear if this was a consequence of 
supply-restrictions or demand characteristics. For that reason, this chapter attempts to fill some 
of this void by providing direct measures of capital input for the main Catalan industries.
168 Sudrià et a i (1992). table 4, pp. 197.
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Employing the standard methods o f the theory of capital. There are two general reasons why 
this alternative approach might be useful: (1) macroeconomic figures can be used to establish 
the relations between investment and growth rates (that is» to study the contribution o f capital 
accumulation to industry growth), (2) it can serve to discriminate between the supply and 
demand arguments since it is possible to establish with these figures whether Catalan 
experience on industrial investment correlates well with the experience of other European 
countries during early industrialisation.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 reviews concepts, methodology 
and historical sources for the measurement of capital. Section 3.3 presents the results of the 
estimation of capital for the main Catalan industries. Section 3.4 addresses the debate with 
the evidence from the Catalan experience.
3.2. Definitions, Methodology and Historical Sources
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to narrow the definition of capital and 
describe the measure that will be employed in this section. Capital here comprises 
(considering that this dissertation only refers to industry) non-residential structures (industrial 
buildings), producer durable equipment (machinery and other industrial equipment), and 
inventories (stocks of raw materials, semi-manufactured and finished goods, here, in the hands 
of industrialists). It differs from the concept of capital employed in business and accounting 
(the financial resources available for an enterprise; what is put into a project). Since the 
accounting concept also includes some non-tangible assets and the financial capital required 
to cover trade debts and the depreciation of tangible assets. Two final points about the 
composition of buildings. The measures of land for industrial uses are embodied in the 
measures o f buildings, and industrial buildings were sometimes also used as residential 
buildings. Or, as was more often the case, that residential buildings were also employed as 
industrial buildings.
The correct measure of capital as a factor of production is the flow of services 
emanating from capital. It is customary to assume that the flow of services from capital is
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proportional to the measured net capital stock at T-l; in other words, previous capital 
investments minus depreciations and retirements.169 It is also convenient to adjust these figures 
for underutilisation. One simple solution to this problem is to compute energy consumption 
instead of physical capital stock.170 However, in this period, this does not seem the optimal 
procedure because the growth of energy consumption did not correlate well with the increase 
of the capital stock. In effect, the relationships between capital services and energy changed 
during the period since the new technologies introduced employed more energy per unit of 
capital.171 Specifically, at the beginning of the period, machinery was hand, horse or water 
powered. In the 1830s and 1840s the first steam engines were introduced, and then in the 
1850s the low pressure steam engines were replaced by high pressure engines.172 To sum up, 
since data on capital utilisation is not available for all years, and cannot be computed from 
energy consumption, the flow of capital services is assumed to be proportional to the 
measured capital stock. This requires the condition that Kit = X^Ci,, where X*, is a constant, 
K is capital input, and C the measured capital stock.173
The first step in developing measures of capital input is to construct estimates of net 
capital stock for the benchmark years at current prices. The perpetual inventory method was 
not used to extend these estimates from the benchmark years to annual for two main reasons: 
(1) this methodology requires several stringent assumptions that do not correlate well with the 
early industrialisation experience, (2) data on annual investment and retirements is not readily 
available for the studied period. There are three main assumptions behind the perpetual 
inventory method: the firms are not free to retire old capital as economic conditions dictate, 
maintenance and repair activities do not influence efficiency, and a higher rate of utilisation 
does not cause asset efficiency to decline more rapidly.174 These three assumptions are highly 
implausible for the scenario of early industrialisation.
169 Hulten (1990), pp. 123.
170 This solution was proposed by Costello (1993), pp. 211.
171 Hie classical reference is Von Tunrelmann (1978). On Catalonia see Carreras (1983) and 
Maluquer (1990).
172 Nadal (1974), pp. 197-201.
173 It should be noted that this is a common assumption in this kind of exercises.
174 Hulten (1990), pp. 126-127.
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The second step consisted of transforming the cunent estimates of capital stock into 
real figures. In this case, I employ the same methodology as Mark Blaug and Kenneth 
Sokoloff, deflating current values by an index of capital goods prices.1751 do not deflate each 
industry by its price index as Sokoloff did, but each kind of capital good in each industry by 
its corresponding price index.176 Therefore, I employ capital goods indices for each type of 
asset. Considering four sectors (the cotton industry, the metal industry, the paper industry and 
other textile industries),177 and up to six different types o f assets (workshops, factories, hand- 
machinery, steam and water driven machinery, engines, and inventories).178 For workshops and 
factories I employ the same price index. In machinery, I use two different price indices: one 
for domestically produced machinery and one for imported machinery. Finally, when I 
computed the price index for inventories the assumption was that they were composed o f 
equal values of outputs and raw materials.179
Unfortunately, no index of capital goods has already been constructed for that period 
in Spain and, therefore, I must develop previous the price indices.180 Due to the scarce 
information in the rest of industries, I preferred to construct buildings and machinery indices 
employing only price data on cotton spinning and weaving. And, then assumed that the rest 
of the industries’ prices experienced the same trend. Therefore, the prices of bergadanas 
(handspindles), steam-driven mule-jennies, steam engines, handlooms, powerlooms and 
factories have been computed for the two benchmark years (1840 and 1861). An unweighted 
average of the price of bergadanas, handlooms and steam engines generated the national 
machinery price index. Similarly, an unweighted average of mule-jennies, powerlooms and
175 Blaug (1961), and Sokoloff (1986).
176 Since the price indices vary across industries according to the industry-specific composition 
of capital goods this method is equivalent to deflating industry figures by a Torqvist price index.
177 As was mentioned in the previous chapter, I do not separate other textile industries into their 
individual components because looms were employed to produce cloth with different fibres.
178 In the case of other textile industries assets are also divided between mxhinery for spinning 
and weaving.
179 This is the same assumption as Sokoloff (1986), pp. 693.
180 Prados (1997) furnishes a series of deflators but only from 1850 onwards.
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steam engines generated the imported machinery price index.181 A further problem was 
provoked by the fact that the average size of factories rose during the period. To avoid this 
problem the price of new factories was divided by the number of spindles that were in the 
factory, using the assumption that spindles occupied the same space during the period.182 183The 
results of these calculations are in the following table:
Table 3.1 Capital Goods Prices, 1840-1861 (in Pta.)
1840 1861
(1) Factories (per spindle) 20.34 19.41
(2) Bergadanas (per spindle) 2.00 2.00
(3) Mule-jennies (per spindle) 26.53 25.00
(4) Powerlooms (per loom) 1000.00 840.00
(5) Handlooms (per loom) 100,00 100.00
(6) Steam Engines (per C.V.) 
Indices
1500.00 1240.00
(a) Buildings 100.00 95.43
(b) Imported Machinery 100.00 86.97
(c) National Machinery 100.00 93.28
Notes and so u rces: T he prices o f factories corresponded to cotton spinning steam -driven factories. T he prices of 
mule- jennie and pow erloom s are the prices o f  steam -powered m achinery. T he prices included all ancillary equipment, 
except the steam  engine. The prices o f  steam engines corresponded to low  pressure steam engines o f  less than 12 CV. 
The prices are draw n from: (1) Factories: for 1840 Comisión del gobierno (1841) and for 1861 Com isión especial 
arancelaría (1867); (2) Bergadanas for 1840, M .M . Gutiérrez (1837) and fo r 1861 Gim enez G uited  (1862); (3) Mule- 
jennies for 1840 C om isión del gobierno (1841) and for 1861 Com isión especial arancelaría (1867); (4) Powerlooms 
for 1840 M adoz (1846) and for 1861 Com isión especial arancelaría (1867); (S) H andloom s the same sources than 
powerlooms; and (6) S team  engines for 1840 Figuerola (1968) and for 1861 Com isión especial arancelaría (1867).
Note that the prices computed show the same downward trend is present in the prices 
for the United States, England and France.’83 However, the prices of imported machinery 
declined faster than the prices of national capital goods (buildings and machinery). It should
181 Note the biases introduced for the system are larger in the case of national machinery than 
foreign machinery.
182 The technical handbooks in spinning technology published in Catalonia provided a list of 
formulas to establish the space required for each spindle. Therefore, one can assume that all factories 
were constructed taking these requirements into account. Aran (1855) and Calvet (1857).
183 Blaug (1961), pp. 375; Sokoloff (1986), pp. 692; Feinstein (1988), Appendix, table XU, pp. 
470; and Levy-Leboyer (1978), pp.278.
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be underlined that national prices of machinery are composed of three goods, two produced 
by the woodwork industry and one by the metal industry, and that the good produced by the 
metal industry experienced a declining trend in prices as rapid as imported goods. This result 
shows that the metal industry increased productivity whereas the woodwork and construction 
trades suffered from productivity stagnation.
The third step in developing sectoral measures o f capital input is to construct rental 
prices for each category. Using the assumption of perfect competition and constant returns to 
scale I take the aggregate share of capital by industry to be simply one minus the estimated 
share of labour and intermediate inputs. I employ rental prices to allocate capital income by 
asset type. Here depreciation rates are very important because they decide the price.184 In 
capital literature there are three main depreciation rates: one-hoss shay form, straight-line and 
geometric decay. I prefer the geometric pattern since modem productive measurement tends 
to support the use of geometric depreciation rates in estimating rental rates.185 However, it 
should be underlined that the geometric rate is likely to exaggerate rental prices because of 
the rapid loss of efficiency in the first years of asset life. Consequently, when computing the 
rental prices with geometric rates one increases the differences among the different types o f 
capital goods (and the effect of capital quality on output growth).186
The estimated lives of the different assets are: 50 years for workshops, 40 years for 
factories, 20 years for engines, 25 years for hand-machinery, 14 years for steam or water- 
powered machinery and zero years for inventories.187 The corresponding geometric 
depreciation rates are: 4 percent for workshops, 5 percent for factories, 10 percent for engines, 
8 percent for hand-machinery, 14.3 percent for steam or water-powered machinery and, 
obviously, 0 percent for inventories. Workshops are given a longer life than factories because 
workshops were sometimes used as housing. Similarly, hand-machinery was employed during
1M Moreover, in the case of the perpetual inventory method they also determine the quantity index.
185 Hulten (1990), pp. 125.
186 Therefore, I also exaggerate the rate of growth of the capital input index.
187 These asset lives are based on Von Tunzelmann (1978) and Lyons (1987). However, Catalan 
sources displays the same asset lives see, for example, Nadal and Ribas (1992) or Arau (1855).
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more years than modem machinery because it was simple to repair.188 Furthermore, by 
assuming these different lives of the assets in the proto-industry and factory system I try to 
capture the effects of embodied technical change.
In perfect markets the rental rate must be equal to the arbitrage condition. Thus:
(3.D Pk(7) = pfJ-D K D  + ipfl) -  Ip/n-p/T-VA
Where pk (T) is rental rate, p¡ (T) is price, 8t is the geometric depreciation rate for a 
capital good type i, and r (T) is the nominal rate of return between (T) and (T-l) years. The 
price of the input capital is the sum of the nominal price and depreciation less revaluation. 
Under the customary assumption that all assets obtain the same rate of return 1 vary r(T) until 
total payments to capital equal the aggregate share of capital. Implicitly, this equation assumes 
that the transition from long duration to short duration capital goods is an increase in the 
quality of input capital. Therefore, the capital goods with larger amortization rates had larger 
weights in the input capital index, and machinery had a higher weight than buildings in the 
input capital index.
The final step in constructing the data on capital input was to combine price and 
quantity data into price and quantity indices of capital input. Employing the Torqvist index, 
capital input is computed as follows:
(3-2) In K '-h K ,^  = £  [e^OnCi.-lnCi,.,)]
where Ki designates capital input, C designates capital (observable) stock, n kinds o f capital 
inputs (l..i..n) are being considered, the two time periods are t and t-l, and the value share 
weights ©ü are computed as:
= i/2[e*(D + e^r-i)],
The 0 w’s denote the share of each in the value o f sectoral property compensation. The 
exponential of this logarithmic change yields an index number.
1,8 Gutiérrez (1837).
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A subsequent difficulty is the adaptation of contemporary data to the requirements o f 
these measures. Notice that, in almost all nineteenth century studies, capital was measured 
according to the narrow definition o f the Spanish industrial tax. Industrial taxes were collected 
with principles very similar to the concept of net capital stock and were adjusted for 
underutilization since taxes were only paid on the machines in use.189
For the first benchmark year (1840) the main data source is the industrial survey 
conducted during the period. For this census a Royal Commission, which was formed o f 
several outstanding Spanish economists and was directed by Esteban Sayr6, visited all the 
villages and towns in Catalonia where the cotton industry were located. The objective of the 
census was to evaluate the importance of the Catalan cotton industry, and other ancillary 
industries, and to decide if they merited tariffs. The census has never been fully published but 
two books gathered the main results. The first book, which was edited by the same Sayr6, 
collected the total figures and gave details on the methodology and sources of the survey.190 
In addition, Pascual Madoz, who took part in the Royal Commission, published a great part 
of the results in his geographical dictionary.191 The dictionary presented detailed information 
on the cotton industry and other minor industries by districts, provinces and towns.
The debate during the period over cotton industry spindles gives some insight into the 
quality o f Sayrd's census. As it was submitted to severe scrutiny by many contemporaries that, 
finally, certified the veracity of the data. In particular, Figuerola, in his very detailed study 
on the cotton industry disputed the figures in hand-machinery but, by contrast, confirmed the 
rest.192 A reduction in the amount o f hand-machinery cannot challenge the overall results since 
hand-machinery represented a small proportion of the stock of capital. Moreover, the figures 
of the census are confirmed indirectly by the anterior and posterior estimations of the cotton 
industry.193
189 An alternative estimation with the perpetual inventory method shows that stock estimates in 
different censuses are likely to be net.
190 Sayrd (1842).
191 Madoz (1846), especially the article, in the volume IE, devoted to Barcelona.
192 Figuerola (1968), pp. 302-320.
193 See following pages for a description of these sources.
Chapter 3: Capital as a Factor o f Production 73
In this census, capital was divided in three types: buildings, machinery and circulating 
capital. The two first components were net of depreciation and retirements, and were also 
adjusted for capital utilisation. Since the Royal Commission excluded all machinery and 
buildings which wer not in in-use, obsolete, in-construction or newly installed but not 
effectively employed. Moreover, part-time firms were registered only on the basis of their 
machinery in use.194 For example, during the visit of the Sayro's commission, the Junta de 
Fabricas (the cotton industry employers' organisation) claimed, without any success, that in- 
construction, part-time and stopped factories and workshops must be included as full-time 
factories in the census. Arguing that a 'strong crisis' had reduced the real productive 
capacity.195 The truth is that the Junta de Fábricas was interested in exaggerating size of 
cotton industry to prove its importance. Therefore, the Royal Commission estimated the 
adequate measure of buildings and machinery for the purposes of this chapter.
Nevertheless, the measure of circulating capital is not the most suitable for these 
purposes since they computed a 'rough' measure aggregating money values. Thus measure not 
only includes raw materials, semi-manufactured goods, and stored goods, but also provisions 
for wages. However, it is important to appreciate that provisions for wages might be 
necessarily reduced since wages were paid on a weekly basis and piece-rates were paid 
immediately after the goods were finished.196 Therefore, the biases produced by using 
circulating capital instead of inventories can be considered small.
Further problems could have been caused by the low quality of the price data but this 
does not seem the case. According to the procedures associated with the analysis of capital 
as a factor of production, capital stock must not be valued at new prices but at 'the amount 
that would be obtained from selling each piece of capital at its market price'.197 Evidence 
seems to suggest that the census values were based on actual prices of capital goods (i.e.,
194 Sayró (1842) describes the methodology of the survey. One of the authors of the survey, who 
did not agree with the methodology and preferred a gross capital measure, considers that almost 10 
percent of the (gross) capital was not computed. Madoz (1846), m , pp. 462-473.
195 Junta de Fábricas (1841).
196 Sayró (1842).
197 Hulten (1990), pp. 129.
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historical acquisition prices minus depreciation plus revaluations) and, therefore, fit quite well 
with the requirements of this kind of study. Sayró explains how the values of buildings were 
computed by capitalizing the actual rental values, but gives little information on the method 
that was employed when computing machinery and equipment values.198 Nevertheless, some 
indications of the method employed to estimate values of machinery can be indirectly 
obtained by looking at some of the data published by Madoz. For several Catalan towns he 
published the complete census sheets. In these sheets the information was disaggregated to 
unit-of-production level. From this evidence, it can be inferred that the Royal Commission 
gave different values to the same models of machinery in different cotton mills and 
workshops and, therefore, considered depreciation. For example, in the small village of 
Malgrat in the Province of Barcelona, 30 dandy looms were valued at Rv. 300 each in the 
factory of Francisco Sanllehi, 24 dandy looms were valued at Rv. 500 each in the factory of 
Gispert and Cia, and 8 dandy looms were valued at Rv. 412.5 each in the factory of José 
Maria Mandri.199
Unfortunately, Sayró’s census only covered the cotton, mixed fabrics and metal 
industries. The rest of the main Catalan industries (paper, linen, wool and silk) were 
practically ignored or the figures were simple speculations made by the members of the Royal 
Commission. Consequently, capital estimates for these industries must be based on alternative 
sources.
With regard to the paper industry, the main sources are the two studies on this industry 
conducted during the period.200 At first glance both estimates were based on the concept of 
gross stock o f capital since they tried to estimate the amount of value-added generated by the 
industry, and the return on capital. Moreover, the evidence presented in both studies is non- 
conflicting. Therefore, I convert from gross to net Figures by assuming 30 percent 
depreciation.201
198 Sayró (1842), pp. 36.
199 Madoz (1846), pp. 75.
200 Gutiérrez (1837), pp. 142 and the report cited by Delgado (1991), pp. 213-215.
201 Gutiérrez (1837) and Delgado (1991).
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For the linen industry, the gross stock of capital was estimated for 1846 in an article 
in Madoz's dictionary. This article also contains production figures from 1840 to 1846.202 
Employing these output figures, one can estimate the gross stock of capital in 1840, using the 
assumption that there were no changes in the capital to output ratios during the period. 
Furthermore, because linen weaving was practically new in Catalonia, the gross capital figures 
for 1840 are practically equivalent to net figures and, consequently, they do not require further 
adjustments.
From the available data on machinery and buildings for the wool industry in Sabadell 
and Tarrassa,203 one can estimate the overall capital stocks using the assumption that Catalan 
capital to output ratios were the same in Sabadell and Tarrassa. In this period these two towns 
contained a large part of the Catalan wool industry. Therefore, it can be postulated that the 
biases involved in using this data for computing the net stock of capital in the wool industry 
are likely to be small.
To complete the set of calculations for 1840, 1 move to the silk industry. Due to the 
scarce information on this textile industry, it was necessary to draw on the capital to output 
ratio (in this case the number of looms divided by the metres of cloth) of the mixed fabrics 
industry.204 *Silk weaving and finishing employed almost the same type of equipment as mixed 
fabrics weaving and finishing. Furthermore, in the early 1840s, Catalonia was not involved 
in the early phases of the production of silk cloth. The silk yam needed had to be imported 
from other Spanish sites, usually Valencia and Grenada.203 Therefore, the biases introduced 
by using the mixed fabrics ratios in computing the net stock of capital in silk are likely to be 
minimal.
With regard to the last benchmark y ear (1861), the main sources are: for cotton textiles 
the survey o f the Comisión especial arancelaría, and for the other industries the Gimenez
202 Madoz (1846), pp. 555.
203 Benaiil (1991), pp. 117.
204 Sayró (1842), pp. 17.
203 Figuerola (1968), pp. 225-226.
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Guited industrial guide.206 Several academics, and influential nineteenth century experts, have 
considered the survey as the best source of information on the cotton industry in the 
nineteenth century.207 It contains detailed information for all types of assets in spinning, 
weaving and finishing and very detailed reports on three firms in each of these sub-sectors. 
The data was collected on the same basis as the Sayro's census; machinery and buildings were 
net of depreciation and retirements and circulating capital included provisions for wages. 
Moreover, figures are given for 1860, the best year of the industry, and 1865.208 In Gimenez 
Guited (1862) the stock of capital was divided into only two types, aggregated buildings and 
circulating capital, but stock was net of depreciation and retirements.
A sceptical reader would argue that the estimations of Gimenez Guited (1862) might 
be biased downwards since they were based on tax data and, therefore, tax evasion might 
reduce overall figures.209 In particular, evasion of the direct industrial tax (Contribución 
Industrial) would reduce equipment figures because this tax was paid according to the number 
of machines. Furthermore, the errors contained in the number o f machines were transmitted 
to the value of buildings and circulating capital since their amount was estimated considering 
data on machinery.210
To estimate the amount o f tax evasion, and hence the undervaluation contained in 
Gimenez Guited's figures, I can only use cotton industry data this is because other industries' 
alternative figures are not already available or are not suitable for this purpose. Consequently, 
I must assume that the level of tax evasion in the other industries was equal to the level in 
the cotton industry.211
206 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867) and Gimenez Guited (1862).
207 Nadal (1974), pp. 11-12.
208 The figures employed here have been adjusted to 1861 levels.
209 By contrast, Sayro's census was not conducted for tax reasons and, consequently, it is probably 
more exact.
2,0 In Gimenez Guited (1862) only information on machinery capital appeared at firm level, 
whereas buildings and inventories appeared aggregated at industry and province levels.
211 In this period taxes had to be paid on machinery as soon as it was installed. However, in the 
1860s the Spanish parliament passed several laws that gave exemption from industrial taxes to 
factories that employed water energy. Carreras (1983), pp. 54-55.
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It should be highlighted that in the cotton industry, particularly in spinning, to establish 
the reliability of the figures is relatively simple. One can check the figures by calculating the 
physical production per unit of machinery. The quantity of raw cotton consumed by each 
spindle varies according to four factors: the quality of the yam, the type of spindles, the age 
of machinery, and the underutilisation of the machinery. During the 1850s in Catalonia, the 
first two factors remained stable since yam was produced by a constant combination of mule- 
jennies or self-acting mules and throstles (since 1852-1853 proportions were nine spindles of 
selfactings to one spindle of the other two types of machinery).212 Furthermore, the quality of 
yam remained constant during the 1850s213 and all the machinery, except a few handspindles 
and mule-jennie spindles, was relatively new. Therefore, underutilisation is the unique varible 
that affected physical productivity. The following table collects data on the physical 
productivity of spindles:
Table 3.2 Physical Productivity of Cotton Spindles: Catalonia, 1849-1861
SpindlesRaw Cotton Kg. per
Source year scope (thousands) (Tons) spindle
Figuerola 1849 Self-actings 20.0
Figuerola 1849 Mule-jennies 20.0
Figuerola 1849 Throstles 15.0
Ronquillo 1850 Catalonia 704 13,934 19.8
Instituto Industrial 1860 Catalonia 1,050 21,920 20.9
España Industrial SA. 1860 Sans 42 876 20.9
José Ferrcr & Cia 1860 Vilanova 19 298 15.7
Jové, Ascacibar & Cia 1860 Barcelona 15 323 21.5
Gimenez Guited 1861 Spain 1,017 23,024 22.6
N otes and  so u rce s : num bers are subject to rounding eirors. Kg. p e r  spindle is tons o f raw cotton d iv ided by the 
am ount o f spindles. F iguerola (1968), pp . 314. R onquillo (1851-1857). pp. 129; Instituto Industrial: Com isión Especial 
A rancelada (1867), pp. 27-28. España Industrial S .A ., José Ferrer and C ia and  Jové, A scacibar and C ia: C om isión 
Especial A rancelaria (1867), pp. 11-26. G im enez G uited (1862), pp. 204.
Fjguerola's figures refer to the full-capacity of the Catalan machinery in 1849.
212 See in the table 3.2 that, according to Figuerola (1968), mule-jennies and selfactings consumed 
about 20 Kg. of raw cotton per year whereas throstles only 15 Kg.
213 See chapter 9.
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Ronquillo's figures, which are corrected for underutilisation,214 are based on the cotton 
industry census conducted by the Junta de Fabricas de Cataluña in 1850. However, in 1850, 
many hand-spindles (about 26 percent o f in-use spindles), with very low productivity, were 
still active. The Instituto Industrial's figures were not adjusted for underutilisation. The next 
figures correspond to three firms that replied to the comisión especial arancelaria: the España 
Industrial SA ., the largest Catalan cotton mill, Jové, Ascacibar & Cia, and José Ferrer and 
Cía. The output of two first companies is representative of the average output produced by 
Catalan mills, whereas the output of the third firm was finer than the average.215 Furthermore, 
the first two worked at full capacity during 1860, whereas production at José Ferrer and Cía. 
was halted for several months. However, it should be noted that even when the mills worked 
at full capacity some machinery was stopped for repairs during the year. For instance, Cerdà 
reports that machinery was stopped about 9 to 10 weeks per year (about 17 percent of the 
year for repairs).216
Comparing the productivity of cotton spindles derived from Gimenez Guited with other 
sources, I find that these values are only about 8 percent higher than the Instituto Industrial's 
figures. Since data on raw cotton imports seems very accurate, this high productivity value 
is probably due to the different treatment of the machinery stopped for repairs. This 
impression is confirmed by the fact that industrial taxes in Spain were only paid on machinery 
in-use. Therefore, Gimenez Guited’s figures seem accurate, and the major differences are 
probably due to the different treatment of idle machinery.
Another important question is the reliability of the prices employed by Gimenez 
Guited and the distribution of the sample errors. As has been mentioned above, capital goods 
must be valued at acquisition prices minus revaluations and depreciations. Like in the Sayró 
census, in Gimenez Guited's guide the same machinery was valued at different prices in 
different factories, which suggests that depreciation rates were considered. By looking at the
214 According to the source, about 26 percent of the spindles were idle.
213 See a description of the quality of Catalan yam output in chapter 9.
216 Cerdâ (1968), pp. 595-598.
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surviving records of two cotton firms,217 *this supposition can be investigated in detail. In 
Gispert, Soucherion and Cía. (Vilanova) the real value of machinery was 25 percent higher 
than the value Gimenez Guited reported while in Miguel Puig and Cía. (Esparraguera) the 
reported and the real values were practically identical. This puzzling evidence can be solved 
by looking at the amount of machinery in Gispert, Soucherion and Cía. According to the 
company’s reports, 70 very old powerlooms, which worked at 75 percent of capacity, and 
other 132 new powerlooms (acquired after 1853) which worked at full capacity, were in the 
factory. Whereas only 142 mechanical looms were declared to the guide.318 Therefore, the 
managers maintained some old looms on the accounting books to artificially increase the 
value of their assets. To sum up, according to the evidence on these two cotton firms, the 
prices seem correct. Concerning the question of the distribution of the errors in Gimenez 
Guited (1862), two statistical tests show that the errors were randomly distributed among all 
the industries and provinces.219
In the cotton industry but not in other industries, the capital input has been estimated 
for two more benchmark years (1830 and 1850). The main sources for 1830 are the figures 
of Figuerola and Gutiérrez.220 Both estimates were not based on census data but were the 
direct estimations of the authors. Therefore, it is likely that the margins of error were larger 
than in the census. By contrast, the main source for 1850 is more reliable since it is a cotton 
industry census conducted by the Junta de Fabricas de Cataluña.221 There are two main 
problems with the 1850 figures: the finishing figures do not comprise the whole finishing 
industry since they only take into account printing but not bleaching, and the weaving figures 
also include the mixed fabrics industry. To deal with the first problem, the capital tooutput 
ratios of the other finishing operations in 1840 to 1850 were extrapolated using the
217 The firms are Gispert, Soucherion and Cia and Miguel Puig and Cia. The data on the first was 
studied by Nadal and Ribas (1992) whereas the records of the second firm are in Sedó (1861-65)
2,8 Nadal and Ribas (1992), pp. 220-221.
219 For example, the data observations have a log-normal distribution at 99 percent and they also 
passed the alpha-test of data reliability. See Greene (1993) on the mathematical grounds.
220 Figuerola (1968), pp. 311 and Gutiérrez (1834), pp. 131-141, and Gutiérrez (1837), pp. 22.
221 Junta de fábricas (1850). The results were published by Ronquillo (1851-1857), pp. 129 
whereas the whole census was reproduced, with several small errors, by Graell (1910), pp. 442-492.
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assumption that these operations underwent no important technological innovations. Then, the 
resulting figures have been added to printing figures to obtain the net stock of capital in 
finishing. Similarly, the capital to output ratios of the 1840 mixed fabrics industry were 
extrapolated. These figures were then used to estimate the capital levels of the 1850 mixed 
fabrics industry. These capital amounts were then subtracted from the weaving totals to obtain 
the level of capital used in the cotton weaving industry.
3.3. Em pirical results
Table 3.3 shows the evolution of the stocks of capital of nine industries: cotton 
spinning, cotton weaving, cotton finishing, metal, paper, linen, silk, wool, and mixed fabrics. 
These industries account for 84.22 percent of the stock of capital reported by Gimenez Guited 
in Catalonia and probably a similar proportion of 1840 stocks.222 Capital input growth rates 
range from about 2 percent to about 9 percent. Net capital stock223 rates (hereafter raw capital) 
were smaller than capital input rates, which shows that capital quality rose during the period.
The interpretation of capital quality has provoked a large debate among economists. 
Many academics have argued that the quality change in investment goods could be attributed 
to embodied technical change, which can be defined as the technical progress due to 
improvements in the design of new capital.224 Others have argued that the embodiment 
hypothesis was substantially unimportant, because changes in the composition o f capital stock 
have only a small impact on output growth.225 Finally, a third group of authors has rejected 
the concept of embodiment with the argument that the procedure used to compute quality in 
capital goods ’is no more than an extension of the standard two-factor analysis to the 
consideration of more numerous inputs'.226
222 Gimenez Guited (1862) tables of the provinces of Barcelona, Gerona, Lérida and Tarragona.
223 Net capital stock is equal to previous investments minus depreciation and retirements.
224 Hulten (1990).
225 Denison (1964).
226 Young (1995), pp. 649.
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Table 3.3 Growth Rates of Capital Inputs and Sectoral Output: 
Modem Industries, 1840-1861
Capital Raw Sectoral
Input Capital Quality Output
Cotton spinning 5.97 5.47 0.50 532
Cotton weaving 4.72 1.02 3.70 6.04
Cotton Finishing 9.03 8.26 0.77 5.95
Cotton Industry 627 4.92 135 5.80
Metal Industiy 6.77 6.14 0.63 6.82
Other Textiles 2.72 2.20 032 4.28
Paper Industry 1.90 0.98 0.92 2.07
Total 5.92 4.70 1.22 5.29
Notes and so u rce s : N um bers are subject to rounding errors. T otal figures com puted according to the method 
described in the equation 3.2. For capital sources see text above. Sectoral ou tpu t figures are drawn from table 2.8
and 2.9.
Whether the numbers in the above table reflect the trend of capital input in Catalonia 
between 1840 and 1861,227 I may justifiably infer from them that the country was 
accumulating industrial capital at respectable rates throughout thè process of early 
industrialisation: roughly 5 percent per year in net stock and 6 percent in capital input. Even 
the lower rate is well above the growth of the manufacturing labour force in those years.228 
In other words, the capital to labour ratio in Catalan manufacturing must have increased in 
those years. More interesting, however, is that total capital rates were very close to output 
rates in all industries, and even in the other textiles and paper industries they were below the 
output growth rates.
There are grounds for pursuing this question somewhat further. In particular, sceptics 
might argue that investment booms preceded any kind of industrial expansion within the 
period. This means that the balance between capital and output growth might be disturbed 
during the first decades (the 1830s or the 1840s) in one or several industries. During these 
short spans Catalan industry might receive large transfers o f capital from the rest of the 
economy and it is certainly possible that these funds found their way into the Catalan cotton
227 It should be noted that the sample of industries is biased in favour of modem industries and, 
hence, overall industiy capital growth tales were likely to be lower.
228 See the next chapter.
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industry.
The sequence of capital stock growth offers a convenient point for discussing the first 
question. The procedure is to concentrate on the cotton industry data by comparing capital and 
output by decades. Table 3.4 presents a set of estimates of capital input, raw capital (ie., net 
stock), capital quality and gross output growth rates.
Chapter 3: Capital as a Factor o f Production 83
Table 3.4 Growth Rates of Capital Input and Sectoral Output: Cotton Industry 1830-1861
Period Sector
Capita]
Input
Raw
Capita] Quality
Sectoral
Output
1830-1840 Spinning 3.45 2.41 1.04 7.02
Weaving 7.19 5.17 2.02 857
Finishing 9.10 8.43 0.67 839
Total 5.01 3.74 1.27 8.22
1840-1850 Spinning 7,89 7.42 0.47 7.65
Weaving 458 1.40 3.18 9.68
Finishing 8.61 7.62 0.99 10.48
Total 6.92 5.47 1.44 10.41
1850-1861 Spinning 5.41 3.70 1.71 3.29
Weaving 2.11 0.67 1.44 2.93
Finishing 10.47 8.84 1.64 2.12
Total 5.63 4.02 1.61 2.15
1830-1861 Spinning 4.88 4,48 039 5.90
Weaving 7.67 236 531 6.93
Finishing 9.21 831 0.90 6.81
Total 6.41 4.65 1.77 6.77
N otes and so u rce s : N um bers are subject to rounding errors. Total figures computed according to the method 
described in the equation 3.2, For sources see text above. Sectoral output growth rates computed with the figures of 
the tables 2.2 and 2.4.
In the 1830s and 1840s, production had grown more rapidly than investment; in the 
1850s the reverse was the case. Moreover, during the whole period, the capital slock 
experienced a quite stable growth pattern. Indeed, this result confirms the picture resulting 
from table 3.3. Note that individual sub-sectors evolved differently in the short-run, weaving 
experienced the largest investments in the 1830s, spinning in the 1840s, and finishing in the 
1850s. This result may indicate flows of capital among sectors throughout this early phase of 
industrialisation and structural changes in the composition of capital. It should also be noted 
that it gives little support to arguments based on the large transfers of capital towards 
industry.
However, the aggregate quantitative unimportance of capital growth may conceal 
significant shifts in the composition of capital stock through these years. Changes in the 
composition of capital can be of two types: alterations in the relative importance of the 
different industrial sectors, and changes in the composition w ithin the sectors of capital stock.
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Moving to the question of the changes in the share of each industry in the net capital 
stock, table 3.5 provides a detailed statement on the trends from 1830 to 1861. In cotton 
textiles the share is presented for four benchmark years whereas in the rest of industries only 
two years are given.
Table 3.5 Net Stock of Capital: Modem Industries, 1830-1861 (thousand Pta.)
1830 1840 1850 1861
Cotton spinning 26,460 33,664 70,701 106,220
as % cotton 55.65 46.89 56.85 53.87
as % total 35.50 44.43
Cotton weaving 16,833 28,238 32,481 34,970
as % cotton 35.40 39.33 26.12 17.73
as % total 29.78 14.63
Cotton Finishing 4,257 9,887 21,189 56,000
as % cotton 8.95 13.77 17.04 28.40
as % total 10.43 23.42
Cotton Industry 47,550 71,790 124,371 197,190
as % total 75.70 82.48
Metal Industry 3,988 14,489
as % total 4.21 6.06
Other Textiles 11,140 17,673
as % total 11.75 739
Paper Industry 7,912 9,730
as % total 8.34 4.07
Total 94,830 239,083
Notes an d  so u rc e s :  num bers subject to rounding errors. F or sources see  text.
Throughout the period the cotton industry absorbed the lion's share o f capital stock, 
its share fluctuated between roughly 76 percent and 82 percent. Within the cotton industry, 
weaving lost importance whereas finishing gained positions and the share of spinning 
remained quite stable. The evolution of cotton finishing is the most remarkable, the share in 
1861 was triple the share of 1830. After cotton finishing, metal was the industry that most
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rapidly increased its share in the net stock. This rapid growth can be associated with the 
creation of several modem companies that produced modem machinery with foreign patents. 
In spite of the rapid growth o f these new factories, the small workshops did not disappear 
because they participated in the new business as sub-contractors of the large firms.229 The 
counter-examples of the cotton and metal industry are the other textiles and paper industries. 
These industries showed a declining participation in the net stock of capital during the period. 
It is well known that the widespread use of cotton textiles damaged the rest of the textiles 
industries, reducing their market share. Moreover, the mechanisation of weaving in mixed 
fabrics and wool encountered many problems because the powerlooms used were not 
profitable until the 1850s.230 More complicated is to explain the slow growth of capital in the 
paper industry. Certainly, the establishment of new factories took place in the 1840s and 
1850s. Meanwhile, the traditional paper industry based on small water-mills, which produced 
high quality products, survived without important changes. It is likely that this dual aspect of 
the paper industry slowed down the total growth rates since new investment in the traditional 
sector was probably small.
The changes not only affected the distribution of the net stock of capital among the 
different industries, but also the shares of their components (buildings, machinery and 
equipment, and inventories) within each industry. Accounts for several countries have shown 
the relative increase of machinery with respect to industrial buildings during early 
industrialisation.231 Similarly, some economic historians, of whom the most famous is the 
Nobel winner Sir John Hicks, predicted that fixed investment during industrialisation benefited 
from the decrease of circulating capital.232 The next table displays these changes in Catalonia:
229 See Nadal (1974) and (1991b).
230 For mechanisation in the wool industry see Benaiil (1991), pp. 105-158.
231 However, the reader must not be confounded by this phenomenon since the share of machinery 
in total net capital stock remained small during the whole period. For example, Field (1985), pp. 380- 
381 shows that in the United States in 1850 machinery (producer durable) represented only about 9 
percent of total reproducible tangible assets.
232 Hicks (1965X1969).
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Table 3.6 Changes in thè Composition of Net Stock of Capital: 
Modem Industries, 1830-1861 (percent)
Year
Machinery &
Buildings Equipment Inventories
Cotton spinning 1830 63.78 13.86 22.36
1840 48.90 22.20 28.89
1850 30.13 32.89 36.97
1861 23.05 56.27 20.68
Cotton weaving 1830 27.42 9.41 63.16
1840 31.13 11.95 56.93
1850 31.92 20.61 47.48
1861 46.05 39.65 14.30
Cotton Finishing 1830 45.89 25.13 28.98
1840 65.18 19.11 15.71
1850 35.62 17.65 46.74
1861 48.91 28.77 22.32
Cotton Industry 1830 49.31 13.29 37.40
1840 44.15 17.74 38.11
1850 31.53 27.09 41.38
1861 34.47 45.51 20.02
Metal Industry 1840 43.18 26.74 30.08
1861 41.23 33.77 25.00
Other Textiles 1840 50.93 13.94 35.13
1861 5355 22.50 23.95
Paper Industry 1840 37.45 27.16 35.39
1861 34.57 30.85 34.57
Total 1840 44.35 18.46 37.19
1861 35.90 42.24 21.86
Notes and  so u rc e s :  num bers subject to rounding errors. F o r sources see text.
The outstanding feature of the classification by type of capital is the increase of the 
share of machinery in the net stock. At the beginning of the period under review machinery 
accounted for 18 percent of the total; by the end its share was 42 percent; that is, its relative 
importance had doubled. It is also important to appreciate the downward trend in inventories; 
in 1840 they accounted for 37 percent of the total and by 1861 their share had fallen to 21
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percent; that is, their relative importance had halved. The proportion of net stock of capital 
as industrial buildings also decreased significantly from 44 percent in 1840 to 36 percent in 
1861.233 A further consequence of these trends is the sharp rise in the ratio of fixed to 
circulating capital. Thus, the ratio of fixed to circulating capital was 1.6:1 in 1840 and by 
1861 it had climbed to 3.6:1. This latter result is similar to british figures where the ratio of 
fixed to circulating capital within the commercial and industrial sectors also experienced a 
sharp rise; from 1.5:1 in 1800 to 3.3:1 in I860.234
The first part of table 3.6, in which the changes in the cotton industry are displayed, 
is in some ways the most interesting. It again shows a marked upswing in the importance of 
machinery, with an increase from over 13 percent of the total in 1830 to over 45 percent in 
1861. The table also shows the falls in inventory levels, with a decline from 35 percent of the 
total in 1830 to 20 percent in 1861. The increase of machinery showed a constant increase. 
In current values, the amount of machinery grew from about 6 million Pta. in 1830 to 90 
million Pta. in 1861. By contrast, the downward trend of inventories was not constant as it 
was affected by business cycles. In particular, in 1850 the share of inventories grew due to 
the special characteristics of that year.235 However, it should be noted that this decrease in the 
share does not correspond to a similar decline in their current value. In 1830 inventories 
amounted to about 18 million Pta. and in 1861 about 39 million Pta. (i.e., more than twice 
the 1830 figure). Moreover, this reduction in the share of inventories is almost entirely due 
to cotton weaving. Inventories in cotton weaving fall in importance, with a decline from 63 
percent in 1830 to only 14 percent in 1861. These results imply that their current value in 
weaving was reduced from over 10 million Pta. in 1830 to only 5 million Pta. in 1861. This 
result does not mean that spinning and finishing did not save capital in inventories but that 
the reallocation of inventories among the different sectors strongly benefited weaving.236
233 This change in the structure of net capital implies that 57 percent of net investment was 
exclusively devoted to machinery whereas buildings received about 31 percent and inventories only 
12 percent.
234 Feinstein (1978).
233 For example, in the cotton company studied by Nadal and Ribas (1992), pp. 237 the value of 
inventories in 1850 were double that of 1849 and 1852.
236 See chapter 8.
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Another aspect of the structure of the net stock of capital is set out in the first part of 
the table 3.6. The wider differences in the composition of capital among the different sub­
sectors of the cotton industry. My contention is that the changes in the structure of capital 
were mainly decided by the point of departure and the different stages in the transition 
towards the mechanized factories.
For the period studied, spinning is the unique sub-sector of the cotton industry that 
completed the transition from proto-industry to factory system. In 1830, it was a putting-out 
industry with many units of production and very low investments in machinery.237 For 
example, an observer at that time emphasised the low amount of capital necessary to acquire 
a jenny.238 Then, the spread of the new cotton mills reduced the relative importance of 
buildings by decreasing the number o f workshops. Furthermore, competition among the new 
entrants helped the rapid succession of new vintages of machinery, every time more 
complicated and consequently more expensive. Thus, the buildings to machinery ratio 
plummeted from 4.6:1 in 1830, to 0.4:1 in 1861.239 Initially, in the 1830s, new steampowered 
factories constituted a small portion of the industry, and water and horse-powered mills 
constituted the large part. For example, in 1840, the total number of CV installed in the 
industry was 2,014. O f which only 14 percent corresponded to steam engines. During the 
1840s the process accelerated with the introduction of the self-acting mules. These new 
spinning machines benefited from the reduction of power costs through the adoption o f high- 
pressure and compound steam engines.240 This reduction in running costs was accompanied 
by a progressive increase in the amount o f capital invested in machinery. This was because 
the new machinery was more expensive but also more efficient and competitive with respect 
to alternative sources of energy. By the 1850s, the standard factory in spinning was 
steampowered and employed a combination o f self-acting mules and throstles. Through this 
process the industry saved on capital invested in buildings by reducing the number of
237 See chapters 7 and 9.
238 Gutiérrez (1837), pp. 152-153.
239 Furthennore, the net investment in buildings from 1830 to 1861 was equal to about 45 percent 
of the value of the net stock of buildings in 1830.
240 Von Tunzelmann (1978), pp. 206-208.
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productive units, but not the amount devoted to inventories.241 Moreover, it should be noted 
that the previous investments in fixed capital were never wasted since old buildings were 
prepared to adopt the new machinery and old mules were scrapped only at the end of their 
working lives.242
Contrary to spinning, cotton weaving did not complete the transition to the factory 
system in the period. Moreover, handloom weaving was not heavily damaged by the use of 
the new machinery until the 1850s. For example, in 1850 eight handlooms were in service for 
each mechanical loom.243 In spite of the survival of handlooms during the period, the changes 
in the capital structure had a marked parallelism with that of spinning. Thus, the buildings to 
machinery ratio decreased from 2.9:1 in 1830 to 1.15:1 in 1861, while the fixed capital to 
inventories ratio rose from 0.58:1 in 1830 to 6:1 in 1861. Indeed, the change in the buildings 
to machinery ratio can be associated solely with the process of mechanisation, but the fall in 
inventory levels was also associated with other factors. In weaving, the impulse towards 
mechanisation came from spinning mills that integrated forward into the production of cloth 
and also, sometimes, the finishing processes. These new vertically integrated factories were 
responsible for large inventories savings.244 For example, the management of España Industrial 
estimated that without the vertical integration of spinning, weaving and finishing the firm 
would have been forced to increase the amount of grey cloth in the storehouses from 7,000 
to 25,000 pieces (i.e., vertical integration saved about 70 percent of inventories of semi­
finished products).245
The finishing industry did not experience the strong alterations in the composition of 
capital that took place in spinning and weaving. The differences between the organisation of 
the proto-industry in finishing and the other two sub-sectors of the cotton industry were
241 These building were mainly devoted to putting-out.
242 For example, many mule-jennies were transformed into self-acting mules through modifications. 
Maluquer, (1976).
243 Ronquillo (1851-1857), pp. 129.
244 See chapter 8.
245 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867), pp. 45.
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wider.246 The proto-industry in Finishing was organised in manufactories but not into putting- 
out webs. This is perhaps the major reason why the changes in the structure of capital were 
small. Any changes in inventory levels was due to business cycles.
3.4. Conclusions
This chapter has revisited the role of capita] in the early phase of Catalan 
industrialisation. The main empirical conclusion is that the rate of growth of industrial capital 
was important during early industrialisation in Catalonia, but less impressive than the rate of 
output growth. The Catalan experience correlates very well with the experience of other 
European countries during early industrialisation, such as Britain, France, Germany, or the 
United States.247 Where the absolute levels of industrial investment appear to have been quite 
modest. In contrast, the Catalan experience differs strongly from Twentieth Century growth 
experiences. For instance, in the last twenty years the growth rates of industrial capital in the 
Asian newly industrialised countries were twice or thrice the historical Catalan rates.248
The extent of the industrial production in Catalonia in a hypothetical world without 
supply restrictions on capital cannot, of course, be confidentially gauged. However, the 
comparison of Catalonia with the other industrialising European countries probably provides 
the best indicator of the extent of capital supply constraints. Since comparisons suggested that 
the growth rates of Catalan industrial investment were normal for Europe. It seems very 
difficult to argue that supply side constraints largely decided the amount of industrial 
investment. By contrast, several demand-side characteristics that were common to all early 
industrialising regions can explain the low requirements of capital by the Catalan industry. 
First, the gradual nature of industrialisation reduced the simultaneous quantity of capital put 
into new projects. For example, the construction of new factories in the cotton industry took 
place throughout the period and was not concentrated in a few years, and only towards to the
246 See, Thomson (1992), chapter 9 and Sánchez (I989)(1992) and (1996).
247 Feinstein (1978)(1981), Tilly (1978), Lévy-Leboyer (1978) and Davis and Gallman 
(1978X1994).
248 For instance, in South Korea manufacturing the capital stock grew at 15 percent per year, in 
Taiwan at 13 percent; and in Singapore at 10 percent. See Young, (1995), tables VI, VII and VUI.
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end of the period were the major cotton mills constructed. Another aspect was that during the 
emergence of the factory system putting-out remained important. This tended to slow the 
aggregate rate of growth of the stock of capital since the reduced rate of investment in the 
putting-out system affected the total rates. Third, the low fixed capital requirements in 
absolute terms of Catalan industries. All Catalan industries during the early industrialisation, 
even the metal industry that was mainly devoted to the production of machinery, can be in 
though of as light industries; that is, industries with low fixed capital requirements. Finally, 
many historians have pointed out that the factories economised on the substantial working 
capital associated with putting-out and domestic manufacturing.249 These savings were then 
spent on the plant and equipment of the mill. The rationality of this substitution is easy to 
explain in a neoclassical context since the marginal productivity of inventories (i.e., the rental 
rate) was lower than that of fixed capital. In other words, the savings in working capital 
increased the marginal productivity of the total stock of capital. In the Catalan case, these 
savings appear to be important, especially in the case of cotton textiles where the share of 
inventories with respect to total stock of capital decreased substantially.
Given the demonstrated slow increase in the net stock of manufacturing capital, the 
next logical question concerns the supposed relationship between the previous accumulation 
o f capital and the beginnings of industrialisation. My results make it difficult to support the 
primitive accumulation argument suggested by Marxists. Likewise, the explanations of the 
early phase of Catalan industrialisation based on the accumulation of capital during the 
Colonial Era or through the exports of wines and spirits are rejected. I would suggest that 
there is at least as much evidence to support productivity improvement within the 
manufacturing sector after 1830 as the major source of capital. In other words, Catalan 
industry produced enough surplus to sustain further increases in industrial capital.
Moreover, it has been shown that the failure to adjust capital for quality change has 
the effect of reducing the rate of growth o f capital input. On average, the embodied technical 
change was about 20 percent of input capital, but varied strongly from industry to industry. 
This leads to the conclusion that changes in the quality of capital had a nontrivial impact on
249 Von Tunzelmann (1995), and Field (1985).
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the growth of capital input from 1830 to 1861. However, these results also cast serious doubts 
on the relevance of the embodiment hypothesis for explaining a large part of output growth. 
The data presented in this chapter suggest that Denison (1964) was correct in his emphasis 
on the unimportance of the quality of capital. It seems likely that the machinery supposition 
fails to explain the essence of economic growth during early industrialisation. In other words, 
it appears to be difficult to explain the Continental industrialisation only in terms of the 
transference of the modem machinery from Britain to the Continent.
In summary, this chapter has established the inappropriateness of the argument that 
capital accumulation played the main role in the early phases o f Catalan industrialisation. 
Consequently, future chapters should be directed towards discovering the main sources of 
growth. Only two possible explanations remain: (1) a very elastic supply of labour allowed 
the Catalan industries to grow without large investments, (2) gains in productivity due to non­
capital embodied innovations were the key element in early industrialisation.
IThe Transformation of the Labour Market in Manufacturing
Chapter 4
l
The goal of this chapter is to throw light on the changes in the labour market in the 
early industrialisation of Catalonia. The first half of the chapter is devoted to contrasting the 
two basic hypotheses on the role of labour during early industrialisation: the Dual-growth 
model and the Goldin-Sokoloff hypothesis. Employment and wages in manufacturing are 
then analysed. On the whole, the evidence does not support an explanation based on the 
former and gives only partial support to the arguments of the latter. The second part of the 
chapter is devoted to discussing new evidence in capita]-skiUs p-complementarity and to 
formulating a simple partial equilibrium model. This model tries to explain the evolution of 
labour markets after the adoption of the factory system. An important corollary of the 
discussion is that from 1830 to 1861 the overall contribution of labour to growth rates was 
small.
4.1. Introduction
It has long been stressed that cheap and abundant labour was important at the 
beginning of industrialisation. In particular, many authors have linked the success of some 
European regions during the first half of the nineteenth century with this kind of competitive 
advantage.230 231This chapter will not resolve this question definitively. Its purpose is much 
more modest. Its starts with the proposition that this is an empirical question, and that 
accurate answers depend on the peculiarities of each region.251 Furthermore, I attempt to go
230 See, for example, Mendels (1972) and Mokyr (1974X1976).
231 A review on labour markets history is available in Grantham (1994).
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behind the common belief that only the quantity of labour was crucial, to see what can be 
learned by considering not homogeneous but heterogeneous labour.252 This sounds trivial and 
unimportant; it is not. For example, if physical and human capital (skills) are relatively p- 
complementary, any process of capital-labour substitution would affect the demand for the 
different types of labour differently. It would increase the demand for skilled labour and 
depress the demand for unskilled labour.
This chapter will explore the changes in the manufacturing labour market during the 
early industrialisation of Catalonia. My contention is that labour had a limited role in 
explaining output growth because of the Catalan industries desire to economise on labour. 
The Catalan labour market in the eighteenth century was characterised by many artisans in 
several towns, who were grouped into powerful guilds.253 There was a scarce supply of men 
labour for labouring tasks since small to medium landholdings predominated in the 
countryside.254 Furthermore, the Catalan farms grew many agrarian products reducing the 
seasonality of the agrarian employment. Which affected the amount of men labour that 
would be interested in participating in manufacturing work. Thus, in Catalonia, the most 
scarce supply of labour was unskilled men (labourers) whereas skilled artisans were 
relatively abundant.
At the beginning of industrialisation Catalan modem manufacturing used a lot of 
skilled men, women and child labour. Therefore, it can be argued that there was a first phase 
of Catalan industrialisation up to 1850; a phase during which a large amount of women and 
child labour was used. The period post-1850 was market by an increase in the employment 
of men and a decrease in the use of women and children. However, men were mainly 
employed in the new skilled jobs created by the spread of the factory system. Thus, in this 
second phase, Catalan manufacturing also economised on women and child labour.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Sections 4.2 to 4.4 compare the
252 A review of the literature on heterogeneous labour is in Hameimesh (1993).
253 Molas (1970).
254 Vilar (1962).
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Catalan case and the received wisdom. The first section describes the literature on the topic 
at international level. Then, the amount of employment in the modem industries is analysed 
by means of industry-based data. Section 4.4 provides data on the evolution of wages. From 
this section emerges the conclusion that wages grew with productivity increases and that 
earning differentials between men and women decreased. Basically, the result from these two 
sections is that the Catalan case does not correlate well with the received wisdom, especially 
after the 1850s. For that reason, section 4.5 presents evidence on capital-skills 
complementarity, which is not habitually considered in the analysis of the early 
industrialisation. Evidence on the dispersion of wages and labour demand elasticities is 
provided. Employing the evidence from the previous sections, a novel (stylized) model of 
the labour market is sketched in section 4.6. Finally, the last section summarises the major 
findings and presents conclusions.
4,2. The Literature on the Contribution of Labour to the Early Industrialisation
The standard interpretation is that the contribution of unskilled and cheap labour to 
early industrialisation was important and decisive. However, there appear to be two broad 
views. The largest group of economic historians places greater emphasis on the release of 
labour from agriculture, while others have emphasised the role of women and child 
employment. For the first group, early industrialisation can be explained with the labour 
surplus model whereas for the other with the so-called relative productivity hypothesis.
The two-sector growth model, which is sometimes called the dual or labour-surplus 
model, is the most widespread interpretation of the early phases of European 
industrialisation. Arthur W. Lewis developed the primitive dual model in the 1950s.23 *35 He 
used explanations based on economics with a surplus of labour producing an elastic supply. 
Several leading economic historians, such as Habakkuk, Kindelberger and Herric, agree with
233 Lewis (1955)(1963). However, the model has its roots in the classical economists, such as 
Malthus or Marx, though the definitive formalisation is due to Lewis. The early version of Lewis
was further refined and improved by several leading economists such as Fei and Ranis (1964), Sen
(1966) and Dixit (1973).
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him because they consider that the elastic supply of labour is the 'engine of growth' of 
capitalist development.256 They believe that the elastic supply o f labour makes it possible for 
real wages to grow more slowly than productivity. This helps the accumulation of capital 
that forms the basis of modem growth. Therefore, they think that if real wages grow at the 
same rate as productivity the incentives for investment are damaged and that economic 
growth will stop.
In the Lewis model the economy is divided into dual sectors o f traditional and 
modem parts, and it is argued that the traditional parts o f the economy are absorbed into the 
modem parts during the process o f modernisation. The main characteristics o f the traditional 
sector are a low labour productivity, which remains stagnant for long periods and a large 
supply of labour. The traditional household is a small farm. In these households there is a 
lot of hidden unemployment because the labour force does not work at full capacity.
The main characteristic of the modem sector is that it has higher labour productivity 
than the traditional sector. As the traditional sector has a surplus of labour, it can export part 
of the labour force to the modem sector. The modem sector can grow with this new 
workforce while maintaining the high productivity o f labour. Inevitably, the institutional 
constraints decide the wage level, and workers in both sectors usually obtain low wages. 
Accordingly, capital accumulation is produced in a ’natural way' because the gains of labour 
productivity in the modem sector are transformed, simultaneously, into new savings and 
investments in the hands of capitalists. In other words, the capitalists obtain a 'quasirent* 
because the rise o f labour productivity has no repercussions on wages.
The Lewis model has a major implication for the understanding of the role of labour 
during early industrialisation. The main extension of this model is that during the first phase 
of the process o f industrialisation, real wages fall because prices rise. Whereas nominal 
wages remain constant. Obviously, the decrease of real wages has consequences for workers' 
living standards because it produces an impoverished labour force and an increase in
236 Habakkuk (1962), and Kindleberger and Herric (1977).
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inequality.
Fei and Ranis have expressed doubts about the Lewis model because, they argue, the 
traditional sector does not operate in isolation from the modem sector. The co-existence of 
the old and the new is important, and the interaction of the two sectors does not only affect 
the wage level. Therefore, they think that the traditional sector is capable of improving its 
productivity because the marginal return of the traditional family is permanently zero. In 
other words, they reject the hypothesis that labour productivity stagnation is the main 
characteristic of the traditional sector. Moreover, these authors argue that it is possible that 
the traditional sector was not only formed by family farms. There was a large rural 
proletariat that worked as wage earners receiving monetary and non-monetary remunerations. 
The simultaneous existence of surplus labour and positive wages in the traditional and 
modem sectors is theoretically possible. Therefore, the surplus of labour is not a sufficient 
condition for unlimited supplies of labour.257 At this point, the basic concept of the Lewis 
model, the unlimited supplies of labour, appears too vague to sustain a dual explanation for 
economic growth.
Joel Mokyr, in his work treating industrialisation in the Low Countries, adapts the 
Lewis model to the historical reality.258 He suggests a pseudo labour-surplus model, in which 
the superabundance of a labour force is unnecessary for ’dual' growth. Thus, he argues that 
during the 'transitional* phases of industrialisation, a 'growing up' process occurs that is 
basically a disequilibrium of the 'classical stationary state'. In his model, the wage level is 
fully determined by technological and economic parameters because wages are based on the 
opportunity cost of labour in the traditional sector. In the Neoclassical model wages and 
profits are decided by the marginal productivity (assuming perfect labour markets) of labour 
and capital. In the Lewis model wages are determined by the institutional parameters. Mokyr 
also supposes that, ceteris paribus, technological change was almost independent of factor 
prices. Consequently, the capitalists obtained a 'quasirent' because wages were not fully
257 Fei and Ranis (1964).
258 Mokyr (1974)(1976).
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determined by marginal labour productivity.
Another pivotal element in Mokyr’s reasoning is the coexistence of two techniques, 
’old’ and 'new*, in one industrial sector. Modem technology and entrepreneurs are exogenous 
to the model because he assumes that both were mobile and were available from the most 
developed countries, Britain and France, during these early phases of industrialisation. In the 
modem industries the labour force essentially came from workers who were previously 
employed in the traditional sector. This labour did not receive a rise in wage level when the 
capital to labour ratio grew with the accumulation o f capital. Therefore, modem 
entrepreneurs obtained a 'quasirent' that they reinvested or consumed. Consumers, on the 
other hand, benefited from the lower prices of industrial goods and, therefore, the demand 
curve shifted as fast as demand elasticity. These two forces explain the process of 
industrialisation.
A secondary element of the model is that the absence of capital markets, during this 
early phase of industrialisation, meant firms had to self-finance investment. The capital 
accumulation necessary for the growth of the modem sector had to be provided by each firm 
or to flow among the firms within the sector. Therefore, capital flows from extra-sectoral 
savings were empirically insignificant. In the modem sector, the rate of growth was decided 
by the rate of profit and by the proportion of profits ploughed back into the firm. Profits will 
diverge from the marginal productivity of capital because the coexistence of two techniques, 
one relatively more inefficient than other, implies that the more efficient technique earns a 
'quasirent'. So, the rate of profit cannot fall with the increase of the capital to labour ratio, 
and could fall only if wages were rising. In other words, if the rate of profit accelerates, the 
'transitional' process does so as well. The process finishes when the traditional sector 
disappears.
To sum up, the Mokyr model has two main conditions: that during the 'transitional' 
period the wage level should not rise, and that the capital required for modem industry 
development had to come from inside the modem sector. Therefore, the model is valid only 
if labour costs did not grow and if real wages did not rise.
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The increasing participation of women and children compared with men in 
manufacturing during early industrialisation, i.e., the second broad interpretation, has been 
pointed out by Claudia Goldin and Kenneth Sokoloff.259 They argue that early 
industrialisation was associated with an extraordinary rise in the demand for women and 
children as labour force, because the expansion of the new methods of production promoted 
the substitution o f unskilled for skilled labour. The low relative productivity of women and 
children in agriculture in some regions established a relatively low opportunity cost for their 
labour.260 Consequently, regions where the productivity of women and children in agriculture 
was the lowest had a competitive advantage at the start of industrialisation.
According to Goldin and Sokoloff this increase in the demand for women and 
children meant that they had up a large proportion of the entire manufacturing labour force. 
However, they were not represented in the same amount in all sectors since their 
employment was closely associated with the production process used by large establishments 
both mechanised and non-mechanised. Note that this last statement is very important since 
it separates this interpretation from the classical proto-industrialisation model.261 In the proto- 
industrialisation model, women and children lived in the countryside were paid low salaries 
because industrial work is complementary to typical agrarian activities. Therefore, an 
increase in their participation in manufacturing could not result in an increase in their 
relative wages.
Briefly, the Goldin-Sokoloff model specifies two major conditions: that during 
industrialisation the relative women and child wage should rise, and that the new workforce 
required for modem industry development has to be formed by women and children. 
However, note that the Goldin-Sokoloff model fails to predict some features of the evolution 
of labour markets from 1850 onwards in the United States. Thus, it is unable to explain why
239 Goldin and Sokoloff (1982)0984). Recently, the model has been tested against new evidence, 
and confirmed, by Craig and Field-Hendrey (1993).
260 In shaip contrast, the unskilled men labour was not redundant in these regions. Consequently, 
the substitution of unskilled men for skilled men could not result in any gain for manufacturing 
development.
26t Mendels (1972).
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after peaking near 40 percent in the 1850s, the share of the industrial labour force in the 
American North-east composed of women and children began a secular decline which 
continued into the second half of the nineteenth century,
Goldin-Sokoloffs hypothesis and Mokyr's model agree that the role of the 
transference of labour within manufacturing was crucial during early industrialisation. 
However, the Goldin-Sokoloff hypothesis is more optimistic than Mokyr's thesis since it 
argues that the wages of women and children rise during this phase. Furthermore, in a more 
recent paper, the widespread gains in real wages that happened during the industrialisation 
of the United States have been pointed out by Sokoloff and Villaflor.262 In the next two 
sections I will contrast the two major features of the Mokyr and Goldin-Sokoloff models: 
employment and wages. Thus first I will discuss the evidence available on manufacturing 
employment and then I will analyse the evolution of labour costs, real wages, and the 
relative wages of women and children.
4.3. Evidence on Manufacturing Employment
New evidence on changes in modem manufacturing employment during early 
industrialisation is presented in this section. The first area of interest is the growth of the 
amount of workforce. Note that Mokyr's thesis can explain why the growth rates of the 
Iabourforce in Catalonia were faster than output growth rates; that is, they were above 4 
percent per year. The reason is that since wages were below the equilibria wage level 
entrepreneurs found it more profitable to contract more workers than to increase their 
investment in capital and therefore productivity. The second area of interest concerns the 
effect of the arrival of the factory system on the composition of employment, specifically 
sex-age composition of the workforce. Here the expected result according to Goldin- 
Sokoloffs model is a large increase in the women and child workforce during 
industrialisation. Note, however, that this fast increase in the employment of women and 
children is not incompatible with Lewis-like models. One could advance a slightly weaker
262 Sokoloff and Villaflor (1991).
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version of Lewis' model by asserting that, while it was a condition of superabundance of 
labour, entrepreneurs in manufacturing preferred to contract women and children because 
of their low wage levels.
The available figures cover the manufacturing sectors analysed in the two previous 
chapters, i.e., the cotton industry, the metal industry, other textiles comprising mixed fabrics 
and the linen, silk aiid wool textiles, and paper industries. The figures for cotton spinning, 
weaving and finishing were adjusted to full-time employment (FTE) according to the 
procedure described in the following pages. Finally, it should be noted that the cotton 
industry's figures are presented for four benchmark years (1830, 1840, 1850,1861) whereas 
in the rest of modem manufacturing there is only data for two years (1840 and 1861).
Lacking good sources on employment adjusted to work-hours, it was necessary to 
develop an indirect method for calculating these numbers. The total number of F i t s  in the 
year t was computed by multiplying the amount of functioning machinery in the year t by 
the positions per machine. Each FTE is equivalent to 3185.5 hours (113 hours x 277 
working days per year).263 It should be noted that positions are different for each type of 
machinery and they were derived directly from different historical sources. Thus, for 
example, I actually estimate the 1850 FTEs in mechanical looms using the number of 
functioning mechanical looms in 1850 and the positions per mechanical loom. For my 
overall FTE estimates, I then sum across different types of machinery. The main advantage 
of this method is that the number of hours obtained is adjusted for periods when factories 
were at a standstill, so the FTEs are correlated with movements in output. Therefore, the 
figures obtained do not reflect the number of workers, on the contrary, they represent the 
real hours worked.264
263 The number of woik-days during the year is furnished by several sources see Cerdá (1968) 
and Ferrer Vidal (1875).
264 The data on positions per machine are drawn from Madoz (1846), Ceidá (1968), Comisión 
especial arancelaria (1867), and Ferrer Vidal (1875). It is important to appreciate that different 
sources give very similar positions per machine. Finally, Figuerola (1968), Sayró (1842), Junta de 
Fábricas (1850), and Comisión especial arancelaria (1867) provided, respectively, the data on 
functioning machinery for 1830, 1840, 1850 and 1861.
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As was mentioned above, jobs in the rest of industries are not adjusted to full-time 
employment. Indeed, this can introduce unknown biases into the results to the extent that 
industry relied on part-time work. In the mixed fabrics and metal industries, Sayró's survey 
is the source of the working population for the first benchmark year (1840).265 By contrast, 
the paper, linen, wool and silk industries were practically ignored in the census or their 
figures were simple speculations made by the census officials. Therefore, I must compute 
their employment figures using alternative sources. Regarding the paper industry, the main 
sources are the two studies on this industry conducted during the period.266 These works 
display figures for men, women and children. For the linen industry, employment was 
estimated for 1846 in an article in Madoz's geographic dictionary, which also contains 
production figures from 1840 to 1846.267 Using these output figures, employment can be 
easily estimated for 1840 by assuming that there were no changes in the labour-output ratios. 
The total workforce in the wool industry can be estimated using the 1849 data for Sabadell 
and Tarrassa.268 I thus assume that Sabadell-Tarrassa labour-output ratios were equivalent 
to the same ratios for Catalonia. To complete the set of calculation for 1840 I must go to 
the silk industry. Due to the scarce information on this textile industry, it was necessary to 
draw on the labour-capital ratio (here the number of workers divided by the number of 
looms) of the mixed fabrics’ industry.269 However, it should be noted that the biases 
introduced by this method are likely to be small because the technology and productivity 
in both industries was very similar. Furthermore, in this early period, the silk industry in 
Catalonia was concentrated in the weaving phase. Finally, with regard to the last benchmark 
year (1861), the main source is the Gimenez Guited industrial guide.270 The next table 
presents the evidence on the evolution o f the labour force in the main Catalan manufacturing 
sectors:
265 Sayró (1842) and Madoz (1846), especially the article devoted to Barcelona in the volume
in.
266 Gutiérrez (1834), p. 142 and the report cited by Delgado (1991), p. 213-215.
267 Madoz (1846), vol. HI, p. 555.
268 Benaiil (1991), tables 17 and 18, p. 114-115.
269 Sayró (1842), p. 17.
270 Gimenez Guited (1862).
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Table 4.1 Evolution of Labourforce: Modem Industries. 1830-1861
1830 1840 1850 1861
Cotton Spinning Men 982 1295 3.631 3.632
Women 11.292 14.774 8.409 6262
Children 6.046 7.915 4599 2.630
Total 18320 23.984 16.640 12524
Cotton Weaving Men 18397 22,185 29.024 26.088
Women 8335 9,944 10253 6785
Children 3,160 3.769 3.038 1052
Total 30,092 35.898 42315 33924
Cotton Finishing Men 2,101 3,470 4.045 6650
Women 315 520 535 800
Children 1309 1,997 1.001 200
Total 3,626 5,987 5584 7,650
Cotton Industry Men 21,680 26,950 36.700 36370
Women 19.943 25338 19.968 13.847
Children 10,415 13,681 8,642 3,882
Total 52,038 65,869 64538 54,098
Metal Industry Men 1,067 1,497
Women 0 0
Children 0 0
Total 1,067 1,497
Other Textiles Men 5,700 15,022
Women 5,935 4,766
Children 3246 1.684
Total 14,881 21.476
Paper industry Men 3360 1,126
Women 1,462 490
Children 578 445
Total 5,400 2,061
Total Men 37,077 54,015
Women 32,635 19,103
Children 17305 6,011
Total 87317 79,128
N otes and so u rces: see text
The outstanding feature of the previous table is the decrease in the total number of 
workers in Catalan industry. The decrease in the number of workers was mainly 
concentrated in the cotton and paper industries whereas others sectors experienced a 
relatively sharp increase in their labour. In particular, the metal and other textiles industries 
increased their workforce by about 50 percent from 1840 to 1861. Moreover, with a more 
detailed observation of the data, it is possible to appreciate that the decline in the total 
figures is only because women and child labour plummeted. Whereas the adult male
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workforce rose of about 46 percent from 1840 to 1861.
One can further explore these changes by analysing the more detailed and probably 
more exact data on the cotton industry. At first glance, the evolution of the total number o f 
workers in the cotton industry had the typical bell structure. FTE was 52,038 in 1830 and 
in 1840 it was 65,869. It then slightly decreased in the 1840s, 64,538 in 1850, and then 
plummeted to 54,098 in 1861.271 The evolution of the different components of the workforce 
was divergent, the men workforce increased until the 1850s, whereas the number of women 
and children decreased after the 1840s. These results reflect the great transition in the 
methods of production since the increase in the men labour force and the rapid decrease in 
women and child labour occurred over the consolidation of the factory system. Note also, 
that the anomalous behaviour of men employment in the 1850s was exclusively due to 
weaving where the workforce increased from 30,092 FTE in 1830 to 42,315 in 1850. There 
was then a decrease to 33,924 FTE in 1861. In weaving during the 1840s the expansion of 
the labour force took place by incorporating new handweavers, who were mainly young 
males. This process was clearly the result of the cheaper yam produced by the new 
mechanical spindles. This spillover process between the innovation in spinning and the 
increase of the labour force in weaving was similar to that which occurred in Lancashire.272 
By the 1850s the great decrease in the number of weavers was due to the irruption of the 
powerlooms that began to substitute handlooms. Interestingly, the number of handweavers 
that abandoned cotton weaving is almost equal to the increase in handweavers in the other 
textiles industry. This result could suggest that handweavers only had to change fibre when 
their market was occupied by the new powerlooms.273
In spite of the sharp decrease in the employment of women and children within the 
modem industries from 1840 to 1861, the share of this type of labour in Catalan
271 It should be emphasised that these changes occurred during a period of growth. Consequently, 
labour productivity must have increased rapidly (see chapter 5).
272 See Timmins (1993) and Bythell (1978).
273 Cerdi (1968), pp. 610-615 presents evidence on the capacity of handweavers to weave with 
different fibre according to the changes in fashion and season.
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manufacturing workforce was high throughout the period.274 The extent to which modem 
manufacturing drew on women and children in recruiting workers during the initial period 
of industrialisation can be better appreciated in the next table:
Table 4.2 Proportion of Men, Women and Child Labour: Industry, 1840-1861 (percent)
Catalonia, 1840
Adult
Men
Percent
Adult
Women
Percent
Children
Percent
Cotton Spinning 5.40 61.60 33.00
Cotton Weaving 61.80 27.70 1030
Cotton Finishing 57.95 8.69 3336
Cotton Industry 40.91 38.32 20.77
Metal Industry 100.00 0.00 0.00
Other Textiles 3830 39.88 21.81
Paper industry 6232 27.08 10.70
All of these industries 4231 37.42 20.07
Barcelona, 1856
Modem Industries 50.83 32.35 16.82
Artisanal Trades 63.18 24.60 12.22
Construction 92.83 0.00 7.17
Total Industries 5839 27.12 1439
Catalonia, 1861
Cotton Spinning 29.00 50.00 21.00
Cotton Weaving 76.90 20.00 3.10
Cotton Finishing 86.93 10.46 2.61
Cotton Industry 67.23 25.60 7.18
Metal Industry 100.00 0.00 0.00
Other Textiles 69.96 2230 7.84
Paper industry 54.63 23.77 2139
All of these industries ' 68.43 23.91 7.66
Notes and  sources: (1) 1840: for cotton  industry Madoz (1846) and Sayr6 (1842); Meta] industry; M adoz (1846);
O ther textiles; M adoz (1846), Sayró (1842) and Benaül (1991); Paper industry: G utiérrez (1834) and D elgado 
(1991). (2) 1856: C erdá (1968) considering m odern industries as  m entioned above and under the assum ption that 
ha lf the apprentices w ere adults and h a lf  child labour. (3) 1861: fo r cotton industry. Com isión especial A rancelaria 
(1867), and for the rest, G im enez G uited  (1862).
274 The proportion of women and children in Catalan manufacturing workforce was higher than 
the proportion in the north-east of the United States. For example, Goldin and Sokoloff (1984), p. 
748 report figures of roughly 40 percent in 1832 and 30 percent in 1850. Whereas in Catalonia in 
1840 the percentage was about 60 percent in 1840 and 30 percent in 1860.
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The table reveals that women and children made up a large proportion of the 
industrial workforce throughout the second third of the nineteenth century. The historical 
peak of women and child employment in manufacturing occurred around 1840 when they 
were 57.5 percent of modem manufacturing workers, but this percentage had dropped to 
31.6 percent by 1861. A similar pattern is apparent in Barcelona, where Cerdà’s study 
provided the data for my 1856 figure. In that town the share of the labour force consisting 
of women and children is around the average of the figures for 1840 and 1861. It should 
also be underlined that women and children were more abundant in modem industries than 
in artisanal trades, and that their share is not sensitive to the reduced share of domestic 
production in Cerdà’s figures. This result gives some support to the argument advanced by 
Goldin and Sokoloff that the emergence of the factory system substituted unskilled women 
and children for men.275 Although, it should be underlined that the Catalan case does not 
resemble to the north-east of the United States. In the United States outworking was less 
common than in Catalonia.276 Therefore the number of women and children in manufacturing 
before the coming of the factory system was larger in the latter than in the former.
With the help of the figures on the cotton industry it is possible to distinguish two 
broad phases in the evolution o f the workforce in Catalan manufacturing. Until the 1840s 
the labourforce grew at respectable rates by using women and child labour. After 1840 the 
overall labour figures decreased or remained stagnant because the employment of women 
and children plummeted. The sharp decrease in women and child employment in the 1850s 
is difficult to explain with the Goldin-Sokoloffs model. They have underlined that this was 
because the full available women and child workforce was employed at its market price. At 
equilibrium, one would not expect any new incorporation of women and children within the 
manufacturing labourforce. However, this explanation is not very convincing since the 
women and child workforce decreased in the 1850s, instead of remaining constant as they 
predict.
275 Goldin and Sokoloff (1982) and (1984). See also Sokoloff (1986).
276 See the evidence on the United States furnished by Sokoloff and Dolar (1997).
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4.4. Evidence on Labour Rem uneration
This section deals with the Mokyr and Goldin-Sokoloff models' predictions of wage 
movements. The prediction of the first model is decreasing real wages. Note, however, that 
this prediction can be accomplished in two ways: directly if productivity did not rise during 
the period, and indirectly if productivity gains were not transmitted to wages. Only in the 
second situation is Mokyr's model supported since the labour surplus model predicts wage 
decreases throughout industrialisation and, therefore, that productivity gains did not imply 
wage increases. As mentioned above, Goldin-Sokoloffs model predicts that the women-men 
and child-men wage gap decreases throughout early industrialisation.
Obviously, to discuss the evolution of labour remuneration, it is essential to establish 
a correct measure for wages, bearing in mind that this measure has to be correct for the type 
of question asked.277 To be precise, the technically correct calculation of labour costs must 
include the part of value-added that workers effectively received. In the next paragraphs four 
types of methodological problems will be discussed: the choice of nominal or real wages, 
the methodology used to estimate real wages, the spatial biases, and the choice between job 
wages and average wages.
A major problem is the choice between nominal and real wages. The choice of 
nominal wages has a main risk: sometimes the increase or decrease in nominal wages is not 
due to increases or decreases in the price of labour but changes in living costs.278 Therefore, 
although nominal figures are useful, real wage estimates provide a richer picture of the 
change over time of labour markets.
Although some scholars have doubted its efficacy, nominal wages deflated by a cost
277 On the history and methodology of wages see: Bothan and Hunt (1987); Crafts (1985b); 
Crafts and Mills (1994); Hunt (1986); Feinstein (1990a) and (1990b).
27S If one assumes that the labour market is perfectly competitive then the changes in the price 
of labour parallel changes in the marginal productivity of labour.
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of living index is by far the most widely used method to measure real wages.279 
Unfortunately, no cost of living index for Catalonia covering the whole period studied here 
is available.280 Therefore, two other price indices must be considered: the Sard&, which is 
a wholesale index based on the prices at the Port of Barcelona, and the Reher-Ballesteros, 
which is a cost of living index for Castilia.281 The main difference between the two indices 
is that in the Sard& index fluctuates more than the other during the period considered here. 
Both indices have their problems. Since the Sardd index is based on wholesale shares it may 
not reflect the expenditure pattern of the Catalan population. Similarly, the basked of goods 
on which the Reher-Ballesteros index is based may be not representative of the patterns of 
consumption among Catalan industrial workers. It is reasonable to believe that new estimates 
of a consumer price index might revise the pattern presented here. The two indices are in 
the next table:
Table 4.3 Alternative Price Indices, 1830-1861 (1830=100)
Type Scope 1830 1834 1840 1846 1856 1861
Wholesale Barcelona 100.0 118.4 107.3 109.2 126.8 125.5
Cost-of-living Castilia 100.0 107.0 130.5 120.9 131.0 134.2
N otes an d  so u rces: (1) wholesale: Sard& (1948), p. 302-305 and (2) cost-of-living: Reher and Ballesteros (1993), 
p. 131-136.
Thirdly, serious problems of interpretation may arise when there are substantial 
differences in wages by zones. In particular, historians have pointed out that there were 
strong spatial differences in agricultural and road labourer wages282. According to Ramón 
Garrabou and his associates, these differences in wages may be not only due to differences 
in living costs but also to be attributable to the inadequate integration of the Catalan labour
279 See a technical review of criticisms at Nordhaus (1996).
280Maluquer (1994b) presented an index of cost-of-living for Barcelona but, unfortunately, began 
in 1855.
281 Reher and Ballesteros (1993) and Sard& (1948).
282 An agricultural worker was paid a daily wage of 8.5 Rv in Barcelona and only 6.0 Rv in 
Lleida (Garrabou et al. (1991), p. 40). Similarly, in the same year, a labourer that was employqlin 
the constmction of roads received money wages of 8.2 RvVday in Barcelona, 7 Rv/day in Lleida, 
6.9 Rv7day in Tarragona and only 6.4 Rv7day in Girona. The source is Madrazo (1984), p. 208.
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market.283 The question that remains, however, is if these differences were also important 
in manufacturing since Catalan industries were not spread across Catalonia but concentrated 
in a few zones. These zones were characterised by, comparatively speaking, high agrarian 
and unskilled wages. Furthermore, the labour demand equations in section 43  support the 
view that spatial segmentation did not significantly affect manufacturing wages.
Another problem is the choice between job-based wages and average wages. Both 
choices have their pitfalls.284 In the first case, given the absence of complete information for 
all groups of workers, the choice could be biased. Furthermore, sometimes the increase or 
decrease in real wages is not due to changes in the remuneration of the given job but 
alterations in its nature. In the second case, to say average real wages have risen does not 
mean that all groups of workers have benefited. For example, the rise or fall in average 
wages can be exclusively due to changes in the skills composition of the workforce or 
changes in the location of the industry. In other words, it can be possible that individual 
wages remain constant while average wages rise or fall.
An idea of the trend of nominal wages can be obtained by computing yearly earnings 
for several Catalan modem industries. Raw data for 1840 and 1861 serve to calculate 
average annual earnings cross-classified by industry, sex and age. An important problem in 
the survey of 1840 is that it did not give information on annual days worked, but only 
offered the information on a monthly basis. Thus, the assumption was that workers worked 
all months of the year. This is likely to overestimate the real value of average wages for 
1840, reducing, in turn, the growth rate of wages from 1840 to 1861.
2,3 Garrabou et al. (1991), p. 33-34.
284 The discussion is based mainly on O'Brien and Engeiman (1981), p. 167-171.
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Table 4.4 Nominal Yearly Earnings: Modem Industries, 1830-1861 (in Pta.)
Cotton Spinning Men
1840
750
1861
1004
Women 311 585
Children 126 255
Weighted average 274 637
Cotton Weaving Men 554 745
Women 242 453
Children 138 187
Weighted average 424 669
Cotton Finishing Men 794 788
Women 395 488
Children 192 300
Weighted average 558 743
Cotton Industry Men 595 778
Women 286 515
Children 139 239
Weighted average 382 672
Metal Industry Men 773 1350
Women
Children
Weighted average 773 1350
Other Textiles Men 712 975
Women 251 450
Children 145 300
Weighted average 404 806
Paper industry Men 536 900
Women 166 278
Children 29 159
Weighted average 381 592
Total Men 612 863
Women 274 489
Children 136 252
Weighted average 390 727
Notes an d  so u rce s : fo r the cotton industry  in 1840 Sayró (1842) and M adoz (1846) and for 1861. Com isión 
especial arancelaria (1867). In metal industry, the sam e sources than  in cotton . In other textiles: for w ool Benaiil 
(1991), for linen M adoz (1846) and C om isión espec ial arancelaria (1867), fo r silk Com isión especial arancelaría 
(1867) and C erdá (1968); finally for m ixed fabrics the  sam e sources than fo r cotton industry. In paper industry: 
Gutiérrez (1834) and D elgado (1991) fo r 1840 and  for 1861, C erdá (1968).
According to this table nominal yearly earnings grew quickly from 1840 to 1861. On 
the next page I present evidence on real wages. However, since there are salient 
discrepancies between the alternative price indices (see table 4.3), the picture varies with the
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Table 4.5 Real Yearly Earnings: Modem Industries, 1840-1861(1840=100)
1861 1861 Growth rates (percent)
Cerda Reher Ceida Reher
Cotton Spinning Men 114.44 130.13 0.64 1.25
Women 160.81 182.86 2.26 2.87
Children 172.96 196.68 2.61 3.22
Cotton Weaving Men 114.87 130.62 0.66 1.27
Women 160.18 182.15 2.24 2.86
Children 115.98 131.88 0.71 1.32
Cotton Finishing Men 84.82 96.45 -0.78 -0.17
Women 105.64 120.12 0.26 0.87
Children 133.64 151.96 1.38 1.99
Cotton Industiy Men 111.94 127.29 0.54 1.15
Women 154.16 175.30 2.06 2.67
Children 147.08 167.25 1.84 2.45
Metal Industiy Men 149.30 169.77 1.91 2.52
Other Textiles Men 117.16 133.22 0.75 1.37
Women 153.38 174.41 2.04 2.65
Children 177.22 201.52 2.72 3.34
Paper industry Men 143.67 163.37 1.73 2.34
Women 143.67 163.37 1.73 2.34
Children 464.71 528.42 7.32 7.93
Total Men 120.48 137.00 0.89 130
Women 152.62 173.54 2.01 2.63
Children 157.87 179.51 2.17 2.79
N otes sn d  so u rce s : Price indices are in table 4 .3  and nominal earnings in table 4.4.
In spite of the large differences between the estimations made with the different price 
indices, and further differences between industries, the wage figures are consistent with a 
substantial improvement in real wages from 1840 to 1861. For men, the average is about 
the 1 percent per year whereas for women and children it is around 2 percent. However, not 
all employees gained during the period. For instance, the men workers in cotton finishing 
registered large losses. The lower earnings of men workers in finishing were due to the 
adoption of new machinery in calico printing (perrotin and cylinders), which reduced the 
skills required to perform the process of printing.285
2SS For a full description of this transition see chapter 7.
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I now discuss the predictions of the Goldin-Sokoloff model about the women-men 
and child-men wage gap. Then, I compare the men, women and child wages in the cotton 
industry and agriculture.
Table 4.6 The Sex-age Wage Gap: Cotton Industry and Agriculture, 1840-1861
cotton cotton cotton cotton Agriculture
spinning weaving fininshing industry Barcelona Lleida
■e
£
E
£ W./W.Wa/W« W A V . w J W mwyw„
1840 41.46 16.80 43.68 24.91 49.75 24.18 48.07 23.36 51.28 45.77
1861 58.27 25.40 60.81 25.10 61.93 38.07 66.20 30.72 58.82 40.98
N otes a n d  so u rce s : W /W B: women w age divided by m en w ages m ultip lied  by  100. W ^ W .: children w age divided 
by male w ages m ultip lied  by 100. (1) 1840: for co tton  industry and  m ixed fabrics M adoz (1846); fo r agriculture 
GaiTabou et at (1991). 1861: for cotton industry and m ixed fabrics. C om isión  especial A rancelaria (1867).
In the table 4.6 there is clear evidence of the narrowing o f the women-men and child- 
men wage gap in the cotton industry and in agriculture in Barcelona. By contrast, the wage 
gap increased in the mostly agrarian province of Lleida. Obviously, these results are 
compatible with the predictions of the Goldin-Sokoloff model.
The difference between the Catalan experience and industrialisation based on the 
Lewis-like dualisms which Mokyr describes for Belgium is large.286 The above results show 
that growth rates of manufacturing labour were slow and that wages did not stagnate but 
rose. Exactly the contrary of Mokyr's model. On the other hand, some evidence seems to 
support the Goldin-Sokoloffs model287 since the share of women and children in the 
manufacturing workforce increase until the 1840s. Their wages also experienced sharp 
increases in the 1840s and 1850s. Moreover, women and children were employed more in 
the modem industries than in the artisanal trades. However, since the 1850s the events 
cannot be explained by either o f the models. Total employment in modem manufacturing 
decreased, and many women and children were replaced by men, simultaneously wages 
experienced notable gains. Evidently these issues require further investigation.
286 Mokyr (1974)(1976).
287 Goldin and SokolofT (1982)(1984).
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4.5. Evidence on Capital-skills Complementarity
Labour is treated in the Goldin-Sokoloff and labour-surplus models as a skills- 
homogenous input. It is noteworthy, though, that literature on labour markets has recognised 
the importance of accounting for the differences in skills among the types of workers.288 
These differences in skills have a pervasive influence on the substitutability and 
complementarity among the different types of workers and different inputs; that is, in the 
evolution of the demand for labour. In particular, many economists have emphasised the 
notion o f capital-skills p-complementarity.
The concept of capital-skills complementarity was originally proposed by Zvi 
Griliches.289 He argued that in the production function capital and skills (human capital) are 
more complements than substitutes; that is, an increase in the amount of capital was 
accompanied by an increase in the amount of human capital employed in production. More 
recently, Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz point that capital-skill complementarity 
occurred in the aggregate economy as particular technologies spread; that is, the emergence 
of capital-skills complementarity is a historical fact.290 They also relate the appearance of 
capital-skill complementarity with the development of the batch and continuous-process 
methods of production, but not with the emergence of the factory system which they 
consider as de-skilling. In the next few pages four different tests of the emergence o f capital- 
skills complementarity in Catalonia during the development of the factory system will be 
discussed.
Note that the simplest way to detect the emergence of capital-skills complementarity 
is to analyse the wage structure. The theory predicts that, in the presence of capital-skills 
complementarity, the periods of rapid technological advance serve to widen the wage 
structure. The wage structure should then narrow in the next period when the state or 
individuals have invested in the skills associated with the new technology, as they can obtain
281 See the review of the literature in Hamennesh (1993).
289 Griliches (1969).
290 Goldin and Katz (1996a)( 1996b).
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large returns from this investment in human capital.291 For instance, the boom in the demand 
for clerical labour at the beginning o f the twentieth century not only increased the salaries 
of these employees but also the demand for that kind of education. Consequently, after a 
period of adjustment, the structure of wages narrowed again. At this point, I will present 
evidence on the widening of the wage structure in Catalonia during early industrialisation.
A simple procedure to study the changes in the unskilled/skilled workers wage gap 
is to compare nominal wages among different jobs. It would be convenient, to avoid the 
effect of market failures, if these wages corresponded to the same industries and same 
towns. The next table presents nominal wages for different occupations within the cotton 
industry in Barcelona. The maximum wages for each job were chosen to eliminate the 
effects of age and experience. Finally, several jobs that significantly changed over the time 
period were eliminated of the sample.
Table 4.7 The Skills Wage Gap: Cotton Industry in Barcelona, 1830-1861 (Rv. per day)
Job Sex 1830 1834 1840 1846 1856 1861
Carders young male 8.0 9.3 10.0
women 4.5 4 5 4.6 6.3 6.3
Minders Spinning men 8.0 10.0 12.1 14.2
women 8.0 10.0 12.1 14.0
Mechanical weavers men 12.0 12.0
women 12.0 12.0
Handweavers men 8.0 8.0 8.8 10.0 11.0 12.5
Jacquard weavers men 13.0 16.5
Labourers in factories men 9.1 10.0 10.0
Notes an d  so u rces : m axim um  nominal w ages in  e ach  job . N um bers subject to  rounding errors. Sources: for 1830: 
Junta de Fábricas (1830); for 1834, Jun ta  de F áb ricas (1834a); fo r 1840 C om isión del G obierno (1841) and only 
the wages for handw eavers M adoz (1846), vol. I l l ,  p. 462; for 1846 C om isión de Fábricas (1846), p. 48 and only 
the wages for handw eavers M adoz (1846), vol. I l l ,  p. 555; for 1856 C erdá (1968); and for 1860, Com isión especial 
arancelaria (1867).
The picture that arises from this table, in spite o f some differences among the
291 The wage gap effect of capital-skills complementarity is discussed in many studies see, for 
example, the seminal work of Griliches (1969), a review of the literature in Hamermesh (1993), 
chapter 3, and the recent empirical studies of Osterman (1986) and Autor et al. (1997).
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different occupations, is that nominal wages remained constant during the 1830s, and grew 
in the 1840s and 1850s. The shift in the 1840s implies that the wage level increased by 
about 20 percent. In the 1850s the increase in wages was between 10 and 40 percent. It must 
be pointed out, however, that skilled workers’ wages grew more than unskilled ones. 
Furthermore, on the whole, the results presented here are similar to the figures for the wool 
industry in Sabadell, where skilled wages rose and unskilled wages fell.292 To summarise, 
the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers grew. This first impression can be 
confirmed, or rejected, by looking at the available data on the wages of unskilled workers 
in agriculture. The next table presents the evidence collected:
Table 4.8 Daily Nominal Wages: Agriculture, 1830-1860
Scope Sex 1830 1834 1840 1846 1856 1860
Province of Barcelona males 8.0 7.9 7.8 8.0 8.0 8.5
females 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 5.0
Province of Lleida males 6.0 5.0 4.4 55 6.6 6.0
females 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.5 2.4
Notes and  sources: In Rv. Num bers subject to rounding errors. W ages corresponded to periods w ithout harvest. 
The male w age o f  B arcelona in 1840 is an average of those o f 1839 and 1841; the female w age o f  Barcelona in 
1830 is an average o f  those of 1829 and 1831; and the female wage o f Lleida in 1840 is an average o f  those o f 
1839 and 1841. T he source is G arrabou et al. (1991), pp. 40 and 43.
In the 1830s and the 1840s male agrarian wages in Barcelona were stable while from 
1856 to 1860 they only grew about 6 percent. Consequently, the trend of agrarian wages in 
Barcelona was very similar to that of unskilled workers. In Lleida the male agrarian wages 
were even more stable since the money wage in 1860 was the same as in 1830. Moreover, 
in spite of a delay, the wage gap between male and female workers in Barcelona shrink. The 
same is not true for Lleida. Therefore, this table tends to confirm the results presented in the 
previous one and, obviously, the above statements on the existence of capital-skills 
complementarity. In other words, early industrialisation boosted real wages for skilled 
workers. Unskilled workers benefited less from economic progress. Occasionally, namely 
agricultural labourers, there were not net benefits but clear losses. For instance, the real
292 Estimations made by Camps and cited by Benaiil (1991), table 19, p. 115.
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male agrarian wage was lower in 1861 than in 1830.
Another test for the consistency of the hypothesis of capital-skills complementarity 
is to examine the relationship between average earnings per wage earner and capital-intensity 
and firm-size variables.293 The data to perform this test is drawn from the survey of the 
Catalan industry, which was conducted by the Sayró's commission in 1840.294 295Survey 
officials collected information on establishments and not on firms. The published tables 
describe the value and quantity of one month output, the amount of inputs, the number of 
employees, and their wages (broken down into men, women and children). But do not give 
the number of days worked. They also describe the number of engines (broken down by 
type), their power, the number of other machines (looms, powerlooms, mule-jenny spindles, 
handspindles, and so on), and the value of machinery, building and circulating capital. The 
original schedules of the survey have been not conserved and only a published table that 
records information aggregated by towns and small districts remains. This may introduce a 
serious drawback since the use of aggregate data in labour demand studies can introduce 
unknown biases into the results.293 Anyway, to control for these biases, equations are 
estimated with the weighted least squares instead of the ordinary least squares procedure. 
The required data is only available for the cotton, mixed fabrics and metal industries but this 
does not appear to be a major problem. Since the purpose of this exercise is to measure the 
effect of the new technologies on labour demand and these three industries were greatly 
affected by the introduction of the new technologies.
In the first regression the dependent variable is the total wage bill divided by the 
quantity of labour. The variable capital intensity is the total amount of capital divided by 
the number of workers. The variable establishment size is the result of dividing the number 
of workers in each observation by the number of establishments in the same observation. 
The capital-skills hypothesis implies a positive correlation between the capital to labour ratio 
and wages and, similarly, a positive relation between wages and average firm-size.
293 This test was proposed by Goldin and Katz (1996a).
294 The data that I employ here is collected in Madoz (1846), voi HI, p. 164ff.
295 Hamermesh (1993), pp. 64ff.
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Table 4.9 Determinants of Wages. 1840
Dependent variable: Log (Average monthly earnings)
Independent variables: Coefficients (Standard error)
Constant 2.719050 (0.196909)
Log (K/L) 0.279878 (0.026598)
Log (Establishment size) 0.128162 (0.029777)
% women -0.790337 (0.090312)
% children -1345922 (0.134450)
Number of observations 81
R2 adjusted 0.8873
F 158.45
N otes an d  so u rce s : See te x t The equation has been estimated with weighted least squares with w eights given by 
the num ber o f  w orkers in each observation. AH coefficients are significative at 99 percent.
The estimated equation gives the expected result. For instance, an increase of 10 
percent in the capital to labour ratio would lead an increase of about 2.79 percent in average 
wages. A caveat here is that the measured wage premia may be due to compositional effects. 
A greater proportion of more skilled workers were found in industries with more capital per 
worker and large average size. A possible alternative interpretation may be that wage 
differentials reflected premia for identically-skilled individuals working under factory 
discipline.296 However, it has been credibly argued that in Catalonia workers organised their 
own production and administered their own time in the factories. The fact is that the firms 
preferred to employ an incentive more than a coercive system.297 Another explanation would 
be that the more capital-intensive and largest establishments were in zones where the cost- 
of-living was highest, for example in Barcelona, or the quality of life was poorest. For that 
reason, differentials in average wages may reflect compensation for the high rents and poor 
sanitation of urban locations.298 However, the impact of any location variable on the 
dependent variable is not statistically significative.
Another quantitative strategy to discuss capital-skills complementarity would be to
296 The best treatment of the issue is furnished by Clark (1994).
297 See, for example, Comisión Especial Arancelaria (1867), Camps (1995) or Cerdá (1968). The 
latter displays evidence on the existence of incentives to avoid shirking and increase effort at work. 
For example, the work groups had to pay for lighting if they were behind schedule.
298 See on this aspect see Brown (1990) discussing workers in the north-west of England.
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estimate labour demand equations.299 The simplest are the traditional conditional factor 
demand equations developed from Cobb*Douglas technology. These equations are first-order 
approximations of the economy. The number of equations that will be estimated here is four:
(4.1) log (Workers*) = p0 + P* log (Output*) + p2 log (Wages*) + p3 log (Machinery*) + 
dummies« + £*,
(4.2) log (Men*) = p0 + Pi log (Output*) + P2 log (Wages*) + p3 log (Machinery*) + dummiesd
(4.3) log (Women*) = P0 + p, log (Output*) + P2 log (Wages*) + P3 log (Machinery*) + 
dummies« + £*,
(4.4) log (Children*) = p0 + P, log (Output*) + p2 log (Wages*) + p3 log (Machinery*) + 
dummies« + e* .
Where on the left-side workers, men, women and children represent, respectively, a 
measure of workers, men, women and child employment. On the right-side wages are 
average wages (respectively for all workers, men, women and children), output is a measure 
of one month output, machinery is the value of the stock o f machinery, and i indexes 
observations and e industries. Equation 4.1 assumes that labour is homogeneous whereas the 
other three equations assume that each category is homogeneous. It should be noted that this 
latter assumption seems more plausible for women and children than for men.
These equations may be viewed as traditional demand curves with 'machinery' acting 
as a shift variable.300 Thus, the 'machinery* coefficient summarizes the substitution and 
complementarity relations between the different components of the labour force and 
machinery. Because output is controlled for in the equation the channel of impact through 
lower product price, and greater production, is not reflected in the coefficient of 'machinery.' 
In other words, the equation only measures the direct effect of the introduction of
299 For a complete discussion of the literature on labour demand see Hameimesh (1993), 
especially the chapters 2 and 3.
300 Basically,.this is the same method that was employed by Osteiman (1986) to estimate the 
impact of computers on the employment of cleiks and managers.
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machinery, but not the demand-shift effect produced by productivity growth.
This straightforward and traditional method is not without problems. It is likely that 
the most important fault is that machinery stock might not be fully employed. Failure to 
control for business-cycles will tends to reduce any displacement effect. Since complete 
controls are very difficult, the best solution may be to introduce industry-specific dummy 
variables into the estimating equations.
Data limitations prevented computing the model for several years, but a range of 
enough observations is available for 1840. This year seems a good choice since in that year 
a mixture of production techniques were used.501 The database is the same employed in the 
previous regression on the wage determinants. 301
301 Chapter 7 for a full description of the industrial structure of the cotton industry in 1840.
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Table 4.10 Cobb-Douglas Labour Demand Equations. 1840
Dependent variables: 
Independent variables:
Log(workers) Log (men) Log(women) Log(childrcn)
Constant 3.651055* -1.59478** -5.166685* -2.40480**
(SB.) (0.718661) (0.657925) (0.775823) (1.134170)
Log (output) 0.663097* 0.524208* 1.050924* 1.025919*
(S B.) (0.097034) (0.085944) (0.146519) (0.192802)
Log (average wage) -1.652376* -0.614943* 0302068** 0.656025*
(SB.) (0.191109) (0.128813) (0.157700) (0.234402)
Log (machinery) 0.22421** 0.321709* -0.429070* -0365719*
(SB.) (0.114728) (0.096270) (0.160557) (0206702)
Dummy spinning -0.967231* -2.287887* 2.850639* 0.70879**
(SJE.) (0222741) (0.153955) (0.266132) (0.350295)
Dummy weaving -0.296206" 0.202153" 1229303* -1.328665*
(SB.) (0.228809) (0.202153) (0.358336) (0.470183)
Dummy metal industry -0.481553" -0.67612** -3.032134* -3.522448*
(SB.) (0.404534) (0.341043) (0.887931) (120146)
Number of observations 81 81 81 81
R2 (percent) 90.85 96.93 88.60 74.04
F 133.425 416.747 104.674 39.021
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes an d  sou rces: See text fo sources, "sign ifica tive at 99 percent; ** significative at 95 percent; " n o t statistically 
significative. Equation estim ated with the w eighted  least squares m ethod w ith weights g iven by the num ber of 
establishm ents in each observation. The finishing industry is the industry w hich is om ited  in the dummies. 
A lternative estim ations w ithout dum m ies offered few er statistically reliable results.
The results for the four equations are presented in table 4.9. Some signs of the 
coefficients are as expected, with increases in output having a positive effect upon all kinds 
of employment, but the wage variable does not always show the expected sign. The expected 
sign (negative) was obtained in the total and men employment equations, but the 
coefficcients were positive in the women and child equations. The major variable of interest 
for the objective of this chapter, the machinery coefficient, is positive and highly significant. 
The magnitude of the coefficients implies that, other things equal, a 10 percent increase in 
the stock of machinery led to a 3.2 percent increase in men employment, and a 4.3 percent 
decrease in women employment and a 5.6 percent decrease in child employment. Note that 
the nature of the estimation procedure mean that these elasticities represent marginal 
changes.
In broad terms, these Cobb-Douglas equations show that the demand for men was
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strongly and positively correlated with the introduction of more machinery. The opposite 
holds for women and children. An unexpected result is that the demand for women and 
children grew with their wages, although this latter result was predicted by the Goldin- 
Sokoloffs hypothesis.302
One source of concern is that the Cobb-Douglas function is quite uninteresting when 
one wishes to discover the cross-price elasticities or how the substitution between pairs of 
inputs is affected by the amount of inputs used.303
An alternative procedure to estimate labour demand equations is based on the 
Translog approximation of production. In this case, the choice is between cost functions and 
production functions. The Translog cost function is preferred when the data used is collected 
at firm-level since, then factor prices rather than factor quantities are treated as exogenous. 
On the other hand, production functions are employed for large observation units as then 
factor quantities are more exogenous than factor prices. Since the units of observation in the 
data used for this study are towns and districts I employ the production function instead of 
the cost function. Specifically, after taking logarithms, the translog production function has 
the form:
]nQ = Cg + aJnM + aJnW  + aJnK + aJnR +^mJlf(MAf)2 
(4 S) + + {KQnR? *bJnM lnW * bJnMInK *
bJnMlnR + bJnWlnK* bJnWlnR + bJnKbtR.
Where Q is total output, M is men employment, F is women and child employment, 
K is capital and R materials.304 The data source and variables are the same as in the Cobb- 
Douglas demand function with the only difference being that here I introduce a new variable 
(raw materials) and the variable machinery has been expanded by introducing the other
302 Goldin and Sokoloff (1982)(1984).
303 Hamermesh (1993), pp. 38-39.
304 The use of this number of variables is not casual. In the process of computation this group 
of variables offered by far the best model. Moreover, due to problems of conelation, women and 
children variables have been split within a single variable by means of a translog quantity index. 
This is because the variables are practically perfect complements.
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components of capital input (buildings and inventories). This is the common physical 
production function. It is estimated using the weighted least squared method.305 O utput 
shares have been employed to compute the production function and, therefore, the im plicit 
assumptions are the presence o f constant returns of scale and that firms were price-takers 
in factor markets.
Using this production function, the questions of substitutability and complementarity 
of inputs can be considered. Two measures of elasticity, the Hicks partial elasticities o f 
complementarity (HEC) and factor price elasticities, will be employed.306 For the Translog 
function the own HEC is defined as:
(4.6) Cü = ( b,, + S* - /  S*,
and the cross-elasticity of complementarity as
(4.7) Cjj = ( bjj + SjSj) /  SjSj.
Where bj are parameters obtained from the Translog equation and is the mean output 
share of factor i. Finally, the standard errors for the elasticities evaluated at the mean shares 
are:307
(4.8) S.E. (C, ) = S.E. ( bj )/
(4.9) S.E. (Cij) = S .E .(b ij) /S ij.
Equations 4.6 and 4.7 measure the ceteris paribus effect on relative factor prices of
305 See a similar application of Translog production in Field (1988).
306 Note that the Allen elasticity of substitution is a more common measure but that this concept 
is inappropriate if we are interested in considering the effects of exogenous changes in factor 
quantities on factor prices. See Grant and Hameimesh (1981).
307 See on this method Griffin (1996).
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changes in relative factor quantities, holding output price and other input quantities constant. 
Factors i and j are quantity complements (q-complements) when C;j > 0 and quantity 
substitutes (q-substitutes) when < 0. Associated with are the factor price elasticities 
(T|y)f which show the change in the price of factor i given a 1 percent change in the quantity 
of factor j, holding output price constant. These were computed by multiplying the HEC by 
the appropriate factor share. Factors i and j are price complements (p-complements) when 
T||j < 0, whereas they are price substitutes (p-substitutes) when > 0.
Some examples may help to show the use of these definitions. When women labour 
and capital are p-substitutes one may infer that a rise in the cost of capital will increase the 
fraction of women workers at each level of production. These two factors may also be q- 
complements. If so, an increase in the supply of capital will raise the relative wage of 
uneducated workers by making them more productive.
Table 4.11 Translog Labour Demand Elasticities, 1840
Elasticities of factor Elasticities of factor
Complementarity Prices
Value SE. Value SE.
Own-Elasticities
Men -2.176 (0.52) -0.213 (0.05)
Women and children -12.174 (0.25) -0.693 (0.01)
Capital -10.070 (0.50) -1.501 (0.07)
Raw Materials -0.218 (0.03) -0.151 (0.02)
Cross-Elasticities
Men - Women and Children -5.484 (0.54) -0.312 (0.08)
Men -Capital 0.182 (0.33) 0.027 (0.08)
Men - Raw Materials 0.531 (0.08) 0369 (0.06)
Women & Children - Capital 8.625 (0.50) 1.285 (0.10)
Women & Children - Raw materials 0.200 (0.06) 0.139 (0.04)
Notes and sources: see text.
The elasticities of table 4.11 display several important findings. First, all of the own 
HECs are negative, which is consistent with convexity and, therefore, with equilibrium in
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labour markets.308
Second, men, the most skilled labour group, on average, was the labour group with 
the lowest own-price elasticity and was least p-substitutable for capital. Less skilled labour 
groups, women and children, are found to be strong p-substitutes for capital.309 For instance, 
looking at elasticities of factor prices, the own elasticity of men is -0.213 whereas the own 
elasticity of women and children was -0.693. This means that an increase of one point in 
the supply of men decreased their wages by 0.2 points, whereas the same increase in the 
supply of women and child labour decreased their wages by 0.6. That is, three times the 
reduction in men wages. It should be emphasised that, according to the labour demand 
literature, this is a consequence of the existence of capital-skills p-complementarity. In 
effect, many present-day empirical studies on labour demand have agreed that own-price 
demand elasticities are inversely correlated with the amount o f human capital held by the 
group of workers. Similarly, they have also concluded that skilled groups of workers are 
more p-complementary with capital than unskilled workers.310
Third, the own-price elasticities are quite small, which implies that relative increases 
in the supply of one type of labour could be absorbed with only a small decline in its 
relative wage. This result casts strong doubts on the elastic labour-supply explanations. On 
the other hand, the large own-price elasticity of capital implies that the market responded 
strongly to fluctuations in interest rates. In other words, the capital market worked quite 
well.311
Finally, men and women were q-substitutes and p-complements. This implies that an 
increase in the wages of men might reduce women and child employment. Similarly, an 
increase in the amount of men labour might depress women wages. The reason is simple: 
the supply of men was less elastic than that of women and children since there was no
308 Field (1988), p. 657.
309 The skills differences between men, women and children are discussed in chapter 6.
310 Hameimesh (1993), pp. 134ff., and Griffin (1996), p. 894.
311 This result reinforces the arguments of chapter 3.
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hidden men unemployment.312 Similarly, it can be argued that this is because, on average, 
men were more skilled.
This section has proved the robustness of the capital-skills p-complementarity 
hypothesis in the early industrialisation framework. The results of the different elasticities 
also imply that general and skilled wages might grow during early industrialisation, as 
occurred, even when total employment decreased.
At this point, many readers may be intrigued about the nature of capital-skills 
complementarity in this early period and how the transition to the factory system produced 
this phenomenon? For example, Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz state that the emergence 
o f factories was de-skilling (i.e., there was no capital-skills complementarity) because it 
narrowed the knowledge employed by shop floor workers (blue collars).313 In other words, 
before the increase in the division-of-labour, each artisan was trained in all the different 
operations.314 In sharp contrast, I argue that the emergence o f factories increased the demand 
for skills since it created new skilled tasks unknown in the previous decentralized system 
of production. Furthermore, despite the fact that some jobs were simplified (for example, the 
reparairs were done by specialized workers instead of by the same artisans), the use of the 
new machinery required a different types of skills.
To accumulate the details that I needed I ignored the rest of the industries and 
concentrated on the metal industry, which evolved from small workshops to factories during 
the period. Before the advent of the factories each metal artisan with one or two assistants 
and one or two apprentices, produced metal goods in a small shop.315 The spares were 
collected by merchants who commercialised the product or were produced to order.
312 Active population censuses of the period supports the belief that the participation rates of 
males were very high (see Nicolau (1990), Table 10, p. 46).
3,3 Goldin and Katz (1996a).
314 Leijonhufvud (1986).
315 See a description of the salaries of the different workers in the metal industry in Cerdá 
(1968). There is also a description of the factories and workshops in Comisión especial arancelaria 
(1867).
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Consequently, the masters owned and repaired the machinery. However, note that the 
machinery was usually simple and easy to repair.
In the new metal factories skilled workers with assistants produced the spares. 
However, their work was not essentially simpler since the rhythm of the new machinery was 
controlled by the skilled worker. More precisely, the skilled worker had to develop a new 
level of dexterity since a good master had to run his power-driven machinery faster than the 
old hand-driven machines. Also, they had to be capable o f managing their work team, which 
was probably larger than in the artisanal shop. More prominently, the final product had to 
be homogeneous and the skilled worker had to simultaneously control the quality and 
amount of production. In other words, the shop-floor tasks in the mechanical metal-industry 
were not simple and routine. Furthermore, skilled workers repaired the small problems of 
the machinery, which was certainly more difficult than the typical reparations of the old 
hand-machines. To sum up, the emergence of factories in the metal industry did not result 
in the de-skilling the shop floor skilled workers. The main effect was that it separated the 
skilled from the unskilled tasks.
In addition, the factories created some new jobs that were absolutely skilled. For 
instance, the number of clerks and accountants grew exponentially because of the 
complication of management tasks, accounting systems and business relations.316 Within the 
new factories the commercial tasks performed by merchants in the proto-industry were 
performed by clerks who need schooling. Similarly, new jobs were created on the shop floor. 
The unpredictable and sometimes dangerous steam-engines were controlled by new 
engineers. The spares were designed by groups of designers and the workers were controlled 
by managers. Up to this point the evidence seems clear-cut that the transition to the factory 
increased the demand for skilled workers. In part, the increase was driven by the new 
machinery increasing and creating a new demand for metal goods. But a close look at the 
factories would suggest that the development of many new jobs was associated with the 
development of accounting and other management system. As well as the design of new
316 Pollard (1965).
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goods, the control of the new machinery and, more prominently, the control and organisation 
of the labourforce. The history of the metal industry suggests that the transition to the 
factory system was more than just a change in the skills employed on the shop floor. It 
suggests that the increase in skilled tasks created a demand for skilled workers.
4. 6. A Simple Model of the Early Industrialisation Labour M arket
To complete the discussion of the changes in the labour market I develop a simple 
labour model. This model is basically an adaptation of the models outlined by Hamermesh 
and Goldin-Sokoloff.317 The objective of this model is to formalise some arguments 
discussed previously. The model is based on two main ideas: (1) the scarce factor during 
early industrialisation was human capital (skills),318 (2) industrial production is efficient at 
any moment in time given the scarcity of production factors. In other words, the 
technologies used in early industrialisation appropriately reflected existing factor prices.
For simplicity, I will consider two stages in early industrialisation: the proto-industry 
(which was comprised of handicrafts and outworking production) and the factory system. 
Each of these stages is defined by different levels of skills (human capital). Three inputs 
(unskilled labour Lu, skilled labour Ls, and physical capital K) are used to produce goods 
in manufacturing. Women and children were unskilled labour and could substitute men once 
division-of-labour and technology allowed this process.319 The supply of unskilled labour is 
more elastic than the supply of skilled labour.320 Finally, for simplicity, I assume that
317 Hameimesh (1993), pp. 383-385; and Goldin and Sokoloff (1982X1984).
318 Note that here the terni skill is used in a broad way since the skills are the knowledge 
necessary to organise production and deal with industrial technology. However, when I measured 
capital-skill complementarity in the past section I narrowed the definition of skill to the quantity of 
human capital employed by the labour force. See charter 6 for a detailed definition of the terms 
human capital and knowledge.
319 On the importance of the physical aptitudes and education of females for their position in the 
labour market during early industrialisation see Burnette (1997). See also a complete discussion on 
the human capital factors in chapter 6.
320 This model does not require the assumption of unlimited supplies of labour. Therefore, it is 
unnecessary to agree with the Lewis' model to formulate the model.
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entrepreneurs could choose the quantities of physical capital and labour with the main 
constraint being the available input of skills.321
Figure 4.1 Capital-Unskilled Labour Substitution and Skill Endowments:
Early Industrialisation
N otes an d  so u rce s : M odified  from H am eim esh  (1993), p. 384.
First, consider the behaviour of the typical entrepreneur in the proto-industry, shown 
in Figure 4.1. The available quantity of skills was constrained to be Lsl, so that the firms 
operate on the isoquant Q l. Given the relative prices o f the services of physical capital and 
unskilled labour the firm chooses to produce PI. Using PI unskilled hours. Then the total 
amount o f labour employed is LI = Lsl + L ui. Labour productivity is Qo/Lo.
There then follows a process of innovation propelled by local conditions, for example
321 Note that this does not mean that I assume elastic supply of labour but simply that 
entrepreneurs make an efficient choice given the relative prices of factors.
m
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the size of the market for the locally produced goods.322 The entrepreneurs then found it 
profitable to introduce the factory system. The factory system is characterised by an 
increasing division-of-labour and* in the second phase* by using new capital goods 
(machinery). The new establishments and machinery were larger and therefore more 
expensive than the proto-industry shops and machinery. Hence, the total amount of fixed 
capital increases. Consequently, capital-skills complementarity is more evident. Furthermore, 
the division-of-labour allowed women and children to participate more actively in 
manufacturing since the need for physical strength was reduced.323 However, it should be 
noted that in some industries, such as cotton spinning, there was previously some initial 
division-of-labour and women and children were already used for manufacturing tasks. In 
other words, the argument is that the process of employment of women and children in 
unskilled tasks was intensified, not originated, in this period. There was a shift in the price 
of skilled labour and private and public investors found it profitable to invest in the 
acquisition/diffusion of the new skills associated with the new machinery because they 
realised skilled workers received higher wages.324 325Thus, the supply of skill increases to Lsl. 
The isoquant shifts outward to Q2, where Q2 »  Q I. At the new maximizing point, P2, 
there is a decline in the demand for unskilled labour, even a decline in total labour input, 
and an increase in the demand for physical capital.323 It should be noted that with the new 
amount of skilled workforce output per worker and per unit of capital rises substantially.
This transition did not affect all industries in the same way since in many industries 
in the middle of the nineteenth century hand-trades still cohabited with factories in all the 
industrialising regions. Although it should be noted that manufacturing as a whole 
progressed in this fashion, the transition in each industry was decided by the extent of 
market for their products.326
322 A discussion of this issue in chapter 7.
323 Burnette (1997).
324 See chapter 6 for a full discussion of the methods of informal education and on-the-job- 
training.
325 However, in the long run, the total amount of employment grew again accoiding to the 
Marshall's derived demand laws (see, Hamennesh (1993), pp. 24-25).
326 See chapter 7.
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In spite of the fact that this simple model obviously ignores important issues in the 
development of the labour market, it predicts the growth of endowments and returns in a 
three-factor world during early industrialisation. Briefly, the predictions of this model are: 
(1) a rise in wages in the transition from the proto-industry to the factory system because 
the marginal productivity of labour rises due to the increase in skills endowments; (2) a 
decrease in employment in the same period because of the labour-saving effect of capital- 
skills complementarity and because consumers' demand for manufacturer goods grew slower 
than labour productivity (instead, if  demand growth was perfectly elastic to price changes 
one would expect employment to grow at a faster rate); (3) the growth in the skilled- 
unskilled wage gap because of the shift in capital and technology; (4) a large number of 
women and children performing unskilled tasks; (5) a decrease in the women-men and child- 
men wage gap. All these events occurred in Catalonia during the industrailisation.
4.7. Conclusions
This chapter sets out some empirical findings about the evolution of the labour 
market in manufacturing during the early phase of Catalan industrialisation. These findings 
come from the fragmentary evidence on wages, employment and labour demand. In sharp 
contrast to much of the existing literature on the process of industrialisation, the evidence 
points to the conclusion that Catalan industrialisation was not based on the use of a large 
supply of (cheap) labour. Quite the contrary, the evolution of manufacturing employment 
and wages supports the view of changes promoted by the demand-side of the labour market. 
Until the 1840s, the extent of the division-of-labour allowed women and children to enter 
the manufacturing workforce and then to decrease their wage gap with men. After the 1840s, 
the existence of capital-skills complementarity in the new factories depressed the demand 
for unskilled labour while simultaneously increasing the demand for skilled workers. Who 
benefited from the widening of the gap between their wages and the wages of the unskilled 
workers. As a consequence, many women and children who occupied unskilled jobs were 
displaced from manufacturing towards other occupations. The outcome of all these 
successive and rapid changes was an increase in the overall wage level accompanied by a 
slight decrease in total employment in manufacturing.
Chapter 5
The Contribution of Productivity Growth
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a careful analysis of the contribution of 
factor accumulation and productivity growth to the output growth of the main Catalan 
industries. This study covers the period 1830-1861 for the cotton industry and as much of 
this period as is feasible for each of the remaining six industries (metal, wool, linen, silk, 
mixed fabrics and paper).327 The main conclusion is that neither capital accumulation, nor 
the transference of labour within modem manufacturing appear to be as important as 
productivity improvement. In other words, growth in modem manufacturing from 1830 to 
1861 was mainly due to shifts in total factor productivity.
5.1. Introduction
There is a large intellectual disagreement among economic historians on the roles 
played by factor accumulation, such as labour and physical capital, and technical progress 
in early industrialisation.328 Some have argued that increasing investment rates and the 
transfer of labour into manufacturing can explain a great part of manufacturing output 
growth. Others have insisted on the main role played by machinery investment; that is, the 
diffusion and adoption of new machinery.329 In these explanations technology is usually
327 There are few growth accounting studies for this early period. See, for Britain, McCloskey 
(1981), Feinstein (1981), Crafts (1985a)(1995) and, for the United States, Abramovitz (1993), 
Sokoloff (1986), and Tchakerian (1994).
328 See, for example, Rostow (1960), Geischenkron (1962), Landes (1969) or Pollard (1981).
329 Landes (1969).
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embodied in the stock of capital goods and the so-called adopters and users o f technology 
play no role in developing or changing the technologies they choose and use. Therefore, the 
followers can benefit from the diffusion of industrial technology without incurring the costs 
of technological innovation. Finally, others have underlined the crucial importance of 
innovations that were non capital-embodied and affected the organisation of labour, firms 
and markets.330 According to this line of reasoning productivity improvement is partly 
independent of factor accumulation, and especially from investment in machinery.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. A survey on the literature on growth 
accounting, including the major shortcomings and recent innovations, forms the next section 
of the chapter. The following section describes the methodology used in the chapter and 
provides a quick overview of the generation of the variables. The fourth section examines 
labour productivity. The fifth section investigates total factor productivity, underlines some 
stylized facts, and discusses the main biases of the measures computed. The results of 
sections four and five imply that most manufacturing industries realised large gains in labour 
productivity and total factor productivity. Therefore, productivity improvement seems the 
main 'engine* of growth in the early phases of Catalan industrialisation. The last section 
summarises.
5.2. An Overview to the Literature on Productivity Measurement
This section presents information about the origins and developments of the literature 
on growth accounting. Little of the content claims to be original. The first part, on the 
history of the method, could readily be omitted by those familiar with the subject. Compared 
to the usual surveys on the topic, it does devote less attention to mathematical points. It 
would have to be complemented by a thorough study of the technical side to give a full 
picture of the methodology.331 Lack of space and opportunity precludes that here. The 
objectives o f this section are: (1) to prove that the growth accounting methodology is
330 Clark (1984) and Sokoloff (1984a)(1986).
331 There are numerous surveys of growth accounting see, for example, Gollop (1983), Kohli 
(1990), Joigenson (1990) and Dean et aL (1996).
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rigorous, (2) that many measuring choices are the result of previous debates.
Growth accounting is the most widespread method of measuring the contribution of 
the different inputs and productivity improvements to growth. Growth accounting is a 
framework that purports to distinguish the separate contributions of innovation, capital 
accumulation and labour in raising output. Consequently, standard growth accounting 
provides some quantitative descriptions of the 'proximate' sources of growth. Innovation in 
growth accounting is assumed to be equal to the 'residual' of the growth equation left by all 
factors of production when they are weighted accordingly.
The early growth accounting methodology was based on the concept of an aggregate 
production function.332 Paul H. Douglas developed the original concept of the production 
function before the Second World War.333 345A few years later, a Dutch economist, Jan 
Tinbergen, established one of the earliest formulations of what we now call the neoclassical 
theory of growth. His innovation consisted of adding a time trend to the function of capital 
and labour inputs (i.e., to the production function) using this to represent the level of 
’efficiency.' The work of Tinbergen was ignored in the United States, where his research was 
not rediscovered until the mid-1950s. Meanwhile, George J. Stigler had independently 
introduced the idea of efficiency or total factor productivity,3M In the following years, the 
National Bureau of Economic Research developed a major research programme on this 
subject. In the framework of this project, Moses Abramovitz, John W. Kendrick and 
Solomon Fabricant published several important articles that contained the first true growth 
accountings.333 The programme culminated in 1961 when John W. Kendrick published his 
path-breaking monograph on the United States. In his analysis of the productivity trends in 
the United States, Kendrick employed an explicit system of national accounts to generate
332 This paragraph is based on Jorgenson (1990), pp. 19ff.
333 Douglas (1948).
334 Stigler (1947).
335 Abramovitz (1956), Fabricant (1959), and Kendrick (1956).
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to capital stock if capital inputs were homogeneous, while labour input would be 
proportional to hours worked if labour inputs were homogeneous. However experience 
shows that, in fact, inputs are enormously heterogeneous. Therefore, an implication of the 
early growth accounting was that, because all inputs were undifferentiated, one hour of work 
of an unskilled worker was the same as one hour of a skilled worker.
Third, in primitive growth accounting the part of the growth equation explained by 
factors of production was of only one-quarter of all growth of net output per capita. 
Obviously, this introduced a major source of concern in the quality and usefulness of the 
new methodology. It was commonly argued that the "residual" contained too many different 
things. Consequently, Abramovitz spoke o f the residual as 'the measure of our ignorance’.339
Finally, many held that growth accounting was only useful in describing long-term 
growth but not short-term fluctuations in growth rates. It was also commonly argued that the 
very aggregate early growth accounting offered little room for the analysis of the sources 
of invention or innovation. Such as new and improved products or processes, or 
organisational and structural change. For instance, the highly aggregate production models 
used by the early growth accountants were a serious obstacle to understanding the causes 
of the slowdown in economic growth in the OECD countries during the period 1973-1979.340 
Thus, the general impression was that the assumptions underlying the aggregate model were 
inconsistent with the empirical evidence and that growth accounting analysis, which was 
based on broad models, was too vague and imprecise.
Since the early 1970s, however, the importance of the unexplained part and the main 
shortcomings of the method have been reduced. This is mainly due to improvements in the 
methodology that have led to a much more analysis of productivity. The main improvements 
have been: (1) the use of superlative indices and their derived production functions; (2) the 
substitution of industry-based analysis for aggregate or economy-wide analysis; (3) the
339 Abramovitz (1993).
340 Jorgenson (1990), pp. 26.
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analysis of inputs other than labour and capital (i.e., intermediate inputs); (4) considering 
the heterogeneity o f capital and labour inputs.
In growth accounting, such as in output measurement, the choice of index number 
strongly effects the results. Broadly, two great families of index numbers can be 
distinguished: the non-superlative and superlative indices. The most common and best- 
known non-superlative indices are the Laspeyres, Paasche and Geometric. Empirically, 
Paasche indices tend to reduce the rates of growth whereas Laspeyres indices tend to 
increase these rates. Moreover, the Laspeyres and Paasche indices are exact for the Leontief 
production function while the Geometric indices are exact for the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. Both production functions are first-order approximations of an arbitrary neo­
classical production function that assumes a constant elasticity of substitution among the 
factors of production. If a nonsuperlative index is chosen the analysis of the interrelations 
among the factors of production is biased, because a correct measure of growth must 
consider that sometimes the innovation implies changes in the elasticities o f substitution. For 
this reason, modem growth accounting has abandoned this type of index and introduced 
superlative indices. These indices are a second-order approximation of an arbitrary neo­
classical economy because they assume multiple elasticities o f substitution among the factors 
of production. The best-known superlative indices are the Fisher ideal and the Divisia (also 
so-called Tomqvist). The first fits a quadratic production function and the second a Translog 
production function. Both production functions assume, obviously, multiple elasticities of 
substitution among the factors of production.341
The second major innovation consisted of the analysis o f the sources of economic 
growth at the level of the industrial sectors. The pioneering work in this area was due to 
John W. Kendrick, although Dale W. Jorgenson and his associates have dominated this topic 
since the 1970s.342 Later, the same Jorgenson developed a new framework to integrate the 
results for the individual sectors into an analysis of the sources of growth for the economy
341 Diewert (1976)(1987), Diewert and Nakamura, eds. (1993), and Hill (1993).
342 See, Kendrick (1961), Kendrick and Grossman (1980), and Jorgenson et el. (1987).
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as a whole.343 Aggregate productivity growth can be represented by a weighted sum of 
sectoral productivity growth rates. The weights given by the ratios of the value of output, 
or value added, in each sector to value added in all sectors. This improvement makes it 
possible to attribute aggregate growth rates with their sources in individual industries. 
Another major accomplishment of this methodological improvement was that overall growth 
can be decomposed into sources at individual industry level and the effects of resource 
reallocation. Consequently, the assumption of perfect competition has been largely relaxed 
(e.g., the economy can misallocate resources) and it is possible to measure the effects of 
structural changes in the economy (e.g., the effect of the reallocation of labour from 
agriculture to industry).344 345
The introduction of intermediate inputs into growth accounting was due to Dale W. 
Jorgenson.343 Previous studies had modelled economic growth using the concept of value 
added, eliminating the effect of increases in the quantity and quality of intermediate inputs 
on overall growth rates.346 Jorgenson also introduced the concept of symmetry by treating 
all inputs into the accounts symmetrically. All inputs must be computed with the same index 
number methodology and all inputs, including intermediate inputs, were heterogeneous.
However, the most pathbreaking advance in productivity measurement was the 
development of heterogeneous measures for inputs. The development of heterogeneous 
measures for inputs was strongly related with progress in the application of index number 
theory to productivity measurement.347 In 1961 Edward F. Denison introduced the concept 
of heterogeneous labour.348 Hours worked are cross-classified by age, sex, education, and 
employment status, and weighted by wage rates. The development of similar (heterogeneous)
343 Bemdt and Joigenson (1973).
344 This major accomplishment also makes it possible to measure the effects of market failures 
on overall growth rates, and analyse the consequences of structural reforms on the use of inputs and 
total factor productivity.
345 Bemdt and Jorgenson (1973).
346 Kendrick (1961).
347 Diewert (1976) and Caves et al. (1982a)(1982b).
348 Denison (1961).
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measures for capital input generated a large and intense debate that started in the 1960s. 
Space restrictions prevent the summarising of this debate.349 In 1980, Gollop and Jorgenson 
published the work that shaped the subsequent literature.350 The basic objective was to divide 
capital into homogeneous components, and weigh each by its rental rate. Note that the 
introduction of the heterogeneity of inputs makes it possible to separate the contribution due 
to changes in the quantity and quality of inputs. Quality changes in labour input are 
associated with increases in the use of human capital.351 Whereas quality changes in capital 
input are associated with the effect of embodied technical change.351 The effect of this was 
a considerable reduction in the amount of total factor productivity. For example. Jorgenson 
has shown that changes in quality account for two-fifths of the growth of capital input and 
for more than one-third of the growth of labour input for the United States between 1947 
and 1985 .3”
The major consequence of all the recent developments in growth accounting 
methodology was a reduction in the unexplained part. State-of-the-art growth accounting 
makes it possible to decompose overall growth into the growth of capital, labour and 
intermediate inputs. One can also compute the effect of the reallocation of inputs (production 
factors) among the different sectors, and measure the changes in the quality of inputs. Strong 
assumptions have been relaxed and, in broad terms, the methodology has become more 
useful in explaining short-term fluctuations. However, it should be noted that the new 
improvements do not serve to reject the results of the early methodology. They have been 
able to narrow the size of the residual by explaining part of their composition. In other 
words, early accounting included in the residual not only 'pure' (disembodied) innovation, 
but also the innovation embodied in capital goods (capital quality), human capital 
accumulation (labour quality) and the improvements in markets (resource allocation). *3012
344 See chapter 3 and Hulten (1990).
330 Gollop and Jorgenson (1980).
331 See chapter 6.
332 Hulten (1992).
353 Jorgenson (1990), pp. 24-25.
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There are numerous studies on economic history that are based on the growth 
accounting methodology. Furthermore, many of the early works in growth accounting were 
historical accounts. However, many economic historians are still sceptical of the explanatory 
capacity of the growth accounting methodology and the related econometric methods.354 It 
is useful to be fairly sceptical of the explanatory capacity of growth accounting 
methodology, but mistrust must not be exaggerated. Macroeconomic growth accounts helped 
us to focus attention on long-term growth and permitted economic historians to examine the 
"big picture" of what was happening in the economy without being confused by obscure 
details that they could not measure. I already noted that recent improvements in the 
methodology have expanded its explanatory capacity towards the level of individual 
industries. Modem growth accounting requires fewer assumptions and, for example, is very 
consistent in its treatment of market failures and related problems. Finally, it should be 
emphasised that this framework does not include a theory of growth, it only describes the 
process of growth.355 Therefore, it is compatible with economic theories even if they are 
different from standard neo-classical growth theory (for example, growth accounting would 
be used to analyse New Growth Theory models).
There are a large number of studies based on the growth accounting methodology 
for the period after the Second World. In sharp contrast, the literature on the early phases 
of industrialisation using this method is remarkably thin. Several economic historians have 
studied the British Industrial Revolution. The most macroeconomic approach is the work of 
Feinstein.356 This work was replicated by Donald McCloskey and Nicholas F.R. Crafts.357 
McCloskey’s growth accounting worried about the effects of the reallocation of resources 
and estimated productivity through prices instead o f quantities. The pioneering and 
innovative work o f McCloskey was refined and corrected by Crafts, who decreased the 
growth rates of the whole economy, individual industries and TFP. Recently, he has also
354 See, for example, the review of the British debate on this aspect in Crafts and Harley (1992).
355 Barro and Sala-i-Martm (1994).
356 Feinstein (1981).
357 McCloskey (1981) and Crafts (1985a). See, also, Crafts and Harley (1992).
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introduced the concept of human capital input in his growth accounting exercises.358 Indeed, 
these works have helped to change opinions on the Industrial Revolution. In broad terms, 
these three authors have arrived at similar conclusions: structural changes were very 
important, but that the British Industrial Revolution cannot be completely explained by the 
accumulation of production factors (capital, labour or human capital). In other words, the 
perspective given on the British Industrial Revolution by these studies is that it was due to 
a sharp increase in productivity.359 However, according to Crafts' results innovation was 
concentrated in few sectors, whereas McCloskey supports the view that it was a broad 
phenomenon.360
The early phase of industrialisation in the United States was studied with the growth 
accounting methodology by two economic historians. Kenneth Sokoloff developed labour 
productivity and total factor productivity measures for 13 major industries in the north-east 
of the United States for the period from 1820 to I860.361 This work was recently replicated 
for the south of the United States by Vicken Tchakerian.362 These two studies emphasised 
that a broad range of manufacturing industries enjoyed substantial gains in productivity 
throughout the early nineteenth century, and that the major source of growth during early 
industrialisation was productivity improvement (i.e., innovation). Furthermore, they have 
underlined the importance of the changes in labour organisation.
There are two basic findings that impede us in generalising the results of these five 
studies for other early industrialisation cases in Europe. First, the British and the United 
States cases seem exceptions to the norm more than universal models. Great Britain was the 
first country to industrialise and experienced large structural changes that not were replicated 
in European countries. The United States enjoyed a large home market and an unparalleled
358 Crafts (1995).
359 See the recent debate of Crafts and Mills (1997) versus Greasley and Oaxley (1997).
360 McCloskey (1981). See, also the recent criticism on the arguments of Crafts by Temin 
(1997).
361 Sokoloff (1986).
362 Tchakerian (1994).
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abundance of resources. Second» unfortunately» these five studies did not incorporate many 
of the recent improvements in growth accounting methodology» and considered all outputs 
and inputs as homogeneous. At this point, a sceptical and informed reader could not accept 
the relevance or importance of the results, claiming that these large TFP growth rates are 
spurious due to, for example, a failure to account for changes in the quality of capital.
A knowledge of the productivity improvement in manufacturing is clearly of great 
value in studying the early phases of European industrialisation. Turning now to the Catalan 
case, a really accurate productivity analysis of Catalan industrialisation, something which 
currently does not exist, must take into account changes in the quality of outputs and inputs. 
Furthermore, changes in the quality of capital, for overall manufacturing and for individual 
industries, is very useful in studying the importance of the transference of British technology 
(machinery) for the industrialisation of the followers. For instance, if a large part o f growth 
rates are explained by improvements in the quality of capital, the success of the early 
industrialisation regions must be attached to the adoption of British machinery. Conversely, 
if productivity improvement is relatively independent of productive factors one must 
underline the importance of local knowledge and innovative capacity as major sources of 
industry growth.
5.3. Methodology
This section is devoted to describing the methodology employed to estimate labour 
and total factor productivity. Interested readers can find more detailed accounts on the 
methodology used to estimate output and capital input in the respective chapters. The labour 
input methodology is contained in the appendix to this chapter.
This study o f the sources o f growth at the industry level is based on the economic 
theory of production. Beginning with a production function, giving output (Qi), as function 
of capital input (IQ , labour input (IQ, intermediate input (5Q and time (T). The contribution 
of each input is the product of the value share of the input in total outlay multiplied by its 
growth rate. It may be useful here to give a quick analytic overview of the approach. The
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point of departure is that each industry has a homogeneous production function (F,). given 
by:
(5.1) Q p  Fs (Xj. Kj, L,, T), (i= 1,2. ...n)
We can approach this production function by means of the Translog production 
function, which gives the theoretical justification for the use of factor shares to weight 
growth rates.36 465 Specifically, the Translog production function in the case of three inputs is:
^  InQ * Oq + aJaX *aJnK ♦ oflnI *~bJ!nX f
+ I b J b tK ?  + \b,<JnLf bJhXlnK* bJnXlnL ♦ bJn K ln l
In the case of two discrete periods of time, and after differentiating and taking logarithms:364
in<?(7)-iii<?(r-i) = ejW D -w nr-i)] ♦ Q j t n m - k K p - n ]  ♦
B J W J i-ln L C r -l) ]  ♦ TFPT_lJt
0, = *  B flT -1)]
The ©i denotes the elasticity of output with respect to each input. Weights are given 
by the average share of each component in the total outlay for the two periods.3“  Note that 
the share of each factor of production in the total inputs relies exclusively on its relative 
price (elasticities) and, moreover, under constant returns to scale the value shares sum to 
unity. The Translog index of TFP (TFPt .,t) is the difference between the growth rate of 
output and a weighted average of the growth rates of intermediate, capital, and labour inputs. 
It is, thus, a measure of the increase in output attributable to a time-related shift in the
363 Christensen et a l (1971X1973).
364 For reasons of space the mathematical development of the Translog index is not complete; 
it appears in Christensen et al (1980) and Joigenson (1990).
365 Total outlay is practically equivalent to the total payments received for outputs. However, in 
some cases, these payments can be adjusted for direct taxation and monopoly gains to obtain the 
total outlay. In this case, I make no adjustments and I assume that total outlay is equivalent to total 
payments (it should be noted that adjustments would reduce the share of capital in total payments 
and, hence increase the TFP growth rate).
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production function.
A major innovation adopted in this production account is that output and inputs are 
not treated as homogeneous.366 Therefore, the rate of growth of output and each input 
between two periods is a weighted average of the growth rates of its n components. Weights 
are given by the share of each component in the corresponding payments for each input. In 
the case of output, intermediate inputs, capital and labour, the respective equations are:
(5-4) lnQ,-kQ,-i = E , [^ ( In
(55) M X , = E ,  ie^OnH.-lnS,.,)]
(5-6) In K '-ln K ^  = £ , [^(taC i.-lnC i,.,)]
(5-7) ¡nLr lnL,., ^ ( l n
Where value shares are computed as:
(s.8) %  ■ V W J R  * o jr - i) i ,
The methodology used for computing output, intermediate, capital and labour inputs 
has already been full described in the respective previous chapters, but two critical points 
should be mentioned: the procedure used to distinguish among the components of inputs and 
output and the assumptions behind the methodology used in computing the input shares.
We can approach the different components with two different techniques: (1) break 
down each input, or output, by class and, then, multiply each by its share in factor 
payments; (2) construct a Tomqvist price index then deflate the total value o f each input or 
output with this price index. Note that if the price and quantity indices are properly
366 See Jorgenson (1990), pp. 22ff. for a complete discussion of the importance of this issue.
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constructed the results with both techniques are equivalent.5*7 The latter technique was used 
to obtain an exact approach for output and intermediate inputs for the period 1840-1861. The 
former technique was employed for capital and labour inputs for the period 1840-1861, and 
the cotton industry outputs and inputs for 1830*1861. Obviously, where they are comparable 
(e.g., in the cotton industry), the results of both techniques are practically equivalent. 
Basically, the choice of technique was dictated by availability of sources; where it was 
possible the quantity technique was used.
In order to estimate the share of labour and capital in value added it is necessary to 
measure output from the point of view of the producer. This requires removing all indirect 
business taxes on the value of output, while retaining all the taxes on factors of production. 
Here this is simple because indirect taxes were small and only direct taxes on factors of 
production (capital) were paid. Consequently, the value of the output can be employed to 
estimate the share o f the different inputs. The first step consists of calculating the proportion 
of output devoted to physical intermediate inputs. This is derived directly by multiplying the 
quantities of physical inputs by their respective prices. Then, each factor share is calculated 
using equation 5.8. Next, the labour share was computed in two steps; (1) estimates of the 
workers' hourly incomes cross-tabulated by sector, sex, age and skills were constructed, (2) 
the implicit labour income and, therefore, its share in total payments was computed by 
multiplying hourly incomes by the previous estimates of yearly hours of work cross- 
tabulated by sector, sex, age and skills. Finally, the remuneration of capital was computed 
as the residual of the total output value. Note that this method to compute capital's share is 
common to many growth accountings and that the result is biased against total factor 
productivity growth rates. Each industry has its own shares for each benchmark year. The 
next table reports these shares from 1840 to 1861; *
367 Dieweit (1976) and Hill (1993).
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Table 5.1 Shares of Inputs in Total Payments: Modem Industries, 1840-1861 (percent)
Interni ediate Labour Capital
Cotton Spinning 63.14 16.31 20.55
Cotton Weaving 66.73 28.51 4.77
Cotton Finishing 71.95 1823 9.82
Cotton Industry 34.93 40.34 24.72
Metal Industry 6721 28.79 4.00
Other textiles 66.73 14.85 18.42
Paper 41.45 2151 30.98
Total 42.77 34.06 23.16
N otes and  sources: N um bers are subject to rounding errors. T otal figures com puted  according to the method 
described in the equation 5.8.
Note that we can also compute labour productivity (LP), which can be defined as the 
difference between the growth rate of sectoral output and labour input. Specifically:
(5.11) ]nLp(T)-]nLp(T-l) = [ln<?(7)-ln<?(r-l)] -  [toi(7)-lnL(7--l)]
A further problem, but not minor, is how aggregation over sectors should be 
conducted. I formulate two different models: one model of production for manufacturing as 
a whole and another by aggregating over models of production for individual industrial 
sectors.368 In the first model I adopt the restrictive assumption that a unique value-added 
function exists for all sectors; in other words, there is an aggregate production function. Note 
that the concept of an aggregate production function is highly problematical, requiring the 
very stringent assumption that the technology of each sector must contain a  replica of the 
whole economy production function.369 Under this assumption, I can combine sectoral value 
added functions for all industrial sectors with market equilibrium conditions for each factor 
of production to obtain an aggregate model of production.
In the second model, value added is the sum of the quantities of value-added in all
368 Basically, I adopt the methodology proposed by Joigenson (1990), pp. 64ff.
369 This question provoked a large debate. Initiated by Samuelson (1962) and summarised in 
Burmeister (1980).
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industrial sectors. This formula was originally proposed by John W. Kendrick.370 A closely 
related approach to aggregate productivity measurement uses sectoral productivity growth 
rates based on output rather than value added.371 Thus, in the case of value-added, 
transactions in intermediate goods do not appear at the aggregate level. Measures of 
aggregate capital and labour can be constructed by weighting the individual components of 
these inputs in each industry by the weighting of that industry in total value added. Finally, 
sectoral productivity growth rates are weighted by ratios of the value-added in the 
corresponding sector to the sum of value added in all sectors. According to the theory, the 
difference between the growth rates of the model that is based on an aggregate production 
function, and the resulting growth rates of the model that is a weighted model, is the effect 
of the reallocation of factors among sectors.372
5.4. Empirical Results: Labour Productivity
The results for labour productivity for the period 1840 to 1861 are shown in table 
5.2.. The numerator is based on the concept of sectoral output while the denominator is a 
measure of labour input obtained by weighting men, women and children by their relative 
wages. Alternative labour productivity figures with value-added instead sectoral output can 
also be computed. However, it should be noted that generally these figures offered lower 
labour productivity estimates and are less recommended by the technical literature.373 
Similarly, a broad measure of labour (hours worked) can be used instead of the more 
sophisticated measured employed here, but the procedure can be highly misleading due to 
the large differences in the marginal productivity of the different types of labour.374
370 Kendrick (1956).
371 See, for example, Joigenson (1990), p. 67.
372 This approach is full discussed by Joigenson (1990), pp. 66-67.
373 See, for example. Dean et a l (1996).
374 See chapter 6 for a full discussion of this topic.
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Table 5.2 Labour Productivity Growth: Modem Industries. 1840-1861
Sectoral Labour Labour
Output Input Productivity
Cotton Spinning 5.32 -1.50 6.82
Cotton Weaving 6.04 0.24 5.80
Cotton Finishing 5.95 2.15 3.80
Cotton Industry 5.80 0.02 5.78
Metal Industry 6.82 1.61 5.20
Other textiles 4.28 3.48 0.80
Paper 2.07 -5.58 7.65
Weighted model 5.29 0.61 4.68
Aggregate model 5.13 0.57 4.57
N otes and so u rce s : N um bers are subject to  rounding errors. Total figures com puted  according to the method 
described in the equation  5.10. Sectoral output figures draw n from table 2.8 and 2 .9  and labour input figures from 
table 5.6. The w eighted m odel has been com puted using value added w eights.
The first point to note is that labour productivity increased substantially between 
1840 and 1861. All of the industries registered significant advances in 'real' sectoral output 
per labour input (equivalent worker).375 Obviously, this result tends to confirm the belief 
presented in chapter 2 on the historical importance o f this period as the early phase of 
Catalan industrialisation.
The second point to note is that there was a considerable degree of variation in 
growth rates among the different sectors. In particular, the leadership in labour productivity 
growth corresponded to the paper industry and cotton spinning, whereas the other textile 
industries experienced the slowest trend. In the paper industry, the growth of labour 
productivity can be explained by the spectacular decrease in the labour input index since the 
output index experienced a slow growth trend. Obviously, this result can introduce some 
concern about the quality of the paper industry figures. However, a simple comparison 
between these estimates and similar estimates for manufacturing in the north-east of the 
United States show that the paper industry experienced very similar productivity growth
375 Obviously, this result confirms the figures discussed in section 2.3 in the second chapter. 
These labour productivity increases are also indirectly confirmed by the gains in real wages that are 
displayed in chapter 4 (see, in particular, table 4.8).
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rates in both regions in this early period.576 In cotton spinning, fast labour productivity 
growth seems to be provoked by the combination of two effects: the rapid growth of output 
and the remarkable decrease in labour input (fortunately, both changes are remarkably well 
documented in the historical sources).
The third point of interest is the high growth rates in overall productivity. Some 
sceptical readers could argue that these productivity estimates may exceed what might have 
been expected. However, it should be noted that this result is partly due to the combination 
of industries and partly due to the specialisation of Catalonia in high labour productivity 
industries.
At this point, it is interesting to discuss what the effect of these industries was on 
the overall performance of Catalan manufacturing. Note that the industries of the sample 
cover about 56.8 percent of Catalan manufacturing value added.177 Therefore, under the 
assumption that in the sectors without data productivity rates were not negative, one can 
establish that the minimum labour productivity growth in Catalan manufacturing was about 
2.6 percent per annum (i.e., 56.8 percent x 4.57). Moreover, in broad terms, labour 
productivity rates seem quite reasonable by other historical standards. For example, Sokoloff 
has computed rates of productivity growth for thirteen industries in the north-east of the 
United States during that region's initial phase of industrial development, 1820-1860. His 
calculations suggest that the U.S. record of advance was similar to that observed in 
Catalonia.376 78 Similar statements can be derived by comparing the estimates of McCloskcy 
for four manufacturing industries in Britain during that country's early period of industrial 
development (1780-1860)..379 Of perhaps even greater interest, the labour productivity rates 
of each Catalan industry are very close to the corresponding industries in the north-east of 
the United States. Except in the other textiles industries (wool, linen, silk and mixed fabrics)
376 The UJ5. datais available at Sokoloff (1986), table 13.6.1 compare (he Catalan estimates with 
the GQLP (gross output per equivalent woricer) estimates for the U.S.
377 See section 23  in chapter 2.
378 Sokoloff (1984), table 13.6., p. 698.
379 McCloskey (1981).
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where Catalan growth rates were lower than in the United States.380
The last point to consider is that the evidence seems to support the conclusion that 
labour productivity growth in Catalan manufacturing during this early phase of 
industrialisation was faster than labour productivity growth in Spain.381 This result is not 
unexpected since it is the obvious outcome of the results that were obtained in the previous 
chapter. Thus, I would like to step back for a short period and look at chapters 2 and 4. 
Chapter 2 shows clearly that the growth rates in Catalan manufacturing surpassed the 
Spanish manufacturing and economy growth rates. In sharp contrast, chapter 4 shows the 
sluggish labourforce growth rates in Catalonia, well below the natural growth rates of the 
Spanish population. These two factors lead to Catalonia having a higher level of growth of 
labour productivity than Spain.
5.5. Empirical Results: Total Factor Productivity
It is well known that the estimates of labour productivity growth display a very poor 
picture of the process of growth, and therefore of productivity change. In particular, labour 
productivity growth cannot be related to increases in overall efficiency because it would be 
caused by the accumulation of capital. Consequently, the most methodologically consistent 
approach to productivity growth must consider the interaction between inputs and 
productivity. In Table 5.3 the results for TFP and physical inputs accumulation are presented 
for each industry for 1840 to 1861.
380 See the data on United States in Sokoloff (1986), table 13.6, p. 698.
381 Bai roch (1982) and Prados (1988).
l *
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Table 5.3 Contribution o f Factor Accumulation and TFP to Sectoral Output Growth:
Modem Industries, 1840-1861
G ro  wthContn butionContn butionContn b u t io n
Sectoral Interniediale Labour Capital TFP
Cotton Spinning 532 2.71 -0.25 1.23 1.63
Cotton Weaving 6.04 3.87 0.07 0.23 1.88
Cotton Finishing 5.95 3.91 039 0.89 0.76
Metal Industry 6.82 2.47 0.46 032 337
Other textiles 4.28 1.98 032 0.70 1.08
Paper 2.07 038 -134 0.94 2.29
Weighted model 5.29 1.86 0.07 1.32 2.04
Aggregate model 5.13 1.69 0.19 1.33 1.91
Reallocation of resources -0.16 -0.17 0.12 0.01 -0.13
N otes and so u rce s : N um bers are subject to rounding errors. Figures com puted according to  the method described 
in the equations 5.9 and 5.10. Sectoral output figures drawn from table 2 .10  and 2.11. intermediate input figures 
from table 2.10 and 2.11, labour input figures from table 5.6, and capital input figures from table 3.3. T he weighted 
model has been com puted using value added weights. The reallocation o f  resources is com puted as the difference 
between the difference o f the growth rates o f  the weighted model and the respective rates in the aggregate model.
The table above displays several findings of particular interest. First, the general 
conclusion is that the driving force behind the expansion of manufacturing output during the 
early industrialisation of Catalonia was the growth of total factor productivity. The annual 
total factor productivity growth rates range from 0.76 percent per year for cotton finishing 
to 3.57 percent per year in the metal industry. Total factor productivity disparities among 
industries are important, but it confirms that the modem manufacturing industries in 
Catalonia benefited from relevant TFP gains. More specifically, TFP is the main source of 
growth of value-added (that is, sectoral output minus the contribution of intermediate inputs) 
in all sectors except cotton finishing.
However, if we focus attention on the contribution of intermediate inputs to sectoral 
output growth, examining equation 5.3, we find that the intensification in the use of 
intermediate inputs is a more important source of growth that changes in productivity. This 
result does not mean that productivity growth was lower or unimportant during the period
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but that technological innovation saved relatively little in intermediate inputs.382 For instance, 
coal consumption expanded greatly during the period in all manufacturing industries.
Second, note that the contribution of TFP to growth was practically double the 
contribution of the accumulation of physical factors (labour and capital) in the total 
measures.383 The labour force had a reduced role in the growth of total output, even though 
it accounted for an important share in the total payments (see table 5.1). This was because 
working hours remained practically constant in all the industrial sectors considered.384 More 
specifically, in the cotton spinning and paper industries, labour input accounted for a 
negative figure. In the rest of the industries the contribution of labour to growth was small 
and only in the metal industry was it larger than capital.
The disparities in the rates of contribution of physical capital to output growth are 
larger. The minimum was 0.23 percent in cotton weaving, and the maximum was 1.55 
percent in the cotton industry. In the total models (aggregate and weighted), capital 
contributes to about 35 percent to 39 percent of value-added growth. Moreover, these results 
are not modified to take into account the changes in the quality of capital. Changes in the 
quality of capital account, on average, for about 20 percent of the growth of capital input 
(i.e., they contributed about 8 percent of growth rates).385 Since many authors have argued 
that capital embodied innovation (i.e., the innovation embodied in the use of the most 
modem machinery) can be measured by computing capital quality, one can argue that their 
role in value-added growth was relatively minor.386 In particular, capital embodied innovation 
accounted for, at best, 14 percent o f total factor productivity growth. This result has two
382 For example, Catalan TFP rates were in the range of the rates found for the north-east of the 
United States by Sokoloff (1986), table 13.11, pp. 719 and, on the whole, higher than those found 
by Jorgenson (1990), table 32., p.27 for the United States industries from 1947 to 1985.
383 Note that labour input does not reflect human capital accumulation. However, chapter 6 
demonstrates that human capital accumulation only accounts for a small proportion of growth in 
cotton spinning and weaving (see table 6.5.). Therefore, it is likely that overall results would not be 
greatly altered by taking into account human capital accumulation.
384 A very detailed discussion of the evolution of labour is available in chapter 4.
385 See in chapter 3, table 3.3.
386 Joigenson (1989), Hulten (1990)(1992).
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important consequences. First, it casts doubt on the work of scholars who view the diffusion 
of mechanisation across manufacturing industries during 1840s and 1850s as the crucial 
development behind early Catalan industrialisation.3*7 In effect, according to the figures 
above, the perspective that relates industrialisation with mechanisation contributes little to 
understanding how and why the striking progress between 1840 and 1860 was achieved. 
Second, this result confirms indirectly the robustness of previous TFP studies for Britain and 
the United States. Studies which did not consider capital quality.387 88
Third, table 5.3 depicts some differences between the weighted and the aggregate 
model. We can see that the divergence between both models in TFP growth rates is 
relatively important (about one fifth). As was mentioned above, this means that the market 
imperfections reduced actual growth rates by 20 percent. If value added and all components 
of capital and labour inputs were to grow at the same rate for all industries, there would be 
no reallocation. Interestingly, the market failures were due to the reallocations of 
intermediate inputs, and labour input, but not capital input. In other words, the major market 
failures were concentrated in the labour and intermediate products markets. In contrast, the 
capital market appears to have been quite competitive.389 It is also relevant that the amount 
of the misallocation of resources is practically the same as found in a similar study, but with 
37 sectors, for the United States from 1947 to 1985.390
There are grounds for pursuing TFP measures somewhat further. In particular, 
sceptics could argue that fast TFP rates are a consequence of the election of the benchmark 
years.391 In other words, they are the result of the biases introduced by the election of one
387 See Nadal (1974) or Maluquer (1976).
381 Feinstein (1981), McCloskey (1981), Crafts (1985a), Crafts and Harley (1992), Crafts (1996) 
in Britain; and Sokoloff (1984) and Tchakerian (1994).
389 Pollard (1981) and Hudson (1986)(1989) argue that early industrialising regions were 
characterised by regional capital markets that efficiently channelled hinds from the traditional to the 
modem sectors and industries.
390 Jorgenson (1990), table 3.1., p. 22.
391 It should be underlined that the Divisia index employed in the elaboration of the index is not 
additively consistent. See, for example, Diewert (1976), Hill (1993) or Dean et al. (1996).
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bottom year of the business cycle as an initial year and a peak year as the last year. 
However, it should be noted that whereas 1840 can be considered as a peak in the business 
cycle, 1861 was not.392 Then, according to the arguments put forward by Abramovitz, TFP 
productivity measures can be biased downwards, but not upwards, since productivity of 
factors is not fully exploited.393 Anyway, the most detailed data on the cotton industry allow 
me to discuss in detail this question.
Table 5.4 Contribution of Factor Accumulation and TFP to Value-added Growth:
Cotton Industries, 1830-1861
Value Added Labour Capital TFP
Spinning
1830-40 3.27 0.60 0.92 1.76
1840-50 3.15 -0.18 1.55 1.79
1850-61 126 -0.18 0.90 0.54
1830-61 2.58 -0.02 1.15 1.45
Weaving
1830-40 4.46 0.65 0.54 327
1840-50 4.88 0.71 0.35 3.81
1850-61 0.71 -0.40 0.16 0.95
1830-61 3.09 0.22 0.56 231
Finishing
1830-40 0.12 0.21 0.15 -024
1840-50 121 0.03 0.19 0.99
1850-61 -0.39 020 0.42 -1.01
1830-61 0.39 0.15 0.32 -0.07
N otes and  so u rces: N um bers are subject to rounding errors. Total figures com puted according to the method
described in the equation 5.10. Sectoral ou tpu t figures draw n from table 2.2, interm ediate inputs from table 2.3, 
labour input figures from table 5.7, and cap ita l figures from  table 3.4.
In broad terms, table 5.4 confirms the picture emanating from table 5.3 and bolsters 
confidence in the robustness of the qualitative interpretation derived from it. First, TFP was 
the main factor in the growth of cotton spinning and weaving but not cotton finishing. 
Second, the TFP growth rates differed strongly from one decade to another. Moreover, they 
also indicate that the 1850s was not a period of spectacular TFP growth rates. In other
392 See table 2.5. For example, 1840 was the best year of the 1830s while the best year of the 
1850s and early 1860s was 1857, but not 1861.
393 Abram ovitz (1993).
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words, I may justifiably infer from them that results o f table 5.4 are not biased upwards but 
downwards.
It is noteworthy that the mean annual aggregate productivity growth rates are similar 
to what was found for similar exercises developed for the north-east of the United States for 
the same early industrialisation period.3”  However, the main problem of TFP is that it 
computes the absolute changes in the efficiency of the sectors and not the relative changes 
with respect to other sectors; that is, it describes the pace o f growth but not the level of 
efficiency.393 For example, industries at different technological levels could have the same 
TFP growth rates but this does not mean that they have the same level of efficiency. For this 
reason, Catalan and U.S. TFP growth rates are not directly comparable (it could be that the 
U.S. was at higher level and consequently the same TFP growth rates have different 
meanings). However, it should be underlined that the pace of growth was similar in both 
countries during the early phases of industrialisation. Moreover, U.S. results tend to confirm 
the view expressed in this paper and show that, probably, early industrialising regions had 
more resemblances than differences in their development paths.
Finally, the next table presents estimates of the importance of quality growth in the 
sectoral growth of the Catalan cotton industry. The Translog indices aid the decomposition 
of the growth rates into quantity and quality growth rates. The quantity rate is simple to 
calculate because it is the difference of successive logarithms, and is derived directly from 
the quantity produced. The quality growth rates can then be computed by subtracting the 
quantity rates from the Translog rates.* 39596
3”  Sokoloff (1986).
395 Allen (1991).
396 Christensen et a i (1980) and Gollop and Jorgenson (1980).
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Table 5.5 Quantity and Quality Decomposition of Growth Rates: 
Cotton Industry, 1830-1861
Sectoral Decomposed in
Output Quantity Quality TFP 1 TFP 2
1830-1840 8.22 6.15 2.07 3.27 2.31
1840-1850 10.41 5.56 4.85 4.29 2.77
1850-1861 2.15 3.80 -1.65 -0.91 0.41
1830-1861 6.77 5.13 1.65 1.77 1.59
N otes and  so u rces: Q uantity is an unw eighted index o f cotton industry production where quantities are directly 
added. Quality growth rates are the difference betw een the Tfirqvist quantity index growth rates and the unw eighted 
index growth rates. T FP  1 refers to the aggregate m odel and TFP2 to industry m odel (see text).
This table contains a number of important results. The periods of large TFP growth 
were coincident with periods of large shifts in quality and sectoral output. Therefore, the 
changes in the market for cotton goods can be associated with the development of 
innovations that affected quality. It is clear that this is a question worth addressing in the 
next chapters.397
To end this section, it is important to consider whether there may be some biases in 
the estimates of total factor productivity. I will discuss three main points: (1) the biases in 
the sample of industries; (2) the possible bias in the data as a consequence of business 
cycles; (3) the assumptions behind the construction of the weights for each input.
It is necessary to remember that this exercise does not cover the whole Catalan 
manufacturing sector, but only nine industries (cotton spinning, cotton weaving, cotton 
finishing, linen, metal, mixed fabrics, paper, silk and wool). The main absences in this 
exercise are the flour, cork, and liquors industries, where there was not enough data for 
1840. Therefore the sample is biased in favour of the most modem, capital intensive and 
rapid growth industries and, obviously, against the sectors with low rates of growth and 
productivity stagnation.
397 See chapters 8 and 9.
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Special mention should be given to workforce figures because they are very volatile 
over the business cycle and, hence, are the perfect candidates for estimation errors. However, 
there are several ways to test the quality of the data. For example, the workforce in the 
cotton industry was estimated with the alternative method of multiplying the machinery in 
use by a coefficient of full-time jobs, which is different for each kind of machinery. Despite 
this more sophisticated method, the new results are only slightly different from the data 
reported in the original sources.
Inventories also varied strongly through the business cycle. In particular, during the 
peaks of the cycle inventories tend to decrease, while the contrary holds for the bottom 
years. Indeed, this pro-cyclical movement of inventories tends to exaggerate the cyclical 
movements in productivity. Furthermore, during the period there is a large transference of 
inventories from one sector to another. At this point it would be worth explaining in detail 
what happened in the cotton industry. In 1830 the cotton industry was formed by three sub­
sectors: spinning, weaving and finishing. Inventories of raw materials and semi-finished 
goods were rather equally distributed among the sub-sectors; that is, no sector was able to 
transfer semi-finished goods to other sectors. However, the integration process in the 1840s 
and 1850s was not equally intense in all sub-sectors. Moreover, many cotton spinning firms 
integrated vertically into cotton weaving.398 The outcome of these changes was the reduction 
of the inventories in spinning and weaving but an increase in the inventories of semi­
finished cloth in finishing. What effects had this change on the measures proposed here? It 
decreased the amount of capital in spinning and weaving, whereas the contrary holds for 
finishing. Consequently, ceteris paribus, it increased the efficiency (TFP) of spinning and 
weaving and decreased TFP in finishing.
A last source of bias could be the share o f the factors in output. It is worth 
addressing the interesting question that the main source of error could be the absence o f 
perfect competition. Habitually, the absence of perfect competition tends to benefit 
capitalists more than workers (it should be take into account that at the time the Catalan
398 See the further chzqpter 8.
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trade unions were very feeble in manufacturing).399 Therefore, capital's share will be 
overstated. Basically, since the capital input is the fastest growing input, this bias tends to 
reduce the TFP figures.
Although there is a possibility of biases in TFP measures, it is likely that the impact 
of these biases was relatively minor in the overall results. Neither the biases introduced by 
the coverage of the sample, nor the bias in the labour force figures, nor the bias in 
inventories, nor the overstatement of capital's share seem capable of altering the overall 
conclusions. Furthermore, it should be noted that many biases acted against my main 
argument, the importance of TFP growth, since they tended to reduce the 'residual'.
5.6. Conclusions
Sceptics could argue that the approach of this paper is vulnerable to measurement 
error, but this does not seem plausible because the main assumptions are derived from 
standard methodology and are consistent with the historical data. Different historical sources 
and growth accounting studies for other countries seem to indirectly confirm the results 
obtained. Moreover, any kind of correction in the capital and labour shares is not likely to 
produce spectacular changes in the productivity estimates. Consequently, the conclusions and 
implications of this research seem to be largely consistent.
Some general interpretation of Catalan industry growth can be derived from the 
results. The first implication is that innovation in the light industries in the nineteenth 
century had strong multiplicative effects. In other words, the adoption of some innovations 
in these industries produced larger effects in the growth of output. Contemporary experience 
is quite different, to increase growth long research projects and extensive human capital are 
required. In the nineteenth century the effects of innovation were larger.
A second implication is that direct machinery investment and larger TFP growth rates
399 Izard (1979).
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did not correlate well. In other words, the non capital-embodied innovations had a leading 
role in the productivity improvement. This chapter emphasises the importance of active 
involvement in technical change and the role played by local innovations. In particular, 
Catalan industry was not only successful because of its ability to import technologies from 
abroad. Consequently, it can be argued that the achievement o f high rates of productivity 
was strongly related to the local conditions and capabilities. In this environment, the 
presence of market pressures and opportunities, the rivalry among firms, the local 
knowledge, and the social capabilities emerge as the main factors in economic development.
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Appendix to C hapter 5: The Indices of L abour Inpu t
The objective of this appendix is to develop measures of labour input by combining 
into a single measure the quantities of men, women and children. This new labour input 
measure is employed to compute TFP and the labour productivity figures in chapter 6.
The first step in developing sectoral input measures is to construct employment 
matrices. Cross-classified by men, women and children. These employment matrices are 
presented in table 4.4. The second step is to construct labour compensation matrices for each 
year. Table 4.7 displays this data. Differences in labour remuneration reflect differences in 
average marginal product. The last step in constructing data on labour input is to combine 
price and quantity data, cross-classified by men, women and children, into price and quantity 
indices of labour input. Employing the Torqvist index, labour input is computed as follows:
(512) W r W M = E ,
Where Li designates labour input, I designates labour, three types of labour (men, women, 
and children) are being considered, the two time periods are t and t-1, and the value share 
weights ©u are computed as:
= i i2[eti(T) + e^ r-i)],
Where the 0 u's denote the share of each in the wage bill. The exponential of this 
logarithmic change yields an index number. The results for the main manufacturing sectors 
are displayed in the table below:
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Table 5.6 Growth rates of labour input and its components,
modem manufacturing, 1840-1861
Labour
Male Females Children Input
Cotton Spinning 4.91 -4.09 -5.25 -1.50
Cotton Weaving 0.77 -1.82 -6.08 0.24
Cotton Finishing 3.10 2.05 -10.96 2.15
Cotton Industry 1.43 -2.86 -6.00 0.02
Metal Industry 1.61 1.61
Other textiles 4.61 -1.04 -3.13 3.48
Paper -5.21 -521 -124 -5.58
Total 1.79 -2.55 -5.09 0.57
N otes and so u rce s : N um bers are sub ject to rounding errors. Labour input index computed according to the m ethod
described in the equation 4.6. For labour sources see text above.
Finally, in the case of the cotton industry because data is available for more periods 
it is possible to elaborate the labour index for four benchmark years. The results are 
presented in the next table:
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Table 5.7 Growth rates of labour inputs and its components.
Cotton industry, 1840-1861
Spinning Male Female Children
Labour
Input
1830-40 2.77 2.69 2.69 2.70
1840-50 10.31 -5.64 -5.43 -1.18
1850-61 0.00 -2.68 -5.08 -1.76
1830-61 4.22 -1.90 -2.68 -0.15
Weaving Male Female Children
Labour
Input
1830-40 1.76 1.74 1.75 1.76
1840-50 2.69 031 -2.16 2.18
1850-61 -0.97 -3.75 -9.64 -131
1830-61 1.09 -0.66 -335 0.74
Finishing Male Female Children
Labour
Input
1830-40 5.01 4.99 5.00 5.01
1840-50 1.53 0.27 -6.87 0.69
1850-61 4.52 3.67 -14.67 3.72
1830-61 3.72 3.01 -5.81 3.07
Male Female Children
Labour
Input
1830-40 2.18 2.35 2.73 2.27
1840-50 3.09 -2.74 -4.59 1.14
1850-61 -0.08 -2.97 -7.28 -0.94
1830-61 1.67 -1.18 -3.18 0.76
N otes an d  so u rce s : N um bers are subject to  rounding errors. Total figures com puted  according to the m ethod 
described in the equation 4.6. For labour sources see tex t above.
Part II. Inside the 'Black Box': 
Explaining Productivity Growth

Chapter 6
The Contribution of Human Capital
The objective of this chapter is to investigate: (1) how large the accumulation of 
human capital was prior to the emergence of the factory system, (2) what the role of human 
capital was during this process. In other words, my aim is to study the level and growth 
effects of human capital. The chapter argues that for a region adopting a technology from 
elsewhere, an existing stock of (relevant) human capital was essential to the rapid and 
successful adoption of the technology. But once the technology has been fully assimilated, 
you would not expect increments in human capital to be important in its further growth. 
Catalan industrialisation was possible because the level of human capital present in industry 
was enough to adopt and modify new technologies. The human capital stock was mainly the 
result of past investments in on-the-job-training, and children's informal education took place 
in the workplace rather than the schoolroom. Therefore, the level of human capital present in 
the workforce was higher than literacy and schooling rates showed. However, evidence is also 
presented on the low contribution made by human capital to growth rates.
It should be noted that the topic of this chapter is strongly related with several of the 
arguments presented in chapters 4 and 5. On the one hand, in chapter 4, it was proved that 
there was a shift in technology. This resulted in the intensification of the capital-skills 
complementarity and the widening of the unskilled-skilled workers wage gap. Two main 
questions were left without an answer in that chapter. How Catalonia was capable of adopting 
the new British and French machinery? How and where the new skilled workers were trained 
and recruited? Obviously, this issue can only be resolved by examining empirically the level 
effects of previous human capital accumulation and the system for educating and training the 
workforce. On the other hand, the growth accounting exercise of chapter 5 showed that the
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'residual' is the major source of the Catalan industrialisation. Nevertheless, the measure of 
total factor productivity of chapter 5 was based on the original Solow formulation (sectoral 
output is function o f intermediate, capital and labour inputs). This formulation includes in the 
residual not only gains in productivity but also improvements in human capital. It is obvious 
that the question o f how much o f the residual is explained by human capital accumulation 
(i.e., the growth rate of human capital) is critical for further analysis of Catalan 
industrialisation.
6.1. Introduction
A certain level of human capital accumulation is almost universally regarded as a 
prerequisite for economic growth. In other words, the level o f human capital is important in 
determining future growth rates and explaining differences in income per capita among 
countries. For example, Sandberg argues that the lack of human capital limited the 
opportunities of backward countries to grow rapidly during the last century.400 Several studies 
have also underlined the role played by the comparative low levels of literacy and schooling 
in the relative backwardness of the Mediterranean basin.401 In a similar vein, many empirical 
studies for the twentieth century have also shown that the level o f human capital is one of the 
major influences determining the capacity of nations to innovate and the speed of 
convergence.402
In contrast, there is much discussion of whether the rate of growth of human capital 
explains actual growth rates. Thus, several economic historians have argued that human 
capital growth is less o f an explanatory factor for the growth rates of the nineteenth century 
than of the twentieth.403 However, it should be stressed that in their accounts these authors 
have considered schooling and literacy, and not on-the-job-training. This is more likely to
400 Sandberg (1979)0982).
401 See, for example, Reis (1993) and Tortella (1994).
402 See, for example, Bano and Sala-i'Martin (1992), Benhabib and Spiegel (1992X1994), Lucas 
(1988)(1990), Mankiw et a l (1992) and Romer (1986).
403 Abramowitz (1993) and Crafts (1995).
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reduce estimates of human-capital during the nineteenth century when an important part of 
the workforce was illiterate but skilled. It will simultaneously raise the estimates for the 
twentieth century, when formal education is universally adopted and widespread. More 
prominently, during the early phases of industrialisation, training played a leading role in the 
development of skills among industrial workers and was widespread within proto-industrial 
households, workshops and factories.
Before to proceeding further, two clarifications on terminology should be useful. First, 
here, the human capital term is not treated as a synonym for knowledge. According to 
Mankiw's definitions: 'Knowledge refers to society's understanding about how the world 
works. Human capital refers to the resources expanded transmitting this understanding to the 
labour force'.404 405Second, throughout this chapter, the term 'informal education' is treated as a 
synonym for training received before adult age.
The motivations for this chapter are twofold. First, as yet, no scholar has considered 
human capital as a prerequisite for Catalan industrialisation and a broad inspection of 
schooling and literacy data seems to support this view. For example, in 1860, Catalonia 
showed all the characteristics typical of countries with low levels of education: low literacy 
and primary schooling rates, large differences between the male-female levels of literacy and 
schooling, a strong concentration of schools in urban zones, low public investment in 
education, and many students at secondary and higher levels.403 Finally, in the debate over 
proto-industrialisation, the transmission of skills from proto-industry to factory system has still 
not received adequate attention, while the contribution of cheap (unskilled) labour has been 
considered elsewhere.406
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents a simple 
framework to understand this methodology. The next section gives qualitative evidence on the 
levels of human capital present in the labour force. In addition, it describes the methods of
404 Mankiw (1995), p35.
405 Nunez (1992), pp. 135, 292 and 298.
406 See section 4.2 in chapter 4.
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education and training in the factories and verifies whether workers' earnings were correlated 
with past investments in human capital. Section 6.4 discusses the effect of the spread of the 
factory system on the skills required for production. The subsequent section discusses the 
contribution of human capital to growth. Finally, section 6.6 summarises and gives new 
perspectives on the role of human capital in the early phases of Catalan industrialisation.
6.2. A Methodology to Estimate Human Capital
In order to evaluate the contribution of human capital during the past century, a 
measure for the effects of both schooling and training is necessary. An alternative approach 
suggested by recent growth accounting exercises gives a simple solution to this problem 
through computing the quality o f the labour force; that is, the set of skills employed during 
production.407 There are two basic ideas behind this: (1) the quality of the labour force is 
enhanced by past investments in human capital, (2) differentials in individuals' earnings are 
the consequence o f these same investments. These two ideas are derived directly from the 
seminal arguments of human capital theory.408 Put simply, the argument is that the income 
employed in enhancing human capacities raises the worker's earnings because it increases 
productivity per worker.
This argument is widely debated. Some authors have maintained that earnings 
differentials, even during the nineteenth century, are due to institutional constraints.409 As a 
result, human capital accumulation cannot be measured by computing individual earnings 
since they do not imply a direct relationship between age, experience, skill and productivity. 
For instance, Michael Huberman has argued that in the Lancashire cotton industry, where 
standstill had higher costs and monitoring tasks were difficult, workers were paid 'efficiency' 
wages. In other words, they were paid higher wages at the end of their working lives to 
compensate them for the lack of job security, for monitoring tasks, and to stop them shirking. 
Therefore, employers and workers established a long-term and implicit contract where
407 For example, Jorgenson (1990), and Young (1995).
408 Becker (1962), Schultz (1962), and Mincer (1974).
409 See, for example, on Catalonia, Camps (1995); and, on Lancashire, Huberman (1996).
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seniority criteria were employed to settle workers' earnings. The contract was stipulated by 
means of piece-rate lists. These were public documents where a relation was established 
between the age of the worker, the type of output, and the piece rate obtained by each unit 
of output (in this case, pound of yam) produced. These piece-rate lists regulated the salary 
structure in the Lancashire spinning industry by paying workers according their age (the older 
the worker, the higher the piece rate).410 Obviously, according to this argument, the increase 
in wages with age cannot be associated with any increase in human capital but it is 
consequence of the contract that regulated how the labour market worked.
It should be underlined that the evidence on Catalan cotton firms demonstrates that 
payment of 'efficiency' wages is unlikely to have affected average earnings significantly. The 
fact is that in the largest Catalan cotton firm (the España lndustrialSA), which had about 
1700 workers, the wages of skilled workers at the end of their working lives were 
significantly lower than at the peak of their physical strength.4" In Barcelona factories, during 
periods of crisis, no seniority criteria were employed to fire workers412 and piece-rates were, 
different for each worker according to the quality and quantity of their production and not 
according to their age. For example, in mechanical weaving, there were many different piece 
rates according to the productivity of the firm, the quality of workers’ production, the number 
of pieces per hour, and so on.413 Furthermore, employers repeatedly rejected any kind of 
agreement with workers to establish piece-rate lists, with the argument that ‘every worker must 
be paid according to his individual productivity and dexterity'.414 Working in the same cotton 
mill for long periods was unusual since the cotton companies were constituted for only short 
periods. In effect, movements of the labourforce were common and workers migrated from 
one zone to another in search of better jobs and salaries.415 Finally, the reduced size of the
4,0 Huberman (1986)(1991a)(1991bX1995)(1996).
411 Camps (1995), table 7, pp. 204-205.
412 Ceidá (1968), pp. 575-576.
413 Ceidá (1968), pp 607-609.
4.4 Junta de Fábricas (1830), (1834a) and (1835). However, in the 1870s several piece-rate lists 
were agreed. Where payments were regulated according to the distance of the factory from Barcelona 
and the age of the worker. See Nadal (1991a), pp. 55-58.
4.5 Camps (1995).
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Catalan cotton mills, in comparison, for example, with Lancashire’s mills, made the 
monitoring tasks relatively simpler for entrepreneurs and bosses.416
However, it is true that all pay structures in the Catalan cotton industry contained 
elements which hindered the perfect labour market. For instance, during short periods workers 
formed powerful trade unions and obtained substantial gains in real wages.417 Similarly, 
employers collaborated to avoid increases in wages and the establishment of regulated work 
conditions.418 For the most part, however, these imperfections affected the difference in 
earnings between industries, rather than within a given industry. That is, some differences of 
salaries among industries could be difficult to completely explain within the framework of 
human capital theory. In any case, it should be noted that a human capital explanation is not 
inconsistent with the presence of some imperfections in labour markets. For instance, over 
time earnings can increase with investment in human capital; but at one moment in time the 
labour market can exhibit imperfections, like monitoring or shirking problems.
6.3. The Levels of Human Capital in the Labour Force
It is commonly accepted that certain levels of skill and technical competence are 
needed in the recipient country of new technologies.419 Moreover, it is pointed out that the 
rapid production or large scale importation of skills is very inefficient, at least compared to 
the production or importation of machinery.420 In other words, countries without a skilled 
labourforce encountered many problems to starting any process of industrialisation. Moreover, 
in the nineteenth century technological innovation had some peculiarities made the
4,6 For example, in 1850, Catalonia cotton factories had on average 86 workers whereas those in 
England had 171 workers. The sources are: for Catalonia, Junta de Fábricas (1850) and for England, 
Sicsic (1994). Furthermore, there were very few factories in Catalonia with more than 500 workers 
(for example, in 1861 only 6, see chapter 9 the table 9.2) whereas in Lancashire they were very 
common (see, for example Gatrell (1977) or Lloyd-Jones and LeRoux (1980)).
417 See, for example, the references of Cerdá (1968) to the associations of powerweavers and the 
work of Izard (1979) on the organisation of the first trade unions.
4,8 See Graell (1910) on the history of the Junta de Fábricas.
419 Rosenberg (1982), pp. 246ff.
420 Sandberg (1982), p. 696.
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transmission of knowledge difficult. In particular, many of the technical procedures were not 
codified or based on science and, therefore, experience and tacit knowledge played a central 
role in the acquisition of the human capital necessary to manage any technology.421
In Catalonia during this period a large part of the cotton production shifted from 
domestic production, artisan shops and non-mechanised factories, to mechanised factories that 
employed inanimate sources of energy instead of animal strength.422 The new mechanised 
factories in Catalonia were as sophisticated as the most advanced British and French 
factories.423 A puzzling question is that, in spite Catalonia's overall low education and literacy 
levels, its cotton industry showed itself to be surprisingly efficient in embracing and rapidly 
adapting foreign technologies. For example, from 1836 to 1840 the imports of modem cotton 
machinery from Britain and France were increased 600 percent and the horsepower of steam 
engines from 1832 to 1848 increased 8000 percent.424
In the first stages of the transition to the modem industry, the 1830s and the early 
1840s, foreign technicians and workers played a leading role in the adoption of new 
machinery since they installed and maintained new machinery and trained native workers.425 
But by the 1840s native workers had completely substituted foreign workers in this field. 
Thus, from about 1850s onwards, Catalan factories could replace their machinery with new 
vintages, which were more sophisticated than the previous ones because they ran faster and 
operated with high pressure steam engines, without needing to appeal to foreign technicians.426 
Therefore, after the initial period, Catalans developed the capacity to maintain their own 
machinery, adopted the new technologies and, obviously, ran them without any foreign help. 
Moreover, in the post-adoption phase, Catalan firms incorporated a stream of incremental
421 On the differences between the present-day and the past centuiy technological diffusion. See 
Nelson and Wright (1992). Furthermore, chapter 7 contains a description of the technological 
peculiarities of the Catalan cotton industry.
422 See chapter 8.
423 See Arau (1855) and Calvet (1857).
424 The data comes from Madoz (1846) and Figuerola (1968).
425 Ronquillo (1851-57), p. 128.
426 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867), Ferrer Vidal (1875), Figuerola (1968).
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developments and modifications to improve and adapt foreign technology to local 
requirements.427
The stock of metal artisans and the active involvement of the Catalan entrepreneurs 
were the two main factors that helped this rapid development of native technicians. During 
the proto-industrial period, in Barcelona and other Catalan industrial towns, many handicraft 
workshops made and repaired spares, small metal pieces, and machinery, including cotton 
industry machinery.428 The artisans in these workshops were relatively (highly) skilled since 
they could perform many different tasks (i.e. the division o f labour was not particularly 
important) under the supervision of the master.429 With the spread of new cotton factories, 
cotton entrepreneurs recruited many metal artisans to fill the new machinery-maintenance 
posts. For instance, a contemporary commentator said: 'All cotton, silk or wool establishments 
had their own machinery workshop, which had its master and skilled workers ready to repair 
any sudden machinery breakdowns. These workers have been educated in metal-industry 
workshops and factories (....) and they all are actually ( 1849) natives of the country'.430 Thus, 
it can be argued that foreign technicians did not train uneducated native workers but converted 
the artisans and former apprentices of the metal workshops. Who could become factory 
technicians with only a short period of training.
The Catalan entrepreneurs participated actively in the development and enlargement 
of this native highly-skilled workforce because the cost of recruiting and employing foreign 
workers was higher. An interesting example of this active involvement of Catalan 
entrepreneurs is given by the first modem cotton mill, the Bonaplata factory (established in 
1832), which not only produced cotton goods with the most modem technologies but also 
trained many young Catalans. These trainees were then rapidly recruited by other new 
factories for the repair and maintenance of their new machinery. For example, in 1833, the
427 Arau (1855), Calvet (1857).
428 Madoz (1846), Sayró (1842), Comisión especial arancelaria (1867), Figuerola (1968), Nadal 
(1991b).
429 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867), Cerdá (1968), Figuerola (1968).
430 Figuerola (1968), p. 299.
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employers' organisation congratulated Mr. Bonaplata 'for the efficiency of leaching so many 
young Catalans the theory and practice of modem machinery in his factory. As this creates 
the seedbed of the new mechanic artisans that will replace the foreign artisans and spread 
their skills to the whole cotton industry*.451 It is intriguing why Mr. Bonaplata preferred to use 
local workers, who could abandon the factory after their training, and not foreign workers. If 
one assumes that Mr. Bonaplata was not a philanthropist there are two possible reasons. Local 
workers had to pay for their education (for example, they were not paid during the months 
of training), which is highly plausible, and/or the costs involved in importing foreign workers 
were so high than Mr. Bonaplata found it profitable to lose some money training some 
national workers. An idea of the high wages of the foreign workers is given by the next 
example. In 1861, an Alsatian chemist of the España Industrial SA. had a daily wage of Rv. 
275, whereas a male adult unskilled worker in the same production section received a daily 
wage of only Rv. 10.432 *
Contrary to the machinery-maintenance sector, in the productive sector native workers 
performed all the productive tasks from the beginning.435 Despite the fact that labour was still 
heterogeneous, factories preferred to employ workers from the proto-industry, especially in 
weaving, because they were more productive than other workers.454 According to 
contemporaries, their higher standards were the consequence of the many years of training 
they had had from when they were children.455 It should also be stressed that the proto- 
industrial workers could retain this advantage over other workers during the first stages of 
factory transition because there were more similarities than differences between the proto- 
industrial and factory machinery. For example, a contemporary comments that 'in mechanical 
weaving there are not apprentices since former handweavers can manage the new mechanical 
looms after a short explanation’.436
451 Junta de Fábricas (1833).
452 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
433 Camps (1995), p. 123.
414 Junta de Fábricas (1835).
455 Junta de Fábricas (1830).
436 Ceidá (1968), p. 568.
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However, not all workers in the proto-industry were as skilled as the handweavers. 
Thus, the differences in skills between handweavers and handspinners were wide. 
Handweaving was usually a high-skilled, full-time, male occupation with higher piece rates. 
Whereas handspinning a low-skilled, part-time, female and child occupation had lower 
earnings/37 In handspinning, the proto-industrial household was the key element in the 
informal education of children whereas in handweaving apprenticeships were widely diffused, 
especially in towns. Briefly, handweavers corresponded very well to the image of skilled 
artisans while proto-industrial handspinners were more akin to cheap labour.
A new system to educate the workforce was developed within the new mills. The 
necessity of a stable and skilled factory workforce, the low public investments in primary and 
technical education, and the decrease o f proto-industrial workers who might be recruited by 
factories were the three main causes behind this innovation. In particular, the same spread of 
factories reduced the available stock o f (skilled) proto-industry workers since they destroyed 
the old putting-out districts and jeopardised the survival o f artisan workshops. Problems 
provoked by the cheap goods of new mills encouraged young proto-industrial workers to 
migrate to the new factories.437 38
It should be noted that the rise of informal education within factories was more rapid 
in spinning than in weaving because the survival of handweaving during the period made the 
recruitment of skilled weavers for new mills easier.439 Moreover, it seems that the training 
system of handweavers, which was based on apprenticeship, was very flexible and showed 
itself to be highly efficient. In particular, in the period of prosperity of cotton handweaving, 
the 1840s, the amount of handweavers increased rapidly, but without appreciable effects on 
quality and productivity and with relatively small consequences for wages.
The key element in the informal education of the new factory workers was the work
437 Sayró (1842), Gutiérrez (1834) and (1837), Madoz (1846). See also the discussion in chapter 
4 and in chapter 7.
438 Camps (1995), chapters 3 and 4.
439 Cerdá (1968), p. 568.
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of children and youth within the factories.440 Children entered the factories at the age of eight 
or nine, doing preparatory and auxiliary jobs (blowing, carding and rowing). Over the 
following years, they worked beside a parent, relative or other experienced worker receiving 
little pay and sometimes changing occupation or even factory. In this way, many children 
gained a wide knowledge of the factories and their machinery. By the age of 15 or 16, the 
most proficient children were still attached to a work group receiving fixed weekly wages. 
At the age of 17 or 18, many had acquired a high degree o f dexterity and were ready to 
supervise their own work group as main mule-spinners.441 Therefore, during their time in the 
factories children not only worked but also received an informal education. As adults, they 
were able to obtain further increases in their earnings as their skills continued to improve. In 
spinning, for example, spinners began with throstles, afterwards moving to longer mules, and 
some of them finished their careers in the well-paid supervisory posts.442 Apprenticeships were 
also common in factories among the highly skilled workers who filled the machinery 
maintenance jobs. For example, in 1856 in Barcelona, apprentices were 30 per cent of the 
workers in factory machinery-maintenance sections.443 Contrary to the other factory children, 
these apprentices specialised in a specific job from their entry and did not receive any wages 
for their work.
The evidence on posts, earnings, opportunity costs and returns of informal education 
shows that human capital investment was made during the period in which children and young 
worked in the factories. Former factory children filled the skilled posts in the factories 
because the workers who had not received any training as children could not develop these 
skills and were limited to unskilled jobs throughout their lives.444 However, this does not mean 
that unskilled workers did not have opportunities to increase their earnings throughout their 
lives because they were given some sort of training within the factory and, therefore, were
440 There are many references to child labour in the contemporary sources; see for example, Sayró 
(1842), Madoz (1846), Ceidá (1968), and Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
441 Cerdá (1968), p. 568.
442 This system of child training was very similar to the system employed in the cotton mills of 
Lancashire. On Lancashire, see Boot (1995).
443 Cerdá (1968), pp. 590-591.
444 Junta de Fábricas (1834b), and Cerdá (1968), p. 568.
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sometimes promoted from the simplest to semi-skilled tasks.443
Table 6.1 Male Yearly Earnings: Selected Cotton Factory Jobs, Barcelona. 1856
Child Minimum Maximum
Skills Education Earnings Earnings Difference
Machinery-maintenance HSK AP 2791 4996 2205
Mechanical-weavers SK PR 1016 3853 2837
Hand-weavers SK PR 1210 3574 2364
Jacquard-weavers SK PR&AP 1694 3570 1876
Mule-Spinners SK CH 2384 3829 1445
Factory labourer USK NO 2286 3218 934
Carding-machines USK NO 1814 2694 880
Notes a n d  so u rces: Values in R eales de V ellón (hereafter R v ); Skills: H SK  (highly skilled), SK  (skilled), USK 
(unskilled). Informal education: PR (children w orking in proto-industry households); C H  (children  working in 
factories); A P (apprenticeships) and N O  (any inform al education). M inim um  earnings corresponded to young workers 
and m axim um  earnings to experienced workers. T he data source is C erdá (1968, pp. 629-640).
Table 6.1 shows the earnings in diverse jobs in Barcelona cotton mills and the 
informal education and skills associated with these jobs. It can be seen that the largest 
maximum earnings and largest differentials between maximum and minimum earnings 
correspond to skilled jobs. Unskilled workers with no childhood education, in spite of the fact 
that they performed occupations with a considerable degree o f physical exertion, expected to 
get lower earnings which would not increase much. Former apprentices obtained the largest 
minimum and maximum earnings because they received many specific skills and invested 
heavily in their education. However, a puzzling feature o f these figures is the difference 
between the earnings of the former proto-industry and factory boys. The minimum earnings 
of former factory boys were higher than those of boys formerly in the proto-industry, whereas 
in maximum earnings, these differences were not significant. This apparent anomaly can be 
explained by the fact that, at the beginning of their adult life, factory boys had more training 
in specific factory tasks than proto-industry boys. But proto-industry boys were able to catch­
up on factory boys' skills and earnings during their lifetime work in the factories. In other 
words, the evidence shows that the proto-industry trained workers for the factories and the 45
445 See interesting references to unskilled lifetime earnings in CerdS (1968) and Camps (1995), p.
204.
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new machinery.
The work of children in factories had large opportunity costs for them and their 
families. Comparing the earnings of shoeshine boys with factory boys makes the analysis 
simple. Shoeshining was the typical unskilled job with absolute free-entry. For example, many 
factory boys also worked at shoeshining on Sundays because the factories were closed.**4 The 
shoeshining earning was on average Rv. 3.5 per day while in the factories boys received an 
average wage of Rv 2.5 per day. Moreover, for a large part of this period, factory children 
were only paid Rv 2 per day and only at the age of fifteen or sixteen were they promoted to 
work in work groups, receiving wages of Rv 3 per day. If we assume (1) that children began 
to work at eight years of age; (2) that the number of days of work in the factories was 227 
while shoeshine boys worked for 349;**7 (3) that the discount rate was 6 per cent; (4) that the 
wages remained constant, as the sources indicate for I855.*41 Then the actual opportunity cost 
o f working within the factories at the age of sixteen is equal to the difference between 
shoeshine and factory wages plus discount rate. Thus, the total opportunity cost of the period 
in the factories from eight to sixteen years was equal to three years of young adult (minimum) 
mule-spinners earnings*49 and the opportunity costs of apprenticeship in machinery- 
maintenance, which was not paid, was equal to about four years of young adult (minimum) 
machinery-maintenance earnings.46 78950
Lifetime earnings may also be used to estimate the net returns of informal education 
within the factories.451 To compute the net returns of informal education, the adult yearly 
earnings of skilled workers in cotton factories were compared with the yearly earnings of
446 Cerdl (1968), p. 599.
447 As Cendi (1968) indicates.
448 Under the assumption that factory boys did not have other jobs during the days when factories 
were closed. For example, they could woik as shoeshineis on Sundays to cover part of the opportunity 
costs of their work in factories.
449 Sources of data; Ceid& (1968).
450 Under the same assumptions but considering the wage of apprentices equal to zero.
431 Recently# Boot (1995), p. 283, suggested that by observing the lifetime earnings profiles of 
wodcers it is possible to measure skills formation during the nineteenth century in Lancashire.
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unskilled workers, throughout their lives using the time series of Camps.452 The net return to 
skills acquisition is the difference between skilled and unskilled occupation earnings 
discounted to their actual value. At the age of sixteen a skilled worker could anticipate 
earnings in present value terms of about Rv 206,556 from his life as factory worker, whereas 
a labourer could only expect Rv 126,176 Rv, that is to say 64 percent of what he would have 
earned as a skilled worker.
A different figure from that based on Camps' data can be obtained by using the cross- 
section series from Cerda, which corresponds to the year 1855. Thus, the adult yearly earnings 
of mule-spinners and machinery-maintenance workers were compared with the yearly earnings 
of building labourers, which was an unskilled occupation, for all their lives.453 At the age of 
sixteen, a mule-spinner could anticipate earnings in present value terms of about Rv 229,652 
from his life as a factory worker and a machinery-maintenance worker about Rv 250,487. 
Whereas a construction labourer only about Rv. 129,632.
At this point, many readers may be intrigued about why the opportunity cost estimated 
with the cross-section series differs from that computed with the time-series. Obviously, one 
could argue that it is simply because the sample differed among the two series although a less 
evident answer could also be given. It can be argued that these differences are a consequence 
of the narrowing of the skilled-unskilled wage-gap (the time-series of Camps finished some 
years after 1855). Why did this wage-gap narrow? Simply because the new technology was 
fully assimilated and the supply of workers skilled in the new technology was firmly 
established. As was explained in chapter 4, after a period with a widening wage gap comes 
a period of narrowing since the individual finds it profitable to invest in acquiring the new 
type of skills. Therefore, the same market forces that shaped the labour supply were 
responsible for the narrowing of the skilled-unskilled wage gap.
452 The data is the time series from 1847 to 1887 computed by Camps (1995), table 7, p. 204.
453 The source is Ceidi (1968). Note that it is assumed that wages remained constant, as the 1855 
sources indicate.
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6.4. The Effect of the Spread of the Factory System
Scholars have debated whether the emergence of the factory system increased or 
decreased the demand for skills among workers.454 It is misleading to argue that all workers 
in the proto-industry were skilled since there was a division of labour such that some simple 
productive tasks were carried out separately by unskilled workers. And at least some artisanal 
jobs were relatively unskilled.4”  However, it is true that the division of labour increased with 
the spread of factories. In particular, in the proto-industry some workers could not only make 
the final goods but also produced, installed or maintained machinery. It was not true for the 
new factories, the machine-installation, machine-maintenance segment, and the production 
portion were composed of specialised groups of workers.456 457
The labour force in the cotton mills during this period was a combination of highly 
skilled, skilled, and unskilled workers.437 In the preparatory section, where raw cotton was 
cleaned and prepared for spinning, unskilled workers (women and children) were monitored 
by some foremen, who were the only skilled workers in the section. On the shop floor of the 
spinning rooms, work groups were common and overlookers did not monitor the effort of the 
workers. In work groups, each spinner worked with one or two piecers, unskilled workers who 
mended broken threads during spinning operations. From around the 1850s, the rapid 
substitution of mule-jennies by self-actors did not reduce the importance of work groups and, 
according to the Catalan sources, did not alter the structure of labour.431 On average, in 
spinning mills, which traditionally were comprised of preparatory and spinning sections, the 
proportions were one skilled worker (overlooker or spinner) to three or four unskilled
454 Note that the evidence on capital-skills complementarity of chapter 4 reinforces the arguments 
that I will present in this section.
455 See the data that appears in Cerdá (1968), p. 609-613.
436 Goldin and Katz (1996a).
457 The following description of cotton mills is based on several historical sources: Arau (1855), 
Calvet (1857), Ceidá (1968), Comisión de Fábricas (1846), Comisión especial arancelaria (1867), 
Comisión del Gobierno (1841), and Ronquillo (1851-1857).
431 Ceidá (1968), pp. 595-598.
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workers.459 In weaving, the work group was less common than in spinning and many 
experienced weavers worked alone. Whereas unskilled workers (mainly women and children 
monitored by foremen) carried out the auxiliary tasks in the section. The increase in 
mechanical looms altered the relation between the number of weavers and auxiliary workers 
since in handweaving (with dandy or jacquard looms) the ratio was one weaver to two 
auxiliary workers. In mechanical-weaving it was one auxiliary worker to three or four 
weavers.460 Machinery-maintenance and engine-control tasks were also carried out by work 
teams, which were normally composed of several artisans. Interestingly, the corps of 
machinists was highly skilled because the steam engines were very unpredictable. 
Furthermore, all factories had several labourers who did some general tasks. Finally, many 
factories also had their own group of clerks and other white collar workers such as 
accountants, designers and so on.
There are several procedures for investigating changes in workforce skills. The most 
simple is to compute the proportion of men, women and children. It was common during the 
period for women to receive less formal and informal education than men. Therefore, on 
average they were less skilled.461 In Barcelona’s workforce in 1856 about 75 percent of men 
were skilled, compared to only about 48 percent of women. Moreover, only 14 percent of 
apprentices were female.462 Similarly, on-the-job training for women lasted less than for men 
because they tended to abandon the factory much earlier (sometimes after their marriage) and 
had more frequent and longer absences for illness. Although, these results might be different 
if there were strong differentials in shirking among men and women, but on this aspect the 
data is not available.
However, women's skills cannot be studied without a proper understanding of their 
heterogeneous situation within the cotton industry. In the proto-industry, women predominated
459 According to Cerdá in Barcelona's mills (1856) there were 1450 spinners, 1450 piecers and 
2110 workers involved the preparatory stages. Cerdá (1968), pp. 595-598.
460 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867), pp. 45-46, Cerdá (1968), pp. 607-613.
461 For example, this is the assumption behind some of the regressions in chapter 4.
462 According to Cerdá (1968), pp. 562-570.
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in handspinning and auxiliary tasks but not in handweaving (i.e. the fairly unskilled 
occupation). More to the point, women predominated in the domestic industry and men in the 
small shops. By contrast, in mills, in spite of their preponderance in low paid and unskilled 
jobs, many women were frequently to be found in skilled jobs such as mule-spinning or 
mechanical-weaving. Where they were paid the same piece-rates as men. In particular, 
Ildefonso Cerdá lists 16 jobs where he points out that women had the same competence as 
men. Only in three of 16, corresponding to mule-spinners, self-acting spinners and 
mechanical-weavers, did women have the same salary as men. This evidence proves that in 
cotton mills the labour market in skilled jobs was not generally segmented by sex .461
The main difference between men and women was that men filled the extra-paid posts 
in longer mules, monitoring, white-collar and machinery-maintenance. There was a large 
spectrum of variables that influenced this segregation of women from the extra-paid posts. 
Occasionally, for example in the longer mules, the physical exertion required was an 
unavoidable entry barrier for women.463 64 The size of the spinning mule was extended until it 
made more efficient use of the adult male worker's physical capacities. Furthermore, in other 
posts, women had not been apprentices or had received no formal education (e.g. in machinist 
posts). It is well known that in Spain, at that period, the schooling rates of girls were lower 
than those of boys.465 Finally, on other occasions, they were not recruited simply for social 
reasons (e.g. as overlookers). Here, since many women successfully monitored their own work 
group in spinning, it cannot be argued that they did managerial tasks worse than men.466
463 Cerdá (1968), p. 646.
464 Huberman, (1996), p. 35.
465 Nunez (1992).
466 This contradicts the views of Lazonick (1979) and Hubennan (1991b).
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Table 6.2 Composition o f the Labour Force in Full-time Equivalent Employment: 
Cotton Spinning and Weaving , 1830-1861
Male Female Children Total
1830 19,579 19,628 9,205 48,412
percent (40.44) (40.54) (19.01) (100.00)
1840 23,480 24,718 11,684 59,882
percent (39.21) (41.28) (19.51) (100.00)
1850 32,655 18,662 7,637 58,955
percent (55.39) (31.65) (12.95) (100.00)
1861 29,720 13,047 3,682 46,448
percent (63.98) (28.09) (7.93) (100.00)
N otes a n d  so u rce s : T able 4.1.
In table 6.2 it is easy to appreciate the process of substitution of women and children 
by men. This process is related to two different facts On the one hand, the typical female 
occupations in the proto-industry, especially handspinning, disappeared more rapidly than 
male occupations, such as handweaving. On the other hand, many new jobs created with the 
arrival of factories were filled exclusively by men (e.g. engine-driver, overlooker, dockers). 
These new jobs were sometimes highly skilled jobs, which could not be filled by women for 
the reasons advanced above.
Data on sex, age, and skills was put together to establish the proportion of skilled and 
unskilled workers in the cotton industry, both factory and proto-industry. Here, eight 
categories have been established. Five categories correspond exclusively to factory workers: 
highly skilled male workers, skilled male workers, unskilled male workers, skilled female 
workers, and unskilled female workers. Proto-industry workers are divided into only two 
categories: men and women. Finally, the children category corresponds to workers under the 
age of 16.
The factory categories have been defined in the following way: highly skilled workers 
were workers employed in non-productive jobs (e.g. administration, maintenance) and had 
normally already received a formal education and/or an apprenticeship; skilled workers were 
those employed in the process of production that were in charge of machines (e.g. spinners, 
weavers) who had normally been trained within the same factories or in the proto-industry;
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and unskilled workers were those employed in auxiliary tasks (e.g. carders, cleaners, dockers) 
and who were not trained in the cotton industry as children. Highly skilled and unskilled 
workers were wage-earners while skilled workers (and also proto-industry workers) were paid 
by piece-rate.467 Moreover, skilled workers managed work groups while the unskilled were 
monitored by foremen or other workers.
My next task is to estimate the labour force cross-classified by up to seven skills 
attributes. First, I separate the workforce between proto-industry and factory workers. This 
separation has been established under the assumption that workers who used hand machinery 
were proto-industry workers and that workers who used other machinery were factory 
workers. Therefore, to obtain the number o f full time equivalent workers in the proto-industry 
I multiply the amount of functioning hand machinery by positions per year per machine. 
Then, I make use of the information provided by the sources to divide the resulting figures 
into men, women and children.468
Second, I make use of the information provided by several historical sources on the 
occupations associated with each type of machinery to divide factory workers into several 
skills categories. Thus, for example, I actually estimate the FTE in 1861 self-actings cross- 
classified by sex and skills using available sources. For my final estimates I then sum across 
different machinery to derive a reduced table of the variables of interest to me.469
467 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867) and Cerdá (1968).
461 Gutiérrez (1834) and Figuerola (1968), Madoz (1846), Junta de Fábricas (1850), Giménez 
Guited (1862) and Comisión especial arancelaria (1867), respectively, provided the data on hand- 
machineiy for 1830, 1840, 1850 and 1861.
469 Estimates of the working population cross-tabulated by class of machinery, sex, and skills were 
derived from Comisión de Fábricas (1846), Cerdá (1968), and from Comisión especial arancelaria 
(1867). Note that for 1830, skills by type of machine were assumed to be those reported in the 1840 
data, the earliest year for which detailed data is available. Finally, it should be noted that, in weaving, 
factories were only important in the 1850s and that the different sources give very similar pictures of 
the skills composition of the workforce.
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Table 6.3 Skills Composition of Adult Workforce in Full-time Equivalent Employment:
Cotton Spinning and Weaving, 1830-1861
Factory Factory Factory Proto- Factory Factory Proto-
Highly Skilled Skilled Unskilled industry Skilled Unskilled industry
Male Male Male Male Female Female Female
1830 64 120 123 19271 1045 2493 16090
percent (0.16) (0.31) (0.31) (49.15) (2.67) (6.36) (41.04)
1840 212 486 402 22381 3394 8049 13275
percent (0.44) (1-01) (0.83) (46.44) (7.04) (16.70) (27.54)
1850 . 604 3128 1122 27803 2272 4629 11763
percent (1.18) (6.10) (2.19) (54.18) (4.43) (9.02) (22.92)
1861 907 7915 1635 19261 2885 5073 5088
percent (2.12) (18.51) (3.82) (45.04) (6.75) (11.86) (11.90)
N otes an d  sources: See text
The most outstanding result that emerges from table 6.3 is that in 1861, despite thirty 
years of factory workforce development with rapid growth rates (on average about 5 percent 
per year), proto-industry occupations were still important, with about 55 percent of the total. 
Until the 1850s, the development of the factory workforce was accompanied by a parallel 
increase in proto-industry labour. This was because in the first twenty years handweaving 
benefited from the expansion of mechanical spinning, which decreased the price of yam, and 
increasing the markets for cotton goods. In effect, handweaving was only strongly damaged 
by the factory expansion of the 1850s, when mechanical looms took over coarse-medium cloth 
production, but handweavers remained numerous until at least the 1870s. When Catalan 
mechanical looms also began to produce fine cloth.470 Therefore, due to this partial 
substitution of handweaving by mechanical weaving, highly skilled hours formed only 2 
percent of the total hours in 1861 and skilled hours (male and female) formed 26 per cent. 
In response to these features, one might argue that human-capital supply bottlenecks restricted 
the development o f the factory system. However, available evidence gives little support to this 
assertion. In weaving, the survival of a large number of artisans guaranteed the continuous 
availability of skilled workers. This was not true in spinning, where artisans had practically 
disappeared in only a few years (by the mid-1840s). Furthermore, the number of children 
trained at factories largely exceeded the demand for new skilled workers from the same
470 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
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factories.
A secondary result is that the growth of the skilled (highly skilled and skilled) 
workforce was more rapid than the unskilled one, which only represents a minor portion of 
the total workforce at the end of the period. This result gives strong support to the argument 
advanced in chapter 4; that is, the existence of capital-skills complementarity in the 
emergence of the factory system.
The final test concerning the demand for skills can only be made by computing the 
changes in the remuneration of productive factors (raw labour, human capital and physical 
capital). Two of the possible outcomes are related to changes in the demand for skills: (1) if 
raw labour and physical capital remunerations rose while human-capital dropped, the new 
machinery had a de-skilling effect, (2) if human and physical capital remunerations increased 
while raw labour diminished, the new machinery increased the demand for skilled labour.
Human-capital remuneration is assumed to be labour minus the part of raw labour. 
Raw labour remuneration is the result o f the sum of the total of hours of male work 
multiplied by the male hourly wage of unskilled cotton workers between 16 and 20 years old, 
plus the total hours of female work multiplied by the female hourly wage of unskilled cotton 
workers between 16 and 20 years old, plus children's earnings. This measure of raw labour 
is based on three points: (1) unskilled cotton workers between 16 and 20 years were not 
trained, (2) the differences between males and females must be reflected in the account, (3) 
the measure of raw labour must be based on data from the same cotton industry to avoid 
distortions caused by labour market failures. In contrast, other economic historians471 have 
established the remuneration of raw labour as the wage of agrarian labourers. It should be 
noted that, in this case, the average male agrarian wage in the province of Barcelona was 
about 90 percent of that of unskilled workers in the cotton industry .472
The human-capital share was also separated into two sub-shares. Specifically, the share
471 Crafts (1995).
472 See chapter 4.
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improvements into the analysis by considering intermediate inputs, subdividing inputs by type, 
and then weighing each type by its imputed return.475 Here the new theory is combined with 
the above methodological improvement to create a single growth accounting equation. This 
is done by dividing labour into raw labour and human capital parts, thus simultaneously 
considering changes in input quality. Specifically:
ln<?(7)-ln<3(r-l) = 0JlnX(7)-lnX(r-l)] ♦ QJlnK(T)-\nK(T-l)]
* QJ\nHO)-lnH(T-l)] + TFPt. ix
where:
e, = 1/210^7) + e^r-i)].
Here Q is output, X physical intermediate inputs, K capital, L labour, H human capital, 
TFP the Total Factor Productivity and ©4 denotes the share of each input in total factor 
payments. The index of TFP (TFPt., t ) is a measure o f the increase in output attributable to 
innovation; in other words, it is the increase in output triggered by a time-related shift in the 
production function.
The appropriate measure of physical capital, human capital and labour inputs is the 
flow of services emanating from these inputs. Moving to labour input, one can reasonably 
assume that the flow of services is proportional to the total hours of work. The contribution 
of the raw labour input is estimated as the arithmetic sum of hours worked, with no 
adjustment for labour quality, multiplied by its share in total payments. Likewise, the 
contribution of human capital is computed as an index of human capital, where the price part 
is the remuneration of human capital in each category of workers. The quantity part is the 
quantity of hours worked cross-tabulated by sex, age and skills. Moreover, each category is 
weighted by its earnings premium over the raw labour wage (i.e. the wage of unskilled 
workers from 16 to 20 years). Specifically, human capital rises if the components with higher 
flows of labour input per hour worked grow more rapidly, and falls if components with lower 
flows per hour grow more rapidly. For example, in this paper it is hypothesised that, because
475 Jorgenson (1990). For a full discussion of these advances see chapter 5.
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the average wage of a male highly skilled worker was higher than that of a male skilled 
worker, the direct substitution o f a skilled male worker by a highly skilled male worker entails 
an increase in the use of human capital in the aggregate production function.
Table 6.5 Augmented Solow-type Growth Accounting:
Cotton Spinning and Weaving, 1830-1861
Contributions to growth (percent rates per year)
Output
Physical
Inputs
Spinning
1830-40 7.02 3.74
1840-50 7.65 4.50
1850-61 3.29 2.03
1830-61 5.90 3.32
Weaving
1830-40 8.57 4.11
1840-50 9.68 4.81
1850-61 2.93 2.22
1830-61 6.93 3.84
Physical Human Raw
Capital Capital Labour TFP
0.92 0.20 0.45 1.71
1.52 0.04 -0.38 1.96
0.84 0.00 -0.17 0.59
1.12 0.11 -0.15 1.45
0.54 0.13 0.36 3.43
0.29 0.27 0.31 4.02
0.09 -0.16 -0.29 1.07
0.41 0.22 0.06 2.40
N otes and  so u rces: See appendix.
Table 6.5 compiles the contributions to growth in the Catalan cotton industry. Two 
main conclusions emanate from these results: (1) TFP was the factor that grew more rapidly, 
(2) the growth of human capital was slow or, in some cases, even negative. Consequently, 
table 5 tends to confirm more than reject the results obtained previously with the descriptive 
techniques and the results of growth accountings of chapter 5. That is, the main source behind 
the Catalan industrialisation was total factor productivity growth. It is also interesting to see 
that there are very few connections between the human capital contribution and the TFP 
contribution. In other words, it is unlikely that the shifts in human capital could explain the 
shifts in total factor productivity.
Some interpretations of TFP growth in the Catalan cotton industry can be derived from 
these results. The first implication is related to the fact that TFP clearly appears to be the 
main ingredient in the years of output expansion. As mentioned above in chapter 5, these
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years of strong expansion o f output and TFP were associated with important structural 
changes in the sector that altered the organisation o f the firms, markets and labour. The main 
change during these years was, precisely, the emergence of the factory system. In other words, 
the substitution of putting-out with the factory system formed the basis of the development 
of industrialisation and the growth o f industrial output.
The second implication is that innovation in the new industries in the first half of 
nineteenth century had strong multiplicative effects. For instance, the adoption of some 
innovations in the cotton industry produced large effects on the growth of output. 
Contemporary experience is quite different because to achieve greater effects, long-term 
research projects and extensive human capital are necessary. In the nineteenth century, the 
effects of innovation were greater and more immediate. Therefore, with relatively low 
investments in physical and human capital, leading European regions could grow.
6.6 Concluding Remarks
The overall balance-sheet of human capital in Catalonia during the emergence of the 
factory system is still uneven. On the one hand, the level o f human capital present in the 
cotton industry was enough to adapt most modem foreign technologies and to fill the skilled 
posts in the new factories with native workers. For instance, after a short period of training 
for the new technologies, all machinery-maintenance posts were filled by Catalan workers. 
On the other hand, no less important is the fact that human capital appears to contribute little 
to output growth; in other words, the overall level of human capital in the cotton industry did 
not rise much during the period.
The presence of this initial stock of human capital is one major explanation for why 
the economic and political crisis of the first thirty years of the nineteenth century was not 
enough to impede Catalan industrialisation. In all likelihood, the main development advantage 
of Catalonia over other Spanish and European regions was, precisely, this stock of human
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capital.476 Therefore, it is possible on the basis of the evidence presented to make some 
considerations as regards proto-industrialisation theory. In the original formulation by Frank 
Mendels the main contribution of proto-industry to the new industry was in terms of unskilled 
labour force.477 In other words, the proto-industry furnished the new factories with abundant 
and cheap labour. On the contrary, the evidence for Catalonia suggests that the proto-industry 
provided the new Catalan factories with the necessary human-capital to introduce the new 
technologies. It was possible to adapt prior training to the technical requirements of the 
factories because there were more similarities than differences between proto-industrial and 
factory technologies. Furthermore, some new factory technologies were also adapted for proto- 
industrial use.478
A methodological corollary of this growth-accounting exercise is that it is easier to be 
sceptical about the restriction of the concept of human capital to that of formal education 
during almost all the nineteenth century. Thus, it is important to appreciate that the emergence 
of the factory system during the past century had the potential of Filling some important gaps 
in the historical analyses of human capital. In truth, it shows that the 'educational' definition 
of human capital is very restrictive because the role of formal education (schooling) was 
limited in many proto-industrial households, factory jobs and, by extension, during the early 
phases of industrialisation. While a vast literature, accumulated over the last decades, contains 
a wealth of findings on the growth rates of schooling (enrolment and participation rates), 
corresponding estimates of on-the-job training and learning have not been constructed. Instead, 
the growth of participation or enrolment rates has been assumed to reflect human-capital 
accumulation during the nineteenth century.
Finally, the limitations of the model employed in the emergence of the Catalan factory 
system should also be stressed. In reality, this model was not able to sustain a new shift in
476 Mitch (1990), p. 33 has said: 'Successful industrializers commonly drew on a stock of workers 
skilled in more traditional artisanal methods, while economies that had difficulty industrializing may 
have encountered problems because of the restricted supply of workers whose skills were acquired on 
the job'
477 Mendels (1972).
478 Berg (1985).
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the output and in the quality of the production in the long-run because the Catalans were not
able to produce original technology with their stock of human capital. Therefore, Catalan
industrial firms were only capable of adapting and modifying foreign technologies with more
similarities than differences with the technologies employed at that moment. Only with the
development o f formal technical training could the Catalans develop this innovative capacity
in the long term. Entrepreneurs were aware of this problem and one of them said to a
government commission in 1867:479 
%
Our managers had to make use of several technicians from foreign countries.
The indifference in Spain towards the study of applied mathematical and 
natural sciences impedes our industrial firms in organising a numerous and 
sufficient national skilled workforce in order to satisfy all production 
requirements. It should be acknowledged that this (skilled workforce) is a main 
element in the development and the prosperity of any kind of industry and that 
it has to be found at any cost, even out of our borders where is abundant.
479 Comisiön especial arancelaria (1867), p. 83.
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Appendix to Chapter 6: Methods and Sources for Augmented-Solow Growth Accounting
Output: Divisia index of output with six homogeneous categories of product. Spinning 
quantities are based on yearly imports of raw cotton with variable wastage calculated 
according to the method of Huberman.480 Weaving figures are yam production minus yam 
employed by the mixed fabrics and hosiery industries.481
Physical inputs: Divisia index of inputs with five homogeneous categories plus energy.482
Physical capital: Divisia index of real capital with six homogeneous categories (factories, 
workshops, modem machinery, hand machinery, engines, and inventories) weighted with 
rental rates (with geometric depreciation). The results are robust to changes in depreciation 
rates and alternative rental rates.483
Human capital: Divisia index of real human capital with 56 categories (cohort x sex x skills) 
weighted with relative incomes exceeding the raw labour wage.
My first task is to estimate the working population, cross-classified by up to three 
attributes, i.e. sex, age and skills. Under the assumptions that the life expectancy of all kinds 
of workers is the same and that they remained in the industry all their lives, I derive an 
approximation of the age distribution of the workforce for each benchmark year ( 1830, 1840, 
1850,1861). Because age-specific mortality was higher for unskilled than skilled workers, my 
first assumption will produce an underestimate of human capital. By contrast, the second 
assumption will produce an overestimate of human capital to the extent that workers left the 
cotton industry.
I use three sets of numbers: the total number of FTEs in each benchmark year, the age
480 Hubetman (1996), pp. 107-109.
481 For a full description of the sources and methods see chapter 2.
482 For a full description of the sources and methods see previous chapter 2.
483 See chapter 3 for a description of the sources and methodology.
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distribution of the Catalan cotton industry workforce, and the survival tables for Catalonia. 
The total number of FTEs is in table 4.1, The age distribution of the Catalan cotton industry 
workforce is drawn from Camps (1995, table 10, p. 166), Bamosell et a i  (1994) and Ferrer 
(1994). It should be noted that the age distribution is different for proto-industry and factory 
workers. Finally, the survival tables are drawn from Munoz (1991).
The second task is to estimate the remuneration of human capital in each category of 
workers. I begin by constructing estimates of the average hourly incomes of employees cross- 
tabulated by industry (proto-industry and factory, spinning and weaving), adult-child, sex, and 
skills. I then use the figures o f Camps (1995), pp. 198-204 on wage profiles for highly skilled, 
skilled, and unskilled male and female workers to estimate the variation in incomes of 
employees due to age. Therefore, relative incomes by worker age are assumed to be constant 
at the levels reported in Camps (1995). Finally, I deduct the part of remuneration that 
corresponds to raw labour (initial hourly wages of workers; that is, the minimum wage at each 
occupation).484
Raw Labour: Unweighted hours worked (see text).
Shares: Current values at wholesale prices minus taxes. Capital share has been computed as 
the residual of total value minus physical inputs, human capital, and raw labour values.
484 The sources are: for 1830 Madoz (1846) and Comisión de fábricas (1846), for 1840 Madoz 
(1846) and Comisión de fábricas (1846), for 1850 Cerdá (1968) and for 1861 Comisión especial 
arancelaria (1867).-
Chapter 7
The Emergence of the Factory System
This chapter examines the gains in efficiency associated with the emergence of the 
factory system in an attempt to explain how total factor productivity improvement took place 
in Catalonia during the period of early industrialisation. Three major conclusions will be 
reached. First, there was a connection between the enlargement of the size of industrial 
establishments (i.e., the adoption of the factory system) and the substantial productivity gains 
in the early phase of Catalan industrialisation. Second, in modem industries, such as the 
cotton industry, the emergence of factories and associated productivity gains were previous 
to the adoption of the new machinery. Therefore, some productivity improvement was 
independent from the adoption of the sources of central motive power (i.e., it was non- 
embodied in capital goods). Third, some of the superior productivity of the Catalan industry 
can be explained by the larger than average size of the Catalan industrial establishments.
For different reasons the questions of this chapter are not without interest. The 
question is not confined to whether one type of firm was more efficient than another. The 
main issue is whether substantial economic growth was realised by industrialising economies 
prior to the diffusion of new machinery, and to what extent this early phase of 
industrialisation was driven by increases in productivity achieved through changes in the 
organisation of the manufacturing labourforce. This reorganisation of labour gives an 
empirical explanation for the large total factor productivity rates of the early industrialisation 
period in Catalonia. Recently, Kenneth Sokoloff and Gregory Clark have linked the
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productivity gains of early industrialisation to the development of new forms of 
organisation.485 However, as on other occasions, evidence has been circumscribed to the U.S. 
and British cases. Therefore, this study can throw light on the influence of this kind of 
innovation on other process of industrialisation, especially those that took place in 
Mediterranean regions.
7.1, Introduction
The story of early industrialisation has often been explained around the theme of 
technical innovation in machinery. The discovery of new spinning and weaving techniques, 
the innovations in iron making and power generation, the improvements in freight 
transportation and so on have been considered the most spectacular outcomes of these early 
years.486 However, if one looks at these technological innovations from the present-day, all 
these inventions have capitulated to the passage of time with the arrival of new discoveries. 
For example, the ring spinning substituted the spinning mule, the automatic loom substituted 
the powerloom, electrical motors and Diesel engines replaced the steam engine. Instead, the 
major innovation in business institutions of early industrialisation, the factory system, has 
not only survived until the present-day, but still has the control over the production of 
industrial goods.
The term factory has been defined in several different ways. Some have chosen a 
narrow technical definition. Thus, according to A. Ure, 'the term Factory, in technology, 
designates the combined operation of many orders of work-people, adult and young, in 
tending with assiduous skill a system of productive machines continuously impelled by a 
central power.'487 Others have emphasised the type of authority relationship prevalent in 
factories. Viewing the presence of wage-earners controlled by bosses and the ownership 
division between labour and capital characterising the factory.488 Note that this definition is 
rather restrictive since, according to this view, some present-day large establishments that
485 Clark (1984)0994) and Sokoloff (1984a)(1986).
486 Ashton (1962), Pollard (1965), Landes (1969), and Mathias (1969).
487 Ure (1836), pp. 13.
481 See, for example, Clark (1994).
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sometimes use sub-contracting must not be considered factories. Less restrictive definitions 
have also been adopted. In particular, Williamson defined factories in terms of ownership. 
Thus, the capitalist mode of production (factories) involves that 'inventories of all kinds (raw 
materials, intermediate product, finished goods) as well as plant and equipment are owned 
by a single party.'489 He also distinguishes two sub-categories: inside contracting and 
authority relation. 'Under the system of inside contracting, the management of a firm 
provided a floor space and machinery, supplied raw material and working capital, and 
arranged for the sale of the final product. The gap between raw material and finished 
product, however, was filled not by paid employees arranged in [a] descending hierarchy ... 
but by [inside] contractors, to whom the production job was delegated. They hired their own 
employees, supervised the work process, and received a [negotiated] piece rate from the 
company.'490 Instead, the authority relation implies capitalist ownership of equipment and 
inventories combined with an employment relationship between entrepreneur and worker.491
In this chapter, two strong reasons have decided the choice of the less restrictive 
definition that was proposed by Williamson. First, this definition is the most useful in 
discussing the reasons behind the emergence of the factory system since it does not directly 
imply the technology answer. Second, for those involved in industry in Catalonia, the term 
factory usually referred to premises in which several people (habitually, ten or more) worked 
for an entrepreneur who possessed the various inventories.492 Some had machinery and 
central motive power and some had not. Moreover, in some Catalan factories the authority 
relation dominated, in others inside contracting was common, and many others combined 
these the systems. In other words, Williamson's definition correlates more with the 
contemporaries' view than the other restrictive definitions.
4,9 Williamson (1986), pp. 218.
490 Buttrick cited by Williamson (1986), pp. 218.
491 Williamson (1986), pp. 218.
492 For example, the Catalan census (e.g. Junta de Fábricas (1850)) registered all establishments 
with more than 10 workers independently from their source of motive power or the existence or not 
of an authority relation within the shop floor.
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Before the arrival of the factory system, the family-firm craftshop and the putting-out 
or outwork system were the only forms of business organisation in the industry. These two 
business institutions were based on decentralised small units and little division of labour. 
Under artisanal production, a master craftsman with a few assistants, who were sometimes 
members of his family, ran a small unit-of-production. In these shops the extent of the 
division of labour was little and, hence, the same worker performed several different tasks 
and could make the whole product. The putting-out system was characterised as a 
decentralised production organisation where the producers used their own tools, and where 
work was localised to their own homes. Two main types of putting-system can be found. 
In the verlag-system the putter-out puts out raw materials or semi-finished goods to a 
producer and, at least to some extent, plays a supervisory role. In the kauf-system the 
entrepreneur only collects the finished wares and sometimes supplies the producer with 
credit.493
The rest of the chapter is organised into three main parts. Section 7.2 discusses the 
literature on this topic. In section 7.3 I estimate scale economies to demonstrate that large 
establishments were more efficient than small establishments. Section 7.4 presents three 
different case studies: cotton spinning, mixed-fabrics and cotton weaving, and cotton 
finishing. Here, I show that there was a tendency for plant sizes to grow. Furthermore, I 
show that factories existed before the adoption of centralised sources of motive power. The 
rest of the chapter is devoted to comparing Catalonia with the rest of Spain. Thus, in section
7.5, I present evidence for 1861 on the average size of the Catalan establishments. The 
subsequent question discusses why were manufacturing establishments larger in catatonia 
than in other Spanish regions? Finally, the last section summarises and concludes.
7.2. The Emergence of the Factory System in the Literature
As mentioned above, the major innovation in business institutions during early 
industrialisation was the emergence of the factory system. Many economic historians and
493 This division into two major categories is based on Kriedte et at. (1981).
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economic theorists have discussed the effects, the nature, and the causes of this innovation. 
In the next pages I review the debate, underline some stylized facts, and present the 
implications for our understanding of the early phase of Catalan industrialisation. This 
section will confine itself to the discussion of theory rather than historical and empirical 
issues, since these will be examined in further sections.
In broad terms, there are three views on the emergence of the factory system. Some 
authors reject the arguments that the emergence of the factory system was associated with 
efficiency gains. Others argue that the emergence of the factory system resulted in efficiency 
gains. But do not accept that the development of the nonmechanised factories represented 
a significant technical or organisational advance over previous forms of organisation. In 
other words, they associate the efficiency gains of the factories with the adoption of central 
sources of motive power. Finally, the last group considers that the development of both 
mechanised and nonmechanised factories provided a more efficient method of producing 
manufactured goods.
To marxists, the factory represents a further decisive step in the divorce of the 
worker from control over the means of production. The leading proponent of this view is 
Stephen Marglin. He argues that the capitalist division of labour was not the result of a 
search for a technologically superior organisation of work. But for an organisation that 
guaranteed the entrepreneur an essential role in the production process, as the integrator of 
the separate efforts of his workers into a marketable product.494 495Marglin is arguing that the 
emergence of factory system was due to social determinants. Note that according this view 
productivity improvement was not a necessary outcome of the emergence of more 
centralised and hierarchical forms of production, such as the factory system, and that the
J O «entrepreneur was unnecessary.
494 Marglin (1974), pp. 62ff.
495 In the following paragraphs I only discuss the implications of the efficiency argument and 
not the debate on the role of entrepreneurs. A severe critique of Marglin's statements on the role of 
the entrepreneur is furnished by Landes (1986). See, also, a review of the debate in Berg (1991b).
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Others see the emergence of the factory as 'the necessary outcome of the rise of 
machinery'. This view came from the pioneering economic historians and was broadly 
accepted by subsequent scholars such as Sidney Pollard, David Landes, Peter Mathias and 
S.R.H. Jones.496 They argue that the low thermal efficiency and large size of early steam 
engines required the collection of a labourforce under one roof. The basic argument is that 
the new technologies introduced obvious economies of scale, and that this led to factory 
production. For example, Landes stresses that it was 'the muscle: the machines and 
engines'497 that made the factory system in Britain successful. While, in the words of Jones, 
'the pace of technological change appears to have been a major determinant of the speed 
with which factory production was adopted.'498 Chandler takes the extreme position on this 
argument arguing that the division of labour and the introduction of the factory system into 
nonmechanised industries only accounted for minor increases in efficiency.499
Note that the 'machinery argument' has a strong implication for our understanding 
of Catalan industrialisation. If machinery innovations were the cause of widespread 
organisational innovations. Then in the follower countries (such as Catalonia) the 
introduction of the British machinery led to the development of the factory system. In other 
words, organisational innovations were as 'exogenous' as machinery innovations and the path 
of the development of the factory system must follow the chronology of the adoption of the 
British machinery. However, this does not seem the case because, before the adoption of the 
steam engine the spinning mule and the powerloom in the 1830s, the Catalan cotton industry 
developed some forms of organisation that allowed a concentration of the workforce and 
increased the scale of firms. For instance, in the eighteenth century, without central sources 
of motive power (i.e., the steam engine and the water wheels), calico printing was 
centralised in some large concerns.500
496 Ashton (1962), Pollard (1965), Landes (1969), Mathias (1969) and Jones (1982)(1987)(1992).
497 Landes (1986), pp. 606.
498 Jones (1987), pp. 94.
499 Chandler (1977).
500 See, for example, Thomson (1992) and Sánchez (I989)(1996).
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Thermal economies of scale were evidently one facet of the history. It is regarded 
as beyond dispute that in some industries, such as iron foundries, centralisation was directly 
connected to the discovery of technologies characterised by economies of scale and 
indivisibilities. However, thermal economies of scale are not the whole story. Many authors 
see the adoption of machinery as a consequence, not the cause, of the innovations in 
business institutions.
The position that the gains from the division of labour were previous to the adoption 
of the new machinery can be traced back at least as far as Adam Smith. In his account of 
the causes of the wealth of nations, Adam Smith considers the role of machinery as 
important. But secondary and subsidiary to the increasing division of labour. Basically, 
Smith did not theorise but attempted to explain the world around him. Since the division of 
labour was common in manufacturing when he lived, some years before the triumph of the 
machinery innovations.501 He emphasised the benefits of the division of labour with the 
famous example of pinmaking. In pinmaking, each worker specialises in a particular 
operation and this produces a large increase in productivity.502 Note that technology in 
pinmaking is extraordinary simple; consequently, machinery plays practically no role in 
deciding the forms of work organisation. In other words, since the tasks and tooling are 
relatively uncomplicated, and successive stages are technologically separable, pinmaking is 
suitable for centralised and decentralised business institutions. However, the example as it 
was originally discussed by Smith is unconvincing. As Stephen Marglin and Oliver E. 
Williamson have recently emphasised. The separate elaboration (batch-processing) of each 
pin is quite absurd.503 Marglin argues that; 'It appears to have been technologically possible 
to obtain the economies of reducing set-up time without specialization. A workman, with 
his wife and children, could have proceeded from task to task, first drawing out enough wire 
for hundreds or thousands of pins, then straightening it, then cutting it, and so on with each 
successive operation, thus realizing the advantages of dividing the overall production process
501 Szostak (1989), pp. 350.
502 Jones (1987), pp. 71. discusses the opportunity of the pinmaking example. He argues that this 
was an irrelevant industry in early industrialisation.
503 Marglin (1974), pp. 38; and Willianson (1980), pp. 9.
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into separate tasks.'304 It seems that Smith missed something in his pinmaking example.
Marglin's and the machinist's arguments have been disputed by Oliver E. 
Williamson.504 05 In particular, Williamson argues that the hierarchically organised factory was 
better at quality control, reduced inventories, saved transport costs and allocated work more 
efficiently than decentralised forms of work organization. At least when compared to 
putting-out or the workshop. Furthermore, the rationalisation of production within the factory 
enables entrepreneurs to perceive where technological improvements might be made, thus 
reducing the costs of innovation. In a  few words, Williamson sees the emergence of the 
factories as a consequence of their transaction-cost advantages and efficiency superiority, 
not a result of class criteria or thermal economies.
Recently, Williamson's arguments have been repeatedly discussed. On the one hand, 
Jones and others emphasise the problems of empirically testing Williamson’s theory. Jones 
convincingly argues that the adoption o f the factory system took place in a framework where 
all kinds of costs were important, not only transaction costs.506 Moreover, he underlines that 
putting-out was sometimes superior to the factory as a form of organisation in terms of 
transactions costs. For example, when markets fluctuate severely or when there is great 
seasonality of labour supply, putting-out has shown itself to be superior to the factory 
system.
On the other hand, Leijonhufvud and Szostak have refined some aspects of the 
original transaction-cost thesis. Leijonhufvud recovered Adam Smith's division-of-labour 
hypothesis by discussing the economies achieved by switching from crafts to factory 
production. He argues that the switch is capital-saving because the factory system gives the 
opportunity to economise on work-in-progress inventories. Moreover, it also saves on human 
capital since no worker need possess all the skills required to make the complete product. 
The skills needed to perform each single operation can be quickly acquired whereas, under
504 Marglin (1974), pp. 38.
505 Williamson (1980)(1983).
506 Jones (1997), pp. 15.
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crafts production, each individual had to spend years of apprenticeship before becoming a 
master of all the different operations. Equally important is that skilled workers can employ 
their whole time in skilled operations, because they do not have to spend time in unskilled 
tasks.307 Szostak claimed that factories were not inherently more efficient than cottage 
production. Factories only became the best method of production when transport 
improvements increasingly favoured factories.308
Yet it is clear from our previous discussion that the choice between decentralised and 
centralised forms of production is far from clear cut. The substitution of the factory system 
for putting-out and craft workshops was mainly due to the advantages of the former in terms 
of transaction costs. But not exclusively, in several industries machinery and scale 
considerations might also have played a role. The inherent advantages of the division of 
labour and the extent of markets are two major ingredients. However, there is general 
agreement on the fact that the emergence of the factory increased the efficiency of 
production and helped the adoption and development of technological innovations. It saved 
on human and physical capital and then allowed a more efficient allocation of these scarce 
resources.
The arguments of Williamson, Szostak and Leijonhufvud have clear repercussions 
on our perception of early industrialisation in Catalonia. First, because they define 
organisational innovations as independent of machinery innovation. That is, they explain part 
o f the disembodied component of productivity growth. Secondly, because they give a list 
of conditions under which the adoption of factories was more likely to happen. In particular, 
the efficiency hypothesis appears to be highly relevant and merits detailed attention. And, 
finally, because they provide a framework to understand why and how organisational 
innovations affected productivity and industry growth.
It should be noted that several Catalan economic historians devoted some attention 5078
507 Leijonhufvud (1986).
508 Szostak (1989X1992).
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to the development of business institutions in Catalonia during early industrialisation. Jordi 
Nadal and Jordi Maluquer de Motes agree with the 'muscle' argument of Landes; that is, 
organisational innovation was a consequence of the adoption of British machinery.509 A 
different view emerges from the works of Alex Sánchez since he shows that the adoption 
of centralised forms of production was previous to the introduction of steam engines.510 
However, none have considered the importance of innovation in business institutions for 
productivity growth. This is precisely the argument that I would like to develop in the 
further sections.
7.3. Testing the Efficiency of the Factories: Estimates of Returns to Scale
The most straightforward method of investigating whether productivity (efficiency) 
was influenced positively by the presence of factories (mechanised or nonmechanised) is the 
estimation of production functions. In other words, if large establishments (factories) were 
indeed more efficient than artisanal shops and domestic units-of-production (putting-out), 
production functions should furnish evidence of returns to scale.511 Moreover, the presence 
of scale economies must be widespread in the modem sectors, even if they were not 
mechanised. Finally, one should also expect that economies of scale in the industries with 
small establishments (traditional industries) would be exhausted a moderate level of output.
Several alternative tests of the existence of economies of scale are possible. The 
estimation of either cost of production functions provides the necessary and sufficient 
information for a test of the previous argument. In the absence of knowledge about the 
appropriate cost of capital and wages, this chapter relies upon the estimation of production 
functions. Specifically, Cobb-Douglas and Translog production functions can be tested. The 
main advantage of the Transíog over Cobb-Douglas is that it allows the estimate of the scale
509 Nadal (1974), Maluquer (1976)(1998).
5,0 Sánchez (1989)(1996). See also Grau and López (1975) and Thomson (1992).
511 See, on the methodological aspects Griliches and Ringstad (1971). Similar exercises have 
been already performed for the United States by Atack (1977)(1987) and Sokoloff (1984a), and for 
France by Nye (1987) and Sicsic (1994).
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coefficient to vary over firms.512 In other words, the conventional estimation technique of 
the logarithmic transformation of the standard Cobb-Douglas only provides information on 
the conditions facing the median firm.
The only datasource available for the period that furnishes enough evidence to 
estimate these functions for several industries is Gimenez Guited's Guia fabril e industrial 
de España.5'3 It collects data for the year of 1861 in 13 different industries at provincial and 
national level.514 Moreover, the most important establishments were all enumerated in the 
respective provincial sections; thus the source describes establishments and not firms. The 
published tables report the value of annual output and the number of employees (broken 
down into men, women, and children), but do not give the number of days worked. The 
physical quantities of outputs (tons of yam, yards of cloth, pounds of flour, and so on) are 
also often reported along with the number of machines, establishments and engines (broken 
down by looms, spindles, windmills, and other machines). But their power is only reported 
at the industry-level. The amount of capital reported was not only function of the size of 
buildings, but also of the machines and engines in the buildings.515
Unfortunately, the data is only furnished at provincial levels since the establishments 
data enumerated only the number of workers (without distinguishing men, women, children), 
the amount of machinery (broken down by class) and the capital invested in machinery (in 
the source called capital representado). Furthermore, not all establishments were recorded, 
since in several provinces, especially those with a small number of establishments, many 
small establishments were included in collective observations although the source clearly 
stated the total number of establishments in each collective observation. Data at provincial 
level is not furnished for the provinces of Navarre, Alava, Guipúzcoa, and Vizcaya but
5,2 Griliches and Ringstad (1973).
513 Gimenez Guited (1862).
5,4 The quality of the data for Catalonia was already discussed in chapter 3. The conclusion was 
that the figures are acceptable.
515 The description of the procedures to impute total capital from the value of machinery are 
given on Gimenez Guited (1862), pp. 8ff.
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several national enumerators include them. A major problem is that the transference of 
intermediate inputs among provinces is not recorded since output data is based on the 
concept of sectoral output. It is obvious that this problem calls for adjustments when 
calculations.
In order to estimate returns to scale, I begin with the conventional formulation of the 
Cobb-Douglas production function:
(7-D VA = AICL*.
Where VA is value-added, A is the intercept, L is labour input, and K is capital. 
From this form one can easily derive the following more operative form:
(7.2) hiVA/L = bui + sinL  + pin*/!.
This equation has the advantage that the coefficient on labour (5) yields a direct test 
of economies of scale since:
(7 .3 )  5  = ( y  + p )  -  1
Habitually, this function is estimated with ordinary least squares. In this case this 
does not seem convenient because each province-based observation corresponded to the 
aggregation of many plant-level observations.516 517Consequently, I prefer to perform weighted 
least squares estimation with the weights given by the number of establishments in each cell. 
In addition, I also estimated two more equations by including industry (i.e, 12 dummy 
variables) or regional dummies (i.e., 6 dummy variables). These help control for effects such 
as: unobserved quality of labour inputs, seasonal unemployment, and unrecorded variation 
in the value of output or value-added. All of which might be correlated with the locality 
or/and industry.317 The results of these three equations are presented in the table 7.1.
5,6 See Greene (1993).
517 This solution was implemented by Sokoloff (1984a) and Sicsic (1994).
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Table 7.1 Estimation of Cobb-Douglas Production Functions:
Spanish Manufacturing. 186)
without dummies with industiy dummies with region dummies
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.
Constant -0.413 -0.348 0.188 5.198 -0.030 -0.238
log(labour) 0.136 8.980 0.073 4.152 0.102 6.352
log(capital/labour) 0.258 10.148 0.028 7.487 0.269 11.120
N observations 333 333 333
R2 adjusted 0.360 0.566 0.453
MAE 2.700 2.164 2-581
F-test 94.529 34.385 35.433
N otes and S ou rces: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm o f  value-added divided by labour. Coeff. is 
the coefficient o f  the variable and t-sta t is the t-statisdc. All equations a i t  estim ated  by w eighted least squares with 
weights g iven by the num ber o f  establishm ents in each observation. To derive from the original sectoral output 
figures the value-added figures it has been em ployed the coefficients o f  P rados (1988). except where I already 
estimated my own coefficients (see the previous chapter 2). Labour figures are a weighted aggregate o f  the male, 
female and children figures with the w eights o f  the appendix o f  the chapter 5 plus the entrepreneurial input. A 
complete description o f  the regions is available in table 7.11.
The results are striking. First, and most important, all three regressions yield a 
statistically significant finding of economies of scale, with the scale coefficient ranging from
1.07 to 1.13.518 This result gives support to the argument that there were gains in increasing 
establishment-size and, hence, that factories were indeed more efficient. However, the 
explanatory power of the equation is strongly improved by including the industry dummies. 
Of course, this result gives some support to the existence of a differential in the scale 
economies between modem and old industries. In table 7.2 this argument will be directly 
tested.
5,8 These scale coefficients arc veiy similar to those computed by Sokoloff for the United States 
with data for 1820 (Sokoloff (1984a), table 5, pp.364) but smaller than those computed by Sicsic 
for France with data for 1850 and 1861-1865. Sicsic (1994), table 7 and 8, pp. 468-469 and 472-473.
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Table 7.2 Estimation of Cobb-Douglas Production Functions: 
Spanish Modem and Traditional Manufacturing. 1861
Traditional industries Modem sectors
Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.
Constant 0.194 0.964 0.250 1.894
log(labour) 0.022 2.931 0.083 4552
log(capital/Iabour) 0.096 4.179 0.452 14.074
N observations 183 150
R2 adjusted 0,153 0.702
MAE 2.428 1.911
F-test 5.113 177.159
N otes an d  S o u rces: See the previous table 7 .1 . M odem  industries are tex tile , paper and m etal industries, and the 
rem aining industries formed the traditional sector. Traditional industries equation includes regional dum m ies to 
improve the quality o f  the results.
The econometric results presented in table 7.2 are even clearer than the result of table
7.1. In the case of the traditional industries, the scale coefficient is not significant, whereas 
in the modem industries it is highly significant. In other words, the small traditional sectors 
had exhausted their scale economies by 1861 whilst in the modem sectors there still scale 
economies. Note that this result supports the view that increasing the size of the modem 
industries, as happened in Catalonia in this period, achieved gains in efficiency.
I now move to the Translog equation. Whose main advantage is the relaxation of 
many of the implicit assumptions of the Cobb-Douglas function. However, in this case, it 
would not change the overall conclusion. After taking logarithms, the Translog production 
function has the form:
(7.4) lnK4 = a 0 + a,lnZ. + afiiK * \$ßnLf + + iJnLlnK.
Where the scale economies (s) can be solved for:
(7.5) S - cc, + ak + 2pJL  + + y ^ L + K )
It should be noted that the scale coefficient varies with the size of the establishment.
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Translog production functions for both traditional and modem industries are presented in 
table 7.3.
Table 7.3 Estimation of Translog Production Functions: 
Spanish Modem and Traditional Manufacturing, 1861
Traditional industries Modem sectors
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
Constant 0.9392 0.8487 0.6911 1.2526
log(capital) 0.0035 0.0093 0.7051 4.2663
logflabour) 1.0863 3.1191 0.1890 0.7214
log(capital)2 0.0720 23494 0.0020 0.0849
log(labour)2 0.0902 2.9491 0.0660 1.6742
Iog(c ap ital )* 1 og(l abour) -0.1654 -4.4812 -0.0481 -0.9003
Number observations 183 150
R2 adjusted 0.9265 0.9745
MAE 2.4348 1.9113
F 459.5240 1415.2300
N otes and  S o u rces: T he dependent variable is the log (value added) See the previous table 7.1 and 7.2.
The coefficients indicate the presence of scale economies in the modem industries 
and that these were exhausted in the traditional sectors. Moreover, scale economies in the 
traditional sectors disappear near the actual mean establishment size. In sharp contrast, in 
the modem sectors there is no flattening of returns to scale. In other words, there were 
persistent economies of scale.519
In brief, the econometric results about economies of scale reported above are clear. 
The modem sector, which had relatively large firms, had economies o f scale to exploit 
whereas the traditional sector, which had relatively small firms, had exhausted its scale 
economies. Note that this result gives strong support to the arguments advanced in the 
previous sections. Suppose that the Catalan industry consisted of two sectors: modem and 
traditional. The modem sector producing with factories, the traditional sector producing with 
the small establishments. Production in the traditional sector took place with the given 
technology and economies of scale were exhausted. Only the emergence of the modem
519 The same result was obtained by Sicsic (1994) for France.
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sector increased the optimal plant size and increased total factor productivity. In other wordst 
the substitution o f traditional by the modem sector was the roots of Catalan industrialisation. 
An important corollary can be derived. Regions without modem sectors (factories) could 
expect to remain underdeveloped (in industrial terms) since no scale economies were 
available in the traditional industries.
7.4. The Emergence of Factories in the Cotton Industry
The main objective of this section is to provide a check upon the above results using 
the survivor technique for optimal plant size.320 Thus, this section will give evidence on the 
evolution of average firm size and market structure in the cotton industry, for each of the 
three subsectors: cotton spinning, mixed-fabrics and cotton weaving, and calico printing. A 
secondary objective is to discuss the relation between the adoption of new technologies and 
the enlargement of plant size. In this sense, I will provide evidence that the emergence of 
factories was previous to the adoption o f new machinery but that the adoption of sources 
of central motive power (steam engines and water wheels) resulted in an intensification and 
acceleration o f this process.
The main argument o f the survivor technique is that in the long-run the optimum 
plant sizes not only survived but also increased their share of total industry value-added. 
This is because they adjusted better to market conditions. Therefore, the ultimate assumption 
of this technique is the existence of competition in markets. Obviously, it is difficult to 
believe that the Catalan and Spanish markets were perfectly competitive in the nineteenth 
century. For instance, one could argue that transport costs provoked the existence of local 
monopolies or oligopolies and that factors of production did not move easily among regions. 
For that reason, the survivor analysis may not only reflect the changes in the efficiency of 
firms, but also alterations in the level of competition. For example, improvements in 
transport and other market conditions could cause sharp discontinuities in the pattern of plant
320 See Stigler (1968) on the theoretical grounds. Two application of this principle to historical 
analysis are Lloyd-Jones and Le Roux (1980) and Atack (1987).
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structure.321 However, it is important not to exaggerate the degree of scepticism about the 
results of the survival technique. The existence of profit-maximising behaviour ensures the 
survival of lower-costs plants regardless of market structure. Moreover, the structure of the 
Spanish industries was, in that period, atomistic, which ensures a certain degree of 
competition and cost minimisation behaviour.
The cotton spinning industry completed the transition to central sources of power 
from 1832 to 1861. Thus, by 1861, practically all yam was produced in water or power- 
driven mills. Therefore, at first glance, it can be considered as a perfect example o f how the 
adoption of new technologies might influence the enlargement of establishment size.
The organisation of spinning production varied enormously in the proto-industry 
period in Catalonia; that is, from the last decades of the eighteenth century until 
approximately the 1830s. Many workers laboured individually at home (domestic 
production), or in family units, but others (and an increasing proportion over time) left home 
to perform their tasks in a centralised unit-of-production. However, according to the 
comments of the contemporaries, cotton spinning in Catalonia before the 1830s was 
overwhelming dominated by the putting-out system.322 There were few factories operating 
in the cotton industry before the 1830s. Alex Sánchez proved that, from 1793 to 1808, 
almost 28 new spinning factories were built. These factories being equipped with water 
frames or jennies horse or water-driven.323 Factories that were equipped with jennies 
averaged about 28 spinning machines whereas those equipped with water frames averaged 
about 14 machines. Since water frames employed about twice the workforce of jennies, 
which employed about 2.75 workers per machine,324 one can argue that the average size of 
the spinning factories was about 80 workers. So before the French war the factory system 
must have contained about 2,000 workers. For example, the biggest spinning mill, which 
was erected by Joan Vilaregut in Barcelona, contained 46 jennies powered by horses. So it 5213
521 See Atack (1987) for a discussion of this question.
522 Gutiérrez (1834)(1837), see also Thomson (1992).
523 Sánchez (1996), table 1, pp. 162.
324 These numbers are based on the information of Madoz (1846).
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probably employed about 125 workers.325 326These factories were capable of competing w ith 
the domestic units because most of them could survive until the arrival of the steam-driven 
factories.
The final requirement to show that the factory system expanded is to certify that 
there was an increase in average plant size over the period. Some evidence for such a 
general increase in the scale of manufacturing establishments is presented in table 7.4,526
Table 7.4 Establishment Size: Cotton Spinning. 1840-1861
1840 1850 1861
1. Yam Output (in Tons) 6,874 11,989 18,214
2. Spindles 1,159,979 803,936 766,960
3. Workers 30,081 18,259 11,999
4. Establishments 1,765 539 315
5. Yam Output per establishment 3.89 22.24 57.82
6. Spindles per establishment 657.21 1491.53 2434.79
7. Workers per establishment 17.04 33.88 38.09
N otes an d  S o u rces : Output: chapter 2. Establishm ents and Spindles: 1840: M adoz (1846); 1850: Jun ta de F ib ric a s  
(1850); and 1861: G im enez Guited (1862). In vertically  integrated m ills, it has only been com puted the sp inn ing  
section. In 1861, in vertically integrated mills the num ber o f w orkers is n o t divided by sections; consequently  to  
establish the num ber o f workers in spinning it has been m ultiplied each 1000 spindles p er 13.1. (See the d iscussion  
o f  this coeffic ien t in  chapter 4).
The most striking feature of this evidence is the spectacular increase in the average 
output per establishment. In the period from 1840 to 1850. average output per establishment 
increased 600 percent. From 1850 to 1861 the increase was 250 percent. This implies that 
in 1861 the average establishment produced about fifteen times the output of the average 
establishment in 1840. In other words, the average output per establishment grew five times 
faster than output (measured in tons). Moreover, the measure of output in tons understates 
the gains in product per establishment since in 1861 Catalan spinning mills produced finer
325 Sánchez (1996), table 1, pp. 162.
326 An alternative methodology would he to demonstrate that labourforce decreased in the typical 
putting-out zones. See, for example. Camps (1995) who furnishes this kind of evidence.
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counts. These counts weighed less but required more work.327 This increase in output per 
establishment was accompanied by a parallel decrease in the amount of spindles, 
establishments and workforce. However, from this table, one cannot establish the reasons 
for the increase in output per establishment. Whether it was caused by the crisis of the small 
establishments, especially those units in the domestic system. By an increase in the average 
size of the pool of factories already established in 1840. Or by both factors interacting 
together.
More insights into the problem can be obtained by focusing upon the data for 1850 
and 1861. Since for these two years data is available at establishment-level. Consequently, 
it is possible to develop table 7.5. Considering the changes in the size-distribution of cotton 
mills for the whole industry in Catalonia.
Table 7.5 The Changing Size-distribution of Establishments: Cotton Spinning, 1850-1861
1850 1861
1850 1861 W orkforce
Size Workers Mills Workers Milts Share Share
1-10 1,804 191 438 83 9.88 3.65
11-49 5,917 232 4,368 159 32.41 36.40
50-99 5,406 81 3382 50 29.61 28.19
100-199 3,654 29 2,090 18 20.01 17,42
200-299 1,166 5 725 3 6.39 6.04
300-399 312 1 1.71 0.00
4400 996 2 0.00 830
Total 18,259 539 11,999 315 100.00 100.00
N otes and S ources: Share is based on labour figures. 1850: Junta de Fábricas (1850); and 1861: G im énez Guited 
(1862). See notes to the previous table 7.4.
Table 7.5 gives a more detailed perspective on the situation of the industry by 1850 
and the changes in cotton spinning in the 1850s. It becomes obvious that in 1850 the 
industry was mainly a factory-based industry. The once dominant putting-out system was 
surpassed in only twenty years (from 1830 to 1850). It is also possible to appreciate that, 
from 1850 to 1861, at all establishment-size levels, there was a reduction in the number of 527
527 The chapter 9 discusses the relevance of the quality choice.
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establishments and workers. Perhaps most interesting, however, it is to look at the parallel 
reduction of the share of the smallest units-of-production (1-10 workers) and the increase 
o f the biggest mills (more than 200 workers). Decentralised units-of-production, which a re  
represented by the former category. Already practically disappeared in eleven years. 
Simultaneously, the biggest firms practically doubled their share (from about 8 percent to  
about 14 percent). Given the short span of years (11) between the two figures the results a re  
quite spectacular. One can conclude that it is likely that the increase in the average size o f  
cotton spinning factories from 1840 to 1861 was accomplished through two phenomena 
interacting together. The elimination of the putting-out system and the development of new  
large firms. Obviously, both phenomena show the presence of economies of scale and 
increasing competition in the markets.
It is also interesting to debate the relation between centralized sources of energy and 
the emergence of the factory system. In effect, it could be claimed that the rapidly growing 
number of spinning factories in the 1840s was only the natural consequence of the adoption 
of the central sources of motive power (steam engines and water wheels). The next table 
tries to test this argument. The establishment data from the cotton industry's census o f  
1850s28 contains the basic information needed to compute table 7.6. This source provides 
reports, at the establishment level, o f the type of machinery used, the number of employees, 
and the power source. However, unfortunately, the source does not contain, at establishment 
level, information on output and production costs and, therefore, it cannot be employed to  
compute establishment-based production functions.
528 Junta de Fabricas (1850).
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Table 7.6 Establishment Size and Power Source: Cotton Spinning, 1850
Workers Mills Mainly powered by
Size number percent number percent Hand Horses Water Steam
1-10 1,804 9.9 191 35.4 180 7 1 3
11-49 5,917 32.4 232 43.0 59 68 36 69
50-99 5,406 29.6 81 15.1 3 3 22 53
100-199 3.654 20.0 29 5.5 1 2 7 19
200-299 1,166 6.4 5 0.9 5
300 or more 312 1.7 1 02 1
Total 18,259 100.0 539 100.0 243 80 66 150
N otes an d  S ources: Comisión de Fábricas (1850). In vertically integrated mills, it has only been com puted the 
spinning section. Several water driven m ills had, for ancillary tasks, a sm all steam  engine.
Table 7.6 shows that in 1850 the distribution of the different power sources among 
the different size groups was not uneven. Small-size establishments were mainly hand* 
driven, and mills were usually horse, water or steam driven. It is likely that the small water 
or steam driven establishments shared their building and central motive power with other 
mills. More than 50 percent of labourforce and units-of-production were concentrated in the 
medium-size segment (from 11 to 99 workers). This segment was characterised by the 
dominance of central motive power. Finally, the most marked association between size and 
power source is found in the big mills (200 workers or more). These were all steam- 
powered. Consequently, one cannot deny the fact that water and power-driven firms tended 
to be larger than hand-driven factories. Confirming that there were more scale economies 
in the power and water-driven factories than in the hand-driven factories. For example, the 
use of central sources of motive power simplified the division-of-labour and the control 
tasks. Because in some operations the speed of work could now controlled directly by 
regulating the machinery speed.329
There were several strong differences between the technologies in cotton spinning, 
mixed-fabrics and cotton weaving. In particular, the triumph of the steam engine and water 
wheels in cotton weaving was slower than in cotton spinning. The main reason was that the
329 See, for example, Cohen (1985)(1990) or Hubeiman (1996). Contemporary references at Urc 
(1836), Arau (1855), and Calvet (1857).
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powerlooms consumed a large amount of coal, required many horsepower to be installed, 
and demanded consistent yam quality. This quality was only available after spinning w as 
mechanised. Furthermore, during the period, powerlooms could not be efficiently used to  
produce fine cotton cloth and mixed fabrics.530 It should also be noted that the division o f  
labour in cotton weaving was less attractive than in cotton spinning. The process o f 
transforming the raw cotton into yam was divided into many single operations and each 
operation was performed by specialised workers.531 This contrasts with cotton weaving, 
where the number of different operations production could be divided into was relatively 
low. Handweavers practically controlled the whole phase since they required almost no 
assistance. The introduction of the powerlooms also served to reinforce this path since some 
single operations, which were performed by assistants, were done directly by the 
powerloom.532
There seem to be two further implications of these differences. First, the increasing 
size of cotton weaving establishments might be due more to 'pure1 transaction costs than the 
economies associated with the division-of-labour. Certainly, one could expect that there were 
some gains in the concentration of cloth production. In terms of standardisation of output, 
savings in inventories and transport costs, co-ordination benefits and, obviously, economies 
of speed. Second, establishment size increases might not necessarily be associated with the 
diffusion of the new technologies since new technologies were not widespread in weaving 
until the 1850s.
Table 7.7 assembles evidence on the evolution of the establishment size in cotton 
weaving in Catalonia from 1840 to 1861. As in cotton spinning, there is no a clear 
correlation between increases in average output per establishment and the number of workers 
and looms per establishment. Thus, from 1840 to 1860, the number of workers and looms 
per establishment remained quite constant. The only exception being 1850 when the number
530 VonTunzelmann (1978) see also Arau (1855).
531 For a full description of the process and a description of skills associated with each operation 
see chapter 6.
532 Cerda (1968).
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of workers experienced a sharp increase. This contrasts with the output per establishment, 
which increased 340 percent. Note that, by any measure, the average size in weaving was 
smaller than in spinning.
Table 7.7 Establishment Size: Mixed-fabrics and Cotton Weaving, 1840-1861
1840 1850 1861
1. Cloth output (Tons) 6.810 12.279 18,624
2. Looms 25,620 28.979 22,798
3. Workers 40364 54,082 29,251
4. Establishments 2314 2301 2,021
5. Output per establishment 2.71 4.91 9.22
6. Looms per establishment 10.19 1139 11.28
7. Workers per establishment 16.05 21.62 14.47
Notes an d  S ou rces: 1840: Madoz (1846); 1850: Junta de Fábricas (1850); and 1861: G im enez G uiied  (1862). In 
vertically integrated mills, it has only been computed the weaving section. To estimate the num ber o f  w orkers in 
that section the num ber of powerlooms has been multiplied by one and the number of handloom s by  1.5.
Evidently, from this table one cannot infer if the increase in the average output per 
establishment was due to the crisis in the decentralised forms of organisation o r whether 
there were other reasons such as an increase in the average size of the factories. The 
evidence on the size distribution of the weaving establishments for 1850 and 1861 will help 
to discuss this question.
Table 7,8 The Changing Size-distribution of Establishments: 
Mixed-fabrics and Cotton Weaving, 1850-1861
1850 1861
1850 1861 Workers
Size Workers Mills Workers Mills Share Share
1-10 10353 1352 4326 1319 19.26 15.47
11-49 16392 666 8,669 355 29.73 29.64
50-99 13,940 202 6343 97 25.44 2237
100-199 8,132 61 4,633 34 14.84 15.84
200-299 3386 14 2,667 12 6.00 9.12
300-399 957 3 340 1 1.75 1.16
+400 1,642 3 1,873 3 3.00 6.40
Total 54,802 2301 29351 2.021 100.00 100.00
N otes an d  S ou rces: 1850: Junta de Fábricas (1850); and 1861: Giménez G uited (1862).
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The resemblance with the result for cotton spinning is evident. During this period 
many mills disappeared from the market and there were changes in the size distribution o f 
the industry at the top and the bottom of the range. Decentralised production (small 
establishments) decreased their share by about one-fourth. Simultaneously, the biggest 
establishments (more than 200 workers) increased their share by about 50 percent (from 
about 11 percent to about 17 percent). Note, also, that the reduced share of putting-out 
system in 1850 (only employing about one-fifth of the total number of workers) suggests 
that putting-out system was in its final crisis at that time. Note that this result supports 
Enriqueta Camps* view: that the putting-out districts specialised in cotton weaving lost 
population during this period.533
One could also study the relation between the emergence of the factory system in 
weaving and the irruption of the central sources of motive power. In Catalonia, central- 
driven establishments in weaving could not efficiently adopt water as a source of power until 
the advent of the turbine in the mid 1850s. This was because of the large power 
requirements of the powerlooms.534 Consequently, in 1850 the only source of central motive 
power in weaving was steam engines.
Table 7.9 Establishment Size and Power Source: 
Mixed-fabrics and Cotton Weaving, 1850-1861
Size Workers Percent
1-10 10,553 19.26
1M 9 16,292 29.73
50-99 13,940 25.44
100-199 8,132 14.84
200-299 3,286 6.00
300-399 957 1.75
+400 1,642 3.00
Total 54,802 100.00
hand steam
Mills Percent driven driven
1,519 61.55 1319 0
666 26.99 657 9
202 8.18 182 20
61 2.47 48 13
14 037 12 2
3 0.12 2 1
3 0.12 1 2
2,468 100.00 2,421 47
N otes and S o u rc e s : Junta de F ábricas (1850).
5,3 Camps (1995).
5M Nadal (1992b).
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At first glance, this table reveals two main issues. First, there are some important 
weaving factories which are hand-driven. More to the point, these hand-driven factories 
constituted the core of the industry and employed more than half the workforce. On the 
other hand, a small number o f weaving mills were power-driven. Generally, these mills were 
bigger than hand-driven mills, which could suggest the presence of some scale-economies 
in the adoption of powerlooms. Note also that it seems that a minimum efficient scale 
existed for powerlooms. Since no small establishment (1-10 workers) used that kind of 
machinery.
For many different reasons, cotton printing was an extraordinary industry within the 
Catalan context of the eighteenth century. Since its beginnings, the industry was 
concentrated in Barcelona.335 Moreover, the industry was based on centralised units of 
production. Despite having several managerial structures, from capitalistic firms to artisans' 
co-operatives.336 Thus, the typical unit of production was formed by several workteams, 
which were composed of several masters, artisans and apprentices, and labourers. 
Consequently, the industry was established on the basis of medium-large establishments and 
extensive division of labour.337 *In the workteams the workforce was highly skilled and 
practically all male. Despite the presence of skilled artisans the industry escaped the control 
of guilds and could be considered pioneer in the adoption of capitalist forms of
• • < 1 florganisation.
The choice of centralised forms of production since the beginnings of calico printing 
is really simple to explain in the framework of the transaction costs theory. The production 
of calicoes was high in asset specificity.339 Each factory tried to produce homogeneous 
products with had homogeneous colours and drawings. In this situation knowledge and 
experience played a major role in the market position of the firms. The bleaching of colours
535 Thomson (1992).
336 Thomson (1992).
337 See Grau and López (1975), Thomson (1992) and Sánchez (1989)(1992).
538 Thomson (1992).
539 See, on this argument, Williamson (1986) and section 7.2.
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and the process of printing was generally based on the knowledge of secret formulas and 
procedures that were difficult to transmit.540 Consequently, old calico establishments 
possessed some sort of tacit knowledge that could not easily be acquired by the new entrants 
in the trade. Furthermore, the high price of raw materials, in particular natural inks, gave 
incentives to avoid sub-contracting and outworking. Since pilfering would be very costly for 
the company.
However, calico printing was scarcely mechanised before the 1830s because few  
establishments had adopted the new British and French machinery.541 Over the next thirty 
years, the process of adoption of the new machinery in calico printing was as slow as it was 
in cotton weaving. Thus, by the 1860s, many hand-driven workshops and factories survived. 
It is necessary to underline that the new machinery in calico printing had large consequences 
for the skills of the labour force. In the hand-driven calico factories the quality of the final 
product was in the hands of the artisans. In particular, the homogeneity of colours and the 
perfect reproduction of drawings were a question of skills and experience. In sharp contrast, 
the new machinery simplified the process of printing and the skills required to obtain 
homogeneous coloration. With the new machines, colours were mixed before the process o f 
printing and the drawings were stamped with metal plates. Thus, colours and drawings were 
more uniform and could be easily reproduced. Workers did not participate in the process but 
simply controlled the machines. One chemist with a few (unskilled) assistants prepared the 
colours for the whole factory.542 In other words, the new machinery transformed the highly 
skilled printers into unskilled workers. Cerdâ states that the old skilled printers were 
converted into simple labourers by the new printing machines.543
540 Thomson (1992).
541 On the mechanisation of calico printing see Turnbull (1951) and Nadal and Tafunell (1992).
542 A description of a calico factory is available in Gimenez Guited (1862).
543 Cerda (1968).
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Table 7.10 Establishment Size: Calico Printing, 1840*1861
1840 1850 1861
1. O utput (tons o f  prim ed cloth) 2.662 6.413 8352
2. Workers 3,223 2368 n.a.
3. Establishm ents 62 57 75
4. O utput per establishm ent 42.94 112-51 114.02
5. W orkers per establishm ent 51.98 4134 n.a.
N otesand  Sources: O utput see chapter 2. Workers and Establishments: 1840: Madoz (1846): 1850 Junta de F ibricas 
(1850); and 1861: G im enez Guited (1862).
According to table 7.10, it seems that these changes in machinery in the printing 
industry were accompanied by changes in the average firm size. But smaller changes than 
in cotton spinning and weaving. In the 1840s the firm size doubled whereas in the 1850s 
the average firm size remained quite constant.
At this point, readers should recognise that there is abundant evidence of increasing 
returns to scale in the modem industries in Catalonia. It has been proved that early 
industrialisation resulted in the demise of the putting-out system and other forms of 
decentralised production. The equilibrium of advantages between the two modes of 
production was undoubtedly sensitive to a range of factors. Note that putting-out offered 
workers the convenience of choosing their hours of work and, hence, to combine industrial 
production with household or agrarian activities. Instead the centralised production provided 
more opportunities for gains in productivity through division and intensification of labour. 
As well as economies in the use of fixed capital and inventories. However it is clear that 
the changes in these factors increasingly favoured the adoption of factory.
7.5. Establishment Size in Catalonia: a Comparison with the Rest of Spain
In the past two sections I assembled some quantitative evidence on the relation 
between changes in establishment size and scale economies and efficiency gains. Two 
corollaries can be derived from the results obtained above: (1) regions with the largest 
establishments must have benefited more from higher productivity than zones with smaller 
establishments, (2) regions with modem industries, which had some scale economies to
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exploit, could benefit from further efficiency gains. It is obvious that these two corollaries 
have profound implications for our understanding of the differences in regional 
industrialisation in Spain. More insight on this aspect can be obtained by comparing 
Catalonia with the rest of Spain. To do so, I present evidence on the relative average size 
of Catalan and Spanish firms.
Regional estimates of the average number of employees per establishment in 1861 
are presented in table 7.11. They support the view that in almost all industries the average 
size of establishments in Catalonia was larger than the average of the Spanish regions. This 
pattern holds over mechanised industries such as silk textiles, as well as nonmechanised ones 
such as leather, and is representative of the manufacturing sector in general. Only in three 
industries, namely olive oil refining, the paper industry and the metal industry, was Catalan 
average firm size below the Spanish average (in the case of cotton textiles the figures o f  
Catalonia are also lower but since it dominated the industry, the results would be not 
significant). Averaging across all industries, Catalan establishments employed twice as many 
workers as Spanish establishments. It should be noted that even in industries where 
Catalonia did not dominate the Spanish panorama, such as the linen industry, the average 
Catalan establishment was larger than the Spanish average.
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Table 7.11 Establishment Size: Spanish Manufacturing. 1861
Cat And Ebro Cant Med NCa Sea Spain
Coik manufacturing 9.7 8.6 9.4 9.7
Cotton textiles 16.0 113 16.0 34.8 4.1 8.8 16.2
Leather industiy 63 3.1 3.9 4.1 4.9 93 3.8 5.7
Linen and Flax textiles 5.0 53 63 2.6 1.8 2.8 3.4 4.4
Metal industiy 23.0 64.8 12.9 32.1 20.4 23.9 10.9 25.9
Mixed Fabrics textiles 24.1 24.1
Olive Oil refining 1.6 23 2.4 2.0 2.4 1.8 2.9 2.6
Paper industiy 123 31.8 5.8 18.7 13.9 363 12.9 16.4
Silk textiles 26.1 8.8 39.0 6.2 13 11.9 20.4
Soap industiy 23 1.7 6.1 2.1 2.0 13 2.2
Liquors industiy 2.6 2.4 23 3.0 2.6 2.0 1.6 2.6
Wheat industiy 23 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.9 13 1.7 1.9
Wool textiles 26.7 11.7 15.1 15.4 213 6.4 8.9 15.5
Average 10.5 3.1 4.5 7.7 4.3 2.6 2.6 5.5
Notes an d  S ou rces: Numbers subject to rounding errors. C at (Catatonia) com prises the Province o f  Barcelona, 
Gerona, Lérida and Tanagona. A nd (A ndalusia) comprises the provinces o f Almería, C ádiz, Córdoba, Granada, 
Málaga, H uelva, Jaén and Sevilla. Ebro (Ebro) comprises the provinces o f  H uesca. Logroño, Teruel and Zaragoza. 
Can (C antabric) com prises the provinces o f  Asturias, La Coruña, Lugo, O rense, Pontevedra and Santander. Med 
(M editerranean) com prises the provinces o f A licante, Baleares, Castellón,M urcia and Valencia. NCa (N orth Castilia) 
com prises the provinces o f Avila, Burgos, L eón, Patencia, Salam anca, Segoria, Soria, Valladolid and Zam ora. SCa 
(South Castilia) com prises the provinces o f  A lbacete, Badajoz, Caceres, C iudad Real, C uenca, G uadalajara, Madrid 
and Toledo. Finally, note that Spain 's figures also  comprise the figures corresponding to the tax-exem pt provinces 
o f  A lava, G uipúzcoa. N avane and V izcaya. T hese figures w ere com puted from the industry data com piled from 
G im enez Guited (1862). The figures presented refer to the num ber o f  em ployees, with m en, women and children 
receiving equal w eight. Empty celts correspond to industries w hich w ere no t in these regions.
However, there are some puzzling results that require further discussion. In particular, 
the case of the metal industry, where the average employee per establishment in Catalonia 
was well below the Spanish average, merits some attention. Basically, this result is 
consequence of the heterogeneity of the metal industry.544 The Catalan metal industry was 
mainly composed of machinery constructors whereas in the rest of Spain iron and other 
metals foundries predominated. Since there was a minimum operational size for foundries, 
(about 25 workers) whereas in engineering there was not, average size tended to be larger 
in regions where foundries predominated. However, it should be underlined that engineering
544 Gimenez Guited (1862).
2 2 0 The Early Phase o f Catalan Industrialisation (1830-1861 )
firms in Catalonia were larger than in the rest of Spain.
Although the finding that the average size of most manufacturing industries in  
Catalonia was larger than in the rest of Spain is well supported, this by itself does not im ply  
that relatively more large establishments were located in Catalonia than in the rest of th e  
country. For instance, it could be that Catalonia possessed many units-of-production o n ly  
slightly above the Spanish average firm size but not an appreciable amount of the largest 
ones. The issue is relatively important since some authors have argued the adoption o f  
organisational innovations happened after a certain size threshold. For instance, Jerem y 
Atack argues that 'specialization [of labour] cannot be practised extensively unless a mill h ad  
more than twenty-five workers.'545 Unfortunately, the datasource makes it impossible to  
establish a threshold size of twenty-five workers. As mentioned above, in many provinces 
Gimenez Guited's guide only separately enumerated the most important (largest) industries. 
A detailed observation of the data allowed me to establish that only establishments w ith  
about 50 workers were recorded separately in all provinces and industries. For that reason, 
I decided to estimate the total and the proportion of the labourforce who were employed in  
establishments with 50 or more employees; a certain large threshold size. The results of th a t 
estimation are presented in table 7.12.
545 Atack (1987), p. 288.
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Table 7.12 Workers in Establishments of Fifty or More Workers: 
Spanish Manufacturing, 1861
Cat And Ebro Can Med NCa SCa Sample
(1) Employees that were employed in establishments of 50 or more workers
Cork manufacturing 585 0 585
Cotton textiles 24,090 770 0 634 456 790 26,740
Leather industry 400 57 0 0 0 1372 0 1,829
Linen and Flax textiles 228 0 285 0 0 52 0 565
Metal industry 480 2,133 0 2306 0 620 0 5,739
Mixed Fabrics textiles 4,736 4,736
Paper industry 504 64 0 60 163 0 0 791
Silk textiles 1,815 0 0 1343 0 0 3,058
Wool textiles 4,227 52 1306 115 919 354 288 7,261
Total 37,065 3,076 1,591 3,315 2,781 3,188 288 51304
(2) Share (percent) of all employees who were employed in establishments of 50 or more worker?
Cork manufacturing 12.95 0.00 0.00 1238
Cotton textiles 61.26 78.01 0.00 95.92 19,15 66.16 60.01
Leather industry 28.33 7.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 6335 0.00 28.10
Linen and Flax textiles 7.86 0.00 39.42 0.00 0.00 1235 0.00 10.09
Metal industry 32.06 86.57 0.00 56.92 0.00 6836 0.00 5438
Mixed Fabrics textiles 79.78 79.78
Paper industry 24.45 8.74 0.00 5337 11.40 0.00 0,00 15.11
Silk textiles 62.03 0.00 0.00 27.22 0.00 0.00 3630
Wool textiles 43.46 3.15 40.18 53.49 25.79 10.74 19.33 3131
Total for all industries 48.82 14.14 22.30 46.25 12.81 21.97 2.30 31.92
N otes an d  S ou rces: See the previous table 7 .11. Industries w ithout establishm ents w ith SO o r more w orkers are 
not represented in the table. The to tal does no t com prise the Provinces o f  N avarre , Alava, G uipúzcoa and V izcaya.
This data provides a solid empirical confirmation of the argument advanced above. 
In all industries, except the linen and the metal industries, the proportion of workers in 
establishments with 50 or more workers is larger in Catalonia than in Spain. Basically, the 
results from table 7.12 reinforce the results of table 7.10. In particular, it should be noted 
that only one region (the Mediterranean region) does not maintain the same position in the 
two tables. It is also interesting to note the large share of the biggest establishments within 
the Catalan industry (about half the overall employment). Also remarkable is the case of 
mixed-fabrics textiles, an industry which had not experienced the transition to the steam- 
driven factories where about 80 percent of the workforce was in establishments of 50 or 
more workers..
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A second question relates to the uneven distribution of the modem and traditional 
industries among the different regions. It is clear from the previous discussion that regions 
with modem industries benefited from scale economies. Whereas regions with a traditional 
manufacturing sector could expect output and productivity stagnation. The next table 
assembles data on this aspect:
Table 7.13 The Importance of the Modem Industries: Spanish Manufacturing, 1861
Cat And Ebro Can Med NCa SCa Sample
(1) Distribution of the value added between modem and traditional industries (percent)
Modem 89.17 42.31 55.82 85.10 67.00 38.96 31.53 71.87
Traditional 10.83 57.69 44.18 14.90 33.00 61.04 68.47 28.13
(2) Share (percent) of each region in the overall value-added
Modem 63.93 6.57 2.65 8.84 10.40 4.76 2.85 100.00
Traditional 19.84 22.88 537 3.96 13.09 19.04 15.82 100.00
Total 51.53 11.16 3.42 7.47 11.16 8.78 6.50 100.00
N otes an d  S o u rces: See the previous table 7.11. The total figures for Spain are based on  the sam ple o f G im enez 
G uited (1862), w hich is biased in favour o f  the m odem  industries. T he total does not com prise the Provinces o f  
N avarre, A lava, G uipuzcoa and V izcaya.
Despite the fact that the datasource is biased in favour of the modem industries, 
because many traditional industries were not recorded,546 the results emanating from the table 
are striking. Catalonia not only is the region that accumulated a major proportion of its 
value-added in the modem industries but is also the region that dominated the modem 
sectors. For instance, about 64 percent of the value-added of the modem industries was 
produced in Catalonia. A structure comparable with Catalonia can only be found in the 
Cantabric region, but that region had a very small share in total manufacturing value-added.
546 For instance, I proved in chapter 2 that modem industries were about 50 percent of Catalan 
manufacturing value-added whereas in the sample they represented about 90 percent.
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7.6 Why Were Manufacturing Establishments Larger in Catalonia Than in Other 
Spanish Regions?
It was show earlier that the establishment sizes in Catalonia were quite different from 
the rest of Spain. It was also proved that this had strong consequences for further increases 
in manufacturing productivity. In other words, this appears to be an important issue for 
understanding the emergence of the income differences among the Spanish regions and why 
some regions (in particular, Catalonia) were more successful than others in industrialisation. 
Measuring the effects of establishment size at one point in time will certainly not tell us 
why some regions had larger establishments than others. The relevant question from the 
historian's point of view. Obviously, I will not try to resolve the question definitively, but 
some hypotheses will be discussed in the following pages.
Five different hypotheses can be advanced to explain this phenomenon. First, one can 
interpret the situation in terms of entrepreneurial failure. Industrialisation and the 
enlargement of establishments took place in Catalonia rather than the rest of Spain because 
the number or quality of available entrepreneurs was lower. The implicit assumption of this 
argument is that there were substantial economies of scale in plants located in the 
underdeveloped regions. However, it seems difficult, given the available evidence, to 
interpret the situation of the industry in some regions only in terms of entrepreneurial 
failure.547 548The fact is that in regions where the traditional industry predominated they had 
reached their efficiency limit; that is, the point where economies of scale vanish.348 In other 
words, entrepreneurs had efficiently allocated their resources. Of course, it could be argued 
that entrepreneurs failed since they did not invest in the modem industries when factories 
were more efficient. Although I will show this is also a debatable argument.
One could also argue that there was some kind of human capital constraint on the
547 The leading proponent of the entrepreneurial backwardness thesis is Gabriel Tortella. See, for 
example, Toitella (1994fe).
548 Note that in France, see Sicsic (1994), and in the United States, Atack (1977) and Sokoloff 
(1984a) there were still economies of scale in traditional, small-scale manufacturing.
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development of large factories. In chapter 6 ,1 proved that Catalonia enjoyed a large supply 
of skilled artisans who could be easily transformed into engineers for the new power-driven 
factories. Consequently, regions without this stock of skilled artisans encountered many 
problems in adopting large mechanised factories. Although this explains pan of the story, 
it does not cover the whole story. Since it explains why Catalonia had large mechanised 
factories but does not explain why non-mechanised establishments were larger in Catalonia 
than in the rest of Spain.
The presence of large establishments could also be linked to the superabundance of 
labour.549 According to this line of reasoning, regions that experienced the proto-industry had 
an advantage in developing large manufacturing establishments. However, Jeremy Atack 
recently argued that this could not be the case. He argues that to the extent that putting-out 
was successful, it was an impediment to the spread of the factory as it limited the scope of 
the market and the desirability o f further investments. Furthermore, artisans were more 
efficient than factories in crisis periods since they could switch to part-time work or 
temporary close shop. Whereas the factories could not because they had to amortise the 
large investment in fixed capital.550 Similarly, to compete with the factories, artisans and 
putting-out workers could squeeze their wages.551
Claudia Goldin and Kenneth Sokoloff relate the development of the factory in the 
United States with the relative availability of women and children for manufacturing in some 
regions.552 They argue that the new technologies associated with the diffusion of the factories 
were intensive in the use of women and children. Consequently, one expects that regions 
with larger establishments also employed more women and children in manufacturing than 
regions with smaller establishments. Table 7.14 tries to test this argument for Spain.
549 See, Mendels (1972) and Mokyr (1974)(1976) on the argument of the superabundance of 
labour as a consequence of the proto-industiy.
550 Atack (1987), pp. 325-326.
551 Lyons (1989).
552 Goldin and Sokoloff (1982)(1984) and see also Sokoloff (1984a).
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Table 7.14 Women and Child Workers: Spanish Manufacturing, 1861
Cat A n d E b r o C a n t M e d NCa S C a S p a in
(1) Percentage of employees that were women
Cotton 41.09 42.55 0.00 26.17 11.68 39.95 3930
Paper 23.77 42.90 40.95 26.79 30.42 28.05 22.99 3034
Silk 17.05 1337 10.26 2751 0.00 21.29 22.85
Wool 1538 1656 21.48 16.74 1030 1927 1523 16.26
Total of all 2456 4.94 1050 333 10.76 850 2.93 16.75
industries
(2) Percentage of employees that were children
Cotton 8.89 8.41 18.75 15.89 5.04 4.69 8.95
Paper 2159 11.07 952 2321 1958 19.08 2632 19.23
Silk 3.69 2.40 0.00 8.10 0.00 1939 6.79
Wool 2.00 655 634 3.72 836 1220 6.85 6.04
Total of all 559 131 3.07 1.94 4.92 3.73 1.98 4.66
industries
Notes and  S ou rces: See the previous table 8 .10. Numbers subject to  rounding eirois.Included only the industries 
with female and/or children labourforce. It is likely that cork and m ixed-fabrics industry em ployed fem ale and 
children labourforce bu t the source d id  not furnish that infoim ation.
The results of table 7.14 give some support to the argument advanced above because 
Catalonia, the region with the largest establishment average size, employed relatively more 
women and children than the other Spanish regions. Moreover, it is interesting to note that 
there are some patterns among industries in the amount of women and children employed. 
For instance, women and children appear to be relatively more important in cotton textiles 
and the paper industry than in the rest. However, on closer inspection, one can see that the 
Catalan pattern cannot be used to explain establishment size in the rest of Spain. In 
particular, the Mediterranean and North Castilia regions, which had relatively small 
establishments, employed more women and children than the Cantabrie region. Which had 
larger establishments than the Mediterranean and North Castilia regions. Furthermore, it was 
shown in chapter 4 that the emergence of the new technologies in the 1840s and 1850s did 
not result in an increase in the female and child labourforce in Catalonia. In contrast, the 
share of women and children with respect to men decreased in that period.
Finally, the most convincing explanation for the absence of large establishments is 
related to the extent of markets. Thus, regions where population was comparatively sparse, 
distances were great, means of transport poor, and/or there was little demand for
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manufactured goods discouraged large-scale manufacturing. The reason is that local markets 
were too small to sustain industry on a scale large enough to compete with outsiders. Who 
could draw upon wider markets.353 The industries could survive in these regions as positive 
transport costs created protected markets for high-cost producers. In other words, when the 
cost of transport exceeded the production cost differential between low and high cost 
producers, the latter could survive.
The argument can be put in another way. According to the Heckser-Ohlin theorem 
regions labour-intensive regions specialised in labour intensive production. Whereas land­
intensive regions specialised in land-intensive production. Thus, manufacturing might 
predominate in the relatively labour-intensive regions. Where manufacturing predominated 
the establishment tended to be larger. Therefore, the important variable is population density. 
The next table analyses this argument:
Table 7.15 Establishment Size and Population Density: Spanish Manufacturing, 1860
Average
establishment
Catalonia 10.5
Cantabrie 7.7
Ebro region 4.5
Mediterranean 4.3
Andalusia 3.1
North Castilia 2.6
South Castilia 2.6
Population km2 Density
(thousands) (hab per km2)
1652.3 31930 51.75
2515.8 45288 55.55
1054.4 52703 20.01
1890.4 39636 47.69
2927.4 87268 33.54
2083.1 94147 22.13
2386.2 128823 18.52
N otes and Sources: See table 7.11. A verage firm size from tab le  7.11; population  for 1857 are draw n from Nicolau 
(1989). table 2 .20. p. 80.
The results of table 7.15 are striking. The range of average firm size corresponds to 
the range of population density. However, there are some puzzling results that require further 
discussion. The relative low density of Catalonia is due to the inclusion of the province of 
Lleida, a province with few industries within the region. Eliminating this province from the 
region, the density grows to 83 habitants per Km2; that is, the density that one can expect
553 See, for example, the French debate in Sicsic (1994) or the U.S. debate in Tchakerian (1994).
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due to the largest average firm size of Catalonia. More puzzling is, however, the figure for 
the Ebro region. This can be explained by two facts. Firstly, the concentration of the 
industry in a few zones in that region which produce the overall densities give a very poor 
picture of the situation. Secondly, the existence of good communication with the relatively 
industrialised regions, such as Catalonia. This caused problems for the inefficient firms in 
the Ebro region.
8.8. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter offers a broad perspective on the emergence of the factory system in 
Catalan industrialisation. It also provides a framework for understanding the productivity 
effects of that emergence. The increase in the establishment size seems to have been helped 
by persistent, but small, productivity gains over more traditional production methods. These 
gains are similar to those estimated by other authors for the United States and France.
During early industrialisation, manufacturing by centralised plants grew rapidly, and 
began to displace putting-out and small workshops even before the widespread diffusion of 
the water and steam-driven machinery. This sharply depressed the earnings of domestic 
workers and virtually eliminated the old production system. This analysis accounts for this 
pattern of development by relating the expansion of centralised manufacture to its efficiency 
superiority, the size of markets for manufacturing goods and the existence of an industrial 
workforce.
Furthermore, this chapter also provides a comparative perspective of why early 
Catalan industrial development was characterised by the development of the largest, in 
Spanish terms, manufacturing plants. The development of the industry in Catalonia has 
relevance for our understanding of the causes of the industrial backwardness of other 
Spanish regions. The preliminary results obtained seems to indicate that Catalonia benefited: 
(1) from the presence of skilled labour; (2) from some sort of labour-abundance compared 
to other Spanish regions were there was abundance of land-abundant.
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Chapter 8
The Vertical Integration of the Cotton Industry
This chapter will discuss the vertical integration of cotton spinning and weaving in 
Catalonia during the 1840s and 1850$. Here, I show that this phenomenon was very 
important for the consolidation of this industry. 1 argue that vertical integration helped the 
adoption o f the new machinery» such as the self-acting mule and the powerloom. Assets with 
a high degree of asset specificity. Moreover, this vertical integration served to save 
transaction costs, to obtain scale economies, and to organise the production of cotton goods 
in Catalonia more efficiently.
In the context of the dissertation, this chapter serves to explain what kind of 
innovation in business institutions accompanied the development of the cotton industry after 
1840. Furthermore, it should be underlined that the business institutions that were 
established in this period (i.e., the vertically integrated mills) dominated the sector for many 
years, probably until the crisis of the cotton industry in the 1980s. In a more broad context, 
the arguments developed in this chapter can be inserted into the debate on the role of 
vertical integration into the development of modem industries. Several authors have linked 
the demise of Lancashire's cotton industry with a lack of vertical integration. They argue that 
the superiority of the U.S. cotton firms over their British counterparts was due to the 
massive adoption o f vertical integration in the United States.554 Although not the main issue, 
the results of this chapter could serve to throw light on that debate. In particular, I show that 
market failures explain vertical integration. Consequently, regions with efficient markets for 354
354 See a review of the debate in Mass and Lazonick (1990).
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intermediate inputs would not need to develop vertically integrated firms to efficiently 
develop their cotton industry.
8.1. Introduction
Since there is more than one definition of vertical integration, it seems convenient 
to clarify how this term should be interpreted throughout the chapter. Economists 
traditionally defined vertical integration as the elimination of trade or contractual exchanges 
within the borders of the firm.355 By contrast, engineers consider that vertical integration 
takes place in successive phases within the same technological core.356 I use here the 
economic definition and not the technological one. Consequently vertical integration may 
comprise not only successive production phases. But also the trade and commerce of inputs, 
intermediate, and final goods, as well as their transport and financing. Note that, due to 
practical reasons and the constraint of the available empirical evidence, it was assumed that 
the firm that possesses machinery of one production phase, is vertically integrated in that 
phase. However, this is not completely true since full vertical integration only takes place 
when the firm has not bought goods that it can produce.357
Jordi Maluquer has argued that in the Catalan cotton industry a kind of 'industrial 
district' predominated. Where some capitalists controlled the production and where firms co­
operated.53* He argues that the demand for textile goods in Spain, which was very volatile, 
provoked sub-contracting and that out-working was widespread. In other words, large-scale 
firms were not competitive. The industry was organised hierarchically since some capitalists 56*8
555 Perry (1989), p. 185.
556 Intuitively, the technological core is composed of the successive phases of technologically 
similar production. In particular, in the cotton spinning and weaving industry the technological core 
is foimed by the process of production with mechanical cards, self-acting mules and powerlooms.
357 Furthermore, it is very difficult to find a firm that contains all phases of production in the 
cotton industry. Therefore I will circumscribe my analysis to-the vertical integration of the three 
successive industrial phases (spinning, weaving and finishing). Anyway, many Catalan cotton firms 
integrated into their structure other production and ancillary processes such as machinery 
workshops, wholesale warehouses and shops.
558 Maluquer de Motes (1976)(1998).
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controlled large putting-out and sub-contracting webs. According to Maluquer, this 
hierarchical structure served to avoid the fluctuations in the demand for cotton goods. At the 
peaks of the business cycle capitalists increased the number of sub-contractors, whereas the 
contrary held in the trough years. Note that, with this system, entrepreneurs were also able 
to maintain a low wage level. Finally, he argues that this system was very positive and 
efficient since it eased the development of the industry, the adoption of the new machinery, 
and did not reduce competition among firms.
Maluquer's arguments are debatable. First, the existence of an industrial district is 
difficult to document. It is true that Catalan industry developed some forms of collaboration 
and common institutions but it seems difficult that these few institutions were capable of 
organising a 'true' industrial district, like the Italian style. An industrial district requires that 
firms collaborate in the acquisition of technology and financing. There are contradictory 
examples to that type of collaboration in Catalonia. By the 1860s, some mutual banks were 
established to overcome the absence of industrial credit from the banking system,53’ The 
experience of these mutual banks was unsuccessful and short-lived. Another example of 
collaboration was the employers' organisation. Although, it should be noted that many 
Catalan industrialists, especially those devoted to mixed fabrics weaving, disagreed with the 
protectionist purposes of the institution.560 A final example of collaboration was the 
participation of several entrepreneurs in the development of the industrial engineering 
school in Barcelona.359 6061 Therefore, it can be argued that there was some kind of collaboration 
among Catalan firms although it was less intense than in typical Italian districts. Second, 
Maluquer inferred from the data on the number of firms and some qualitative information 
that sub-contracting might predominate among cotton firms.562 In this sense, the presence of 
many small firms does not imply that these firms might collaborated and functioned 
hierarchically. Third, he argues that, due to the conditions o f the home demand for cotton 
goods, flexibility was more important than scale economies. But offers no evidence to
359 Rosés (1997).
360 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
361 Ganabou (1982).
562 Maluquer (1976).
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support this. Similarly, he assumes that large firms are necessarily less flexible than small 
firms. Finally, he never discusses the high transaction costs and inefficiencies associated 
with a system based on out-working webs.
In the Catalan cotton industry, new business institutions being developed from the 
early 1830s.563 By 1861, vertical integration predominated in the cotton industry. The main 
reason for the substitution o f sub-contracting for vertical integration was that the latter was 
the best choice due to the peculiar conditions of the market for Catalan textile goods. These 
peculiar conditions posed difficulties for the adoption of technologies that were high in asset 
specificity. Such as self-acting mules and mechanical looms. For that reason, the system of 
production based on sub-contracting was circumscribed to mixed fabrics and fine goods 
industries. Where the self-actings and mechanical looms were not efficient. Whereas most 
of the industry, which was devoted to the production of medium-coarse goods, adopted 
vertical integration.564
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The second section is devoted 
to the main issues of the economic theory and the literature on economic history referring 
to vertical integration. In the third section, the diffusion and the scope of vertical integration 
among the Catalan cotton firms is analysed by means of time-series and cross-section data. 
The subsequent section investigates the major determinants of vertical integration. Then, the 
consequences o f the vertical integration are studied. Finally, the last section concludes and 
summarises.
563 See chapter 7.
564 See Von Tunzelmann (1978) and Lyons (1987) for the characteristics of the different types 
of machinery. Both authors pointed out that in high quality goods self-actings and poweriooms were 
not efficient due the cost structure of this kind of cotton good.
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8.2 The Theoretical Framework
Recent literature on business institutions tends to support the view that vertical 
integration is a complex phenomenon which is the result of many causes. Which can act 
alone or interact.565 In sharp contrast, many economic historians subscribe to the anachronic 
view that vertical integration is fully decided by the available technology. Since some 
technologies imply that two phases of the process of production come together within the 
industrial plant. Technically, this means that vertical integration is only the result of thermal 
economies in the two-phase plant and diseconomies in the single-phase plant. However, 
according to the recent literature on business institutions, technology would completely 
determine the structure of an concrete industry only when two restrictive conditions are 
satisfied: (1) in that industry there is only one available technology, (2) when this 
technology implies a singular form of organization.566 In other words, two phases always 
come hand in hand when there is only one method of production that entails the integration 
both phases. These two conditions did not occur in the cotton industry of the mid nineteenth 
century. Firstly, different technological options were employed in the production of cotton 
yam and cloth. For example, spinning employed mule or throttle spindles and, similarly, 
cotton weaving could employ jacquard looms or powerlooms. Furthermore, different forms 
of organisation (business institutions) predominated in each country.567 It is well known that 
in Lancashire the extension of vertical integration was less than in New England or 
Germany.568
It should also be noted that the technology of the cotton industry was relatively 
simple, standardised was subject to continuous improvements (microinventions) throughout
565 Perry (1989), p.187 classifies the determinants in three broad groups: (1) technological 
economies, (2) transaction cost economies, (3) market imperfections.
566 Williamson (1986), pp. 86-87.
567 On Lancashire see Gattrell (1977), Lyons (1985) and Temin (1988); on Great Britain 
Chapman (1987), Famie (1979), pp. 277-323 and Mass and Lazonick (1990); on Germany, Brown 
(1992); on the United States, Temin (1988) and Chandler (1987); on Japan, Mass and Lazonick 
(1990).
568 Temin (1988) and Brown (1992).
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the period.569 For that reason, there were no technological breakouts, or scale economies, 
which could not be achieved with a change in the organisation of labour, management, or 
remuneration of production factors. For instance, in England, many handweavers survived 
the competition of the new powerlooms, in spite of their inferiority in terms of productivity, 
by reducing their wages and working longer hours.570 Similarly, as was shown in the 
previous chapter, many small firms survived by adapting their production to the 
characteristics of the local demand or labour force. Consequently, the vertical integration o f 
the cotton firms for technological reasons was not obvious or essential. One can argue that 
the available technology in the cotton industry allowed the single-phase firms to obtain scale 
economies without having to vertically integrate into the next phase. Consequently, the 
entrepreneurial decision to integrate vertically was determined by a basic issue: the choice 
between whether to buy the intermediate goods in the market or to produce these goods 
within the firm. Of course, this decision is mainly the result of an economic calculation.
One of the first economists who emphasised the role of market failures as a major 
determinant of the scope of the vertical integration was George J Stigler. He argues that the 
intensity of vertical integration varies through the life-cycle of the industry. Thus, when the 
industry is young, or when it is in its maturity, the firms tend to be vertically integrated 
since demand is not high enough to sustain competitive intermediate input markets. 
Similarly, in the middle period of the development of industrial sectors vertical integration 
tends to be less important.571 Porter and Livesay, and Chandler, have presented a somewhat 
different argument572. These three historians are agree, in broad terms, with the influence of 
the life-cycle of the industry on the extension of vertical integration. Although, conversely, 
they hold that vertical integration was not provoked by decrease in demand but by its 
expansion. In other words, vertical integration is predominant in the middle ages of 
industries.
569 Mokyr (1994) and VonTunzelmann (1994)(1995).
570 Bythell (1978) and Timmins (1993).
571 Stigler (1968).
572 Porter and Livesay (1971), Chandler (1977).
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A more recent approach to the problem is the work of Oliver Williamson.573 
According to this author» the evidence allows us to conclude that vertical integration is more 
related to saving in transaction costs than other factors. More specifically, he argues that the 
presence of asset specificity is the main factor that explains vertical integration. The concept 
of asset specificity refers to the extent to which a particular investment might be used for 
alternative purposes. The lack of alternative uses raising the scope for opportunistic 
behaviour amongst contracting parties. Asset specificity includes investment in physical 
capital, sites, human capital, brands and innovation. The ability to identify degrees of asset 
specificity enabled Williamson to specify the occasions when firms preferred to sub­
contracting (putting-out). As a rule non-specific investment will result in market governance, 
(sub-contracting) while specific or idiosyncratic investment and recurrent transacting will 
result in firm governance. When a firm invests in assets which have a high degree of asset 
specificity they tend to integrate into the next phase in order to avoid opportunism in their 
transactions with other firms. Moreover, the firms tend to eliminate the intermediate markets 
when it is difficult to establish contracts that stipulate all the facets of the transaction. 
Williamson distinguishes two types of vertical integration. 'Mundane' vertical integration, 
which embraces the successive industrial phases within an industrial technological core, and 
forward or backward vertical integration, which embraces phases outside this technological 
core. The first type of vertical integration is more common since here savings in transaction 
costs are obvious and large.
Alfred D. Chandler Jr. was the first in to establish the relationship between vertical 
integration and innovation in organisations. He argues that the transport revolution that 
preceded the managerial revolution in the United States was accompanied by the diffusion 
of vertical integration in the production and distribution o f goods.574 In the same line of 
reasoning, William Lazonick underlined the central role played by vertical integration in the 
series o f organisational innovations that characterised the second industrial revolution. Thus, 
vertical integration is relevant when one takes into account economies of speed. He pointed *374
573 Williamson (1975), (1986), (1989) and (1991).
374 Chandler (1977).
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out that the growth of firms and markets made internal coordination of production and 
distribution necessary. Accordingly, vertical integration helps to increase the coordination 
and, as a result, to accelerate production. Moreover, with the process of vertical integration 
firms can transform the high fixed costs of one phase into low unitary costs for the final 
product. And sometimes the expensive innovations in one phase provoke spillover effects 
in the next. Finally, this process of growth generates the achievement of market power that 
reduces the competitive uncertainty that is present in every market. According to Lazonick, 
the reduction of this uncertainty helped the adoption of technological innovations.575 576
From a more theoretical perspective, Lewis and Sappington have maintained that the 
vertically integrated firms are comparable to the technologically innovative firms because 
they try to grow by increasing their internal efficiency. Conversely, the firms that sub­
contract do not try to increase efficiency but try to gain monopolistic rents over 
subcontractors.376
The main criticism of the previous view, which supports the vertical integration, is 
that it tends to associate one type o f organisational development that was common in the 
U.S. economy with a general pattern of development. On the one hand, scholars interested 
in small firms underlined their flexibility and efficiency in comparison with the big firms. 
On the other hand, many British economic historians have stressed the efficiency of the 
British firms which were not vertically integrated and were smaller than the U.S. firms.577 
Thus, recent literature casts doubts on the existence of one path to development and 
technological innovation, and the intrinsic superiority of vertical integration.
I believe that all these perspectives are not contradictories but complementaries. 
Important transaction costs give incentives to entrepreneurs to search for organisational 
innovations, such as vertical integration. This does not mean that I subscribe a deterministic
575 See Lazonick (1991), p. 132ff.
576 Lewis and Sappington (1991).
577 See, on the first perspective, Piore and Sabel (1985), Scranton (1991), Blackford (1991) and 
Sable and Zeitlin (1997); on the second, Berg (1994) and more specially Broadberty (1997).
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and endogenous vision of innovation. Quite the contrary, I argue that innovations have an 
exogenous and unpredictable nature. However, sometimes business innovations are 
transmitted by the imitation of successful experiences. Consequently, it is likely that the 
Catalan entrepreneurs who adopted vertical integration imitated other previous entrepreneurs 
who had become successful with this kind of organisation.578 It is also likely that other 
entrepreneurs who did not adopt vertical integration went bankrupt or obtained lower returns. 
Therefore, they were not imitated by their fellows. Note also that I am not arguing that 
vertical integration is the only route of growth in the cotton industry and the definite 
solution to the organisational problems of the Catalan industry. It also seems erroneous to 
relate the development of vertical integration to big industry as Chandler did. On any 
reckoning, the Catalan cotton firms were relatively small. Therefore, vertical integration is 
clearly possible within the context of small firms. As I show later. To sum up, I believe that 
there is a close relationship among technological innovation, organisational innovation and 
market imperfections. However, in the last instance, the decision to vertically integrate is 
usually due to stochastic (exogenous) factors.
8.3. The Scope of Vertical Integration in Catalonia
From the technical point of view, the production of cotton goods can be divided in 
three successive phases: (1) preparation and spinning, (2) weaving, (3) finishing. Finishing 
is not the last phase for all kinds of cloth since occasionally the yam is coloured before 
being weaved. As was mentioned in the three previous chapters, at the eve of the Cotton 
famine, the three phases were partly mechanised in Catalonia. In other words, part of the 
cotton production in Catalonia was still in the hands of non-mechanised firms and domestic 
workers.579
Vertically integrated firms in cotton spinning and weaving existed in Catalonia from
578 The first modem factoiy in Catalonia, the Bonaplata factory, vertically integrated spinning 
and weaving. The original model for the factoiy was copied by Bonaplata from Lancashire’s coarse 
cotton mills. See Nadal (1985X1992a).
579 See in chapter 9 a description of the evolution of the technology in the Catalan cotton 
industry. Chapter 7 contains a description of the importance of the different power sources.
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the end of the eighteenth century.580 Although, it not was until the 1840s that they become 
relatively important. By 1850, vertical integration was relatively significant among 
mechanised cotton firms. In that year, there were 242 mechanised firms with more than 10 
workers employing 20,844 workers. That is, they had about 28 percent of the total 
labourforce in cotton spinning and cotton and mixed-fabrics weaving. Among these 
mechanised firms, 176 firms with 9,726 workers were devoted exclusively to cotton 
spinning, 13 firms with 1,385 workers only to cotton weaving, and 53 firms with 9,720 
workers had integrated vertically into cotton spinning and weaving.* 381 Consequently, about 
46 percent of the workers in mechanised factories were in vertically integrated firms. At this 
point, readers cannot be confounded by this evidence, I would not argue that vertical 
integration was a consequence of mechanisation.
However, only one decade later by 1861, the situation had changed radically in 
favour of the vertically integrated firms. Table 9.1 illustrates that vertical integration 
expanded faster in the 1850s. In particular, about 18 percent of Catalan cotton firms were 
vertically integrated. They had about 50 percent of labourforce and more than 60 percent o f 
capital in machinery.
580 See Thomson (1992) and Sánchez (I989)(1996).
381 Note that these figures are not adjusted for full time employment (FTE) and therefore they 
can differ from the figures in chapter 3.
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Table 8.1 Vertical Integration: Cotton Industry, 1861
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) (3 )/(4 )
Type E stab lishm en ts F irm s C apital W orkers K  p e r  W
(p ercen t) (p ercen t) (percen t) (percent) (All *  100.00)
I 157 154 35.291 5,799 6,085
(21 .66) (23 .23) (16.88) (15.25) (110 .65)
II 328 311 8,249 11308 729
(45 .24 ) (46 .91) (3.95) (29.74) (13 .26)
III 8 ) 76 33,553 2 3 7 5 13.030
0 1 .1 7 ) (11 .46) (16.05) (6.77) (236 .92)
IV 112 90 55,749 10.971 5,081
(15 .45) (13.57) (26.66) (28.86) (92 .39)
V 14 10 1,487 343 4 3 3 4
(1 .9 3 ) (1-51) (0.71) (0.90) (78 .82)
V I 5 3 2,531 291 8.698
(0 .69) (0.45) (1.21) (0.77) (158 .16)
V II 28 19 72227 6,730 10,732
(3 .86) (2 .87) (34.54) (17.70) (195 .14)
V ertically  in teg ra ted  159 122 131,972 18.335 7 ,198
(21 .93) (18 .40) (63.12) (48.23) (130 .87)
A ll 725 663 209,087 38.017 5 3 0 0
(100 .00) (100 .00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Notes an d  sources: The table only com prises fum s with ten o r more w orkers. I: Preparation and spinning; II:
W eaving; III: Finishing; IV: V ertical integration o f spinning and w eaving; V ; Vertical integration o f w eaving and 
finishing; VI: Vertical integration o f  spinning and finishing; and VII: vertical integration o f  spinning, w eaving, and 
finishing. Num bers subject to rounding error. Capita] figures in thousands o f  Rv.
The diffusion of vertical integration was not equal among the phases of the cotton 
industry. It was more common in cotton spinning and weaving than in finishing. There were 
109 firms that vertically integrated in cotton spinning and weaving whereas only 19 
vertically integrated cotton finishing with cotton spinning and/or weaving. Therefore, cotton 
finishing was mainly done by specialised firms.382 These firms elaborated a reduced range 
of products and were subcontracted by cotton weaving firms. They therefore did not 
participate in the distribution of finished cotton cloth. In effect, the wholesale market of 
finished cloth was in hands of vertically integrated firms, weaving firms and some major 
wholesalers in Barcelona. As example, the finishing firm Abelld, Santos and Cia of Grdcia 
(Barcelona) advertised itself as the producer of cheap printed cloth for other companies. 582
582 On the printing developments in Catalonia see Nadal (1991a), pp. 34-37; and Nadal and 
Tafunell (1992), pp. 39-50.
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Jaumeandreu and Cía, of Sant Marti de Provençals (Barcelona) advertised itself as a primer 
and as subcontracted by four important weaving firms (Ferrer and Cía, Santacana, Sadumi 
and Cía, Rafecas, Marqués and Cía, and Gallifá and Argemí). Similarly, in the industrial 
exposition of 1860, many vertically integrated producers of cotton cloth exposed printed 
goods even though they did not have printing machinery in their factories.583
Catalan finishing firms, especially those in calico printing, were concentrated in Sant 
Marti de Provençals, then in the surroundings of Barcelona. In this town there were many 
external economies. Since there were many firms of the same kind, many ancillary industries 
(specially chemical and machinery firms), easy access to the Port of Barcelona, and 
abundant water.584 Note that finishing firms were water and energy-intensive and, hence, 
their location was driven by geographical conditions.
I can present a stylized hypothesis to explain why in the finishing firms vertical 
integration was less important. The particular energy requirements hindered many spinning 
and weaving firms from integration into the finishing processes within their actual locations. 
For instance, some firms that integrated printing and other finishing processes with spinning 
and weaving had several factories. In particular, finishing factories were habitually located 
at Sant Marti de Provençals. Whereas the other spinning or weaving factories were located 
at the original site of the company.
It would be very useful to review what position vertically integrated cotton firms 
occupied within the Catalan cotton industry. If Maluquer was right one can expect that large 
firms were horizontal firms since sub-contracting the next phase would produce more gains 
than losses. Instead, if transaction costs matter, one can expect that the large firms were 
those that were vertically integrated. One simple way to approach this question is to 
compare their amount of labour and capital with the labour and capital in horizontal (single­
phase) firms.
583 Orellana (1860).
584 On Sant Marti de Provençals and printing see Nadal and Tafunell (1992).
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Tabic 8.2 The Size of Vertically Integrated and One-Phase Firms: Cotton Industry, 1861
(1) Classified according to the number of workers
Type la ­ 50- 100- 200- 300- 400- 500- 600- 1000-
Spinning Fimas i n 28 9
Workers 2,917 1,841 1,041
Weaving Fimas 253 42 12 3 1
Workers 5,736 2,920 2,647 640 365
Finishing Firms 63 12 1
Workers 1,540 735 300
Integrated Fimas 36 33 22 15 6 4 4 1 1
Workers 1,080 2,477 3,124 3,454 2,002 1,625 2,183 600 1,790
All Fimas 469 115 43 18 8 4 4 1 1
Workers 11,273 7,973 5,812 4,094 2,667 1,625 2,183 600 1,790
(2) Classified according to capital in machinety (thousands of Rv.)
Type 0- 50- 100- 200- 300- 400- 500- 750- 1000-
Spinning Fimas 26 21 35 29 17 10 12 3 1
Capital 826 1,486 5,176 7,190 5,899 4,288 6,862 2,564 1,000
Weaving Firms 280 13 7 7 2 1 1
Capita] 2,934 931 1,014 1,657 666 472 576
Finishing Firms 11 8 7 7 6 4 25 4 4
Capital 268 560 987 1,454 2,039 1,74015,643 3,208 7,654
Integrated Firms 15 11 11 9 8 11 22 8 27
Capital 455 805 1,557 2,193 2,845 4,75713,246 6,963 99,173
All Fimas 332 53 60 52 33 26 60 15 32
Capital 4,483 3,782 8,734 12,49411,44911,25736,32712,735107.828
N otes a n d  sources: numbers subject to rounding errors. The source is G im enez Guited (1862)
As shown table 9.2, the major Catalan cotton firms were vertically integrated by any 
of the measures considered. In particular, all the firms with more than 400 workers, and 27 
of 32 firms with more than Rv 1 million of capital in machinery were vertically integrated. 
However, a sceptical reader could argue that this result is the obvious consequence of the 
fact that vertically integrated factories contained two or more phases. In other words, they 
had no more scale economies in each single phase than one-phase firms. The next table 
serves to discuss this question.
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Table 8.3 The Size of Vertically Integrated and One-phase Firms:
Cotton Spinning and Weaving, 1861
(1) Number of mechanical spindles
Type 0- 500- 1000- 2000- 3000- 4000- 5000- 7500- 10000-
Spinning Firnis
Spindles
Integrated Finns
Spindles
All Finns
Spindles
34 21 37 27 22 7 3 3
8,320 15,888 54,937 66,172 73,690 31,180 16,670 26,231
16 11 14 17 14 6 15 9 6
5,395 7,941 19324 41,298 48314 26,724 89,963 75,628142,172 
50 32 51 44 36 13 18 12 6
13,715 23,829 74,261 107,470122,470 57,904106,633101,859142,726
(2) Weekly production of pieces of cloth (estimated)
Type 0- 50- 100- 200- 300- 400- 500- 750- 1000-
Weaving Finns 254 29 16 5 3 2 2
Pieces 5,172 1,975 2363 1388 992 832 1,240
Integrated Finns 47 12 13 13 5 12 8 6 3
Pieces 979 839 1,892 3,056 1,628 5,380 4,732 5,052 7312
All Firms 301 41 19 18 8 14 10 6 3
Pieces 6,151 2,814 4,155 4,444 2,620 6,212 5,972 5,052 7312
N otes an d  so u rce s : numbers subject to rounding  errors. T he source is G im enez G uited (1862)
Not only were the vertically integrated firms the largest firms in the cotton industry 
but they were also the largest firms in each phase. Specifically, in cotton spinning, all firms 
with more than 10,000 spindles were integrated vertically. Similarly, in cotton weaving, all 
firms with a production of more than 750 pieces per week were vertically integrated.385 
Consequently, these figures suggest that the biggest Catalan cotton firms decided to expand 
vertically towards the other phases and not horizontally within one phase. It seems that large 
firms obtained more gains by avoiding intermediate markets than by fixing the prices for 
sub-contractors. More to the point, the pressures associated with asset specificity were more 
important than the expected gains o f expanding a single phase up to the limits of capital 
resources.58 86
585 To estimate the production of the looms I assume that powerlooms produced four pieces per 
week and handlooms one. See Von Tunzelmann (1978). Lyons (1987) furnished a different figure: 
five pieces for the powerlooms and one piece for hand-looms.
586 See Bresnahan (1989) on the theoretical grounds.
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The next few examples serve to clarify how vertical integration and sub-contracting 
worked among the Catalan cotton firms. Firstly, I refer to España Industrial S.A., the biggest 
firm in the Catalan cotton industry at that time. This firm integrated cotton spinning, 
weaving, finishing, machinery repairs and wholesale distribution. From this firm, a book has 
been preserved where all transactions and the movement of goods among the different 
warehouses of the company are registered. With the data of this book, I compute table 9.4. 
This table serves to establish the relative importance of working-out within the company in 
the period 1859-1860.
Table 8.4 The Scope of Sub-contracting: España Industrial SA ., 1859-60
1st phase: Spinning (in libras catalanas)
internal sold to
Output consumption other firms
1859 2045377 (100,00 %) 1918492 (93,80 %) 126885 (630 %)
1860 2392375 (100,00 %) 2340502 (97,83 %) 51873(2,17 %)
2nd phase: weaving (in grey pieces) bought to
Output own production external producers
1859 148098 (100,00 %) 136261 (92,01 %) 11837 (7,99 %)
1860 178685 (100,00 %) 157793 (8831 %) 20892 (11,69 %)
3rd phase: Bleaching and priming (in pieces) Subcontracted
Output own production bleaching
1859 148098 (100,00 %) 132060 (89,17 %) 16038 (10,83 %)
1860 178685 (100,00 %) 154286 (86,35 %) 24399 (13,65 %)
Noies and sources: España Industrial (1859 )0  860).
At first glance, the table highlights the small amount of intermediate goods that the 
firm traded with other companies. In spinning, the small excess of production was partly 
sold and partly sent to a few sub-contractors of the firm.587 The firm also produced less grey 
cloth than the consumption of its finishing phase. Thus, it bought small quantities of fabrics 
from other firms and from sub-contractors who had previously received yam stocks from the 
same company. It must be highlighted that the firm acquired products which were very
5,7 In 1859, the distribution (in libras catalanas) was: with contract 96,784, sold by money 
16,432, and external sub-contractors 13,666; and in 1860: 18,538 with contract, sold by money 
13,092, and external sub-contractors 20,243.
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similar to its own production. Finally, in the bleaching process, España Industrial sub­
contracted in peak periods. The evidence seems to suggest that España industrial employed 
the intermediate (external) markets and sub-contracting not to diversify its production but 
to complete its delivery requirements and eliminate its surpluses of yam or grey cloth. 
Chandler argues that in this period many cotton firms in the United States encountered many 
problems to synchronising the production of the different phases and, therefore, had to buy 
and sell intermediate products in the market388
The problems faced by España Industrial when it tried to sub-contract a small portion 
of the bleaching process can serve to illustrate the transaction costs associated with sub­
contracting. España Industrial decided to sub-contract bleaching because the process was 
very labour-intensive and without any technological sophistication. Thus, it was less subject 
to opportunism by sub-contractors.389 Despite the fact that the characteristics of the process 
make its sub-contracting easy, the firm suffered many problems with sub-contractors and had 
to test many firms to find a suitable company. This test on several sub-contractors 
represented additional costs for the company and delays in the finishing of many orders; 
consequently, the process of sub-contracting resulted in transaction costs and diseconomies 
of speed.390
The main goal of España Industrial was to develop a system of production where not 
only could it gain advantages from scale economies but also maintain a system of flexible 
production. Scale economies could only develop by producing long editions of the same type 
of yam or cloth. By contrast, flexible production involved producing a short edition of each 
fabric. Flexible production was required to overcome the relative small size of the home 
market and to adopt the supply to changes in fashion and consumers' preferences. To 
maintain a flexible production system without losing scale economies the company produced 
38 different fabrics from only a few grey cloths. Furthermore, each type of grey cloth was 
weaved with two single measures of yam. Thus, España Industrial only produced eight 5890
588 Chandler (1977).
589 Klein et al. (1978) and Williamson (1986), chapter 3.
590 España Industrial (1858a)(1859a).
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counts of yam, and five types of grey cloth, but thirty-eight final fabrics. Note that the 
editions of each different type of finished cloth were shorter than the editions of each type 
of yam or grey cloth. For example, the medium quality grey cloth of 70 cm width was 
employed in ten different types of fabrics: genero bianco cdlera, madapolan E, and eight 
different calicoes. The price of the final products was disparate since the cheapest was sold 
for Rv 5.75 per cana catalana and the most expensive for Rv. 15 per cana catalana.591 With 
this combination of longer editions o f grey cloth and shorter editions of finished cloth, the 
firms could invest in highly specific assets obtaining a level of efficiency and maintaining 
the flexibility of production. As was required by the Spanish home market.
Another interesting example is the cotton spinning and weaving factory of Juan Giiell 
and Cfa of Sants (Barcelona). Which was among the ten biggest Catalan cotton firms. This 
firm was mainly devoted to the production of corduroy. The corduroy production was 
completely mechanised except for the process of cutting the nap. This latter process was the 
only process that the company subcontracted to households, where women and children cut 
the nap.592 Why did the firm subcontract this phase and not the others? The reason was that 
the firm was not subject to opportunism from domestic system (sub-contractors) because this 
phase employed unskilled labour and embezzlement was very difficult. Note that domestic 
workers had many problems when negotiating their wages since the firm could easily replace 
them and domestic production was in crisis. Consequently, it was advantageous to cover the 
transaction costs involved in out-working and not introduce the process of cutting the nap 
into the plant. In other words, it was likely that the costs involved were larger than the 
return of integrating the process within the factory. However, it should be remembered that 
the rest of the production processes were vertically integrated within the firm's factory.
391 España Industrial (1858b).
592 Orellana (1860).
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8.4. The Determinants of Vertical Integration
As mentioned above, the determinants in the entrepreneurial decision to vertically 
integrate are very complex. In this section. I analyse the main determinants of the diffusion 
of vertical integration among the Catalan cotton firms. I argue that the vertical integration 
was chosen by the big firms in order to offset certain limitations inherent in the Spanish 
home market. Precisely, it was due to this innovation that these big cotton firms could adopt 
the more efficient technologies. Which contained more asset specificity than the previous 
technologies used in the Catalan cotton mills. The main characteristic of the home market 
that gave incentives to vertically integrated was its small size. Problems were also caused 
by fluctuations in the demand for cotton goods and high interest rates. These problems 
represented diseconomies of scale for the one-phase firms and an incentive for the vertical 
integration of two or more phases o f the production of cotton goods.
The Spanish home market for cotton textiles was smaller than the markets in other 
countries. The main reason was that the per capita demand for textile products in Spain w as 
inferior to the average per capita demand in European countries.393 For this reason, asset 
specificity was a larger problem in Catalonia than in other European regions. Thus, for a  
Spanish cotton firm to invest in a technology with few alternative uses would be very risky 
if the firm could not guarantee a minimum demand for its production. A minimum demand 
for the production of yam could be obtained by vertically integrating the production of grey 
cloth with powerlooms. In other words, the risk of expanding production horizontally with 
technology containing asset specificity was larger than the risk of expanding the production 
vertically.
In particular, by the 1850s the more efficient technology for the production of cotton 
cloth of coarse-medium quality had few alternative uses.593 94 The most productive machinery
593 Sanchez-Albomoz (1981) and Prados de la Escosura (1983).
594 Note that, until now, economic theory has not developed an independent measure of asset 
specificity. Consequently, asset specificity is a relative argument. Thus, one can argue that self-actor 
mules contained more asset specificity than mule-jennies. Since the latter were able to efficiently 
produce more counts (qualities) of yam than the former and, also, could change count easier.
Chapter 8: The Vertical Integration o f the Cotton Industry 247
was the self-acting mule in cotton spinning and the powerloom in cotton weaving. Their use 
was not universal due to their technological constraints. They could not produce all the 
different types of cotton goods because they were only suitable for the medium and coarse 
yam and cloth. Moreover, they were most efficient when they could produce long editions. 
That is, their productivity increased when they could produce large amounts of the same 
count (quality) of yam or cloth. The old technologies (i.e„ the mule-jennie and the hand- 
looms) were more efficient in the production of fine cloth and mixed-fabrics.595
Specifically, the self-acting was not flexible since it could not produce yam of 
different counts, fine quality yam, or easily change count.596 Furthermore, the initial 
investment in plant and motive power for self-actings was relatively important. 
Consequently, to invest in self-actings would be very risky if the industrialists had not found 
enough demand for the relatively large quantity of yam that this spinning machine was 
capable of producing. Moreover, the presence of many cotton mills with self-actings in the 
market should push down the price of yam in the market. Due to this, it was a good idea 
for firms with self-actings to vertically integrate into the next phase, weaving with 
powerlooms, instead to grow horizontally by acquiring more self-actings.
Likewise, the powerlooms were complementaries of the self-actings. To work 
efficiently powerlooms required a long quantity of very homogeneous yam. Mule-jennies 
and other primitive spinning machines were unable to produce this homogeneous yam. 
Unlike self-actings which produced a long quantity of homogeneous yam.597 Note that 
powerloom technology was not more flexible than self-acting technology; in other words, 
powerlooms contained asset specificity. Obviously, this drove the vertical integration of the 
firms that employed self-actings and powerlooms since, as Oliver E. Williamson argues,
595 Von Tunzelmann (1978) and Lyons (1987).
596 Cohen (1990) exaggerates the flexibility of the self-acting mule. The Spanish technical 
handbooks refer to problems with the self-acting mule and the advantages of maintaining the use of 
mule-jennies. See, for example, Arau (1855). However, the self-acting were more flexible than the 
throstle as the latter could not be modified to change count and efficiently produced only a very 
limited range of counts.
397 Von Tunzelmann (1978) and Lyons (1987).
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successive phases with simitar technologies and important asset specificity are integrated 
more easily.598 If we also consider the intrinsic problems of the home market, it is not 
strange that most of firms that employed self-actings in spinning integrated forward into 
weaving with powerlooms.
' Table 8.5 The Relationship Between Cloth Quality and the Type of Firm:
Cotton Industry, I860
Number of turns showing m the exhibition total
Coarse Medium Fine & Mixed fums in the
Type of firm cloth cloth cloth exhibition
Hand Weaving 1 2 14 16
Power weaving 1 0 0 1
Printing 2 12 6 14
Spinning + Weaving 4 10 0 12
All phases 2 9 1 10
Total 9 34 21 53
N otes an d  S ou rces: Som e firms produced m ore than one quality o f  cloth, therefore the last colum n does not add 
up. Coarse cloth: C urados, cutíes, d riles, em pesas and percalinas bastas. M edium  cloth: B rillantinas, elefantes, 
em pesas finas, guineas, ham burgos, indianas norm ales, m adepolan, m uselinas, panas, percalinas, retores, ruanesas 
and semi-retores. F ine cotton cloth and m ixed fabrics: Batistas, cashm ires. castores, chalecos, florentinas, guatas, 
indianas finas, m am ones, pañuelos, and piqués. The source is O rellana (1860), the classification o f  the quality o f  
products is based on R onquillo  (1851-1857) and the classification o f  firm s is based on G im enez G uited  (1862).
Table 8.5 confirms part of the proposition. According to the arguments presented 
above, one can expect that firms producing coarse-medium cloth had to employ 
powerlooms.599 In contrast, hand-weaving firms tended to produce fine and mixed-fabrics 
cloth since powerlooms were not effective in that type of production. Here it is likely that 
vertical integration was less important. Printing firms produced the whole range of qualities 
of cloth since they could buy all types of cloth.
The fluctuations in demand affected the market for intermediate and final goods. It
598 Williamson (1986), pp. 85ff.
599 It is likely that these fnms also employed self-actings but the evidence for 1861 is not readily 
available. However, it should be noted that in 1850 practically all establishments which vertically 
integrated cotton spinning and weaving employed self.-actings in spinning. See Junta de Fabricas 
(1850).
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is well known that the demand for textile products in Spain was relatively small, in 
comparison with the Western European countries and the United States. Demand was also 
very irregular, in comparative terms, throughout the year and from one year to another.600 
the result of this was that the wholesalers and shops rarely settled the date at which they 
would pay their debts, or signed credit documents.601 They preferred to send payments to 
their suppliers when they decided to settle their debts.602 It is obvious that firms could 
finance themselves by means of accommodation bills, although this involved higher financial 
costs due to the high interest rates in Spain.603 Thus, the fluctuations in demand were 
difficult (costly) to avoid by external financing and cotton factories could not get credit on 
the products sold since they did not know when the debt would be settled.
According to the theory, when markets fluctuate the firms in the initial phases of the 
process can protect themselves by adopting flexible production techniques. With flexible 
production firms can adapt the quantity and quality of their production to the changes in the 
final demand for goods.604 In Catalonia, the cotton firms combined vertical integration and 
flexible production. Thus, the majority of production took place in firms which vertically 
integrated cotton spinning and weaving and sub-contracted finishing. Thus, as shown in a 
previous example, the firms could produce a reduced range of grey cloth and finish them 
with different kinds of colours and textures. The price of finishing was very varied and, 
therefore, products could be directed to many different markets and consumers. To 
summarise, the cotton firms reduced the number of intermediaries, reducing transaction costs 
but maintaining a system of flexible production.
600 Sanchez-Albomoz (1981) and Prados de la Escosura (1983).
601 Graell (ed)(1908) and Sudrià (1987).
602 Cuadras and Rosés (1998).
603 The common interest rate in Spain was about 6 percent, although in some occasions this 
would be raised up to 9 percent. In sharp contrast, British interest rates were habitually below 4 
percent. Furthermore, when Catalan firms issued accommodation bills they incurred other expenses 
such as negotiation and rediscounting costs. Which could double the cost of borrowing.
604 On flexible production see Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Eaton and Schmitt (1994).
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Table 8.6 The Relationship Between the Number of Products and the Type o f F i r m :
Cotton Industry, 1860
Type Firms Fabrics
Mean per 
firm
Standard
Deviation
Only weaving 17 24 1.4 0.79
Only printing 14 25 1.8 1.05
Vertically integrated 22 77 3.5 2.44
N o u s  an d  so u rce s : The source is O rellana (1860).
The previous table was computed using data on the cloth presented by several f i r m s  
participating in the industrial exposition that took place in Barcelona in 1860 in h o m ag e  to  
the Queen. Each firm was asked to send to the exposition some fabrics fro m  i ts  
warehouses.605 This table serves to confirm the previous arguments. Vertically in te g ra te d  
firms were capable of producing a wider range of products than the specialised spinning o r  
weaving firms. Furthermore, it shows that finishing firms and weaving firms w e r e  
specialised in a small range o f products.
Recently, imperfections in financial markets have been considered important in  
explaining the level of concentration in industrial sectors because they act as entry b a rr ie rs  
to new firms.606 Furthermore, this kind of imperfection can give an incentive to v e rtic a l 
integration. Vertical integration works as an internal capital market and, therefore, i t  
represents the elimination of financial intermediaries.607 In other words, the absence o f  
external financing, or high interest rates, can give an incentive to firms to buy the next p h a se  
and to employ their money invested in circulating capital (i.e,, the money used for credit to  
customers) within the firm. In this case, vertical integration has three main consequences fo r  
the financial situation of firms: it reduces risk, it increases control over their own business, 
and it diminishes the amount of circulating capital. In other words, vertical integration 
reduces the financial costs of firms.
605 Orellana (1860).
606 Haber (1991).
607 Williamson (1975) and Moweiy (1992).
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In Spain, the final and intermediate markets were organised into networks where 
personal contacts determined the reputation of firms. In other words, transactions were based 
on a system of reputation. For example, España Industrial asked for two recommendations 
from old customers to give credit to a new customer. Thus, the firm was more interested in 
the reputation of the future customer (e.g., if he were a devout catholic, a good father or a 
trustworthy entrepreneur) than his assets or credit record.608 Furthermore, the small size of 
the market and its unstable character caused difficulties for financial institutions trying to 
develop an impersonal system of money lending. Thus, the Catalan cotton firms used an 
important part of their resources financing their own customers since credit from banks and 
other financial intermediaries was scarce. Any unexpected increase in the demand for cotton 
goods might be financed by the same cotton industry that had to finance all the distribution 
from the factory to the final customer. It was rare that wholesalers or shops paid in advance 
or amortised their debts over short periods. Similarly, weaving firms could not easily obtain 
credit from banks. It was also common for spinning firms to finance weaving firms. 
Consequently, for mechanised spinning firms it could be very convenient to vertically 
integrate into the weaving process because they already indirectly financed this phase. Thus, 
they could convert the circulating capital lent to other companies into fixed capital, which 
was directly owned by the company.
An example can help us to understand this situation. The firm Miquel Puig and Cia 
produced yam and cloth in its factory in Esparraguera (Barcelona). This society sold yam 
to weaving firms and coarse and medium counts of cloth (percalinas, empesas, and 
hamburgos) to printing firms. The company received some credit from its suppliers, but it 
was not enough to finance the cycle of production within the firm and the credit that the 
firm conceded to its customers. Furthermore, the firm rarely received credits or discounted 
bills-of-exchange in banks. More commonly, the firm asked its owners for more money or 
delayed the payment of dividends in order to finance the new requirements of capital. The 
result was that a growing quantity of capital was continuously employed to finance the 
market of its products. In other words, new increases in demand simultaneously required
608 España Industrial (1858b)<I 859c).
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new capital. After some years of existence, the firm decided to buy the next phase o f  
production: the printing of cotton goods. Thus, it reduced its financial costs since the amount 
of capital devoted to financing its customers who were printers was larger than the cost o f  
producing printer cloth in the new factory. The acquisition of the next phase was possible 
because the company had access to new sources of external financing.609
To sum up, there were many incentives to vertically integrate the production o f  
cotton goods. The small size of the markets, the fluctuations in demand and the absence o f 
external financing all gave incentives to vertically integrate the production o f cotton goods. 
Furthermore, this vertical integration was more intense in the cases where 'mundane' vertical 
integration was possible. This hypothesis can be formalised in the next model:
(8.Vfcrtical Integration (PROB=l) = F  (Size, Machinery, Capital Intensity, Subcontracting)
Where I assume that the probability of a cotton firm being vertically integrated is a 
positive function of: the size of the firm, especially in the spinning phase; the level o f  
adoption of new technologies containing asset specificity (mechanisation); and capital 
intensity. Whereas it is negative function of subcontracting. I test two alternative models: 
one considering all kinds of vertical integration and the second only vertical integration o f 
cotton spinning and weaving. In the first model I consider all Catalan cotton firms with 10 
or more workers in 1861. Whereas in the second model all Catalan firms in cotton spinning 
or weaving with 10 or more workers.610
The methodology used in the analysis is the logit analysis. This procedure allows the 
estimation of the probability of an event occurring given a sample of different explanatory 
variables. Specifically, given that the dependent variable is binary (the variable takes the 
value 1 when the firm is vertically integrated and 0 when not), the logit estimates a non­
linear equation that indicates which are the determinant factors of the dichotomic event. I
609 Sedò (1850-1855)(1856-1860)(1861-1865)(1866-1870).
610 The data is drawn from Gimenez Guited (1862).
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use this method instead of linear discriminant or multiple regression analysis because it 
requires far fewer assumptions than these alternative methods. These two techniques pose 
difficulties when the dependent variable can have only two values. On the one hand, the 
assumptions necessary for hypothesis testing in regression analysis are necessarily violated 
and the predicted values cannot be interpreted as probabilities. On the other hand, linear 
discriminant analysis allows direct prediction of group membership. But the assumption of 
multivariate normality of the independent variables, as well as equal variance-covariance 
matrices in the two groups, is required for the prediction rule to be optimal. Instead, the 
logit method performs well even when the assumptions required for discriminant analysis 
are satisfied611
In logistic regression one directly estimates the probability of an event occurring. The 
parameters of the model are estimated using the maximum-likelihood method. The regression 
coefficients give the amount of change in the dependent variable for a one-unit change in 
the independent variable. The Wald statistic is just the square of the ratio of the coefficient 
to its standard errors. There are different ways to asses whether or not the model fits the 
data. First, one looks at the likelihood, which is the probability of the observed results given 
the parameter estimates. To test the null hypothesis that the observed likelihood does not 
differ from one (the value of the likelihood for a model that fits perfectly), I used the value 
of -2 Log Likelihood. This is a measure of how well the estimated model fits the data. 
Second, I used a chi-square test that is comparable to the F test for linear regression. The 
chi-square tests the null hypothesis that the coefficients for all of the terms in the current 
model, except the constant, are zero. Finally, I present the goodness-of-fit statistic of the 
model, which compares the observed probabilities to those predicted by the model.
I consider the following variables. Three independent variables refer to size as a 
determinant o f vertical integration. The first refer to preparation, the second to spinning, and 
the third to the number of factories. The variable 'cards' is the number of card machines in 
each firm. The number of cards is a very good proxy for the amount of output since most
611A logit model was preferred to the alternative specification, probit, due to the particular 
characteristics of the sample. See Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) for a discussion of this point.
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firms employed the same type of card. The variable ’mechanical spindles' is the number of 
mechanical spindles in each firm. Finally, the variable 'factories’ refers to the number of 
industrial establishments owned by each firm. Two variables refer to the level of 
mechanisation: the variable 'spinning mechanisation’ is the share of mechanical spindles in 
the total number of spindles in each firm; the variable ’weaving mechanisation' is the share 
of powerlooms in the total number of looms in each firm. The variable 'K/L' 
(capital/intensity) is the amount of capital in machinery of the firm divided by the number 
of workers. Finally, the variable 'sub-contracting' was computed according to the next 
equation:
1,2,3 ...n.
Where the probability of sub-contracting X (PSx), is equal to the number of workers 
in the workshops (establishments with less than 10 workers) in the n districts (Wt) where 
the firm has factories, divided by the number of firms in the n districts (QE) where the firm 
has factories. The expected outcome of our analysis is that the probability that vertical 
integration takes place is a positive function of the variables 'cards', 'mechanical spindles', 
'K/L\ 'factories’, 'mechanical spinning' and 'mechanical weaving', and a negative function of 
’sub-contracting’. The results of the model are presented in table 8.7.
m
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Tabic 8.7 The Determinants of Vertical Integration: Cotton Industry, 1861
Estimation procedure: Logit method
Dependent Variables Any kind of Vertical integration of
vertical integration spinning and weaving
ß Wald ß Wald
Independent Variables (S-E.) (Sig.) ( S E . ) (Sig.)
Constant -7.0237 78.6678 -8.4902 54.9531
(.7919) (.0000) (1.1453) (.0000)
Cards .0323 10.3300 .0456 16.2436
(.0100) (.0013) (.0113) (.0001)
Mechanical Spindles .0002 4.3033
(.0001) (.0380)
K/L .0002 7.3264 .0005 22.0636
(6.09E-06) (.0068) (.0001) (.0000)
Factories 3.2204 39.9386 3.0783 22.8121
(.5096) (.0000) (.6445) (.0000)
Mec. Spinning .0338 55.4721 .0595 49.9469
(.0045) (.0000) (.0084) (.0000)
Mec. Weaving .0390 84.1651 .0586 52.9006
(.0042) (.0000) (.0081) (.0000)
Subcontracting -.1246 5.2814 -.1669 5.4849
(.0542) (.0216) (.1.1453) (.0192)
Observations 663
Signif.
587
Signif.
-2 Log Probability 273.126 1.0000 166.154 1.0000
Chi2 of the model 359.937 .0000 397.264 .0000
Goodness-of-fit 1736.718 .0000 3103.547 .0000
N otes an d  so u rces: see text.
The size of spinning is one of the determinants of vertical integration because the 
market imperfections and transaction costs provoked diseconomies of scale in the spinning 
firms. Moreover, spinning firms invested more in assets with asset specificity since, for 
example, at the end of the 1860s about 80 percent of spindles were in self-acting mules and 
throstles.612 Investments which were high in asset specificity. This explains why integration 
was from spinning towards weaving and finishing more than from weaving or finishing 
towards spinning. The number of factories is also a determinant of the degree of vertical 
integration. As many vertical integrations consisted of the takeover of already established
612 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
256 The Early Phase o f Catalan industrialisation ( 1830-1861 )
factories and because many firms that integrated into the finishing phase maintained the 
finishing factory at Sant Martin de Provencals and the other factories in other locations.
The level of mechanisation in spinning and weaving are determinants of the level o f 
vertical integration. Consequently, the 'mundane* hypothesis (i.e., that vertical integration is 
more common within the technological core) o f Oliver Williamson is corroborated in the 
case of the Catalan cotton industry. Furthermore, it can be assumed that high levels o f 
mechanisation corresponded to the use of self-actings and powerlooms and that, as was 
demonstrated in table 9.6, these firms produced coarse-medium cloth.
Capital intensity positively affected the probability of vertical integration. The reason 
is that the vertically integrated firms had opted for a more intensive technology: self-acting 
mules in spinning and powerlooms in weaving. Note that self-actings and powerlooms 
required less labourforce per Pta of capital that the old technologies (mule-jennies and 
handlooms). Furthermore, as was repeatedly argued previously, this more capital-intensive 
option was only possible in the vertically integrated firms. Note then that the vertical 
integration was a way to intensify the substitution of capital for labour and to increase the 
labour productivity of the cotton industry. Consequently, one can argue that in the Catalan 
case there is a strong relation between organisational innovations and the adoption of the 
most efficient machinery.613
The relationship between the probability of sub-contracting and the probability o f 
vertically integrating cotton production is negative. This means that the tendency was that 
vertically integrated firms did not locate in the same districts as the workshops that could 
sub-contract. As I have already stated vertically integrated firms produced a different cloth 
than the small workshops and domestic industry. Moreover, vertically integrated firms sub­
contracted less than one-phase firms and, obviously, eliminated the intermediate market for 
cotton yam. Thus, vertically integrated firms did not collaborate with workshops but 
competed with them for natural resources and labourforce. In particular, the vertically
613 Lazo nick. (1991), p. 132ff has argued that there is a strong correlation between oiganisational 
innovation and the development of gains in productivity and scale economies.
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integrated firms could offer higher salaries since their labour was more productive. Thus, 
it was likely that the wage level was higher in districts with many vertically integrated firms. 
Consequently, workshops that employed cheap labour encountered many problems recruiting 
cheap labour and tended to disappear from the districts of the vertically integrated firms.
9.5. The Consequences of Vertical Integration
Finally, it is worth addressing to the consequences of vertical integration. Here, four 
main questions will be considered: (1) the effect on the productivity of the industry; (2) the 
consequences on its structure; (3) the effects on the international competitiveness; (4) if it 
had monopolistic consequences, that is, if the vertical integration reduced the level of 
competition among the Catalan firms.
In chapter 5,eu it was shown that total factor productivity in the cotton industry did 
not expand as fast as in the 1850s than in the previous periods. Thus, one could argue that 
this type of institutional innovation had limited effects on productivity growth. However, two 
questions must be considered. Firstly, the rate of productivity growth from 1850 to 1861 was 
hampered by the overproduction problems in the industry at the end of the 1850s. Secondly, 
as was noted in the past section, the diffusion of vertical integration was accompanied by 
the adoption of new machinery. Consequently, some productivity improvements associated 
with the adoption of vertically integrated firms were included in the capital measures as 
capital quality increases.
The dualistic character of the Catalan cotton industry (this was not unique to 
Catalonia) was strongly reinforced by the spread of the vertical integration. An important 
part of the industry was organised into centralised, power-driven, highly mechanised, 
vertically-integrated factories that produced coarse-medium cotton goods. With their vertical 
integration these big cotton firms (in Spanish terms) avoided some imperfections of the 
Spanish market and augmented their efficiency. On the other hand, the rest of the industry 614
614 See table 5.4.
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was formed of many small firms. These firms were less intensive in capital, smaller than 
vertically-integrated firms, and produced fine cotton cloth and mixed fabrics. The printing 
firms were between the two groups: they were sub-contracted by the vertically-integrated 
firms or, alternatively, controlled their own web of small weaving firms or domestic 
weavers. Small firms survived because of their flexible production and the human capital 
of their employees.
The development of the integrated firms altered the nature of the production of cotton 
goods in Catalonia. During the 1830s, the industry had a democratic character since it w as 
very easy to enter the business.615 However, the irruption of the more capital-intensive 
vertically-integrated firms raised large entry barriers. Thus, the initial requirements of capital 
rose substantially and the separation between ownership and labour became more clear cut. 
In spite of the movements towards centralisation, the external economies were still very 
important for the Catalan industries. In particular, during this period there was a spectacular 
increase in the number of ancillary industrial services available in Catalonia. This 
represented a strong competitive advantage of that region compared to the rest of Spain.616
Note that, due to the market imperfections of the Spanish market, which were caused 
by its small size, one can expect that the relative importance of vertical integration in 
Catalonia was larger than in England. Table 8.8 compares the relative importance of vertical 
integration in Catalonia and England. To correctly compare Catalonia and England it was 
necessary to convert the Catalan evidence to the British standards.617 618To construct the next 
table, only power and water-driven factories with more than 10 workers were considered. 
This implies 25,366 workers of the 42,631 in Catalonia. Note also that the British sources 
did not report all the workforce because, for example, hand-weavers were not included.61*
6,3 Thomson (1992), pp. 235ff.
6.6 See chapter 7.
6.7 Gatrell (1977) offers a detailed description of the British sources.
618 Timmins (1993).
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Table 8.8 Share of the Vertically Integrated Mills: Cotton Spinning and Weaving. 
England and Catalonia, 1861 (percent)
Power Mechanical
Workers Looms Spindles
England 52.9 63.9 41.8
Catalonia 65.8 80.2 55.2
N otes and sources: England: Farnie (1979), p. 317 and Catalonia: G im enez Guitcd (1862).
The result of this comparison is very persuasive. By any measure, vertical integration 
was more important in Catalonia than in England. The hypothesis of the relation between 
market size and vertical integration seems warranted. Note that this result is not a 
consequence of the fact that Britain exported a large quantity of its yam. Since in England 
and Catalonia powerlooms were important in vertically integrated firms. Extending this 
result to the United States, one can expect that vertical integration was more important than 
in England since market costs were likely to be larger in the U.S. As the U.S. market was 
smaller and its integration was hindered by the high transport costs.6”
In terms of international competitiveness, the principal consequence of vertical 
integration was to considerably reduce the disadvantages provoked by the size of the Spanish 
home market. Thus, by vertically integrating the production of cotton yam and cloth many 
Catalan firms increased their average size and achieved some scale economies. The next 
table shows how vertical integration helped the efficient development of the Catalan cotton 
firms.619 20
619 See, for example, Atack (1987).
620 This international comparison is .based in the same conversion effectuated to compare 
Catalonia with England.
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Table 8.9 Average Number of Workers per Mill: England, France, 
United States, and Catalonia Cotton Industries, 1850
Type England France
United
States Catalonia
Spinning 106 n o n.a. 55
Weaving 98 136 n.a. 108
Vertically integrated 327 160 n.a. 183
All 171 77 98 86
N otes and  S ou rces: See text. Sicsic (1994) and fo r C a ta lon ia  Jun ta  de Fábricas (1850). The sam ple o f  
w eaving(m echanical) mills in C atalonia is little representative g iven  the sm all num ber o f observations.
The single-phase cotton mills in Catalonia are smaller than comparable cotton m ills 
in France and England. In particular, in the spinning factories, where scale economies were 
very important, the average number of workers per cotton mill in Catalonia was about ha lf 
that of England or France. In sharp contrast, vertically integrated cotton mills in Catalonia 
were larger than in France, but smaller than in England. Necessarily, it should be underlined 
that, since in England markets were more efficient and larger than in other countries, 
average firm size was larger. Similarly, the threshold size for vertically integrating was 
larger than in other countries. Note also that without vertical integration Catalan cotton mills 
could be even smaller and the difference in scale economies with their competitors would 
be more important.
Finally, it is commonly accepted that with low or moderate levels of concentration 
the vertical integration per se did not result in oligopoly situations. As the vertically 
integrated firms could not gain enough market power to successfully collude. In 1861, the 
level of concentration in the Catalan cotton industry was low: in spinning it was 14.89 
percent and in weaving 17.46 percent. To compute the levels of concentration I estimate the 
market share (by means o f the output) of the biggest four firms in each phase. One phase 
became an oligopoly since it reached the 70 percent concentration level.621 Consequently, 
in the short-run vertical integration resulted in an increase in the efficiency of the industry. 
However, it should be noted that in the long-run the situation was not so clear because the
621 Williamson (1986), pp. lOOff.
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vertical integration increased entry barriers into the industry. In particular, to create a new 
competitive firm it was necessary to collect a larger initial capital than before. Since the 
Spanish home market was relatively small and highly protected from foreign competition 
the entrance of a large firm could decrease the level of competition, provoking oligopolistic 
tendencies in the industry. Furthermore, collusion among Firms could become simpler since 
the number of participants in the market decreased rapidly and the share of the larger 
participants increased.
8.5. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I analysed some changes that occurred in the Catalan cotton industry 
after the adoption of the factory system. In the 1850s, sub-contracting was abandoned as the 
main organisational form of the Catalan cotton industry. It was substituted by vertical 
integration. The vertical integration helped the Catalan firms to save in transaction costs, to 
overcome some market failures, and to introduce machinery containing asset specificity. 
Consequently, vertical integration was one of the secrets of the success o f the Catalan cotton 
industry because it resulted in increased efficiency.
From the point of view of economic theory, this chapter has checked the explanatory 
power of the theory of transaction costs in economic history. Thus, the hypothesis of Oliver 
E. Williamson on the relation between transaction costs and vertical integration is fully 
confirmed by this research. As vertical integration was more intense when the technology 
was high in asset specificity.
Finally, from the point of view of the debate on economic history, it is necessary to 
underline the fact that the size of the market matters. The development of vertical integration 
is strongly related to local market imperfections. Obviously, this result casts doubt on 
arguments that claim that the problems in Lancashire’s cotton industry were due to
organisational failures.
El
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Chapter 9
Technology and International Competitiveness
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the differences between the technological 
choices of the Catalan and the two major cotton textile industries of that period. Which were 
located in Lancashire and New England. From this I derive the implications for the 
international competitiveness of the Catalan cotton industry. In the second third of the 
nineteenth century the Spanish, the British and the U.S. cotton industries differed in 
industrial structure and technology. This was caused by differing histories, product choices, 
levels of technological sophistication, markets, factor prices, workforce skills, managerial 
performance and tariffs.
This chapter finds that the choice of quality, technology, and factor endowments are 
intimately connected in the cotton industry in the first half of the nineteenth century.622 In 
particular, I show that, on average, Catalan cotton mills produced a type of cloth that was 
in the middle of the extreme choices: between the unskilled and raw-materials intensive 
production of New England mills and skills-intensive and raw-materials saving choice of the 
Lancashire cotton mills. However, it also proves that, in spite of the fact that technological 
choices and product-mix were adapted to local endowments, the Catalan cotton industry 
could not survive without the help of tariffs. The Catalan cotton industry was not
622 Saxonhouse and Wright (1984) argue the contrary for the last decades of the nineteenth 
century.
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competitive because of the high cost of raw materials and its efficiency inferiority w ith 
respect to the British cotton industry. Consequently, this chapter is also concerned w ith  
modem debates about nineteenth century Catalan and Spanish economic developm ent. 
Specifically, I seek to shed new light on the reasons for the almost complete absence o f  
Catalan manufacturing products in foreign markets.
Finally, this study could also serve to confirm some of the beliefs expressed in the 
previous chapters. First, it shows that, as was underlined in chapter 3, the alleged low cap ital 
investment in industry explains little of the Catalan historical experience during the early  
phase of industrialisation. In particular, the uncompetitiveness of the Catalan cotton industry  
in international markets, and the comparative low levels of productivity, cannot be explained 
by appealing to low levels of capital intensity. Second, it also serves to confirm the  
argument, which was advanced in chapter 6, that the level of human capital in the C atalan  
industry and the system-of-training of the labour force was similar to that in Lancashire. 
Third, I pointed out previously in chapters 5 and 6 that productivity improvement w as the 
main engine of growth in the early phase of industrialisation. This chapter verifies this since  
it proves that productivity improvements in Catalonia explain the reduction of the price gap 
between Catalonia and, at that time, the most advanced cotton industries in the w orld , 
Britain's and New England's.
9.1. Introduction
A knowledge of the choice of technique in the early period of factory cotton textiles 
is clearly of great value in studying the early phase of European industrialisation. By any 
reckoning, the cotton industry is one of the most spectacular and earliest examples o f the 
widespread diffusion of new technology.623 In many European countries and in the U nited 
States, the cotton industry represented the first large-scale application of modem technology 
and the factory system. In the beginnings, the new cotton mills followed the British m odel 
but in few years each country had developed its own practices and adapted the British
623 See, for example, Landes (1969) and Pollard (1981).
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technology (machinery) to its own needs. Therefore, it seems that there is a strong case for 
placing primary stress on the cotton industry as the first example of how technological 
choice is influenced by local conditions.
Economic historians tend to support the view that the technological constraint is not 
exogenous because technology is relatively malleable. Thus, one expects that regional 
differences in technology emerged as a consequence of differences in the relative factor 
prices, factor endowments, economic policies, and home demand. Furthermore, in the 
nineteenth century, the particular characteristics of innovation and the low integration of 
international markets was likely to exacerbate the differences in technology among countries. 
Specifically, technologies of the past century needed a large amount of leaming-by-doing 
and were improved by a continuous process of trial-and-error. In other words, since technical 
progress was local and incremental, the universal diffusion of the best-practices was more 
difficult than nowadays. When technology is often related to common science knowledge.624 
It should also be noted that barriers to free trade and transport costs were important. 
Therefore the competitive pressures exerted by foreign countries, with different technical 
choices, were less pronounced than in present-day global markets.
A striking feature of the cotton industry was that the choice of technique was closely 
connected with the choice of quality. Cotton cloth is not a homogeneous product because 
cotton mills employed different quantities of physical and human capital, labour, energy and 
raw cotton to produce the different kinds of cloth. Furthermore, some types of machinery 
were more adept than others in the production of some kinds of cotton goods. For instance, 
the throstle employed more energy, less skilled labour and was better at spinning coarse yam 
than the mule. Therefore, a detailed analysis of the quality-mix of the cotton industry can 
throw light on the influence of relative prices and factor endowments on the choice of 
technique.
Equally important are the implications of quality-mix for the competitiveness of
624 Nelson and Wright (1992).
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cotton industries and, therefore, their position in the world market. From 1845 Great B ritain 
has gradually lost its share of the world market, being replaced the new European and 
United States cotton industries.623 However, Great Britain continued to export high-quality 
goods to the American and Western European markets while very cheap goods went to the 
rapidly expanding Asian markets.625 26 Therefore, the British cotton industry lost almost o f all 
the market for coarse and medium quality cloth in Europe. The evident question is why the 
British lost the market for low-quality but not the market for high-quality cloth. W as it 
because the new producers became rapidly competitive in the low or medium-quality 
products or was it because tariffs were higher on this kind of good? On this point, only a 
detailed account of the prices of different quality cotton goods can furnish us with the 
correct answer.627
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 9.2 introduces the main differences in 
technology, skills and organisation among the cotton industries in Catalonia, New England 
and Lancashire. Section 9.3 discusses the product-mix. Here, I develop a framework to  
understand how quality choices were decided by factor endowments. The rest of the chapter 
is devoted to discussing the international competitiveness of Catalan firms. Then, evidence 
on the prices of the main Spanish, U.S. and British cotton products is presented. Section 9.5 
measures the cost of the main inputs and the impact on the international competitiveness o f  
the Catalan industry. The subsequent section provides measures of comparative productivity. 
Finally, the last section concludes and summarises.
9.2 Technical Choice: Machinery, Workforce Skills, and Organisation
For the sake of comparison, it is useful to know how large the cotton industries o f 
Catalonia, New England and Britain were. To answer this question, I rely on cloth produced
625 Ellison (1968), pp.97ff.
626 Sandbeig (1968).
627 To my knowledge, only the study of Harley (1992) has been able to furnish detailed evidence 
on the price differentials between the British and one new cotton industry, in this case the U.S. 
cotton industry.
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more than on spindles or raw cotton import figures. The number of spindles is not a good 
indicator of the size of the cotton industry because the productivity of spindles varies 
strongly with yam quality (count). Similarly, the level of raw cotton consumption does not 
furnish information on the real amount of production since, for example, wastage and the 
weight of production vary according to yam quality.628 For the reasons above, my choice 
was to compare cloth produced in square metres. Table 9.1 shows the results.
Table 9.1 Production of Cotton Cloth: Catalonia, New England 
and Britain, 1830-1860 (In thousands of m2, average per year)
Catalonia New England Britain
1830-40 21,291 229,440 680,614
1840-50 51,430 414,972 1,140,804
1850-60 109,132 612,815 1,852,892
1830-60 60,500 420345 1333,122
Catalonia (%) of Catalonia (*%>) of New England (%) of
New England Britain Britain
1830-40 9.28 3.13 33.71
1840-50 12.39 431 36.38
1850-60 17.81 5.89 33.07
1830-60 14.39 4.89 34.09
N otes an d  so u rce s : Numbers subject to  rounding errors. N ew  England's data is draw n from D avis and Stettler 
(1966), table 4, p. 221. The procedure to  com pute the Catalan and British figures was the following. F irst, according 
H uberm an's (1996) m ethod, a  disaggregated yam  output series was constructed for Catalonia and Britain. Then, 
under the assum ption that yam  exports and yam  inventories had the sam e distribution as y am  production. 1 derived 
the am ount o f  yam  consum ed in  the w eaving industry (the figures on British yam exports are draw n from Ellison 
(1968), table 2). T hat is, total yam  production m inus exports o f  yam , inventories, and w astage (S percent) during 
w eaving. To arrive at output in m 2, I m ultiply the w eight o f the yam  consumed by a  fixed coeffic ien t The 
coefficients are different for each  quality also different for Catalonia and Britain. The Catalan coefficients are 
derived from C om isión especial arancelaria (1867) and the British coefficients from the figures on cotton fabrics 
from the Economist (1845). Then I sum across qualities to com pute total estimates.
This table immediately reveals that, in spite of its relative progression, the Catalan 
cotton industry was relatively small in all the periods. On average, the British cotton 
industry was about twenty times as large as the Catalan cotton industry. The cotton industry
628 See, for example, Blaug (1961), Hubeunan (1996) or Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
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of New England was on average eight times as great as the cotton industry in Catalonia b u t  
did not progress like the cotton industry in Great Britain. Finally, it should be noted tha t th e  
cotton industry in Spain grew faster in the 1850s than the Catalan figures show due to  th e  
incorporation of the Basque Country and Andalusia into the production of cotton tex tiles.629 
Similarly, in the United States, national figures may differ from New England’s because o f  
the development of the cotton industry in the Southern and the mid-Atlantic region o f  th e  
United States.
During the first half of the nineteenth century technological leadership rem ained in  
the hands of the British cotton industry. It is well known that a great part of the p ro g re ss  
in cotton technology during the period was due to British engineers.630 At the v e ry  
beginnings of the nineteenth century the fine-spinning branch was the most technologically  
advanced because, for example, it was the first in applying steam-power to the new te x ti le  
machinery. These substantial improvements cheapened finer yams, which had no ticeab le  
effects on both exports and cloth fashion in Britain.631 It should also be noted also tha t th e  
first factories also appeared in fine-spinning. On the shop floor of these factories s u b ­
contracting dominated other forms of labour management.632 Furthermore, these cotton m il ls  
were prepared to produce many different counts of yam. In other words, they developed a  
flexible specialisation where the labour force, machinery and production could quickly a d a p t  
to the volatile demand of foreign and high-quality cloth markets. By the 1830s, ho w ev er, 
technological leadership moved to the production of coarse cloth.633 The improvements in  
the application of power to cotton textiles production had large consequences on the c o s ts  
of production of coarse cloth because coarse spinning was very power-intensive.634 In  
particular, the new high pressure steam engines helped the adoption of the self-acting m u le
629 Gimenez Guited (1862) gives national figures on cotton industry production. Also see N adal 
(1974) for a brief description of Malaga's experience.
630 On the British advances during the period see, for example, Chapman (1987), 
VonTunzelmann (1978), Ellison (1968), and Mann (1968).
631 Von Tunzelmann (1978), p. 224.
632 Cohen (1990), pp. 35ff and Hubeiman (1996).
633 Von Tunzelmann (1978), pp. 184ff..
634 Von Tunzelmann (1978), pp. 186ff.
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and the development of powerlooms, cheapening the production of coarse cloth. In sharp 
contrast with the fine spinning mills, British coarse spinning mills often vertically integrated 
into the production of cloth with powerlooms. Moreover, it should be underlined that their 
labour force was less skilled, which went hand in hand with the adoption of foremanship.635
The first modem spinning machinery (i.e., Arkwrights' water frames) appeared in the 
U.S. during the last years of the eighteenth century.636 The embargo and the war with Great 
Britain had favoured the settlement of the cotton industry in the United States. But the first 
great expansion of the industry took place from the end of the War of 1812. When the 
industry was protected by high tariffs.637 In this early period, U.S. cotton-textile mills, which 
were known as the Rhode Island type, were comparable to British coarse spinning firms. By 
the 1820s, they had introduced their own new type of cotton mill: the Waltham-type. They 
integrated power spinning on throstles and powerlooms and a new form of organization of 
the workforce. According to Jeremy, these new mills succeeded in lowering the cost of 
production for the coarsest products.638 However, until the American Civil War, both types 
of mills survived.639 Rhode Island type mills and handweavers specialised in the segments 
of the market where fashion and flexibility were more important while the Waltham-type 
dominated the market for standardised products.640
In Spain, the first enterprises devoted to printing cotton cloth were established in 
Barcelona in the late 1720s.641 These calicoes were sold in the protected markets of the
635 Hubeiman (1996) and Clark (1994).
636 On the early histoiy of the U.S. cotton industry see, among others, Cohen (1990), David 
(1970), Harley (1992), Jeremy (1981), Nickless (1979), Temin (1988), and Zevin (1971).
637 Zevin (1971) and Stettler (1977).
638 Jeremy (1981).
639 Cohen (1990).
640 Harley (1992).
641 On the histoiy of the cotton industry in Catalonia before 1830 see Thomson (1992), Sánchez 
(1989X1992) and Delgado (1995).
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Peninsula and the Spanish colonies in America.642 Because for most of the eighteenth 
century all cotton yam was imported, as well a large part of the grey cloth consumed, 
cotton spinning and weaving were not important. It took about 60 years for Catalonia to 
develop cotton spinning. In 1802, the new spinning industry was heavily protected. The 
import of foreign yam and cloth was forbidden. In the thirty years that followed the ban, 
domestic production and out-working were common practice in cotton spinning. Thus, cotton 
spinning tended to remain dispersed in the villages and small towns of the Pre-Pyrenees, 
where they could rely upon a good supply of cheap female and child labour, rather than 
becoming concentrated in the calico centre of Barcelona.643 Initially, due to its unskilled 
workforce, Catalan spinning concentrated on the low grades of yam (below 20 count). 
During the same period, handweavers proliferated in the major Catalan manufacturing 
towns.644 Catalan cotton cloth was also coarse due to the ban on cotton yam imports. 
Nevertheless, skilled handweavers produced a wide range of qualities by using other textile 
fibres such as wool, linen and silk.645 This development of the domestic industry was 
accompanied by the scarce adoption of the steam engine and, in general, of any British 
machinery. However, in 1832, the Bonaplata mill introduced the new forms of organisation, 
the steam engine, and the most recent British machinery (e.g., the powerloom).646 In a few 
years, the new machinery was universally employed in cotton spinning and dominated cotton 
weaving. The Catalan industry was characterised during this period by the rapid adoption 
of machinery innovations. For example, Catalan cotton mills made the transition from mule- 
jennies to self-actings in only a decade, such that by the 1850s more than 75 percent of 
spindles were moved by self-actors.647 The diffusion of the new machinery paralleled the 
increase in the quality of local production since the average count increased to 30 count
642 There is a large debate on the role played by the colonial and home markets in the 
development of Catalan cotton industry. On this aspect see the review of the literature in Delgado 
(1995).
643 Gutiérrez (1834)(1837), Sánchez (1989) and Thomson (1992).
644 Sanchez (1989).
645 In chapter 6, there is a full discussion of the skills differences between handspinning and 
handweaving.
646 Nadal (1974).
647 Ronquillo (1851-1857) and Maluquer de Motes (1976).
Chapter 9: Technology and International Competitiveness 271
from about 15 count.648 Moreover, the vertically integrated cotton mills expanded rapidly and 
captured the market for medium-coarse cloth.649 However, well before the 1860s, some 
horizontal spinning mills and domestic hand-weaving survived by producing for more 
fashion-oriented segments of the market.650
Labour management in the early factory period was similar in Catalonia, Lancashire 
and New England because all cotton factories combined two forms of factory management: 
sub-contracting and foremanship651 More specifically, workers in the preparatory section and 
spinners on throstles were supervised by foremen. Whereas spinners on mules were 
organised into autonomous, sub-contracted work teams. In particular, these spinners had 
functional autonomy because the craft-oriented machinery ran intermittently. Thus, they 
decided the pace of their work, organised their own work teams, had the authority to hire 
and fire assistants, and were paid by piece. However, by the 1850s, U.S. practice moved 
towards mass production with an unskilled workforce controlled by foremen.652 The adoption 
of powerlooms and self-actings in the United States went hand in hand with the transition 
of sub-contracting to foremanship.653 U.S. cotton mills substituted resource-using machinery, 
such as the throstle, for skilled labour, which was in short supply in the United States and 
other new settlement countries like Australia and Canada. In sharp contrast with the United 
States, the main consequence of diffusion of the self-acting in Catalonia and Britain was the 
reduction of the number of helpers but not the dislocation of craft control from the shop 
floor. Similarly, it seems that Catalan and Lancashire weavers managed to retain their 
autonomous position in production. Despite the fact that the introduction of the powerloom 
could have increased foremanship practices in some weaving factories.654
648 Fi güero la (1968), and Madoz(1846).
649 See chapter 8.
650 See chapter 8 and Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
651 Cohen (1990) in United States, Huberman (1996) and Clark (1994) in England, and Canps 
(1995) in Catalonia. See also chapter 6.
632 Cohen (1990).
653 Cohen (1990), especially chapter 6.
654 Cohen (1990), pp. 73-74 gives inconclusive evidence on this aspect of the British cotton 
weaving industry. By contrast, Catalan sources such as Comisión especial arancelaria (1867) or
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9.3 Technical Choice: Product Q uality
Cotton cloth quality has always varied considerably from country to country. In 
particular, the disparities in product-mix of the U.S., Britain and Spain cotton industries were 
large. The next table contains data on this point:
Table 9.2 Quality Distribution of Cloth Production:
Catalonia, New England and Britain, 1830-1860 (in average percent per year)
Catalonia <20 20-40 40-60 60-80
1830-40 68.37 31.44 0.10 0.09
1840-50 25.94 71.89 1.83 0.35
1850-60 18.06 76.43 4.04 1.47
1830-60 25.93 70.31 2.77 0.99
New England <16 >18
1830-40 75.99 24.01
1840-50 73.44 26.56
1850-60 76.12 23.88
1830-60 75.27 24.73
Britain <20 20-40 40-60 60-80 >80
1830-40 17.12 45.24 24.16 8.03 5.44
1840-50 14.82 48.66 27.87 4.44 4.21
1850-60 8.10 48.79 34.29 4.60 4.22
1830-60 11.76 48.12 30.55 5.17 4.40
N otes an d  so u rce s : Numbers sub ject to rounding  errors. It should be noted that Spanish figures corresponded to
Spanish counts and British and N ew  England 's to  English counts. T herefore, since the Spanish counts were sligh tly  
finer than the corresponding E nglish  counts, Spanish figures understated the quality o f  the Spanish  production . 
Figures are com puted as arithm etic averages to  avoid cyclical variation in  quality due to  changes in the prices o f  
raw cotton and short-term  m arket adjustm ents. N ew  England data are draw n from D avis and S tettler (1966), tab le  
A.2. N ote that the N ew England figures are  based on a sam ple o f firm s but in the entire population. F o r the  
C atalonia and Britain data see tab le  9.2.
At first glance, this table suggests that New England produced heavier fabrics than 
Catalonia and Britain. For the period as a whole, the quality of the New England cloth did 
not change considerably because about 75 percent of production was constantly of the 
coarsest quality.635 In a sharp contrast, Britain and Catalonia tended to concentrate their 65
Cerda (1968) clearly stated that weavers were paid by piece during this period.
655 This result is similar to the evidence presented by Temin (1988) for the 1830s.
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production in the medium range (counts from 20 to 60). By the 1850s more than three 
quarters of their production was in these counts thus abandoning the production of the 
coarsest qualities. In Catalonia the sharp decrease in the production of coarse cloth took 
place in the 1840s whereas in Britain in the 1850s. Finally» it should also be noted that 
British industry reduced the share of the finest qualities (over 60 count) although it was the 
country with the largest share of that type of cloth.656 There are, of course, several possible 
explanations for the existence of these large differences in product quality. In the next 
paragraphs I speculate about several o f them.
It is possible that quality-mix was a consequence of the life-cycle of the cotton 
industry; young cotton industries produce low quality goods because they did not require 
skilled or experienced labour and there was a large domestic market for them.657 658The history 
of the New England cotton industry gives little support to this argument because the industry 
matured but was still producing coarse goods.
It is often maintained that the characteristics and sizes of markets shaped the product 
choice of the cotton industry. For example, Sandberg has argued that only a worldwide 
exporter such as Great Britain was likely to have a large market for high-quality goods.63* 
Therefore, according to this line of reasoning, all small countries should only develop the 
production of heavy cloth. The obvious counterexample is the small Swiss cotton industry 
that produced high-quality cotton goods and could successfully compete with Britain in some 
European markets for expensive cloth.659 On the other hand, many authors have argued that 
the cotton mills in the U.S. were biased towards standard and cheap products because of the 
size and income of their home demand.660 Following the same logic, one would expect 
Catalan cotton mills to produce cheap cotton goods since the Spanish home market for
656 This sharp drop in the finest qualities can explain the drop in the quality index constructed 
by Sandberg (1968).
637 Sandberg (1968), p. 15.
658 Sandberg (1968), p. 15.
659 Fisher (1991).
660 See criticism on this argument in Temin (1988).
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textiles was poorer and smaller than other European and American markets.661 However, the  
Catalan cotton industry produced more medium-range than cheap goods. Therefore, it seem s 
that the size of home market does not by itself furnish a convincing explanation for the  
quality-mix of the cotton industries. It would be more attuned, however, to relate the  
characteristics of the home production to the preferences of the home consumers. According 
to this line of reasoning, consumers in the U.S. were more prepared to buy standard products 
than European consumers. However, this argument cannot be verified quantitatively.
It is sometimes argued that barriers to free trade modify the quality of the local 
production and foreign imports.662 In most cases during the nineteenth century tariffs w ere 
in ad valorem terms. This kind of tariff has several relevant properties. First, duties w ere 
higher on cheap rather than expensive goods and, therefore, the level of protection w as 
higher for the local production of heavy (low-quality) goods.663 Second, it is perfectly c lea r 
that, ceteris paribust countries with higher ad valorem duties would exclude from their hom e 
markets finer goods than countries with lower barriers. Third, increases in ad valorem duties 
augmented the range of protected goods towards fine (expensive) qualities. Finally, the 
quality range of foreign production excluded from the home market rests on the price o f  
local production and the amount of the duty. For the same reason, when local costs fell and 
the duty actually remained constant, both the level o f protection and the range of goods 
protected rose.
Several studies have discussed the influence of tariffs on the development of the 
cotton industry in the U.S..664 Duties on cotton textiles imports were established in 1789 and 
changed no less than twenty times in the ante-bellum period. The first tariff on cotton goods 
was relatively lower (5 percent ad valorem) and comparable to other manufactured products 
tariffs. In the period from 1790 to 1811, the ad  valorem duty grew in successive reforms up 
to 15 percent. The first great reform happened in 1812 when duties were practically doubled
661 On the Spanish home maiket for textiles see Sánchez-Albomoz (1981) and Prados (1983).
662 See, for example, Sandberg (1968) or Temin (1988).
663 Sandberg (1968), p. 15.
664 David (1970), Stettler (1977), Temin (1988), and Harley (1992).
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(27.5 percent) to finance the war. Moreover, in 1816, a law was completed by Congress that 
established the minimum valuation for all pieces of cloth imported into the United States. 
Note that the system of minimum values reinforced the fact that duties rested more on 
coarse than fine cloth. In 1832 the system of minimum values was dropped and rates were 
generally lowered although the ad valorem rate was still higher (25 percent). From 1842 to 
1846 there was another protective bubble and ad valorem rates were increased up to 30 
percent. Finally in 1846 Congress lowered the tariff to 25 percent and eliminated the 
minimum valuation.665 The U.S. tariff had disproportionate effects on the various cotton 
goods because it gave more protection to heavy rather than light cotton cloth. However, 
Harley has recently shown that the level of protection of the industry in the U.S., even after 
the reform of 1846, was enough to protect the production of coarse and medium-range 
cotton cloth.666 Therefore, the level of protection, was so high that it probably had negligible 
effects on the New England's cotton mills choice between coarse and medium products.
The Spanish cotton industry was protected from 1802 by the ban on cotton yam and 
cloth imports.667 In theory, obviously, the level of protection in Spain was higher than in the 
United States. By the 1840s the scope of the ban was limited to yam below 60 count and 
cloth produced with that type of yam .668 This modification of the structure of the tariff might 
not have directly affected Spanish production since the domestic industry produce very little 
yam above the 60 count. Therefore, the level of protection was so high that it probably had 
negligible effects on the choice of the Spanish cotton mills between coarse and medium 
products. However, one must be aware that the ban on foreign imports was difficult to 
enforce during these years. As a consequence, smuggled British fabrics reached a large 
portion of the Spanish market.669
665 On tariff histoiy in the cotton industry in the United States see Taussig (1931) and Stettler 
(1977), especially chapter 5.
666 Harley (1992), table 2, p. 562,
667 Nadal (1974).
668 Ronquillo (1851-1857) and Giménez Guited (1862).
669 Prados (1984).
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The obvious question is whether changes in the enforcement of the ban can explain 
changes in the choice of quality of the Catalan mills. Specifically, if the movement towards 
the medium range fabrics in the 1840s was caused by an increase in the 'real' level of 
protection (i.e., in the risk o f smuggling due to an increase in the repression of the illegal 
trade). Note that the amount of foreign goods illegally imported was a function of the 
margin received by smugglers, the premium risk obtained by consumers, and the risk 
involved in this illegal activity. For example, when the risk increases and the margin remains 
constant smuggling decreases (i.e., the 'real' level of protection and, therefore, the market 
for home industry increases). Moreover, if the risk of smuggling was little or unvaried over 
time, one could expect that, over the long-run, the amount of smuggled goods paralleled the 
margin received by smugglers and was independent of the risk incurred in illegal trade. 
Here, the hypothetical margin of smugglers is easy to compute since the premium risk 
received by consumers in Spain was negligible. The reason for this was that Spanish law 
punished only the smugglers and not the buyer, and the seizure of smuggled goods could 
only take place within the frontier zone. Thus, the margin of smugglers was equal to the 
domestic price of cotton goods minus transport costs and the foreign price of those goods. 
The next figure studies the relationship between the amount of smuggling and the margin 
of smugglers.
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Figure 9.1. Smuggling of British Cotton Goods in Spain (in £) and Margin of Smugglers
(five-year averages)
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N otes and  so u rce s : T he value o f sm uggling has been com puted according to  the foim ula proposed by Prados 
(1984). T hat is, B ritish Smuggling o f  cotton goods in Spain =  0.2 * E xports to  Portugal +  0.8 * Exports to 
G ibraltar. T he data on the value o f exports to  G ib raltar and Portugal is furnished by Mann (1968), table 25. The 
m argin o f  sm ugglers is defined as the difference betw een the Spanish and British prices o f  printing cloth m inus 
transport costs divided by British prices. For Spanish  and British prices see the further table 9.6.
If the past figure shows the true trend in smuggling and smugglers' margin, one can 
reasonably infer that the amount of smuggled cotton goods relies on the changes in the price 
gap between home and foreign goods. That is, the ban worked like an ad valorem tariff 
fixed at a (high) constant rate. In particular, the rapid decrease in the early 1840s of the 
quantity smuggled was due to the decrease in the price gap (margin), not to an increase in 
the repression of the illegal commerce. However, Figure 9.1 must be read and interpreted 
with caution since the data is highly imperfect. First, short-run variations cannot be captured 
by the formula that was used to compute the smuggling of British cotton goods because the 
formula was based in fixed coefficients. Second, the margin has been estimated as the 
difference between the prices of printer cloth in Spain and Britain. But it is possible that the 
difference between other types of Spanish and British cotton cloth did not evolve in unison
278 The Early Phase o f Catalan Industrialisation (1830-1861)
with printer cloth. Third, the figure cannot explain why smuggling increased faster during 
the 1830s. In any case, it seems implausible to link the movement of the Catalan cotton 
industry towards medium range goods with a hypothetical increase in the repression o f 
illegal trade. The level of protection grew due to the increase in the efficiency of the local 
production and, therefore, the local improvements were the main reason for the shift o f 
production towards medium-range cotton fabrics.
The three interpretations traditionally advanced in the literature have to be rejected. 
Neither the life-cycle of the industry, nor home market characteristics, nor barriers to free 
trade provide a sufficient explanation of the quality-mix of the three cotton industries 
summarised in table 9.2.
Anyone who attempts to analyse the choice among different cloth qualities is 
immediately confronted with the fact that the combination of inputs changes through the 
quality range. As mentioned above, a different combination of energy, raw cotton, labour, 
and human and physical capital was employed to produce each quality of cloth. Therefore, 
it should be relatively straightforward to relate product-mix with factor endowments.
Figure 9.2 and table 9.3 illustrate the costs of producing the different qualities o f 
cotton cloth from the point of view of the Catalan manufacturers. The figure practically 
covers the entire universe of Catalan production of cotton cloth and can be considered 
representative of the state-of-the-art of the industry at the end of the 1850s. A major 
objection, however, might be raised against this cost figure. It is impossible to assess the 
importance o f labourforce skills and machinery alternatives in the production of the different 
qualities. Since these two factories could produce the whole range of yam and cloth.
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Figure 9.2. Producing Costs of Cotton Cloth: Barcelona» 1860
N otes an d  sou rces: C ount refers to the count o f  yam  used in produced the cloth. The source is Comisión especial 
arancelaría (1867). The figures are draw n from  the answer of the España Industrial S.A.The cost o f  weaving in the 
quality 20& 30 and 50& 60 has been estim ated. T he cost o f yam  in 15&18 counts is drawn from the answer o f Jos¿ 
Ferrer & Cfa. This last figure has been m odified to  eliminate the transport costs o f raw cotton and other m aterials 
from Barcelona to V ilanova, where this second firm was settled. Note that cotton com prises the wastage. Energy 
com prises no t only coal for light and pow er but also  other m inor raw materials. L abour includes all labour cost even 
those outside the shop floor. Finally, capital costs comprise depreciation, profits and capital taxes.
The past figure shows that the production cost of cloth grew at different rates at each 
point; that is, the cost-quality relation was not a straight-line.670 Interestingly, the increase 
in total costs is more important in the transition from the medium to finest qualities than in 
the transition from coarsest to medium qualities. For example, the cost of producing one m2 
of coarse fabric (15 & 18 count) was about Rv 2.40. Whereas the cost of producing one m2 
of medium range fabrics (30 & 40 count) was about Rv 2.56 (i.e., only about 6.6 percent 
more). More specifically, raw cotton costs per m2 decreased throughout the spectrum of 
coarse-medium qualities, in spite of the fact that wastage increases with count. In the fíne
670 This result invalidates the argument of Bils (1984) on the straight-line relation between costs 
and quality in cotton cloth.
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qualities, particularly above 60 count, the raw cotton costs grew again due to the use of 
large staple and, therefore, expensive fibre. On the other hand, labour, capital and energy 
costs rose with count increases.
Table 9.3 Share of Inputs in Total Costs of Cotton Cloth: Barcelona, 1860 (percent)
Entrefinos Finos Finos Finos
Gruesos Medios Entrefinos Tupidos Medios Claros
Yarn Count 15 &18 20 & 30 30 & 40 40 & 50 50 & 60 70 & 90
Cotton 53.41 47.00 38 J 1 27.70 18.98 18.31
Energy 8.94 10.10 11.76 13.77 15.21 15.58
Labour 24.39 27.84 31.26 3737 42.92 42.16
Capital 13.25 15.06 18.47 21.16 22.90 23.95
N otes an d  so u rce s : See the previous figure 9 .2 .
Table 9.3 displays the fact that the share of different inputs in total costs varied 
according to quality. Thus, the coarsest quality was the most raw-materials intensive and less 
labour-intensive, whereas the opposite holds for finest qualities. Note that the two factories 
in the sample could produce the whole range of goods given their stocks of human and 
physical capital.671 For that reason, the ratios of capital to labour and energy to labour are 
rather constant. Although, they actually produced more medium quality than other types o f 
cloth (e.g., the share of medium-quality cloth in the production of España Industrial S A . 
was about 80 percent of the total). In other words, it seems that they were better prepared, 
given their stock of physical and human capital, to produce medium-range goods.
Figures for the whole Catalan cotton industry would probably diverge by some 
amount from the sample figures. Thus, firms specialised in the coarsest qualities used 
throstles instead of self-acting mules and, therefore, operated with relatively more capital and 
energy per worker than the sample firms. Conversely, cotton mills specialised in the finest 
qualities used mule-jennies instead of self-acting mules and employed less capital and energy
671 They used steam-powered self-actings and poweriooms and organised their workforce into 
work-teams, as was typical in Catalan cotton firms.
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per worker.672 In a few words, the figures presented above presumably overstate the share 
of labour in the cost of coarse qualities whereas the contrary holds for finest qualities.
Manufacturers in Catalonia were constraint by the price they had to pay for raw 
cotton and for coal, which was primarily influenced by geological and geographical factors. 
The problem was alleviated by producing more fine cloth, which was less raw-materials 
intensive than coarse cloth. Thus, the efficient firm on the frontier of the local best-practice 
tried to produce cloth as fine as was possible with the level of efficiency of its workforce. 
The more skilled was their workforce, the finer was the production, and the high cost of raw 
materials was less important. In other words, cotton mills with unskilled labour specialised 
in products in which the skills inferiority of their workforce had relatively little impact on 
the final price (i.e., in coarse cloth). Whereas cotton mills with a skilled labourforce did 
exactly the opposite. The constraint on this movement towards fine cloth in Catalonia was 
the skill of the local labourforce because the finest qualities were generally beyond the 
abilities of the Catalan labourforce. However, it is not clear whether one should speak about 
the human capital constraint or the climatic constraint. The fact is that the thread breakages 
varied with the count level (high counts broke more often than coarse counts) and the 
dampness of the climate. Because Catalonia is less damp than Lancashire it is clear that 
thread tended to break more often in the former than the latter. For instance, during the 
summer, many spinning firms were at standstill in Catalonia due to the low levels of 
dampness.673 In this segment of the market, the Spanish workforce could not compete with 
British production, even with the help of the high levels of protection. Thus, there is strong 
evidence that the efficiency of labour is important in determining the drift of best-practice 
technology in Catalonia.
Despite the fact that the data reported on the previous pages have their limitations, 
one can argue that they provide an explanation for the technical choice and quality-mix of 
the Catalan cotton firms and, by extension, of the British and U.S. cotton mills. On average, 
Catalan cotton mills produced cloth that was in the middle of the extreme choices; the
672 VonTunzelmann (1978), table 7.3, p. 185 demonstrates this for Lancashire. See also Gattrell 
(1977).
673 See Famie (1979) and the contemporary, Ferrer Vidal (1875).
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unskilled and raw-materials intensive production of the coarse-cloth New England mills» and 
the skills-intensive and raw-materials saving choice of the fine-spinning Lancashire cotton 
mills. Therefore» one can argue that it is likely that Catalonia had a scarce supply of raw  
materials, but that her labour force was on average more skilled than the U.S. but less than 
in Britain.
The other components of the quality choice must, however, be allowed their due. 
Plant and equipment costs were higher in Spain and the U.S. compared to Britain. This by 
itself lowered their optimal quality because it raised their relative operating speeds. Labour 
costs were higher in the U.S. and lower in Spain. In isolation this would have had the 
effects actually observed, lower quality in the former than in the latter. These aspects along 
with the particular characteristics of the consumers' choices are not perfectly disentangled. 
However, the major question that remains is if this Catalan choice was competitive.
9.4. International Competitiveness: The Price of Outputs
International comparisons o f the prices of cotton yam  are simple because cotton yam  
was a relatively standard product. Cotton yam was classified from coarsest to finest with 
successive numbers (counts). In the nineteenth century there were at least four different 
standards (English, French, Spanish and Belgian)674 but the comparison of and conversion 
among them is easy. Moreover, for each count, there were two qualities of yam, warp and 
weft. The next table compares the prices of 'Spanish 30 count weft' (second quality) and the 
corresponding British prices from 1830 to 1861.
674 According to Jeremy (1971), cotton mills in the United States adopted the English standards 
in the 1820s-1830s. Asséo (1989) supplies the table used to convert the different standards but his 
numbers are not‘correct for Spanish count. The correct Spanish figures are available at Ferrer Vidal 
(1875) or Ronquillo (1851-1857).
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Table 9.4 Prices of Yam, Spanish 30 count: Britain and Spain (Cts. per Kg.)
Year British Spanish Year British Spanish
1830 284.62 65625 1845 205.11 40625
1831 240.52 625.00 1846 246.79 375.00
1832 270.93 593.75 1847 190.63 343.75
1833 291.56 593.75 1848 181.40 329.38
1834 324.49 593.75 1849 183.08 312JO
1835 379.35 562.50 1850 245.18 375.00
1836 366.16 562.50 1851 213.90 375.00
1837 293.28 531.25 1852 214.63 343.75
1838 282.30 53125 1853 211.40 329.38
1839 264.34 531.25 1854 192.72 375.00
1840 235.91 53125 1855 196.84 343.75
1841 222.95 500.00 1856 222.91 343.75
1842 211.97 437JO 1857 233.63 343.75
1843 208.29 40625 1858 256.62 343.75
1844 206.01 40625 1859 264.52 343.75
Notes an d  so u rces : IPta. = 100 cts. British prices (counts 30 and 40) are an arithmetic average o f  the prices 
furnished by M ann (1968), The Economist (1845)(1850)( 1855)0 860) and H ubeim an (1996). T he conversion to the 
num ber Spanish 30 has been obtained according to the next formula: Price Spanish 30 = Price British 30 +  0.126 
* (price British 40  - price British 30). The resulting prices have been converted to Pta with the variable exchange 
rate com puted by Prados (1984). Spanish P rices are drawn from Diario de Barcelona (1866).
The table serves to illustrate, first, the large difference between the English and the 
Spanish price in this type of medium-quality yam and, second, the decline of the price gap. 
Thus, in 1830 Spanish prices were 56 percent higher than the British prices. Whereas by the 
late 1850s the difference had been halved (the price difference was reduced to about 25 
percent). It should be underlined that this reduction cannot be associated with the Spanish 
or British industry's cyclical experience, changes in exchange rates or the decrease of the 
price of raw materials in Spain. It is due to the continuous improvement of the productivity 
of the Catalan cotton mills.673
Cotton cloth is the least easy to compare because it was not a standard commodity. 
Prices of cotton cloth could vary with changes in yam quality, widths, number of threads 
per inch, and finishing. The next table serves to illustrate the difficulties in comparing cloth 
prices: 675
675 See chapters 5 and 6.
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Table 9.5 Prices of Several Types of Grey Cloth: Britain and Spain, 1860 (in Pta.)
Density Pnce Pnce
British
gr/m2 PtaAg Pta7m2
72 reed, Printer 128 3.57 0.46
48 reed. Red End Long Cloth 125 2.64 0.33
72 reed, Gold End Shirthings 121 3.47 0.42
66 reed, Gold End Shirthings 114 3.32 0.38
60 reed, Gold End Shirthings 110 3.13 0.35
66 reed, Printer 
Spanish
107 3.97 0.42
80 hilos, 5/4 2* 124 5.90 0.73
84 hilos, 5/4 A 122 6.26 0.77
70 hilos. Entrefinos tupidos 121 5.17 0.62
68 hilos, 5/4 3* 120 5.35 0.64
66 hilos. 7/8 1* 113 4.93 0.56
60 hilos. 7/8 2* 102 4.50 0.46
N otes and  so u rce s : T he British prices are d raw n from  the Economist (1860) and correspond to January 1860 while
the Spanish prices are drawn from C om isión especial arancelaria (1867). A ll Spanish prices are  drawn from the 
answ er o f José Ferrer and C ía, except the p rice  o f  Entrefinos Tupidos that is furnished by the answ er o f España 
Industrial S.A. Spanish  grey cloths are chosen  for their resem blance w ith the B ritish products for which the 
Economist published prices. British prices are converted  to Pta. with the exchange rate o f  Prados (1984). Numbers 
are subject to rounding errors.
It is difficult to find in the previous list two equal goods. Only, the "72 reed, Gold 
End Shirthings" and the 7 0  hilos, Entrefinos tupidos' were almost identical. The Catalan 
cloth was about one third more expensive than the British cloth. It is also possible to 
compare the price of the '66 reed, Printer* with a hypothetical Spanish cloth, which is an 
average of the two quotations of the '66 hilos, 7/8 1*' and the *66 hilos, 7/8 2*' (two very 
similar types of cloth). Here, the price of British cloth was 80 percent of the price of 
Spanish cloth. Note that these figures support the belief that Spanish finer cloth was 
relatively more expensive than British finer cloth.
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Table 9.6 Printer Grey Cloth Prices: Britain, United States and Spain, 1830-1860
(Cts. per m2)
Year British Spanish Year British US Spanish
1830 44.81 14434 1846 33.73 62.10
1831 51.36 121.66 1847 34.93 49.07 50.66
1832 49.52 121.66 1848 31.15 43.06 47.90
1833 51.36 121.66 1849 32.95 37.07 50.66
1834 53.98 112.97 1850 35.33 38.40 56.38
1835 58.43 104.70 1851 32.09 38.50 50.66
1836 5738 101.74 1852 33.69 37.79 50.66
1837 44.81 96.01 1853 33.42 46.33 53.62
1838 48.48 90.29 1854 30.32 42.89 56.38
1839 49.79 87.75 1855 28.93 37.10 53.62
1840 41.93 90.29 1856 31.47 40.68 50.66
1841 41.93 88.38 1857 33.95 41.90 47.90
1842 34.85 67.61 1858 34.70 42.59 50.66
1843 35.90 65.07 1859 40.17 44.19 50.66
1844 35.90 62.10 1860 40.72 46.42
1845 34.33 62.10
Notes and sources: British prices correspond to  66 reed printer until 1845 and are drawn from the Economist
(1850)(l855)(1860). From  1830 to 1845 the price series of 72 reed printer, the only available, w as spliced w ith the 
series of 66 reed using the relative w eights o f  1845. This series w as drawn from  Blaug (1961), p. 376. U .S. prices 
correspond to an average o f the "28" 64*64 M etacom et" and "Print Cloth, 28" 7 yds." o f  the A ldrich Report. This 
series was draw n from  Harley (1992), table 1, p. 562 (I transform ed the series reported by Harley from yards to 
m2). Spanish prices correspond to an average o f  the prices of ’66 hilos, 7/8 1*' and *60 hilos, 7/8 2*’, as appeared 
in the Com isión Especial A rancelaria (1867). These prices correspond exactly w ith the m axim um  and m inim um  
prices of the series o f  T ejido  crudo para pintar', w hich was reported in the D iario  de Barcelona (1867). Pta-Sterling 
exchange rates are draw n from Prados (1984) and the Dollar-Sterling exchange is $4.8 per £ .
Table 9.6 displays the price difference among British, U.S. and Spanish printer cloth 
from 1830 to 1860. Two facts stand out. First, the difference between the Spanish and 
British prices was large, but the price gap reduced drastically from 1830 to 1861. For 
instance, in the 1830s Spanish prices habitually doubled British prices whereas at the end 
of the 1850s the price difference was about 25 percent. Second, the difference between 
Spanish and U.S. prices was about half the difference between Spanish and British prices.
From these results, one can conclude that the Spanish cotton industry could not 
survive without the help of tariffs. The figures for the duties that could have been imposed 
on British printer cloth to protect the Spanish industry are now calculated. Considering that
JV.W w w^v ^■^^1»ywKxx>^V'vv-v^ L -x-^ j. -nu .»
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the price of freight increased by a mere 10 percent the price of British cotton goods in 
Spain.676 On average, the duty required on British printer fabrics to dissuade their export to 
Spain would be 100 percent ad valorem in the 1830s, 65 percent in the 1840s, and 43 
percent in the 1850s. In sharp contrast, U.S. cotton mills would encounter many problems 
selling their cloth in Spain, even if they did not have to pay duties. The price of freight from 
New York to Barcelona, which was double the price from Liverpool to Barcelona, was 
enough to prevent U.S. cotton mills selling their products in Spain. Also, U.S. coarse cloth 
was not competitive in the Spanish market. In particular, including the price of freight, the 
final price of the U.S. domestic (heavy) cloth in Spain would be about 47 cts/m2 in 1860, 
more than the price of the relatively finer Spanish printer cloth (46 cts/m2).677
9.5. International Competitiveness: The Price of Raw Materials
The single most important raw material in the production of cotton cloth was raw 
cotton. From 1830 to 1860, the slave states of the South of the United States retained their 
position as the main world producers of this crop. Raw cotton was also cultivated in Egypt, 
Brazil, some Caribbean zones, and India. In spite of the clear dominance of the United 
States in the production of raw cotton, the major wholesale market in the world was in 
Liverpool. In this period 68 percent of the U.S. cotton industry was located in New 
England.678 The factories in New England bought most of the raw cotton in the Port of New 
York, where it arrived from the Southern States. The raw cotton was cheaper in New York 
than in Liverpool, but recently Knick Harley showed that the price difference was less than 
contemporary commentators suggested.679 In Spain, imports of raw cotton were centralised
676 According to the Comisión especial arancelaria (1867), the price of freight from Liverpool 
to Barcelona was 37.25 cts. per kilo in the case of general merchandise. Taking into account that 
the insurance and bagging costs must be slightly higher in the case of cotton goods, one can assume 
that the cost of 10 m2, which weighed about 10 kg., must have been around 4-4.5 cts. per kilo. That 
is, ten percent of the British price of printer goods.
677 The American price was drawn from Harley (1992), table 1, p. 562. Spanish prices 
correspond to the prices of "60 hilos, 7/8 2*" in table 7.6. Exchange rates were computed as in table
7.6.
678 DeBow (1970), table CXCVI, p. 180.
679 Harley (1992), table 3.
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in the Port of Barcelona because about 75 percent of the cotton industry (1861) was 
concentrated in Catalonia.680 Catalan cotton mills bought their cotton in Liverpool* in New 
Orleans or* alternatively, from wholesalers in the Port of Barcelona.681
The next table shows the different costs of the same quality of U.S. raw cotton (US 
Middling) in the Ports of New York* Liverpool and Barcelona. All prices are final wholesale 
prices and include freight, cargo, duties* taxes and other minor costs.
Table 9.7 Raw Cotton Prices: New York, Liverpool and Barcelona* 1830-1860
(Cts. per Kg.)
Year New York Liverpool Barcelona Year New York Liverpool Barcelona
1830 122 157 188 1845 74 96 121
1831 119 128 192 1846 90 112 136
1832 121 158 182 1847 129 140 168
1833 149 196 199 1848 94 97 125
1834 154 198 239 1849 81 93 146
1835 211 226 273 1850 137 158 188
1836 202 214 257 1851 138 122 188
1837 145 141 227 1852 106 112 156
1838 110 150 184 1853 124 122 163
1839 154 175 212 1854 124 117 158
1840 94 128 175 1855 116 124 165
1841 108 138 155 1856 120 138 164
1842 87 116 134 1857 159 173 188
1843 75 105 133 1858 147 157 200
1844 94 113 166 1859 141 149 189
N otes and so u rces: Prices conesponded to  US m iddling quality (and hence are adjusted for differences in grades
see Harley (1992)). N ew  York and Liverpool p rices are drawn from  Harley (1992) and converted to  Pta. w ith the 
variable exchange rate com puted by P rados (1984). Prices in Barcelona are draw n from  D iario de Barcelona (1867).
It should be noted that market prices tend to fluctuate more severely in smaller than 
in larger markets due to the relative impact of each shipment. Therefore, there could be large
680 Gimenez Guited (1862), p. 204.
681 Spanish duties on raw cotton helped the direct import from producing sites with Spanish 
ships. The duty on raw cotton imports on Spanish ships from the producing sites was Rv. 7 per 100 
kg. and the duty on deposit ports in non producer zones was Rv. 34.7 Rv per 100 kg. In foreign 
ships, the duty increased, respectively, up to Rv. 44 and Rv. 52 per 100 kg. Gimenez Guited (1862), 
p. 204.
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differences between the Catalan and the other two markets in certain years. On average, the 
prices of raw cotton in Barcelona were 47 percent higher than in New York and 28 percent 
higher than in Liverpool. Moreover, the price differential with Liverpool did not decrease 
in the period while the difference with New York fell from an average of 47 percent in the 
1830s to 35 percent in the 1850s.
Table 9.8 gives a detailed account of the import costs that affected the price of raw 
cotton in Barcelona. The data is based on a survey conducted by the government on a major 
Catalan cotton firm (España Industrial S A .) that imported raw cotton from Liverpool. 
Therefore, this table must reflect the lowest import cost of raw cotton in Barcelona because 
this firm did not incur the costs generated by the wholesalers of the Port of Barcelona. 
Which could increase the prices by about 6-7 percent. Note that the two main headings are 
the freight from Liverpool to Barcelona and the Spanish duty on raw cotton imports. These 
expensive freights can be partly explained by the absence of return cargo from Barcelona 
to Liverpool.
Table 9.8 Costs of Raw Cotton: Port of Barcelona, 1860 (in Rv.)
1. Raw cotton (100 Kg.) 547.00
2. Commission for purchase (2%) 10.94
3. Brokerage (0.5%) 2.74
4. Insurance (1.125 %) 0.12
5. Bagging (1.5 %) 0.04
6. Freight 93.50
7. Duty 34.70
8. Tax on roads 2.78
9. Minor charges 4.20
Total 696.02
Added cost 149.02
Percent 21.41
N otes an d  so u rce s : 1 Pta. = 4  Rv. T he data is draw n from C om isión especial arancelaria (1867).
The cost of coal was an important factor in the total expenses of Catalan cotton 
mills. In this period, cotton mills employed up to three different sources of motive power 
in their mills: horses, steam-engines and water-wheels. According to the contemporary
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sources, U.S. mills tended to use water.682 Whereas British mills that were located in 
Lancashire, where water power was scarce and therefore expensive, tended to use steam 
engines.683 An analysis of the comparative costs of different sources of energy in Britain and 
the United States found that U.S. power was nearly half as expensive as British power in 
the cotton industry in the 1830s.684
Catalonia did not enjoy coal deposits and her rivers were short and had irregular 
flow. Therefore, in comparative terms, energy costs were higher in Catalonia than in Britain 
or the United States.685 Furthermore, the high cost of energy in Catalonia delayed the 
triumph of the steam engine over alternative motive powers. Sayrd's report showed that in 
1840 a small portion of all spinning machinery was turned by water or steam power and the 
overwhelming majority of all looms were still turned by hand.686 This situation changed 
rapidly because, at the end of the 1850s, almost 75 percent of spindles and fifty percent of 
looms were turned by steam engines.687 It is likely that the rapid triumph of steam power 
was due to the adoption of the new high pressure engines that saved coal. Consequently, 
they were more economically attractive for the Catalan cotton mills.688
In this period, most of the coal used by Catalan cotton mills was mainly imported 
in sail ships from Cardiff or Newcastle in Britain.689 Large transport costs and tariffs, as 
shown in table 9.9, meant that the price of coal in the Port o f Barcelona was about 76 
percent higher than in Britain.
682 Montgomery (1840), Jeremy (1981) and Von Tunzelmann (1978).
683 Von Tunzelmann (1978).
684 Von Tunzelmann (1978), pp. 160-163, 266-278 and 282.
685 Caneras (1983).
686 Say io (1842) and Madoz (1846).
687 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
688 Von Tunzelmann (1978), chapter 4.
689 Nadal (1974).
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Table 9.9 Costs of Coal: Port of Barcelona, 1860 (in Rv.)
1. Cardiff Coal (100 Kg.) 5.44
2. Freight 11.24
3. Dock and others 2.53
4. Duty 335
Total 22.76
Added costs 17.32
Percent 76.10
Notes a n d  sources: Com isión especia] arancelaría  (1867).
The figures on raw cotton and coal costs can help us approximate the sources of the 
absence of competitiveness in international markets of Catalan cotton cloth. In table 9.10 
I present some estimates of the part of price gap between the Spanish and foreign printer 
cloth that was caused by the high cost of raw materials in Catalonia. For my economic 
analysis I assume that Catalan cotton mills did not change their production function even 
if the relative price of raw materials decreased. One could argue that this assumption can 
be highly misleading because the relatively high cost of raw materials meant that Spaniards 
economised more on raw materials when compared to British and U.S. producers. It is 
likely, however, that the differences in the price of raw materials influenced more the 
quality-mix than the quantity of raw materials employed in each quality. That is, each 
quality was produced with quasi-fixed proportions o f raw materials.690 For example, Spanish, 
U.S. and British cotton mills employed almost the same amount and quality of raw cotton 
to produce each single quality of cotton cloth.691 However, it must be recognised that the 
large differences in the price of energy affected machinery speeds since U.S. cotton mills 
ran faster than both British and Catalan cotton mills.692 On the other hand, Catalan mills 
copied the speeds of the similar British cotton mills.693 Finally, it should be noted that the 
figures assume that British, Catalan and New England cotton mills were situated at the
690 This holds after the Catalan cotton mills adopted steam power as the source of motive power.
691 This question is easy to test by comparing the Spanish technical handbooks (e.g., Aiau, 
(1855) and Calvet, 1857) with the British sources (e.g. Hubeiman (1996), Ure (1836)). Furthermore, 
Harley (1992) argues the same for the U.S. and British mills.
692 See Montgomery (1840) and VonTunzelmann (1978), p. 202ff. on the different speeds of the 
U.S. and British cotton mills
693 See Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
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import sites of raw materials, where the prices were the lowest. Since it is likely that in 
Catalonia and New England transport costs were higher than in Britain this presumption 
would reduce the price-gap. Consequently, it can be assumed that these figures represent the 
lower bound of the price-gap that can be explained by the higher cost of raw materials in 
Spain.
Table 9.10 The Sources of the Spanish Price-gap in Printer cloth, 1845-1859
Final price Due to
difference raw materials Percent explained
Britain US Britain US Britain US
1845 27.78 8.47 3031
1846 28.37 8.36 29.45
1847 15.73 1.59 8.81 10.94 56.05 68938
1848 16.75 4.84 8.77 9.93 5238 205.16
1849 17.70 13.58 12.00 14.18 67.78 104.41
1850 21.05 17.98 9.00 1232 42.76 69.62
1851 18.57 12.15 13.65 1237 7332 101.76
1852 16.97 12.86 10.82 1239 63.77 9630
1853 20.20 129 10.46 11.01 51.75 151.04
1854 26.06 13.49 10.44 1030 40.08 7637
1855 24.69 16.53 1030 12.17 4231 73.62
1856 19.18 9.97 830 1139 4432 116.20
1857 13.95 6.01 7.18 9.63 51.47 160.32
1858 15.95 8.07 10.75 12.76 6739 15833
1859 10.49 6.47 10.35 12.03 98.70 185.93
Notes and  so u rce s ; The price differential has been computed with the data o f  the tables 9 .6 , 9.7 and 9 .9 . It has
been assum ed that A m erican m ills were w ater-pow ered. Furthermore, it has been included the Spanish industrial 
tax in the raw  m aterials differential, because to m y knowledge a sim ilar tax did not exist in the other tw o countries. 
According to the data  o f  the Com isión Especial A rancelaria (1867), the am ount o f coal em ployed in producing one 
m2 o f printer cloth w as 0.55 kg and the am ount o f  raw cotton 0.126376 Kg. T he industrial tax o n  this m 2 am ounted
2.8791 cts.
The results of this table are illuminating: on average, half of the price gap with 
Britain can be explained by the high costs of raw materials alone and, roughly speaking, the 
price-gap with the U.S. mills is explained by the high cost of raw materials in Spain. The 
table also confirms the rapid progression of the Catalan cotton mills in comparison with the 
British and U.S. cotton mills. In the next section, I test the robustness of these results by 
comparing the. productivity of cotton factories in the three countries. Note that if the price
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gap was due to the technological superiority of British mills, and not to differences in minor 
costs,694 695the level of total factor productivity must be higher in Britain than in New England 
and Catalonia.
9.6. Productivity Comparisons
The literature on economic history emphasises that the productivity of labour and 
capital are not independent o f their relative prices.693 For example, Broadberry has recently 
argued that 'the origins of the gap [in labour productivity between the United States and 
Britain] lie in the abundance of land and resources in America compared with Europe' and 
adds that 'technology transfer from Britain to American [in the nineteenth century] required 
adaptation of local circumstances, economising on scarce skilled labour but utilising 
abundant resources'.696 Similarly, development and growth theorists tend to emphasise that 
labour productivity differences among countries can be explained, at least partly, as a 
consequence of different levels of physical and human capital intensity 697 In other words, 
countries well endowed with capital (advanced countries) had the highest labour productivity 
and the lowest capital productivity. Whereas the contrary holds for less developed countries. 
Therefore, it could be interesting to review the differences in the prices of capital and labour 
among New England, Catalonia and Britain before proceeding with the analysis of their 
productivity differentials.
Table 9.11 presents some information in the comparative costs of labour in the New 
England, Lancashire and Catalonia cotton industries. Admittedly, the data is highly imperfect 
because the figures are not adjusted for female and child employment. The table displays 
the well-known fact that the cost of labour was higher in the United States than in Britain
694 Harley (1992) suggested that British superiority was due to minor costs.
695 Specifically, I define for this section productivity of labour as the result of dividing sectoral 
output by labour input and the productivity of capital as the result of dividing sectoral output by 
capital input.
696 Broadberiy (1997), p. 88-89. Obviously, this statements is based on the Habakkuk debate. See 
Habakkuk (1962) and, for example, James, and Skinner (1985).
697 See, for example, Bairo and Sala-i-Maitin (1994).
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and Spain. Therefore, ceteris paribus, one can expect that in New England labour 
productivity was higher than in Lancashire and Catalonia.
Table 9.11 Comparative Cost of Labour: New England, Lancashire and Catalonia,
1840 and 1860 (in Pta.)
N. England Lancashire Catalonia N .England Lancashire Catalonia
per day per day per day per hour per hour per hour
Spinning c.1840 2.88 221 1.21 0.23 0.23 0.10
Spinning c.1860 3.06 2.50 2.21 0.28 025 0.19
Weaving c.1840 2.80 2.06 1.87 0.23 0.21 0.16
Weaving c.1860 3.13 2.37 2.60 0.28 0.24 0.23
S ources and  no tes: N ew  England data are draw n from Layer (1955), table 6, p. 24 and table 14, p. 52; c. 1840 
correspond to the period 1840-44 and c.1860 to the period 1855-1859. L ancashire data is draw n from Ellison 
(1968), p.66-67. C atalonia data fo re . 1840 is draw n from Madoz (1846) and com prised  domestic industry, w hereas 
data for 1860 is drawn from  Comisión especial arancelaría (1867).
Table 9.12 furnishes a better comparison of the real costs o f labour in Lancashire and 
Catalonia. Here the wages are presented on job basis. The differences in weekly wages are 
less than one would expect, on average about 15 percent. By contrast, once the wages are 
adjusted for the duration of the working week the differences practically double. If these 
wages represent the true marginal productivity of labour, one concludes that Lancashire 
workers were about thirty percent more efficient than Catalan workers.
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Table 9.12 Wages in Cotton Industry: Lancashire and Catalonia, c. 1860 (in Pta.)
Lancashire CataloniaLancashire/Catalonia
Week Hour Week Hour Week Hour
Preparation Female 38.4 0.64 34.30 0.50 1.12 1.29
Spinners Male 100.8 1.68 84.00 1.22 1.20 1.38
Assistants Female 48 0.80 42.00 0.61 1.14 1.31
Card masters Male 134.4 224 120.00 1.74 1.12 1.29
Spinning masters Male 124.8 2.08 120.00 1.74 1.04 1.20
Weaving ancillary Female 45.6 0.76 36.00 0.52 127 1.46
Weavers Male-Female 82.8 1.38 72.00 1.04 1.15 1.32
N otes an d  so u rces : T he Lancashire da ta  is draw n from  Ellison (1968), p . 67  and the C atalonia data from  Comisión 
especia) arancelaría (1867). The w orking w eek w as o f  60  hours in Lancashire and 69 hours in C atalonia. British 
wages are converted to  Pta. with the exchange rate  o f  Prados (1984). N um bers are subject to  rounding errors.
The price of machinery was also different in the three countries. Chadwick estimated 
that in 1860 the fixed capital in each new spindle in Britain was 24s and £24 in each 
powerloom. Assuming that each powerloom consumed the yam of about 45 spindles, the 
cost of fixed capital per spindle (plus loom) in Britain was 34.6s.698 In Spain, according to 
España Industrial's figures, the cost of fixed capital per spindle was Pta. 112.85 (95s).6"  
McGouldrick shows that the standard cost of fixed capital per spindle (including buildings 
and the machinery of the weaving section) in the United States was $19.09 in 1860 (that is, 
about 79.54s).700 However, this figure cannot be directly compared with the Spanish and 
British figures since it is based on water-power spindles whereas the other two are steam- 
power spindles. It is well known that the fixed capital costs of water-wheels were higher 
than the fixed capital costs of steam-engines. In particular, Temin's figures show that the 
fixed cost of water-wheels (including buildings) in the United States was 2.04 times the 
fixed cost of steam-power.701 Since the cost of water-power installation was about 17.25 
percent of all fixed capital costs in I860,702 U.S. cotton mills could reduce the total fixed
698 Chadwick cited by Blaug (1961), p. 373.
699 Comisión especial arancelaria (1867).
700 McGouldrick (1968), table 46, p. 240.
701 Temin (1966). Von Tunzelmann (1978), p. 162 argues that Temin's figures probably 
overstated the price difference between steam and water engines.
702 McGouldrick (1968), table 46, p. 240-241.
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capital by about 8.45 percent by using steam engines instead of water-wheels. In other 
words, the cost of one steam-power spindle in the United States (1856) was $19.09 (that is, 
about 72.8s).
It is likely that the relatively lower price of capital goods in Spain and the United 
States than in Great Britain was a consequence of the fact that practically all inventions in 
the cotton industry were made by British engineers. For instance, in this early period, the 
Catalan firms imported practically all spinning machinery and powerlooms from England 
or France (Alsace). Therefore, when one machine had to be repaired spares came from 
Britain, with high costs for the factories.703 Finally, it should also be noted that in Spain and 
the United States duties had to be paid on imported machinery .704 705
In spite of the fact that the past figures are a very imperfect indicator, one would 
expect that, ceteris paribus, U.S. workers employed more machinery than British and 
Spanish workers. Similarly, one would also expect that labour productivity was higher in the 
United States than in the other two countries.
As mentioned above, the Tòrqvist indices of productivity developed in chapters 5 and 
6 cannot be used serve for international comparisons of productivity because they measure 
absolute changes in total factor productivity. Therefore, to compare productivity levels 
among countries it is necessary to develop an alternative method. Basically, the objective 
is to construct a benchmark comparison of productivity levels using the same Translog 
production function.
Moving to output. The measure is based on the Translog approach to output 
measurement. First, the output in each country must be divided into homogeneous 
components.709 Here, I decided to divide the production of cloth into five qualities according
703 Ferrer Vidal (1875).
704 Gimenez Guited (1862) and Taussig (1931).
705 The sources are enumerated in the notes to table 7.1.
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to Huberman’s definitions.706 Then, output is converted to m2 equivalents of coarsest cloth 
using relative unit values. Since relative unit values are different in the three countries, the 
relative unit values employed are an average of the weights of the three countries. With this 
method I get a measure of output that considers quality and the differences between the 
relative prices.707
The comparison of the total amount of production is also hampered by the fact that 
the British, the Spanish and the U.S. spinning industries exported part of their yam 
production. British factories exported yam  to their domestic industry and other countries. 
Catalan factories exported yam to the domestic and to the mixed-fabrics industry. In Britain, 
the total amount 'exported' represents about 32 percent of yam output. More formidable 
problems arise again with the Catalan industry. The fact is that most of the cloth production 
was in the hands of the domestic industry in 1850. Consequently, a large part of the yam 
output was exported. I assume that output from self-acting mules and throstles was used for 
the powerweaving whereas the production in mule-jennies was exported. This assumption 
is corroborated by the original census because vertically integrated firms employed usually 
throstles and powerlooms but not mule-jennies,708 For Britain, I assume that the highest 
quality yam was exported to handweaving709 and international exports were proportionally 
distributed among the different qualities. In Catalonia, it was assumed that the production 
of the powerlooms was 80 percent G2 quality and 20 percent GF quality. It should be noted 
that these two assumptions are biased against Catalonia and Britain since a less restrictive 
assumption (exports are distributed regularly along the spectrum of qualities) would have 
increased their output figures. The following table presents the results of these calculations:
706 Huberman (1996).
707 Relative values arc obtained from Harley (1992), The Economist (1845)(1850)(1855)(1860) 
and Comisión especial arancelaria (1867). It is impossible. to obtain U.S. prices for the finest 
qualities and decided to use only Spanish and British unit values.
708 Junta de fábricas (1850).
709 According to VonTunzelmann (1978), pp. 195ff. powerlooms were not economically 
profitable for the production of the finest cloth.
Chapter 9: Technology and International Competitiveness 297
Table 9.13 Output in Cotton Factory System: New England, Catalonia and Britain, 1850
Output Gl G2 GF FI Equivalent Gl
New England 355,692 133,164 514,823
Catalonia 21,929 5,482 38,199
Britain 173,536 619,398 376,820 96,072 2,071,790
Price 1.000 1.195 1.8054 4.973
Notes and sources: ou tpu t figures in thousand o f  m2. The quality G1 corresponds to the coarsest quality. For a 
very detailed description o f the qualities see section  2.2 in chapter 2.
Moving to labour input. The British figures are drawn from Blaug (1961) and Von 
Tunzelmann (1978). The New England figures are from DeBow (1970) and the Catalonia 
figures are from Junta de Fabricas (1850). With all workers in se lf  actings, throstles and 
powerlooms. Relative wages are not available for children in Britain and New England since 
figures are only available on a male/female basis (in both countries, female wages were 
about 60 percent of male wages). Catalan figures are also adjusted for children, and sources 
show that adult female wages were about 50 percent of adult male wages. This ratio was 
adopted elsewhere.710 The labour input figures are presented in the table 9.14:
Table 9.14 Labour in Cotton Factory System: New England, Catalonia and Britain, 1850
Equivalent Equivalent
L a b o u r Males Females Children Males Hours
New England 15,974 41,148 6,846 38,534 140,956,185
Catalonia 3,350 3,282 1,883 5,457 17,382,987
Britain 106,368 147,956 12,263 184,646 553,939.293
Notes and sources: see text.
The direct computation of the amount of capital would be highly misleading because 
of the differences between the prices of machinery among the three countries (see above). 
Therefore, the choice was for a quantity measure of capital (steam-power spindles 
equivalent), which comprises spindles plus horsepower and powerlooms. The U.S. figures 
were obtained from Stettler (1977), but the water-power spindles (75 percent) were
7,0 Thus, the weights are females = 0.51 males and children = 0.23 males. Working hours from 
Layer (1955), Ellison (1968) and Ceid4 (1968).
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converted to steam-power spindles with the equivalence estimated above (1 water-power 
spindle = 1.0925 steam-power spindles). The Spanish figures were obtained directly from 
the Junta de fábricas (1850) census, and correspond to all self-actings and throstles (the 
assumption is that mule-jennies produced for the export sector). British data is obtained from 
Blaug (1961) the 20 percent of doubling spindles and the percentage of spindles that worked 
for the export sector were eliminated (see above). The next table shows the data on capital 
input:
Table 9.15 Capital in Cotton Factory System: New England, Catalonia and Britain, 1850
Equivalent Value Value
Capital Spindles Hours Fixed Inventories
New England 2,748503 10,054 56,775550 38,464,555
Catalonia 147,368 469 20,117,206 13567,736
Britain 10,852,929 32559 18,775568 8,782,120
N otes and  sou rces: C ap ita l hours are m illion  o f  equ ivalen t steam -pow er sp ind les hours. F ixed capital, inventories, 
rental rates are in local currencies. See tex t for sources.
The last step in computing Translog indices of total factor productivity levels consists 
of estimating the relative shares of capital and labour. The shares are an unweighted average 
of the shares of capital and labour in the three countries. With this method I get a measure 
of total factor productivity that considers the differences between the relative endowments 
among countries.
The wages for Britain were obtained from Wood.711 The New England wages were 
computed from DeBow (1970). Catalan wages were a weighted average of the figures for 
1840 and 1860, from Madoz (1846) and Comisión especial arancelaria (1867). Capital share 
was computed with the rental price of capital. Therefore, perfect competition was assumed 
and that the same depreciation rates were used in the three countries. That is Ri= Pi(t)*r + 
Pi(t)*£ or the rental rate of i is equal to the price times the rate o f return plus the price times 
the depreciation rate. The fixed capital values are obtained by multiplying the number of spindles
7,1 Cited by Blaug (1961)
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by their value (see text). I also computed inventories by means of the figures of Blaug (1961), 
McGouldrick (1966) and Ronquillo (1851-57). The depreciation rates are 7.5 percent in machinery, 
2.5 percent in buildings, and zero for inventories. It was assumed that the rate of return 
(interest rate plus 1 percent) was 5 percent in Britain, 6 percent in New England, and 7 percent 
in Catalonia.
Table 9.16 Factor Shares in Cotton Factory System: 
New England, Catalonia and Britain, 1850
share share
rental rate wages capital labour
New England 8,979,000 11,715,143 0.43 037
Catalonia 3,514,685 4,103,504 0.46 034
Britain 2,457,480 7,990,424 0.24 0.76
Average 0.38 0.62
Notes an d  sou rces: Rental rates and w ages are in local currencies. See tex t fo r sources.
The results of all these calculations are presented in the table 9.17.
Table 9.17 Comparative Levels of Productivity in Cotton Factory System: 
New England, Catalonia and Britain, 1850 (New England=100)
Labour
Productivity
Capital
Productivity TFP
a) per employee basis 
New England 100.00 100.00 100.00
Catalonia 52.39 138.38 5532
Britain 83.98 101.91 90.92
b) per hour basis
New England 100.00 100.00 100.00
Catalonia 60.17 158.91 97.37
Britain 102.40 124.27 110.64
Notes an d  so u rces: see text.
Let me first discuss the productivity figures on a per employee basis. New England 
superiority in TFP is based on its higher labour productivity since its capital productivity 
is the lowest. This highest labour productivity is due to the high capital-labour ratio, and 
also the longest working hours. In 1850, the British work-day was limited to 10-hours
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whereas in the U.S. industry the work-day was 11.8 hours.712 It should be appreciated that 
the number of working hours during the year in Catalonia was less than in New England and 
Great Britain. The work-day was slightly shorter in Catalonia than in the United States, 
(11.5 hours per day) but Catalan mills were at a standstill for longer periods than their 
competitors (in Catalonia the yearly days of work were 277 while in New England 310). 
According to contemporaries, these prolonged standstills of the Catalan cotton mills were 
a consequence of a sharp crisis and fluctuations in the home market, delays in the reception 
of spares for machinery, and the longer and drier summers.713 Note that this characteristic 
of the Catalan cotton mills also affected the productivity of capital goods and, obviously, 
the level of inventories.
Moving to the per hour results, where capital and labour are adjusted for working 
hours. The first point to note is that the British cotton industry was the leader in TFP and 
labour productivity. In other words, by 1850 British cotton mills were the most efficient. 
This result completely explains why the British could sell their products in all kinds of 
markets. Second, the TFP gap between the Catalan and New England cotton industries 
practically disappeared. In broad terms, this result is coincident with the evidence presented 
in table 7.10: New England superiority over Catalonia can be explained by the lower price 
of raw materials in New England. This latter result also gives some support for the argument 
that the lack of competitiveness of the Catalan cotton firms in international markets was 
partly explained by the climatic conditions of Catalonia.
Readers familiar with the literature comparing productivity and factor proportions in 
Europe and U.S. could find this result somewhat unexpected.714 Most economic historians 
in their productivity comparisons have been unable to explain why British cotton mills 
dominated the world markets for cotton cloth during the whole nineteenth century. When 
their productivity record was apparently inferior to that o f  U.S. producers. Nevertheless, they 
have paid little attention to the influence of quality-mix on productivity. Most traditional
712 For New England data see Layer (1955) and for British data see Ellison (1968).
713 See Cendd (1968) and Ferrer Vidal (1875).
7,4 See a review of the literature in the recent contribution of Broadberry (1997).
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indicators of output in the cotton industry such as the amount of cloth produced or the 
weight of raw cotton consumed are very imperfect measures of output in this industry.715 All 
these measures implicitly assume that all countries produce the same kind of cloth; in other 
words, there is only one quality of output. Evidently this assumption can lead to unexpected 
results. For example, one country that produces low quality cloth has, ceteris paribus, higher 
productivity than another country that produces high quality cloth. Because the latter needs, 
on average, more inputs (labour and capital) to produce each m2, or kg, of cloth. It was 
argued above that the production o f the finest requires efficient labourforce. In other words, 
countries with higher productivity, ceteris paribus, tend to specialise in the finest qualities. 
A straightforward solution to the problem of different quality-mixes is derived from the 
Translog approach to comparative output measurement. Which is the standard method for 
the international comparisons of industry productivity.716 Obviously, when this method was 
adopted in my calculation of output, the picture changed substantially. The British 
superiority in international markets can be explained by its high productivity.
7.7. Conclusions
This chapter has raised several issues. First, it showed that the choice of technology 
and the quality-mix of the cotton industries were strongly related. Low quality production 
was a consequence of cheap raw materials and the inferiority of the labour force. Whereas 
the contrary holds for the finest qualities. Furthermore, other factors traditionally highlighted 
in the literature, such as the characteristics and size of the home demand, appear to be less 
important in determining the quality-mix and the drift towards best practices.
So far, this chapter has established the sources of the lack of competitiveness of the 
Catalan cotton industry in international markets throughout the whole period in spite of its 
rapid productivity progress. The Catalan cotton industry was not competitive with the British 
industry because of the higher cost of raw materials in Catalonia and Catalan production was
7.5 Note that all PPP measures that assume that unit values can be computed directly (see, for 
example, Broadbeny (1997)) in both countries are strongly biased against high-quality producers.
7.6 See Dean et a l (1996).
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less efficient. However, the New England cotton industry was not more advanced than the 
Catalan industry. U.S. production was less expensive than Catalan production because the 
U.S. cotton mills had access to the cheapest sources of raw materials and energy.
Third, the size of the Catalan cotton textile production in a counterfactual world 
without the Spanish tariffs cannot, of course, be estimated. However, it is likely that without 
tariffs nearly all the Catalan cotton factories would have succumbed to British competition. 
For instance, the price difference between Catalan and British cloth was larger than the total 
cost of labour in Catalonia. So, even reducing wages Catalan firms would have been unable 
to match British prices. A less ambitious Catalan cotton industry, with only a few 
competitive firms, some skilled hand weavers and calico printing firms creating quality* 
differentiated products, and employing foreign (British) yam, might have had lower costs.717 
Without the tariffs the industry might have been more adapted to Catalan and Spanish 
circumstances. Employing a larger and more skilled labourforce and supplying a larger share 
of the home and foreign markets. However, there is no doubt that Spanish consumers would 
have benefited from the elimination of the ban on foreign imports of yam and cloth.
Finally, this chapter could serve to introduce several new questions into the debate 
over the sources of the backwardness of the Mediterranean countries. It is important to 
emphasise that the Mediterranean manufacturing system was closer to the British, and by 
extension to the European model, than to the U.S. model. In other words, Catalan factories 
employed skilled workforce and flexible methods of production. Note that the U.S. model, 
which was based on the use of an unskilled labourforce and the very intensive use of raw 
materials, was not suitable for the Mediterranean circumstances. Since raw materials, which 
were mainly imported, were relatively expensive.718 However, the adoption of a British-type 
cotton industry was not a viable option for Catalonia. Given the higher cost of raw materials 
in Catalonia than in Britain and the unquestionable superiority of the British mills.
717 The examples are Switzerland and Germany in this early period. Both countries maintained 
a local cotton industiy which employed British yam. Note that with this method they were able to 
maintain their local markets, and in the case of Switzerland, to gain some foreign markets.
718 See, on the high cost of raw materials in Italy, Bardini (1997).
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Conclusion
The decision to state my interpretation and to show its main points at the end of the 
study means that, at this point, I have arrived at the end of the story. However, it is easy for 
the author to suppose that their presentation is as clear to others as it is to himself. The 
deviation of the discourse towards different problems and questions may sometimes have 
suggested different directions from those I intended, and the argument may not always have 
been as visible as I would have wished, especially since it has been spread over many 
methodological discussions. Consequently these conclusions will try to set out the main 
claims in a way to try to remove any residual uncertainties and be explicit some of the wider 
implications of the argument.
The objective of this dissertation has been to analyses the main supply-forces behind 
the early industrialisation in Catalonia. I have addressed this task by computing the 
contribution of the different components of the neo-classical production function to modem 
industries' growth. It is perhaps worth repeating at this point that my concern has been to 
establish the relative importance of each input in order to discriminate which was the main 
element for growth, but I never assumed or defended that any input was unnecessary for 
growth or that inputs act independently one from other. In any case, the use of the 
neoclassical growth equation (j.e., the Solovian model) is a convenient means to instil some 
coherence into the large body of evidence concerning the different inputs for growth. 
However, such as many readers probably know, the neo-classical growth equation lets an 
important part of the rate of growth unexplained. Therefore, it would be convenient to 
complement that analysis with a more profound discussion based on the analysis of the
SB
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‘residual’ (i.e., the part of the output growth which cannot be explained by the accumulation 
of inputs). For that reason, in a second part of this study, I analysed the forces shaping the 
‘residual’ by means of four case-studies.
In a nutshell, the computation of the neo-classical growth equation suggest that there 
is a discontinuity in industry growth rates as an outcome of the increase in total factor 
productivity in a span of years. Neither capital accumulation, nor the transference of labour 
within manufacturing appears to be so important as productivity growth. Note that the 
increase in productivity growth rates was accompanied by a relevant increase in the quality 
of the industrial production. However, as shown in chapter 2, the large output growth rates 
of the modem sectors, which were mainly a result o f these productivity shift, produced wide 
effects on the Catalan economy but narrower effects on the whole Spain. In other words, the 
increase of the efficiency level in the modem industries was not translated into a process of 
'take-off at national level. Consequently, during this early period, industrialisation remained 
as a regional phenomena, which did not ensure a shift at national level towards sustained 
growth rates.
In the second part of the dissertation, I offered evidence that this increase in 
efficiency was the consequence of the development of new business institutions. Therefore, 
the transition from the decentralised forms of production (the artisanal shops and the putting- 
out system) to the centralised forms of production (the non-mechanised and mechanised 
factories) was a major ingredient in Catalan early industrialisation. The presence of these 
large establishments explains the higher productivity of Catalonia, when compared to other 
Spanish regions. Furthermore, the evidence presented above supports the hypothesis that 
factor endowments associated with scale economies explains the presence of these large 
establishments in Catalonia, The localization patterns of large industries are positively 
correlated with the density of population, which was probably the result of some precocious 
agricultural transformation. Obviously, this result is more consistent with the standard neo­
classical Heckser-Ohlin model than other historical explanations based on entrepreneurial 
failure or institutional constraints to growth.
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The Catalan economy was also characterised by the fast adoption of foreign 
technologies. The presence of a large human capital stock, which was mainly the result of 
the children's informal education which took place in the workplace rather than in the 
schoolroom, allowed Catalan industrial firms to adopt and modify new technologies. 
Moreover, the high levels of protection of certain industries, more prominently the cotton 
industry, made possible the adoption of technologies that were not at first sight especially 
adequate to the Catalan factor endowments. For instance, the climatic conditions, the higher 
cost of coal and raw cotton in Catalonia made impossible for Catalan cotton industry to 
become competitive in foreign markets.
Scholars who regard industrialisation as synonym of the adoption of British 
machinery can argue, then, that protection was at the roots of the early Catalan 
industrialisation. Viewed from this angle, the misallocation o f resources which was triggered 
by tariff policy is less significative than the dynamic gains which were obtained with the 
development of a mechanised cotton industry. However, as I noted in chapter 9, the 
development of the cotton industry damaged other industries, such as mixed fabrics textiles, 
which were more adapted to Catalan factor endowments. It is also doubtful that the dynamic 
effects of the protection of cotton industry were larger than those which would have been 
derived from the development of other industries. At the beginning, these industries were 
apparently less sophisticated than the cotton industry but in many ways they were more 
appropriate to the Catalan and Spanish conditions. Moreover, it should be considered that 
scale economies not only available in mechanised industries but also in the nonmechanised 
ones since centralised plants began to displace decentralised units-of-production even before 
the widespread diffusion of the water and steam-driven machinery.
This explanation of the process of early industrialisation in Catalonia is based on a 
reappraisal of the role of local and disembodied innovation (i.e., the innovation which is not 
embodied in the design of new machinery) in the process of industry growth. Other sources 
for growth, like the accumulation of capital and labour or the transference of foreign 
technology in the form of machinery, have their place in the story, but only within the 
context of impulses emanating from the local transformations. Explanations which assign
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a leading role to the transference of British technology to the Continent do, of course, exist 
already; but as I will suggest, the most influential of these are seriously weakened by the 
excessive emphasis placed on the influence of the British model in the development of the 
followers. Moreover this perspective fails to incorporate much of the recent research on 
British and European economic history, and tends to assume rather to establish connections 
between the export of British machinery and the local processes of development. In this 
case, as it is frequent in the historiography on the European industrialisation, the literature 
has been shaped by assumptions about the role of capital in economic growth.
The interpretation of the new evidence suggest that conventional approaches to early 
industrialisation in the regions of Europe need to be reconsidered. In particular, it is 
necessary to recognise the fact that economic growth was not simply the consequence of the 
accumulation of capital, trade barriers to British competition or the imitation of the British 
model. Factor endowments and market forces, specially those connected with the 
development of new business institutions and new products and processes, were far more 
important and independent than standard texts of economic history have tended to allow. 
Identifying the changes in business institutions produced by the market forces establishes, 
in principle, the crucial connection between the local conditions and factor endowments and 
industrialisation, and hence offers a way of overcoming one o f the difficulties faced by the 
traditional interpretations of the processes of industrialisation. By restating the main themes 
of the early industrialisation in Europe and more particularly Spain, in these terms, it 
becomes possible to offer an alternative explanation of the fact that early industrialisation 
was not a wide-ranging process.
I believe that the case study I have presented has sufficient coherence and enough 
evidence to merit serious consideration, and I hope that it will carry forward the study of 
the subject in a constructive manner. Simultaneously, I am quite aware that the new 
evidence opens lines of research rather than closes them: the relationship between the 
demography and the scale economies of the industry, the consequences of the reduction of 
the transport cost in industry efficiency, the relation between industry and agriculture, the 
long-term effects of the barriers to free competition all of these are large topics that invite
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further study. Whatever judgement is made of this particular interpretation, however, I hope 
that I have succeeded for integrating the analysis o f Catalan industrialisation in the new 
debates on European economic history. Anyhow, evidence of intention is no indication of 
the result of an enterprise, which must properly left to the judgement of others.
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